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Over the last two decades, China and Hong Kong have 
been testing grounds for protest movements in rural 
and urban settings. As a result of the changing socio-
economic landscape, the building of a legal state and 
globalisation, Chinese on the mainland are increasingly 
defending their rights and local interests. Likewise, in 
Hong Kong, with the change of sovereignty from British 
colonial rule to Chinese rule, Hong Kong Chinese have 
become politically active and willing to protest for their 
freedom and interests. 
Social Movements in China and Hong Kong: The Expansion 
of Protest Space provides a comprehensive view, from 
multi-disciplinary perspectives, of economic issues 
such as labour rights, labour unions, anti-globalisation, 
individual entrepreneurship and the law; and those that 
concern cultural, religious and gender matters that are 
considered pertinent by the citizens in mainland China 
and Hong Kong and hence worthy of their protest actions, 
despite the inherent risks. Such actions have resulted in 
the expansion of protest space.
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1 Framing Social Movements in Contemporary
China and Hong Kong
Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce & Gilles Guiheux
Introduction
Since 1979, economic reforms have led to a radical transformation of
Chinese society. At the time of the planned economy, individual lives
were being taken care of, and the citizens did not have to worry about
their present and future livelihood, over which they did not have much
influence anyway. Jobs, accommodation, education and health care
were provided by the State or State-related institutions. Besides, society
was almost static as social status was quasi-inherited from one genera-
tion to another and jointly decided by political factors and the position
of the individual in the production system. It was considered, and sta-
ted in the Chinese constitution as such, that the People’s Republic of
China was ‘based on the alliance of workers and peasants’.
Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation together with the progres-
sive institutionalisation of a market economy has put the society back
on the move. Chinese society is now fluid. Individuals are free to move
from one location to another, and although the hukou system control-
ling population movement is still in place, it has been largely eroded.
Masses of people have moved from the interior to the coastal cities in
search of employment, resulting in a large floating population. Follow-
ing Deng Xiaoping’s tour of the south in 1992 and the relaunching of
the economic reforms, civil servants and Party members have turned
into entrepreneurs, with some of them becoming incredibly wealthy.
On the other hand, some have experienced downward social mobility.
Massive lay-offs started in the middle of the 1990s in the State sector,
and many workers in their 40s or 50s without qualifications, especially
women, were not able to find new jobs. Pensioners have also greatly
suffered, living on very small allowances. Since we moved into the
twenty-first century, Chinese society has become more diverse, and so-
ciologists have been working on producing adequate tools to analyse
mobility. One attempt to produce a comprehensive analysis of the new
social stratification was published in 2002 and identified ten different
strata on the basis of three types of capital: social or organisation capi-
tal, economic capital and cultural capital (Lu 2002), ranking the leaders
of State institutions at the top and the unemployed at the bottom of
the social status ladder.
Individuals are freer to move socially and geographically. Paradoxi-
cally, the individualisation of society goes hand in hand with the collec-
tive movements that emerged as a result of individual wants. As wit-
nessed in recent years, farmers are protesting against local govern-
ments and excessive fees; urban residents are opposing evictions from
houses that are being torn down; migrant workers are asking for long
overdue salary payments; activists are organising themselves to protect
the environment; and women are fighting for their rights. At local le-
vels, ordinary people (laobaixing) are taking a growing interest in orga-
nising themselves, sometimes with the help of lawyers or the support
of non-governmental organisations, and fighting for various social or
economic causes. We are not only talking about violent upheavals, but
more generally of a growing capacity of certain groups in society to
make their voices heard. The political leadership is conscious of the
risks of social instability and has been promoting a more ‘harmonious
society’ (hexie shehui) since 2003. Although past Chinese Presidents,
Deng Xiaoping (1979-1989) and Jiang Zemin (1989-2002), were eager
to promote economic growth at the cost of increasing inequalities, the
current national leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, in power since
2002-2003, have repeatedly underlined that China needs more than
steady economic growth, it is also time to pay attention to the distribu-
tion of wealth. Growth should be more balanced, socially and environ-
mentally.
How should we understand these two simultaneous processes: the
individualisation of society on the one hand, and the emergence of col-
lective action on the other? The starting point of this book is the ac-
knowledgement that individuals have to rely on their own efforts for
their wellbeing and are freer from the constraints of the State, while in
some circumstances, they gather together to defend their interests. The
Chinese society is said to be individualistic, yet at the same time, peo-
ple are willing to be involved in collective forms of action. This was re-
cently illustrated by the reactions to the Sichuan earthquake (May
2008). The catastrophe led to an impressive movement of solidarity
coming from all parts of Chinese society. This is evidence that we are
witnessing the emergence of more individualised Chinese subjects and
a new social fabric.
One of the main hypotheses of this book is that there are not only
internal factors leading to the emergence of collective forms of action,
but also external ones. One of the original features of the Chinese de-
velopment path in the last quarter of a century is indeed the high level
of internationalisation of the country (Zweig 2002b): capital, goods,
services, ideas and people have been increasingly flowing across the
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Chinese boundaries, thereby increasing the share of transnational ex-
changes. That is why we have chosen to encompass Hong Kong in our
study. The links between the mainland and Hong Kong are various
and intense. The two economies have integrated over the last twenty
years, most Hong Kong industries having migrated over the border to
Guangdong province, with Hong Kong becoming a service-only econo-
my. Now that capital and goods flow freely across the border, Hong
Kong entrepreneurs have become major economic actors, not only in
the nearby province but all over the country; Hong Kong developers,
for instance, are taking a major part in the reshaping of Chinese large
cities. The land border between Hong Kong and Shenzhen is one of
the busiest in the world, with several tens of thousands of people tra-
velling back and forth across the checkpoints daily, most via train, bus
and ferry for work, school and pleasure. Hong Kongers cross the bor-
der to survey their factories and take advantage of lower costs; mainlan-
ders come to Hong Kong to learn the rules of capitalist economies and
societies and to enjoy quality services at a high price. In this process,
and facing vivid competition from other mainland cities, Hong Kong is
less the gateway to China for foreigners that it used to be and more the
door to the outside world for mainlanders. The growing number of stu-
dents and professors coming from the mainland to study and work in
Hong Kong tertiary education institutions is an example of the growing
intellectual flows between the two territories. Of course, the increase of
economic, social and intellectual flows across the border have been
greatly enhanced by the hand-over of the former colonial territory to
Beijing in July 1997; since then, Hong Kong has become (together
with Macao in December 1999) a ‘special administrative region’ (SAR)
of the People’s Republic of China. For fifty years, Hong Kong will keep
a distinct economic – capitalist, legal, common law, and political, with
partially elected representatives – system inherited from the colonial
era.
The intensity of Hong Kong-China link is only comparable to those
between the mainland and Taiwan. Like in the Hong Kong case, Tai-
wan’s economy is largely integrated with the mainland, notably Fujian,
Zhejiang and the Shanghai region. There are large flows of people as
well, but until the recent election of Ma Ying-jeou as President of the
Republic of China (March 2008), who is willing to improve the rela-
tions with the mainland, these flows have been almost exclusively from
Taiwan to the mainland, involving mostly businessmen and salarymen
(and their families) working on the other side of the strait. Taiwan and
the mainland are two politically separate entities, and there have been
many hurdles to the deepening of people-to-people relationships. The
democratisation of the island’s political institutions that started in 1987
have been largely driving Taiwan, the only Chinese democracy in the
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world, away from the mainland; it has greatly contributed to the emer-
gence of a Taiwanese political and cultural identity. Besides, the ethnic
divide between the Taiwanese – Chinese immigrants who mostly ar-
rived on the island in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – and
the mainlanders – those who arrived in 1949-1950 following Chiang
Kai-shek’s defeat in the civil war – is a unique feature of the Taiwanese
society. The democratisation process, the ethnic divide and the uncer-
tainties over the future relations across the Taiwan Strait explain why
this book is not addressing the issue of Taiwan-mainland China inter-
locking relationship.
Comparatively, the hand-over of Hong Kong has never been debated
as such, and the future of the SAR is irremediably linked to the main-
land, major decisions being actually made in Beijing. The central gov-
ernment carefully scrutinises Hong Kong and its evolution because
what is happening in the territory has an impact across the border. Be-
cause of Hong Kong’s special status, the Beijing authorities cannot
foresee what could happen one day across the border. Since the return
of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China in 1997, the SAR has been ruled
under the Basic Law. For a variety of reasons ranging from anxiety
about the local economy, discontent with the Chief Executive leader-
ship (Tung Chee-hwa from 1997 to 2005 and Donald Tsang ever since)
to a sense of urgency for political reform, Hong Kong people have been
increasingly politically conscious and active. On July 1st 2003, the lar-
gest protest ever seen in Hong Kong since the 1997 handover drew
500,000 marchers to oppose an anti-subversion law (abiding to Article
23 of the Basic Law). In the aftermath, two cabinet members resigned,
and the bill was withdrawn after it became clear that it would not get
the necessary support from the Legislative Council for it to be passed.
The introduction of the Article 23 legislation has since been shelved in-
definitely. As a consequence, the July 1st marches have been held every
year as a means to demand democracy, universal suffrage, rights of
minorities and a variety of other political concerns. In Hong Kong, be-
sides calls for the hastening of the democratisation process, which in-
cludes universal suffrage, activists are calling for awareness of other is-
sues such as environmental and heritage protection, or the implemen-
tation of a minimum wage law. Many of these movements are gaining
rapid momentum and will become forces to be reckoned with in the
near future.
One of the main hypotheses of all the contributors in this volume is
that the integration of Hong Kong into China, and the integration of
China into the global economy, has some consequences for the ability
of people to mobilise and organise in the fight for their interests. Hong
Kong and Chinese citizens are becoming more aware of the political
dynamics of the world stage, and the dismantling of the old economic
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and social order and its replacement by a new one, governed by the
sole search for individual gains, is bringing to China new social dy-
namics. Parts of China, the mainland and Hong Kong are emerging as
important physical spaces for social movements.
Bringing together papers on both mainland China and Hong Kong
is heuristic for several reasons. First, if China is gradually becoming a
social class-based society, social scientists have agreed for a long time
that Hong Kong already is a social class-based society. So the question
of the evolving relations between state and society will be addressed in
a Chinese society returning to social class stratification in one case,
and in a Hong Kong society where income inequalities are growing
fast. Second, fruitful comparative analysis is also possible on the issue
of the institutionalisation of social claims, or how protestors mobilise
the law. In the Hong Kong case, the rule of law has provided institutio-
nalised channels for the members of the society to make their voices
heard for a long time; social activism in Hong Kong started in the
1970s, long before the latest British Governor Chris Pattern started to
democratise political institutions (Lam 2004). For several decades, as-
sociations, unions, and political parties have been using the law as a
weapon. In China, the socio-economic transformations have led to a re-
framing of social interactions. The commodification of resources, allo-
cated through markets, has led to an increasing contractualisation of
relations. Relationships between landlords and tenants, employers and
employees, producers and suppliers, etc. are governed by a new system
of formal contracts. That explains the extensive production of laws and
legal regulations since 1979 and the rapid development of the legal
professions such as lawyers and judges. This has led to an increasing
awareness of legal rights among all kinds of people who may mobilise
the law to protect their rights. Third, comparisons can be drawn be-
tween the issue of globalisation and its impact on the understanding of
social movements. Hong Kong is a society that is highly integrated into
global flows, which explains for instance why the city was chosen as
the location for the sixth World Trade Organisation Ministerial Confer-
ence (December 2005); this was a unique opportunity for local activists
to put Hong Kong on the global map. A comparison should be made
with another event that took place in China a decade earlier, in Septem-
ber 1995: the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing,
gathering representatives from almost two hundred countries. In both
cases, we will try to assert how local forces have been shaped by their
exposure to the international arena.
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Understanding Social Movements
Social movements could be categorised into 1) conventional social
movements based on the Marxist line of class differentiation and eco-
nomic materialism, and 2) the new social movements that Calhoun ar-
gues are the characteristics of the contemporary post-industrial and
post-modern world. Trade unions and other labour groups that fought
for the labouring classes organised many of the earlier social move-
ments. To Melucci, social movements are ‘action systems in that they
have structures’ (Melucci 1985: 793). Here, social movement is viewed
as ‘a form of collective action a) based on solidarity, b) carrying on a
conflict, c) breaking the limits of the system in which action occurs’
(Melucci 1985: 795).
The emergence of ‘“new social movements” in a post-modern and
post-industrial world worked outside of formal institutional channels
and emphasised lifestyle, ethical, or “identity” concerns rather than
narrowly economic goals’ (Calhoun 1995: 173). Many of the new social
movements were seen to be associated ‘with the counterculture, the
search for “alternative” forms of social and cultural life’ (Touraine 1985:
749). Touraine argues that social movements ‘should be conceived as a
special type of social conflict’ (Touraine 1985: 750) that revolves around
‘the social control of the main cultural patterns’ (Touraine 1985: 754).
One key factor for the emergence of the new social movements is
the rise of the middle class, where the focus is on individualised non-
economic needs. As such, they are seen as defending ‘specific spheres
of life’, and those committed to defending various aspects of life
choices are less likely to succumb to pressure for change (Calhoun
1995: 184). Many of these movements focus on people with a minority
banner, as well as being sociocultural in orientation (Touraine 1985:
780). Likewise, they are seen as a way for people to exert their own
power and attempt to free themselves from state power (Touraine 1985:
776). Others argue for the rise of a new middle class, people who are
professionals but have flexible time schedules, which allow for such ac-
tions to take place. At the same time, there are a small group of the
old middle class, as well as those in marginal positions but with time
to spare for such actions, such as housewives, unemployed workers,
students and retirees (Offe 1985: 832). Because of their penetrative in-
fluence on the various social groups in a society, the new social move-
ments inevitably have the power to politicise those who converted to
the causes expounded by these movements.
Calhoun, together with other scholars like Melucci, looked at various
movements such as ‘feminism, the ecology movement or “greens”, the
peace movement, and the youth movement, (…) the gay movement, the
animal rights movement, and the anti-abortion and pro-choice move-
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ments’, as well as at the emerging new social movements which tackle
new issues, use new tactics and appeal to new groups of people within
the nation-state and the world (Calhoun 1995: 173). These new social
movements are a contrast to what he sees as the class-based and eco-
nomically oriented kinds of movements, such as the labour movements
of the early nineteenth century (Calhoun 1995: 173). For Calhoun, these
new social movements are concerned with ‘identity politics’, where the
actions involved in the movements are construed not as a means to an
end but as ends in themselves. In short, these movements are self-ful-
filling (Calhoun 1995: 175). This is so because they deal with issues,
concerns and values of the prevailing situation of the time (Offe 1985:
820). At the same time, their mode of operation begs to differ with the
traditional social movements. The new social movements are alterna-
tive in their operation modus – they are individualistic and eclectic, to
say the least. The movements attract individuals, with the more vocal
ones becoming the spokespersons for the actions, and rely primarily
on donations (Offe 1985: 829). It is argued that the participants in
these new movements are ‘class-aware’ instead of ‘class-conscious’
(Offe 1985: 833). Their actions are seen as legitimate and recognised by
the society, able to galvanise the community at large for their causes
(Offe 1985: 826).
Both types of movements have created an expanded socio-political
space and have enhanced the voices and visibility of those who partici-
pate in them. In this sense, the new social movements go beyond bu-
reaucratic boundaries and seek to address a civil society that does not
depend on bureaucratic regulations and controls (Offe 1985: 820).
They are seen as rooted in ‘free spaces’, enabling protesters to move
out of their subordinate positions and to collectivise and build up their
arsenals of resistance (Polletta 1999: 6).
Chinese State and the Expanding Protest Spaces
As China and Hong Kong inch their way into the twenty-first century,
we are more likely to see social activism flourishing, with an increased
number of social movements, both on a large and small scale, demand-
ing social participation and involvement in various causes that affect
personal lives and the common good of the people and the nation. In
this book, we are paying attention to voices from various social strata
of the Chinese population who are now embracing sets of social values
that differ from those of the old Communist state and ideology. These
voices are contributing to the reshaping of an ideological stage marked
by confusion and chaos – since there is still the communist morality
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on one side and naked self-interest on the other, with various proposals
in between.
We could consider that these social forms are revealing a struggle be-
tween competitive economic and social forces as has been observed in
other industrialised societies, as if they are the signal of a return to (or
another emergence of) the old form of class struggle that advocated re-
volution and overthrowing the existing regime, or at least questioning
the main social and political orientations of mainland Chinese and
Hong Kong society and fighting for general socio-economic and socio-
political improvements. Another perspective would be to consider that
we are witnessing societal movements, as conceptualised by Touraine,
that is to say individualised movements that emerge to defend the
rights of specific categories of people asking for individual autonomy
and rights. These are the main questions we intend to address through
papers based on first-hand empirical studies. Our aim is to look at
what is going on at the grassroots level and analyse these evolutions in
the framework of the Chinese historical trajectory.
All contributors to this book share the view that there is no reason to
believe that socio-political change in China should resemble the experi-
ence of the West. As R. Bin Wong (1997) has argued, China and Eur-
ope have historically followed different paths. In Europe, the state had
to compete and negotiate with other political actors: aristocracies (with
their own land resources and military men under their control), the
Church and the urban elites. This configuration led to legal systems
that affirmed the rights of individuals and estates. In the European
case, constructing state power meant acknowledging an increasingly
well-defined boundary between what the central state could do and
what lay beyond its powers. The formation of this boundary between
the centralising state administrations and society at large is basic to
European ideas about ‘civil society’. The creation of the modern state
and civil society were parts of a common process defining a particular
construction of state-society relations in which sharp lines could be
drawn between state and society (Wong 1997: 87). On the contrary, in
Imperial China, there was no challenge to the Emperor by elites with
independent bases of authority, nor were there municipal elites with
claims to urban autonomy. There were no institutionalised separate so-
cial classes and estates, and no clear boundaries limiting state authority
and power. Local elites were incorporated into the bureaucratic system
as officials “relied on local elites to help them implement a common
agenda for promoting domestic order, an agenda that included social
persuasion, surveillance and welfare” (Wong 1997: 94). One of the
main tasks of the Chinese State was monitoring and controlling the do-
mestic population; that is, maintaining domestic order in rural areas
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was the main challenge, the main threat coming not from the city as
in Europe, but from the countryside.
Today’s Chinese societal evolution is indeed very different from what
is happening in many mature western societies. In the United States
for instance, Robert D. Putman (2000) has argued that the entire spec-
trum of social connectedness in interpersonal, civil and social life is
eroding. He is drawing a picture of an American society, on levels from
family to nation, which has become, over four decades, atomised and
lacking in social capital for investment in societal betterment. Accord-
ing to his (contested) analysis, the American society has become a frag-
mented one where the integrating and mobilising institutions have de-
cayed. In China, the erosion of society was not the consequence of a
declining level of involvement into social activism over generations but
of deliberate action from the State and the Party that forbade autono-
my. Whereas in the West we are witnessing the breaking of society, in
China, the society has still to be produced. What is at stake here are
not the threats that hang over an already institutionalised society but
the hurdles that may jeopardise the production of a society yet to come
(Shen 2007).
Social movements in China are still at the nascent stage, and with
the gradual opening up of China to the world, it is inevitable that they
will start to challenge the once rigid Communist structures as well as
to push the comfort zone of the central, regional and local govern-
ments. Increasingly and irrespective of whether the protest movements
are well organised and large in size or small and sporadic, they have
come to dot the urban and rural landscapes. Since the large-scale Falun
Gong gathering around Zhongnanhai on 25 April 1999, ten years after
the Tiananmen Massacre on 4 June 1989, to small groups of parents
protesting against the kidnapping of their children to work in the coal
mines in northern China, and to recent protests by parents about
tainted milk powder and milk products, protests have come in a steady
stream. What do these social movements represent in the Chinese con-
text and what has been achieved as a result of these protests? Irrespec-
tive of whether we are witnessing rural folk with little education or ur-
banites with a more cosmopolitan outlook, the scenes are the same.
They all come in groups to protest against what they regarded as cor-
rupt practices and moral conundrum of those who abuse their power.
In all these protests, the individuals and the groups have found voices
and the strength to express and actualise their dissatisfaction and de-
mand their rights amidst continued fears of persecution by local, regio-
nal and central governments. Unlike in the past where protests were
not condoned and those involved routinely imprisoned for social dis-
ruption and attempting to usurp authorities, the last two decades have
witnessed a changing political response to some of these protests. In
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rural areas, protest movements against local government have resulted
in the emerging process of democratisation in the villages in China,
leading to the formulation of representative assembly and village citi-
zenship. Likewise, the recent events pertaining to corrupt official prac-
tices, tainted milk powder, kidnapping of children, etc. that led to expo-
sure in the media, have led to swift actions on the part of the central
government, culminating in the arrests of those culprits involved in
these activities. In addition, the government officials were also putting
in measures to allay fears of these protesters and provide various ac-
tions, including medical treatment of children with kidney stones as a
result of the consumption of tainted milk powder. In responding to
such protests, the central government is attempting to portray itself as
a caring government that is concerned about the welfare of its citizens.
It is also attempting to project its administration as having the final
control of the situation and of its ability to manage and contain pro-
tests of all scales.
In this sense, it is possible to argue that the emergence of a civil so-
ciety is gradually gaining ground on the mainland, although its long-
term future continues to be very much dependent on the attitude of
the central government. At present, the central government under the
leadership of Hu and Wen is likely to allow protests to take place as
long as they do not rock the political stability of the country and chal-
lenge the political rule of these leaders. This political allowance is sig-
nificant as China continues its march towards globalisation and its at-
tempts to join the world leadership elites and to gain their acceptance.
It is also an important signal to the global community that it is pre-
pared to give limited concessions in the areas of political freedom, free-
dom of expression and human rights. Such acts could also be used as
leverages in their political dialogue and trade talks with the developed
nations, and it is plausible to argue that as the political leadership of
China becomes more confident of itself, it is more willing to free up
small spaces for its citizens to engage in protest actions within a man-
aged framework.
In protest actions and movements taking place both on the mainland
and in Hong Kong, it is possible to maintain that such developments
have enabled the Chinese citizens to understand the role of the indivi-
duals and groups in expressing and actualising their voices. It has en-
abled both societies to expand their protest spaces. Hong Kong and
mainland Chinese political activism and protest movements could help
us to reconceptualise participation and citizenship. Our analysis con-
nects with approaches that aim to bridge the gap between citizen and
the state by recasting citizenship as practised rather than as given.
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Citizenship has traditionally been cast in liberal terms, as indivi-
dual legal equality accompanied by a set of rights and responsi-
bilities and bestowed by a State on its citizens (...). Placing an
emphasis on inclusive participation as the very foundation of
democratic practice, these approaches suggest a more active no-
tion of citizenship – one which recognises the agency of citizens
as “makers and shapers” rather than as “users and choosers” of
interventions of services designed by others. (Hickey & Mohan
2004: 29)
Under a still authoritarian form of government, and though there is no
free democratic public space, Chinese citizens have become the active
creators of new social and economical rights, hence enlarging their so-
cio-political and protest spaces.
Outline of the Book
This book is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on state-
society relationships; chapters investigate how Chinese citizens, either
on the mainland or in Hong Kong, make use of or contest existing po-
litical institutions at the local, national or international levels; authors
consider how protests may lead to some sort of evolution in the politi-
cal arena. The second part deals with the individuals at work; contribu-
tions look at how recent economic transformations are changing work-
ing conditions and how workers react. In the third and final part, the
chapters deal with the most intimate and private dimensions of an in-
dividual: gender identity and religious beliefs and practices. In so
doing, though not being absolutely comprehensive, we aim at covering
the political, the economically productive and the private dimensions
of people’s lives in both Hong Kong and on the mainland.
Part 1 concerns the issues of citizenship, rights and identity. In
Chapter 2, He explores social protests and their impact through key in-
stitutions of village democracy such as electoral rule, village citizen-
ship, and village representative assembly. He focuses on the democratic
function of social protests, addressing the essential question of how
disruptive social events can be turned into a positive constructive force.
The chapter draws on ten years of research, conducted between 1993
and 2003. While it is not easy to discuss how widespread the phenom-
enon is likely to be, the story he tells indicates a new trend that is sig-
nificant for the democratisation of rural China.
In Chapter 3, Ma discusses the evolution of social movements in
Hong Kong from the early colonial era to the post-handover period.
Hong Kong has been regarded as a minimally integrated system with
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weak links between state and society. However, years of development of
social movement and civil society since the 1970s mean that civil so-
ciety, by actively demanding social and political reforms, has been in-
creasingly influential during the political transition and after the hand-
over. This chapter shows that, with weak horizontal links between civil
society organisations (CSOs), relatively weak organisational resources,
and weak linkage between civil society and political society, the CSOs
in Hong Kong have opted for more ad hoc organisational forms since
1997, and that this is not conducive to an accumulation of resources
and experience for such movements.
In Chapter 4, Chen explores the relationship between social move-
ments and the law in post-colonial Hong Kong society. By Western and
international standards, social movements in Hong Kong are relatively
few, weak, of small scale and of limited duration. However, Hong Kong
does provide an interesting case study of the relationship between law
and social movements. This chapter shows that theories of law and so-
cial movements developed by scholars on the basis of Western experi-
ence are by no means irrelevant to Hong Kong. The Hong Kong ex-
perience vividly demonstrates how the law can both constrain and sup-
port social movements, and how it can become a stage on which the
mass media and members of the public focus their attention as the
rights claims of social movement actors and organisations are fought
out. Since 1997, the life of the law has apparently been strengthened
by the coming into force of the Basic Law and the increasingly activist
role of the Hong Kong judiciary in handling important issues of public
policy. Social movements have begun to exploit the law and the legal
system for the purpose of challenging government policies, or at least
to make their claims highly visible.
Kuah-Pearce, in chapter 5, uses the Anti-Globalisation Movement in
Hong Kong as a case study to explore Hong Kong as an emerging glo-
balising protest space. As China marched into the twenty-first century,
with an emergent consciousness of issues pertaining to rights and free-
doms, there emerged in Hong Kong various forms of protest move-
ments both in the rural and urban areas. Hong Kong, despite being a
part of Greater China, continues to function as a great metropolis with
Western and capitalist characteristics as it was under British colonial-
ism. Perhaps because of its link with the colonial past and its current
political status, political apathy has given way to a threefold jump into
political consciousness, with various factions clamouring for political
participation, expressing and demanding that various types of rights be
put into the governmental structure of post-colonial Hong Kong. The
result has been an emerging protest space for the Hong Kong people
to exercise their emerging consciousness. Likewise, in this push for
better representation, Hong Kong has gradually emerged as a globalis-
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ing protest space, with the Anti-Globalisation Movement a testimony to
this. This chapter explores how this emerging globalising protest space
is being used to send strong political messages to the world, as well as
to the mainland Chinese government.
Part 2 of the book examines the relationship between economic
transformation and unrest and self-assertion in the China-Hong Kong
polity. Rocca, in Chapter 6, examines the resistance of the ‘old working
class’ in capitalist China. In contemporary China, new power relations
lead to a particular mode of administration of conflicts called ‘social
management’. The authorities have set up procedures in order to pre-
vent and/or to forestall protest movements. The objective is to ritualise
dissatisfaction in order to channel protest. This way of dealing with
conflicts is built on a common will of preserving the organic ties char-
acteristic of socialist labour. On the one hand, workers do intend to
maintain close relationships with local officials, and use socialist rheto-
ric. On the other hand, the authorities aim at avoiding any form of glo-
bal repression that could result in the social marginalisation of the
group.
In Chapter 7, Guiheux examines, through the voice of a private en-
trepreneur, the extent to which social movements are constrained by
ideological arrangements. In mainland China, there is an increasing
number of social actors who are taking part in the definition of the
new social, economic and ideological order. This is partly due to the
fact that the Chinese Communist Party is actively recruiting the win-
ners in the economic reform, reaching out and co-opting newly emerg-
ing social elites, in particular the professional and technical elites and
private entrepreneurs. In this chapter, we look at one social actor, a
private businessman, who is not, strictly speaking, a member of the
state apparatus (though he is close to it), and whose discourse contri-
butes to the drawing up of forms of legitimisation for the present so-
cial and economic order. The use of a rhetoric simultaneously moder-
nist, socialist and Confucian reflects the opportunism of the man him-
self and reveals the mixing and matching of values that characterises
China today.
In Chapter 8, Froissart studies social movements among migrant
workers on the mainland. Social movements among migrant workers
in China emerged due to the contradictions of the State, which wanted
to preserve social order without consenting to core political reforms.
Migrants’ autonomy was at first encouraged by the central government,
urging state organisations to protect migrants’ legal rights and to settle
their conflicts according to the law. This legal procedure fostered indivi-
dualisation while maintaining conflicts in the private sphere. However,
this phase allowed migrants to fully experience their disempowerment
and the failings of the system. New forms of mediation and representa-
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tion, such as NGOs, have emerged. These organisations are now lobby-
ing political power in the name of the migrants to promote new social
and political values, and are also helping migrant workers in their
everyday lives. However, these organisations are also working for the
benefit of the party-state to which they adhere, minimising social con-
flicts and orienting reforms in a direction that can help the Party to
maintain its power.
In Chapter 9, Chan examines grassroots labour activism and politi-
cal participation in post-colonial Hong Kong under Chinese rule. He
examines trends and noteworthy dimensions of labour inputs into
Hong Kong’s electoral campaigns, civil society outbursts and democra-
tisation debates over the past decade under Chinese sovereignty. Hope-
fully, this essay may add to the ongoing discourse on the class line as
an increasingly crucial socio-economic cleavage in Hong Kong’s social
mobilisation and party-electoral politics. The great socio-economic ur-
gency and overriding political concerns vis-a`-vis Beijing have become
the two very significant forces in reshaping Hong Kong labour activism
since 1997. A politicisation of organised labour, together with civil ser-
vant unrest and the intensification of labour militancy over rice bowl is-
sues in an ongoing restructuring process have, so far, characterised the
HKSAR labour scene.
In Chapter 10, Ng and Ip look at the changing posture of trade un-
ions in Hong Kong, as the society has gone through a hectic transition
during the last two and a half decades. In retrospect, organised labour
had become self-effacing and even docile for almost three decades in
post-war Hong Kong, for a plurality of reasons that have been well
documented in the literature. However, the momentous impetus of the
political transition of the 1997 ‘dateline’, plus the re-structuring of
Hong Kong’s economy and industry because of the new ‘paradigm’ cre-
ated by China’s marketisation reforms, have precipitated far-reaching
changes in the structure, power base, strategy and policies of Hong
Kong’s labour unions and their movement. In this context, Hong Kong
trade unions and labour organisations are evolving towards a presence
at the level of the neighbourhood community, outside the conventional
‘industrial jurisdiction’ of workers’ combinations.
Part 3 explores the issues surrounding the emergence of social and
religious activism. Chapter 11 examines the gender dimension and ex-
plores the development of Chinese women’s social movements. This
chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part of the chapter,
Milwertz and Bu describe the emergence and development of popular
feminist organising in Beijing since the mid-1980s as one element of
the new reform period of the Chinese women’s movement, and dis-
cusses the relationship between such organising and the state. The sec-
ond part shows how activists have gradually broadened the scope of the
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modes of communication that they employ. She discusses the use of
mainstream and alternative media in a politically restrictive context, ar-
guing that, when activists use radical and alternative media for public
consciousness-raising, it may sometimes help democratise the commu-
nication process. She argues that the success of the activists’ endeavour
to transform society may lie in these kinds of participatory processes,
which may then lead to the widespread generation of emancipatory
knowledge that challenges the dominant, inequitable gender order.
In Chapter 12, Leung examines the role of the Hong Kong Catholic
Church in initiating the movement of resistance to the Chinese govern-
ment. From the beginning of the colonial period, the Hong Kong
Catholic Church played a ‘framing’ role, helping the colonial govern-
ment to stabilise the society. The return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule
in 1997 turned the tide of this Church-state relationship. With an ideo-
logical incompatibility between religious belief and Communism, the
suppression of religion in China legitimised HKSAR Catholics’ fears of
Beijing’s repressive religious policy. Following this, the proposal to leg-
islate Article 23 of the Basic Law led to the Catholic Church taking a
prominent role in framing the political protests. Bishop Joseph Zen led
the Hong Kong Catholics to take up resistance. Paradoxically, the an-
nulment of the legislation of Article 23 has redeemed the prestige of
HKSAR as a metropolitan city where the HKSAR government, since
the return of sovereignty, has been subjected to much criticism for
their various actions. In other words, it is the Hong Kong Catholic
Church, with its global vision, that has played a framing role to pre-
serve the dynamics of Hong Kong as a metropolitan city.
In Chapter 13, Palmer examines how temple revivals and the qigong
movement, though very different from each other, represent two ends
of the wide spectrum of Chinese popular religiosity. Neither clearly fits
conventional definitions of ‘religion’, nor does either fit conventional
definitions of social movement. But applying the concept of social
movement is useful to help us derive models of social agency that
would better describe the dynamics at play when Chinese religious
groups find themselves in antagonistic relationships with the state.
This chapter suggests that two types of dynamic can be observed
around Chinese religious practices of the body and the temple: division
and multiplication, showing that the two often coexist asymmetrically,
with ever-extending lines of division ironically opening ever more
zones of multiplication. The symmetrical mirroring of lines of division
leads to a highly polarised conflict which collapses the possibility of a
social resolution and turns into a physical conflict, either through force-
ful repression or by eliminating, through regime change, the hands at
the levers of state violence.
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2 Social Protests, Village Democracy
and State Building in China:




Social protests are frequent occurrences in rural China. In facing rural
unrest, disorder and instability, the government has adopted various
strategies. The main one aims to contain collective actions through pro-
hibiting any unofficial national associations, punishing the organisers
of collective actions, and disciplining local officials who are corrupt or
incapable of controlling social protests. As a result, rural social protests
and movements are not able to form a national political movement.
They take place on a small scale – they are minor and mild, informal,
isolated, sporadic, and dispersed.
The total suppression of political participation is dangerous. Alexis
de Tocqueville (1955) observed that when the centralised French state
reduced local autonomy and inhibited institutional participation, resul-
tant confrontations were violent and led to chaos and disorder. This
historical lesson seems to be relevant to today’s China. In order to pre-
vent large-scale violent events from occurring and to direct all rural so-
cial protests into an institutionalised area within villages, the Chinese
state has promoted and encouraged the establishing of village demo-
cratic institutions such as village elections and village representative as-
semblies. The Chinese government granted village committees the sta-
tus of ‘mass organisations’ which are able to control village affairs
through village autonomy. It also encouraged the development of lim-
ited local democratic institutions in order to avoid social trouble and re-
duce social conflicts. Rather than demonstrating on the streets or in
public places, villagers are ‘seduced’ into fighting for their interests
through village representative assemblies or elections; any potential ra-
dical social movement, therefore, can be turned into a constructive
force to build an orderly society in rural China. Social protests thus
constitute an essential process of state building and an instrument in
the art of governance. In addition, the relationship between the state
and rural society has been reconstructed in such a way that social pro-
tests have exercised great pressure on the state, and villagers through
their social protests and limited collective actions have been able to ne-
gotiate with the agencies of the state at local levels.
State building and the rural policies concerning rural order and vil-
lage autonomy have provided social protesters with ‘an opportunity
structure’, a term coined by Sidney Tarrow (1994). Drawing on the
State’s Organic Law, villagers have carried out what Kevin O’Brien
(1996) calls ‘rightful resistance’. Social protests as a form of political
participation are a driving force in making formal village democratic
institutions meaningful and in improving the existing democratic insti-
tutions. When villagers are given an opportunity to exert control over
their lives through self-governing institutions, their participation in vil-
lage affairs is a central determinant of whether these institutions can
actually work. Indeed, it is only through the political participation of
villagers that formal institutions, which exist on paper, can be trans-
formed into genuine democratic institutions. It is through ‘rightful re-
sistance’ – a form of participation where villagers use official policies
and state laws to confront local leaders (O’Brien & Li 1996) – that so-
called ‘cosmetic’ village elections can be transformed into meaningful
village democracy (Kennedy 2002).
This chapter studies social protests and their impact on key institu-
tions of village democracy, such as electoral rule, village citizenship,
and village representative assembly. It focuses on the political impact
of social protests, addressing the essential question of how disruptive
social events can be turned into a positive constructive force. My ap-
proach is different from that of Lianjiang Li and Kevin O’Brien (2002),
who study political attitudes and behaviour in choosing different forms
of collective actions, and examines how village elections bring village
committee members and villagers together in resisting unlawful local
policies (Li 2001).
The chapter draws on ten years of research, conducted between 1993
and 2003, which has enabled me to track various trends and develop-
ments in the implementation of village elections and the rise of village
democracy. Official controls on the information about social protests
make it very difficult to get reliable statistical data on rural social pro-
test. The chapter presents anecdotal data on the situation in particular
villages. While it is not easy to discuss how widespread the phenomen-
on is likely to be, the story described in the chapter indicates a new
trend which is significant for the democratisation of rural China.
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Rural Social Protests
According to one study conducted by Professor Jae Ho Chung of Seoul
National University, collective public security incidents (CoPSI, quan-
tixing zhian shijian) – incidents whereby groups of people gather to dis-
rupt public order and destroy public properties – have been increasing
annually, from 8,700 in 1993 to 11,000 in 1995, 15,000 in 1997,
32,000 in 1999, and 40,000 in 2004 (Jae 2004). In my fieldwork I of-
ten encounter demonstrations and villagers’ visits to towns or town-
ships to complain about corrupt village leaders. In December 2004 in
front of the official building at one township in Wenglin, Zhejiang,
more than three hundred villagers gathered to read aloud collectively
the Organic Law’s provision that any major decision with regard to
land and village welfare must be discussed by and passed through the
village representative assembly. They were protesting against one ex-
ploitative developer who had bribed a few local officials for cheap land,
and against corrupt officials who had appropriated village lands with-
out gaining consent from the village representative assembly.2 In Han-
yuan, YaAn, in 2004, hundreds of villagers protested against a reloca-
tion plan to such an extent that the government had to send the mili-
tary to crush the public demonstration.
The issues concerning rural protesters are villagers’ rights, the mis-
appropriation of collective land, the collection of illegal fees, corruption
and the misuse of public funds. Rural social protests express the fol-
lowing values: rights-based morality, personal autonomy, and a clear
and accountable local government, as opposed to centralised control
and bureaucratisation. The forms taken by social protests and collective
action include the mobilisation of villagers to launch complaints, pub-
lic appeals, demonstrations, actions against manipulated elections, the
collection of signatures to submit a dismissal proposal, and many
others. The social bases of rural protests are village kinships, factions,
and even elected village committees or village representative assem-
blies. Increasingly, villagers appeal to elected village committees who
organise collective protest complaints against excessive fees extracted
by township leaders (Li 2001: 2).
Rural social protests can be understood as a diverse and multi-
layered critique of the Chinese authoritarian system. Villagers are
struggling against the exploitation and corruption of local govern-
ments. It can also be explained partly as a result of the inadequacies of
the existing market system. In facing an unequal distribution of wealth
created by the market economy, the most disadvantaged groups have to
organise themselves to fight for their interests and rights.
In addition, it can be seen to be a result of the transformation of rur-
al society in the age of modernisation. In traditional and communist
SOCIAL PROTESTS, VILLAGE DEMOCRACY AND STATE BUILDING IN CHINA 27
Chinese rural societies, the purpose of individuals is seen as contribut-
ing to the good of society. Indeed, the very existence of individuals is be-
lieved to rely on society, and the way of thinking and behaviour of indi-
viduals are said to be defined by society. Society, with its hierarchy and
customs, is understood as a great source of the individuals’ values and
beliefs. It is a safe haven which offers individuals a sense of belonging.
With the marketisation of the Chinese economy, Chinese rural society
has been commercialised and individualised in the sense that rural in-
dividuals care about and pursue their self-interest. The individualisa-
tion and atomisation of Chinese society have been accompanied by in-
creasing collective actions and social protests. Indeed, social protests
and social movements can be seen as an instrumental tool whereby in-
dividuals can maximise their individual liberty and secure their indivi-
dual rights. In facing ruthless markets and corrupt governments, a sin-
gle individual is powerless and carries no weight at all. Individuals
have to organise themselves, either by forming various associations or
launching social protests.
Social protests and collective actions give the individual bargaining
powers and a sense of social solidarity. Under the pressure of maintain-
ing order and stability, local officials sometimes meet the demand
made by social protesters. In subsequent sections, we will see how rur-
al social protests have pressured the state as well as local governments
into developing a system of village citizenship, improving electoral pro-
cedures, establishing a recall procedure, introducing competitive elec-
tions, and institutionalising the village representative assemblies. Of
course, not all social protests lead to village democracy.3 I personally
encountered a professional protester in Beijing in May 2005, who went
to the capital city five times from a remote village in Hunan Province
to launch his petition to get a fair deal on the appropriation of village
land, but was beaten and arrested by local policemen several times,
with the issue concerning the village land still unresolved, and there
has still been no village representative meeting to address the common
land issue in his village.4
Fighting for Village Citizenship5
Merle Goldman (2002) highlights the importance of citizens’ initiative
and struggle in the post-Mao era, by individuals and groups asserting
their political rights, rather than waiting for them to be granted by the
government. Indeed, it is through struggle that villagers now defend
their village citizenship.
The following examples highlight key aspects of struggles for demo-
cratic village citizenship:
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– Retired cadres, who were members of a village and who had house-
hold registration in a city but who are now living in their home vil-
lage, demand the right to vote.
– Those who have gained household registration in cities, after their
collective lands were appropriated by the government or other agen-
cies in the cities, demand their original villager status and their
right to vote.
– Married-out women demand their right to vote in many townships,
as they attempt to retain their household registration in their native
village and refuse to acquiesce to the village leaders’ demand that
they should re-register their household in their husbands’ villages.
One woman, who did not have proper marriage registration and
was therefore deprived of her right to vote, demanded its restora-
tion.
– Migrant workers demand their right to vote in the village where
they have worked for a long period.
– Ordinary villagers demand the right to vote. During the 1998 vil-
lage election in Tianli, Huiping township, votes from one house-
hold were somehow left uncounted. Though the electoral working
team tried to convince the family that it was due to a technical mis-
take, the family was very angry. They went all the way to the town-
ship leaders to protest against ‘being unlawfully deprived of voting
rights’. The leaders had to apologise profusely before the family’s
anger was appeased.
– Those who were deprived of their right to vote, due to their breach
of state laws under the one-child policy, have fought for their right
to vote and the right to run for election.
– Ordinary villagers demand the right to run for election. Zhang Yu-
bin, who was deprived of his right to vote by township leaders, ap-
pealed to a local court and won back his right to contest the village
election in 1998 (Ding 1999: 32-34).
– Even family members whose parents died in the wake of the vil-
lage’s first round of elections argue that their parents should have
the right to vote in the second round of elections (Wei 2001: 65).
Villagers are fighting to realise their political, social and economic
rights and to force local cadres to respect and honour these rights.
They equally defend their rights against the misuse of power by village
cadres. For example, a widow defended her right to inherit the proper-
ties of her husband against the village leaders’ decision that the proper-
ties should go to her son. An ordinary villager who was contracted to
run a village enterprise defended his right against the decision of the
village committee to end the contract before the term expired.
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Migrant workers are fighting for village citizenship. In some villages,
the decision whether or not to grant village membership to a migrant
is made in village meetings on a case-by-case basis. Some village com-
mittees respect and guard the legal rights of migrants in the running
of their business and consult them when migrant affairs are involved.
In village enterprises, migrant workers participate in management
through their representatives. In Beicun, Wuyan township, the local
population is outnumbered by migrants. Taking this fact into account,
the village has set up a system of multi-level consultations with the
aim of collecting opinions from various groups, including migrant
workers and business people in the village.
Women are fighting for their rights. In Zhejiang, married-out wo-
men in rich villages desire to retain village status in their home villages
and refuse to register in their husbands’ residential area. These mar-
ried-out women are frequently denied their right to vote and entitle-
ment to economic benefits by village assembly or village representative
assemblies, which act democratically but in authoritarian fashion
against these women’s interests. In Zhejiang, several villages I visited
held village representative assembly meetings to decide the tough ques-
tion of whether these women should retain their status. The decision
was often made that if a woman marries out, she loses her village citi-
zenship. In one village in Wenzou, even if a divorced woman returns
to her home village and is registered there, she is still denied the right
to vote.6 Only those who marry in are entitled to village status.
Twenty-two women in Simen Village at Anyang township demanded
the economic right to village wealth. Their request was denied by the
village representative assembly. They appealed to county leaders who
did not want to take any responsibility and only requested the village
representative assembly to reconsider the case. The women also ap-
proached the local newspaper to publish their stories. Finally, they
went to the local court, which decided that the question of village status
is a matter of village autonomy and should only be decided by the vil-
lage representative assembly.7 In 2002, however, in Shuangqiao village,
it was decided that a married-out woman can retain her right to vote
within one year of her marriage. In Guangdong, a few women chal-
lenged such a decision through judicial appeal and won the case. The
local court in that instance decreed that the village assembly had no
right to make a decision that denies women their political rights, which
are protected by national law.
Minority groups are also struggling for their village rights. Village
citizenship has the normative requirement that demands equal treat-
ment within a village. The citizens of a village have the right to share
equally in a portion of village wealth. In turn, the differentiated treat-
ment sometimes imposed by the majority of villagers upon a minority
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challenges this fundamental aspect of village citizenship. I will now ex-
amine a detailed case to illustrate this theme.
Jianshe village in Wuyun township in Lishun city has a population
of 872 (400 are male, 472 female) and consists of six village teams. It
has 171 mu of land, of which 109 mu are to be contracted to the villa-
gers during the new contract period, and 62 mu are managed by the
village committee. In 2000, the total income of the village was
625,000 yuan, and total expenses 697,000 yuan. Its annual average
per capita income is 3,366 yuan.
On 18 August 1999, the first village representative assembly was
held to discuss the new contract. The task was completed on 18 March
2000, taking seven months. The proposal that the first contract, with a
few modifications, be continued for another 30 years was passed with
the support of 72.7 per cent of votes in the second village representa-
tive assembly.
A dispute occurred during the process. The key issue was whether
the fifth team should be treated equally. Historically, the fifth team was
amalgamated into Jianshe village in 1958 by an administrative order.
Geographically, it is located on the top of a mountain, far away from
the rest of the village and the site of Wuyun township, so that its lands
have little commercial value and contribute little to the collective
wealth of the village. For these reasons, the other five village teams de-
manded that the fifth team maintain their old contract and that it
should not enjoy the same benefits as all other village teams. While
the villagers of all other five teams are given the amount of money
equal to 12.5 kilogram rice, the fifth team is denied this benefit.
Subsequently, village representative meetings were held ten times.
Each time the fifth team lost its appeal because its four village repre-
sentatives were outnumbered among the 36 representatives. It then ap-
pealed to the township authority and local newspapers, and held a pub-
lic rally. In the end, through compromise and persuasion inside and
outside village representative meetings, a deal was reached. While the
villagers of the fifth team are entitled to most of the benefits, a differ-
entiated policy towards contracting and village welfare provision was
also adopted.
In this case, the fifth team demanded a fair share of collective bene-
fits. Basic village citizenship and the right to appeal enabled the minor-
ity group to defend its rights and interests. This case reveals that vil-
lage democracy is making progress and that compromises can be
made, a balance struck, and relative fairness achieved. Despite the
dominance of majorities, village assemblies provide forums in which
minority groups can express their needs and dissatisfactions, and ulti-
mately reach accommodations.
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In conclusion, villagers’ willingness to fight for status and the right
to vote signals a broad trend towards development from peasants to ci-
tizens. It might be argued that village democratic institutions have
turned peasants into modern citizens, as villagers empower themselves
by using democratic institutions and procedures to defend their inter-
ests. They are simultaneously active in establishing, consolidating and
entrenching the democratic institutions of the village assembly or vil-
lage representative assembly. The increasing importance of village citi-
zenship is changing the local political culture and establishing a rights-
based political morality. In such a context, we should use the term of
‘villager’ seriously and give up the older term of ‘peasant’, which seems
inadequate to describe people, at least in the area I have visited, if not
in the whole of rural China.
Procedures
Through various forms of protest, villagers have resisted manipulated
elections and demanded fair and free elections. They have resisted elec-
tion procedures they consider unfair, irregular or corrupt by refusing to
pay tax. Such resistance has forced the state to adopt and promote open
and transparent procedures, in particular, the state has endorsed hai-
xuan (naming from the floor or direct nomination for candidates) to re-
solve practical problems.
My earlier field trips found that party secretaries appointed candi-
dates in the earlier village elections in Zhejiang. In Jiangxia village of
Chengguan township, village cadres decided their candidates through
negotiation amongst themselves. Beizhang, Pukou and Cangyan town-
ships each had one village where the candidates were secretly decided.
Such a practice was justified by one official in the Ministry of Civic Af-
fairs in 1994 as normal since party leaders decide candidates in all
elections in China.8 In 1994, Wang Yongfei, an official from the De-
partment of Civic Affairs in Zhejiang, stated that villagers did not have
the time and knowledge for complex procedures, so the normal prac-
tice was that the party secretary or party branch would decide on the
candidates. He also argued that it was too costly for villagers to take
more than twenty days and to run four or five preliminary elections to
choose the candidates in one village in Jinghua.9
The appointment of candidates by party secretaries, however, faced
resistance from villagers who did not vote for the official nominated
candidates. Sometimes official nominated candidates lost elections,
sometimes elections failed to produce any village leader, thus leading
to a vacuum in village governance. To overcome this practical problem,
some villages experimented with direct nomination by villagers, and
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township leaders had to make a compromise in letting villagers nomi-
nate candidates.
In the process of resisting manipulated elections, villagers invented
and practiced haixuan, which originated in Lishu county, Jilin province
(Jing 1999; China Association of Study of Grass-root Institutions & Re-
search Team for Project of Chinese Village Autonomy 1994). In one
village, 571 out of 693 eligible voters took part in haixuan (Chan 1998:
511). Haixuan was quickly adopted in the Xiangtan and Suining coun-
ties of Hunan province as well as five counties and two districts in
Gansu province. This was a small minority in national terms (Ma
2003: 5). Haixuan was ultimately endorsed in the 1998 Organic Law.
Article 14 stipulates, ‘In village elections, candidates should be nomi-
nated directly by the eligible voters of the village, with the number of
candidates exceeding the number of positions available.’10
Recall
Elected village leaders might misuse power and/or fail to keep prom-
ises made in election campaigns. They might be incompetent or unac-
countable or irresponsible. Villagers have collected signatures, sub-
mitted petitions, put forward motions, gone to local official offices or
media institutions, and even marched in the streets to demand the re-
moval of some incompetent and corrupt village leaders. Villagers’
struggles have improved the recall procedure and made it work in
some cases.
The 1987 provisional Organic Law made a very general and vague
reference to the issue of recalling. Article 11 merely stipulates, ‘the vil-
lagers’ assembly has the right to recall village committee members or
call for by-elections to elect new members’ (The Division of Local Gov-
ernments, The Ministry of Civic Affairs 1994: 4). It was insufficient to
simply have a law that grants voters the right to recall the elected offi-
cial but that does not lay out a procedure for doing so. In the face of
protests and demands for recalling, the national government has had
to revise the 1987 Organic Law. Specific dismissal terms ultimately
were written in the 1998 Organic Law, Article 16 of which states:
(…) a proposal of dismissal of committee members is valid when
it is put forward and signed by 20 per cent or more of eligible
voters in the village. Reasons must be given for the dismissal.
The members involved have the right to defend themselves. The
village committee should in due time convene a meeting of villa-
gers to vote on the proposal, which takes 50 per cent or more of
votes for a pass.11
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According to the Organic Law, the dismissal should be handled by the
village committee. The several cases we have at hand indicate that the
village committee may be unwilling to carry out the process, in particu-
lar if the dismissal involves the village head. To solve this concrete pro-
blem, Article 27 of the Regulations of Village Election of Zhejiang,
passed by the 16th session of the 9th Provincial People’s Congress,
stipulates:
A proposal to dismiss a committee member is valid when it is
put forward and signed by 20 per cent or more of eligible voters
in the village. The proposal should be submitted to the village
committee in written form with reasons given for the dismissal.
Copies of the proposal should be sent to township governments
as records. Upon receiving the proposal, the village committee
should convene a meeting of villagers to vote on the proposal no
later than within a month. Meanwhile, the sponsors of the dis-
missal should have their representatives state their reasons at
the meeting. Committee members involved in the dismissal pro-
posal have the right to defend themselves. It takes 50 per cent
or more of votes to pass the proposal, and the result should be
reported to the township government. If the village committee
does not convene a meeting 30 days after it has received the pro-
posal, the township government should intervene and help to
hold the meeting of villagers.12
It is apparent from this regulation that township governments have an
important role to play in the recalling of committee members. Town-
ship intervention has proved invariably to be crucial in the dismissal of
the village chiefs of Xikouwang, Bailian and Jile villages.
Since the promulgation of the new law, there have been quite a lot
of dismissal cases. Almost all motions of dismissal are triggered by cor-
ruption in village affairs.13 In Yiwu county, 305 village leaders were dis-
missed through village representative meetings in 2000.14 Below is a
case of the dismissal in the village of Bailian in Pandai township (Zhou
1999: 2). I describe this case in detail to elaborate on the detailed pro-
cedures and the whole process.
1. To put forward a proposal of dismissal. Because of an ‘irregular deal’
that involved the selling of a hundred mu of land and ‘mismanage-
ment of economic affairs’ by the village committee, tension built up
between villagers and the village committee in Bailian. On 13 No-
vember 1998, 451 villagers signed a motion to dismiss He Guang-
shou from his post of village head. The motion was directed to the
leadership above.
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2. Approval. On 29 March 1999, the township government sent its re-
presentatives to check the signatures on the dismissal motion and
found that those who had signed amounted to over one-fifth of the
total number of voters in the village. The next day, the deputy town-
ship head came to the village to announce the start of the dismissal
procedure.
3. Villager representatives’ meeting chaired by township government and
the making of rule. On April 6, the township government held a
meeting of ten village representatives, during which the Procedures
of Voting on the Dismissal of Village Head in Bailian were passed.
4. Villagers’ meeting and the hearing of charges. On 9 April, a villagers’
meeting was held at Bailian Primary School, during which the
township head Ding Shichun asked the villagers to ‘speak truthfully
and vote prudently’. Then, Li Jiankai, a member of the supervisory
group of village finance, listed reasons for the dismissal.
5. The village head defending himself. As stipulated in the Organic Law
of Village Committee, ‘village committee members who are facing
dismissal charges have the right to defend themselves’. Accordingly
He Guangshou presented a different story on the issues of finance
and the land deal.
6. Voting. At the conclusion of the villagers’ meeting, voting took
place. The result was that 413 votes were for the dismissal, 248
against it, and 3 abstained. On the afternoon of 9 April, township
head Ding Shichun announced that the dismissal proposal was
passed on the basis of the 664 votes collected out of a total of 666.
I must point out, however, that many villages, for one reason or an-
other, have difficulty in convening a meeting of all villagers. The voters
of Baoziying village in Hebei province, for example, were not so suc-
cessful in their bid to recall their committee. Incensed by corruption,
heavy taxes and a number of other problems, the villagers took the in-
itiative and held a meeting on 11 December 1998 to vote on the motion
to dismiss the village committee. Over 100 representatives took a peti-
tion to Shijiazhuang, Hebei’s provincial capital, but they were blocked
on their way by the police. Zhao Zengbing, Wang Liying, Fan Zhengjie,
Zhao Lijun, Liu Yanfang and other young villagers were detained on 23
December 1998, and later arrested on charges of ‘disturbing social or-
der’ and ‘interfering with official business’.15
Competitive Elections16
Before examining competitive elections, I would like to briefly discuss
two types of non-competitive elections. The first genre is muddled elec-
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tions in which electors lack information about electoral procedures,
and township and village leaders conduct elections without following a
set of electoral procedures. These muddled elections are nothing more
than a formality.
The second genre is manipulated elections in which village party sec-
retaries manipulate electoral procedures, select their own favoured can-
didates, and pre-determine the result of elections. Prior to these elec-
tions, electors already know who will win, and elections lack uncer-
tainty and excitement.17 These manipulated elections take place in
authoritarian villages where competitiveness is absent and popular par-
ticipation is low (O’Brien 1994: 54).
Both muddled and manipulated elections tend to invite the villagers’
criticism, scepticism and resistance, and contribute little to good village
governance. During the village elections in September 1999 in Sheng-
zhou, the city received over 1,900 telephone calls, letters and personal
visits. Approximately ten per cent of the calls, letters and visits sought
election information, sixty per cent complained about violations of reg-
ulations by electorate staff and Party secretaries, twenty per cent the
violations of the Organic Laws by election staff, and ten per cent finan-
cial mismanagement. Petitioners demanded that action be taken before
elections could continue (Qiu 1999). Villagers adopted various mea-
sures against these forms of elections, such as non-participation, ap-
peal to upper levels, or nomination of their own candidates. Through
villagers’ constant struggles, semi-competitive or full competitive elec-
tions have been gradually tolerated and adopted by the state.
Elections to positions on village committees have become increas-
ingly competitive since they were introduced over ten years ago. The
1998 election was particularly competitive. The practice of direct and
open elections, called haixuan (direct elections) in many localities, has
dramatically increased the competitiveness of the village elections. One
indication of this was the gap between the number of candidates and
that of open positions: there were many more candidates than posi-
tions. Between April and July 1999, 786 villages in the Yuyao munici-
pality held elections under the ‘Organic Law of Village Committee’.
The ratio of candidates to positions was 48:1, which was unprecedented
in the history of village election.18 In Laofangqiao, a township selected
by the Yuyao municipality for test elections, the villagers nominated
959 candidates for the 57 open seats. The candidate-seat ratio was 17:1,
promising intense competition.19
Competition was also intensified as elections shifted from ‘one-can-
didate’ elections, which dominated in 1994, to ‘multiple-candidates’
elections, which dominated in 1998–1999. In Linhai, for example, the
number of candidates in 1995 was generally the same as the number
of positions. In 1998-1999, however, multiple candidates were nomi-
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nated for the position of village head.20 In 1995, the Ministry of Civil
Affairs assessed the degree to which elections across the country met
three criteria: competitive electoral process, public campaigning, and
secret ballots. Judged by these criteria, Zhejiang was behind Fujian,
Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Jilin, Hunan, Henan, Sichuan, and other prov-
inces (Howell 1998: 96). Take the Tongxiang municipality of Zhejiang
as an example. In late 1992, the then-Tongxiang county held its second
round of village elections. Of its 306 villages, 244 (86.9 per cent) took
the non-competitive approach: the same number of candidates for the
same number of positions. Only 40 villages (13.1 per cent) held semi-
competitive elections. By 1998, however, as Zhang Biao has found in
his case study of the elections in the 10 administrative villages of
Taoyuan township in July of that year, competitive elections were com-
mon. Quite a large number of villagers nominated themselves as can-
didates for village committee positions. As the township government
made no effort to limit the number of candidates, elections became
very competitive (Zhang 1998).
The competitiveness of elections is also related to the nominating
procedures and the number of candidates. The intensity of competition
very much depends on how candidates are nominated, how many can
be nominated, and whether the number of candidates is larger than
the number of posts. In past elections in Liuzheng township, candi-
dates were chosen by the village branch of the CCP and were approved
by the township party committee and government leadership before
they were introduced to the voters. Voters actually had no right or op-
portunity to nominate candidates. In addition, in the case of elections
for village heads, it was official policy to limit the elections to one can-
didate for one position. Thus, competition was simply not expected.
Township leaders, out of concern for either employment or vested in-
terests, would have a hand in the nomination process, particularly the
nomination of the village head. Sometimes they even manipulated the
nominations, ruling out the possibility of real competition.
One major difference between the ‘Organic Law of Village Commit-
tee’ of 1998 and its 1987 predecessor is that the new law stipulates that
the village committee should be directly elected by the villagers. After
the April 1999 elections in Laofangqiao township, we interviewed a
number of villagers and asked them to compare the recent election
with past ones. During the past elections, they said, the candidates
were all hand-picked by the leadership above. The number of candi-
dates was exactly the same as the number of positions open to election.
As a result, villagers did not think much of the election, because their
will was ignored, and all they were expected to do was draw a yes-circle
around the names of the anointed candidates.21 However, nominating
procedures in the new elections, such as haixuan, involve and encour-
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age much competition. In such cases, the authorities do not try to con-
trol or dominate the nominating procedure. Instead, they allow the vil-
lagers to exercise their rights and nominate the candidates of their
choice.
The Establishment and Improvement of the VRA
Village representative assemblies (VRA) were designed to elicit people’s
support for local projects or voice their opinions. Concerned with a fair
distribution of village wealth, many villagers demand the regular and
frequent holding of these assemblies. In this way political participation
becomes meaningful, and villagers empower themselves by using for-
mal democratic institutions to minimise corruption and to demand a
fair distribution of village wealth.
As early as 1991, Li Qiaobai, the head of party organisation in Li
Shui prefecture, advocated and promoted the VRA. However, many
township and village leaders disclosed to me in my interview their re-
servation as to the multi-function of the VRA. They would cite the fol-
lowing cases in which the VRA could do little to solve a problem:
1. If a resolution passed by the VRA could not come into effect, help
from township leaders would be indispensable for its implementa-
tion.
2. If a pre-made village decision proved to be inappropriate and
needed some change, it would be up to the party committee and vil-
lage committee to make the change.
3. The effectiveness of the VRA would be seriously impaired when
some representatives express radical views or hold meetings with-
out getting consent.
4. When the head of a village committee proved incompetent, s/he
would need help from a stay-in-village cadre with functions such as
chairing a meeting.22
VRAs were established only in a limited number of villages. It was not
until 1998 that Wuyun township in Li Shui prefecture embarked on a
trial stage in seven of its villages. When we conducted interviews in
1997-1998, most villagers there knew very little about the system. Only
in some model village did the VRA play a full role and was appreciated
by both representatives and villagers.
While the national law does not specify the timing and number of
the village representative meetings, the provincial regulations of Zhe-
jiang stipulated that it should be held at least once a year. The timing
and the number of the meetings vary in different areas. Diyiqiao village
was said to hold at least two meetings each year, in July and November.
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Xiacun village also had two meetings, but the time was March and Sep-
tember. Laiwang village had four meetings each year, presided over by
the village committee. These figures are consistent with Oi and Rozel-
le’s survey in 1995 which found that the average number is 2.76 VRA
meetings a year (Oi & Rozelle 2000). Local officials in Tangxiang town-
ship argued against frequent meetings of VRAs, contending that they
gave too much power to village representatives, who would feel the im-
portance of their positions but whose different views would make it dif-
ficult to reach a conclusion.23 Similarly, the party secretary, Zen He-
ping, in Tuanjie village in Hongshang district in Wuhan, insisted that
the proposal about the privatisation of village enterprises not be dis-
cussed in the VRA, citing as a reason that the representatives are not
able to make a good decision when interests are involved.24 By con-
trast, in Beiwang village, ‘the VRA is particularly active, meeting on
the third day of every month’ (Lawrence 1994: 64).
According to a survey by Yang Min, 57.8 per cent respondents in
1990 and 73.3 per cent in 1996 confirmed that they participated in
VRAs only 1-2 times a year. Some 32.7 per cent and 20.7 per cent parti-
cipated several times a year (Yang 2000). In Kent Jennings’s survey, 47
percent of the respondents reported that they went to all-village meet-
ings (Jennings 1997: 363), and David Zweig’s fieldwork revealed that
16.4 percent of the 3,078 respondents looked to the village assembly if
village cadres carry out unfair policies (Zweig 2002a: 44).
The decision made through VRAs tends to gain legitimacy, face less
resistance and be implemented more easily, while decisions, for exam-
ple, on village land, made by village leaders alone without going
through VRAs often invite criticism and protest. Realising the value of
VRAs’ contribution to maintaining social order and containing social
conflicts, the state has actively called for the institutionalisation of
VRAs. Starting in 2000, VRAs became more active in Zhejiang prov-
ince. For example, Jianshe village held more than ten representative
meetings to decide the tough question of how to carry out the second
round of contracting collective land in Wuyun township. Increasingly,
more and more villagers are using VRAs to challenge village leaders.
For example, one village chief in Yuhuan county signed a contract with
a factory without consulting with the representatives of the VRA in
2000. Some representatives sued the village chief in the local court for
violating the 1998 Organic Law, and they won the case. Such a success-
ful story inspired many villagers who went to local courts to sue their
village chiefs who failed to consult with VRAs when they made various
decisions.
Liaodong village in Wenzhou municipality, Zhejiang, is another ex-
ample of VRAs taking an important role in governance. On 24 May
1999, a villagers’ meeting was held to vote on a motion of dismissal.
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The result was that 87 per cent of the people voted yes for the dismis-
sal of Pan Hongchong as village head, who three years ago was voted
into office with a large majority. Pan was charged with, among other
things, abuse of power and mismanagement of village affairs. As the
check of village accounts revealed, during Pan’s three years in office, he
and others had squandered 660,000 yuan or one-fourth of the village
income for their social entertainment.25
In recent years, village leaders, recognising the importance of the
VRAs, are more frequently using the meeting in their decision-making
process. One such example is Shuangqiao village in Chengjiao town-
ship of Wenzhou. Believing it would pay off in the long run, the village
leaders bought a 4-storeyed office building from a business company
at 8 million RMB. However, since the deal was made without any con-
sultation in advance with the village representative meeting, some
villagers grew angry and suspicious. They challenged village leaders
and demanded a say in the decision-making process, and they went to
the leadership above to voice their anger and suspicion, which did not
die down until half a year later. Drawing from this incident, the village
committee began to pay more attention to the views of the representa-
tive meeting. Consequently, in the latter half of the year 2000 alone, as
many as ten meetings were held. A record of these ten meetings shows
the topics of the meetings. According to Bai Gang and Zhao Shuo-
xing’s survey study, 21 percent of the respondents out of 34 village lea-
ders confirmed that VRAs have made final decisions on major village
affairs in Lishu county, Jilin province; 82.27 out of 51 in Hequ county
in Shanxi province; and 14.99 out of 101 in Lunan county in Yunan
province (Bai & Zhao 2001).
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the role of social protests led by ordinary
villagers in promoting village democracy.26 The opposition between the
interest of ordinary villagers and the vested interests of cadres are driv-
ing forces for village democracy. This gives rise to an unstable and con-
flictive circumstance in which elections and village democracy are em-
ployed by the state as a mechanism to ease these tensions. In particu-
lar, the institution of village representative assembly has been
developed and improved to deal with structural conflicts of interests.
Village democracy provides a mechanism whereby the state can co-
opt the new rich into the system in order to prevent them from becom-
ing a disruptive force. It is regarded by the state as a check system in
which villagers can use the VRA to express their views, while village
chiefs can use village committees as a counterbalance to the power of
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the party secretary. Electoral institutions empower elected village chiefs
and committee members. Village committees and representative as-
semblies in turn restrict the behaviour of village party secretaries.
Village democracy is now seen as an integral part of state building
in rural China. The state has discovered that the benefits of village de-
mocracy outweigh its costs and that it helps to reduce conflict and pro-
mote stability. Township leaders were originally opposed to village elec-
tions that removed their power to appoint village leaders. But through
the process of village elections, they found that VRAs can assist them
in solving controversial questions about village membership. Further-
more, haixuan saves their energy and time by reducing conflict. Of
equal importance, they discovered that democratic means can be used
to regain their control over village leaders. For example, they even en-
courage electoral rivalry within a village so that competing factions will
seek help from the township. Often they are able to use VRAs to dis-
miss village leaders whom they do not like. Most importantly, local offi-
cials find that ‘village democratic institutions such as public consulta-
tion and the VRAs can help to avoid and reduce social troubles and vil-
Table 2.1 Agenda of Villager Representative Meetings, Shuangqiao Village (June to
December 2000)
Meeting Date Agenda and Action
1 8 June Discussing and passing the bill to turn the parking lot in the
village into a household electronics market.
2 20 June Discussing and passing the bill on welfare distribution on a
household base.
3 27 July Discussing and passing the bill to raise the seniors’ pension from
the current monthly 70-80 to 200 RMB.
4 31 July Discussing and passing the bill that a woman is no longer eligible
for village benefits once she gets married and lives away from the
village.
5 4 August Deciding to get a lawyer to sue on the false report by the Zhejiang
Daily Legal Report.
6 24 August Discussing and deciding to settle the contract dispute between
the village and the packing machinery factory through legal
means.
7 16 November Rallying support for the construction of the electronics market.
8 29 November Further discussion and passing of the bill to settle the contract
dispute between the village and the packing machinery factory
through legal means, despite opposition from the township
leadership.
9 7 December Most representatives stick to the resolution of the previous
meeting.
10 20 December Discussing and deciding to reject the shares of one company.
The rejection was partly the result of the villagers’ dissatisfaction
with the deal.
Sources: A Chronicle of Village Meetings in Shuangqiao
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lagers’ protests’.27 Fang Lizhi, the famous Chinese dissident, is right to
claim that democracy is not bestowed as a gift, rather that it is fought
for by the people themselves (Fang 1987). Villager participation that
takes the form of protest and appeal, collective action, and the mobili-
sation of village factions and kinship is what transforms formal institu-
tions, which may exist on paper, into fully functioning ones.
The above Chinese story of social protesters and village democracy is
a testament to the life project of Alain Touraine, a French thinker and
renowned sociologist, who devoted his life to a study of democratic ac-
tion through new social movements (Touraine 1985). According to
Touraine, it is only through participating in social movements that in-
dividuals can recover their liberty diminished by the neoliberal state
and markets (Touraine 1995). For him, the ideas of democracy have
three basic elements: (1) basic rights, (2) citizenship, and (3) represen-
tativity (Touraine 1997). Indeed, in the case of village elections, some
social protests have fought in these three areas through social protest
and some villagers are struggling to assert what Touraine terms ‘the
autonomy of the human subject’ in controlling village affairs.
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3 Social Movements and State-Society
Relationship in Hong Kong
Ngok Ma
Introduction
This chapter discusses the evolution of social movements in Hong
Kong from the early colonial era to the post-handover period. Hong
Kong has been regarded as a minimally integrated system with weak
links between state and society. However, years of development of so-
cial movement and civil society since the 1970s mean the civil society
in Hong Kong, by actively demanding social and political reforms, has
been increasingly influential during the political transition and after
the handover.
This chapter analyses the historical development, in particular the
form of organisation, of the social movement in Hong Kong. It shows
that with weak horizontal links between civil society organisations
(CSOs), relatively weak organisational resources, and weak linkage be-
tween the civil society and the political society, the CSOs in Hong Kong
opt for more ad hoc organisational forms after 1997 which are not con-
ducive to the accumulation of movement resources and experience. By
a case study of the experience of Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF),
the loose coalition that led the movement against Article 23 in 2002-
2003, I show the strengths and limitations of this organisational form
of ad hoc coalitions. In general, the civil society in Hong Kong after
1997 has been better able to defend itself against encroachment by the
state, but less able to accumulate enough political prowess to force the
government to adopt social and political reforms. This leads to more
strained state-society relations, as the social interests represented by
the myriad of CSOs were not effectively channelled into the state, with
sporadic and spontaneous resistance movements the norm of the social
movements in Hong Kong.
State-Society Relationship in the Early Colonial Era
During the early colonial era, the non-interventionist philosophy of the
colonial government meant that the Hong Kong society had ample so-
cial and economic freedom, although movements or activities that chal-
lenged colonial rule were kept under close surveillance. Before the
1970s, the colonial state exercised relatively little intervention in the
economy, did not try to penetrate or transform the society, and played a
very limited role in providing social services. Unlike most non-democ-
racies, where freedom of speech and press are usually constrained, and
the state actively tries to control and penetrate society, Hong Kong has
had a long tradition of relative societal autonomy during the colonial
era.
The dominant paradigm of Hong Kong studies saw the colonial state
as largely autonomous from societal influence, with the civil society
too weak to enforce changes in government policies. The most famous
formulation for the colonial state-society relationship was Lau Siu-kai’s
‘minimally-integrated socio-political system’ (Lau 1984). To Lau, colo-
nial rule was marked by mutual non-intervention between state and so-
ciety, with the society having few socio-political demands on the colo-
nial government. King (1975) saw politics in the early colonial era as
‘administerised’, with the Chinese elites co-opted by colonial honours
and appointed positions in the administrative machinery.
As Chiu and Hung (1999) pointed out, these early sociologists had a
‘high threshold of instability’, as any collective action at that time that
fell short of fundamentally challenging colonial rule was seen as insig-
nificant. By focusing mostly on social and political stability, these early
sociologists naturally overlooked the diverse forms of grassroots pro-
tests and resistance movements in Hong Kong in the early colonial era
(Lui & Chiu 2000: 5-6). More detailed studies of post-war Hong Kong
revealed that there were significant social and political movements
from society (Lam 2004: 53-64). These movements varied in terms of
scale, publicity, and intensity. They included movements seeking
change in government policies (e.g. campaign against rent control,
campaign to change marriage laws), industrial action (e.g. tram work-
ers’ strike), outbursts of violence with political and nationalist under-
pinnings (e.g. the 1956 and 1967 riots), and campaigns against private
corporations (e.g. against the rise of telephone tariffs). Lam (2004: 59)
counted 212 and 137 events of political participation in the decades
1949-59 and 1960-69, respectively, a not insignificant figure even if
compared with those of the 1970s and beyond. Industrial conflicts
were far from absent, although trade union movement had only a mar-
ginal influence at the workplace, industry and society levels (Lui &
Chiu 2000: 6; England & Rear 1975; Turner et al. 1980). These studies
all pointed to significant political participation from civil society during
the early post-war years. Nevertheless, conventional political participa-
tion by the masses and CSOs was still weak, as Lam pointed out that
participation before the 1970s was mostly discursive in terms of strate-
gies, actions and channels of influence (Lam 2004: 221). The actions
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ranged from public violence (the 1956 and 1967 riots), conventional la-
bour union action (the beginning of the 1952 Tramway workers’ dis-
pute), public petition (the campaign to change the marriage law), and
lobbying of legislators and government officials (the campaign to
change the marriage law). There were no designated institutions of par-
ticipation, as the formal consultation channels or the appointed coun-
cils were mostly used for co-optation of elites, not for voluntary partici-
pation from the civil society. More political participation from the
masses came only after the 1970s, as a budding social movement in-
dustry began to bring the society much closer to the state.
The Coming of the Social Movement Industry
The rise of social movements in the 1970s in Hong Kong was the re-
sult of a number of factors. Politically, the emphasis on ‘consultative
democracy’ by the colonial government led to better tolerance of social
protests and petitions, creating a ‘political opportunity structure’ that
encouraged political participation (Lui & Chiu 2000: 7). Economically,
the economic take-off and colonial social reforms in the 1970s meant
that the fruits of development finally trickled down to the lower class,
which encouraged more demands for social improvement. Socially,
there was a distinct gap between the quality of services provided by the
government and the needs for social development and desires of the lo-
cal residents, creating extra demands for social reform (Lui & Kung
1985: 72). Demographically, while before the 1970s Hong Kong was
largely regarded as a refugee society, the 1970s saw the coming of age
of a new class of educated youth, who were born or brought up in
Hong Kong, having a better sense of belonging to Hong Kong, and
were more eager to correct the ills of the colonial regime. By starting a
fresh wave of student movements in the early 1970s, and pressure
group movements in the late 1970s, this new educated class became
the backbone of CSOs afterwards. Culturally, a Hong Kong identity
was beginning to ferment. The disturbances in 1966-67 led to a resus-
citation of the young generation for the future and the identity of Hong
Kong (Lui 1997). The enhanced international recognition of the PRC,
including the normalisation of PRC-US relationship and the entry of
the PRC to the United Nations, stirred nationalist sentiments in the
territory. It was a period where the Hong Kong people collectively
thought about their future and identity.
The 1970s’ movements were a confluence of various sentiments and
concerns fermented within the local civil society. It started from move-
ments with nationalist flavours such as the Protection of Diaoyu Is-
lands Movement and the movement to make Chinese the official lan-
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guage in the early 1970s. These nationalistic movements more or less
had anti-colonial implications, and so were the social movements direc-
ted against colonial injustices, the most representative being the anti-
corruption/ anti-Godber movement in 1973-4. Entering the 1970s, resi-
dents’ movements at the neighbourhood level took centre stage. Hous-
ing has been a key issue of concern in densely populated Hong Kong,
and the residents’ movements played a prominent role in the urban so-
cial movements in the 1970s to 1980s (Lui & Kung 1985: 5). Adopting
the social movement theories of Alinsky, the residents’ movement of
this stage used professional community organisers to train and orga-
nise residents’ leaders, mobilised residents by community issues and
used social protest actions to force the government into negotiations
(Fung 1990). The movements ranged from demanding improvement
of living conditions in public housing and squatter areas to resettle-
ment, and to more progressive demands of housing policy. A study of
social conflicts in 1975-86 showed that housing issues were the second
most common area of conflict, only after labour conflicts (Cheung &
Louie 2000: 70). The study also showed that workers, unionists, resi-
dents and community activists were frequently involved in social con-
flicts in this period (Cheung & Louie 2000: 89).
Over the years, the residents’ movements allowed the groups to accu-
mulate experience and resources and stimulated the awareness of resi-
dents. It also left a major legacy for the subsequent social and political
movements in Hong Kong. The advantage of the Alinsky model was
that it did not require a lot of resources or a change in the power con-
figuration of the political system. It stressed empowerment of the
masses by stimulating awareness and participation, and did not need
the intermediation of other political actors. There was a major limita-
tion, though. With the undemocratic nature of the colonial regime, the
residents’ movements in the 1970s had little actual political prowess to
change government policy. With little institutional leverage, the acti-
vists had to rely on mobilising public opinion support to put pressure
on the government. Street-level protests were a major means to attract
media coverage to earn public sympathy and embarrass the govern-
ment. This in the end posed constraints on the form and actions
adopted by the movements: as earning public sympathy was key to
their success, activists were usually loath to take radical or confronta-
tional actions (Luk 1994: 41).
Because of this lack of institutional channels in the 1970s, when de-
mocratisation started in the mid-1980s, the activists saw that as a good
window of opportunity to increase their political leverage and to further
the movement. Many social activists ran in the District Board and Ur-
ban/Regional Council elections in the 1980s and participated actively
in the democracy movement in the 1980s. To them, the democracy
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movement, by demanding the opening up of the political regime so
that the average citizens can share power, was a natural sequel of the
broader social movement. The 1980s thus saw an integration of social
and political movements. At the community level, livelihood concern
groups were formed as alliances of grassroots movement groups in a
wider geographical area. At the societal level, CSOs invariably formed
ad hoc coalitions for territory-wide movements. Social activists also be-
gan to share some institutional power through election into District
Boards and the Urban/Regional Council.
As Lui and Chiu (2000) pointed out, pressure groups at this stage
had little difficulty in joining together to form ad hoc organisations to
fight for a common cause. Although they had different ideological per-
suasions and concern areas, they were all reformist in nature, and saw
various social movements as parts of a larger movement of decolonisa-
tion and regime reform. The limited political opportunities in this era
and the common experience of fighting against a bureaucratic, closed,
colonial administrative state drove them together (Lui & Chiu 2000:
9). For example, the movement to shelve the Daya Bay Nuclear Plant
in 1986, originally an environmental issue, brought together 117
groups from various sectors (see Ma 1999; Scott 1989: 309-316). There
were also better integration and coordination between community
groups from different districts, and between CSOs and the emerging
political society. For example, the People’s Council on Public Housing
Policy (PCPHP) was a pressure group that organised neighbourhood
associations in different districts in the 1980s. It also actively fielded
candidates in the district-level elections in the 1980s and liaised with
pro-democracy political groups during the elections.
The New Social Movements
The 1990s saw a gradual detachment of the political society from the
civil society in Hong Kong. This trend had to do with new trends of de-
velopment within the social movement industry, with a gradually
widening ideological gap between the political parties and the CSOs,
and with the CSOs’ disappointment with the performance and political
effectiveness of the elected legislators in the 1990s. These factors, how-
ever, were mutually reinforcing, leading to new forms of social move-
ment in the 1990s and beyond.
When the District Boards (DBs) were first introduced in the 1980s,
many social activists saw participation in the DB elections as ‘wars of
position’ (Public Policy Research Centre 1985) that were vital to the fu-
ture development of democracy and social movement in Hong Kong.
To these activists, the DB seats represented institutional resources and
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influences that had never been opened for competition, which could be
used to further social and political reforms. They generally believed
that with elected legislators or DB members as allies in the establish-
ment, social mobilisation could bring greater pressure on the govern-
ment to effect policy changes.
After 1991, the CSOs quickly discovered that this was only a myth.
Limited to a minority in most of the elected councils in a partly demo-
cratised regime, the pro-democracy councillors could not bring as
many policy changes as they wished. Electoral politicians’ preferences
or incentives were also different from the social activists. They were
more constrained by the mainstream public opinion and were more
bent on compromise with the government and other groups. Popularly
elected legislators were also loath to support the more radical or con-
frontational actions of some grassroots CSOs. This, coupled with the
trend of ‘new social movement‘ in the social movement industry in the
early 1990s, sped up the detachment of CSOs from political parties.
The early 1990s saw the rise of ‘new social movements’ among
CSOs. It stressed more thorough discussions among the participating
masses about the goals and courses of action, and collective decision-
making among the participants, with the professional organisers taking
a less dominant role. It valued equality between the organisers and the
masses, with a view that the masses, and not the professional activists,
were the true subjects of movements. It emphasised direct dialogue be-
tween the masses and those in power, often with the help of more con-
frontational actions, in the process of which doing away with the med-
iation of politicians or mass media. To these activists, the direct con-
frontation and dialogue would lead to a fundamental resuscitation of
the power relationship within the society among the participants (Luk
1994; Mok & Yu 1996).
The coming of this trend was due to several developments since the
late 1980s. The debate over democratisation and the drafting of the Ba-
sic Law had turned the attention of most Hong Kong people, and in
particular the mass media, towards constitutional and not livelihood is-
sues. The pro-grassroots CSOs found it more and more difficult to at-
tract public and media attention and to arouse public sympathy with
social policy issues. Secondly, the partly elected councils absorbed a lot
of political participation, which drove the masses to become more ‘reli-
ant’ on ‘professional’ politicians to channel their interests, dampening
political participation. However, social activists quickly found out that
the elected politicians were not that effective in influencing govern-
ment policy after all, and may not accurately reflect the interests of the
grassroots citizens. They also found that the media had their own
biases and agendas, which could not be relied upon to articulate the in-
terests of the grassroots (Luk 1994). For these reasons, the new social
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movement activists stressed the initiatives and participation of the
masses to empower them, and believed that direct action confronting
the authorities could transcend the limitations of the media and elected
politicians.
Ideologically, some activists of the new generation have also become
more anti-establishment and particularistic in orientation. Student
movements in Hong Kong after the 1989 Beijing democracy move-
ment bore a new generation of activists who were more anti-establish-
ment, were inclined to less formal and more spontaneous modes of ac-
tion, and preferred to distance themselves from electoral politicians
(Choy et al. 1998). In short, they were more likely to buy into ‘new so-
cial movements’ ideas. Affected by civil society theories of action which
had been in vogue since the late 1980s, they were more inclined to dis-
engage themselves from the formal political institutions. With many of
these student activists serving in the CSOs in the 1990s and beyond,
the CSOs became more single-issue-oriented, had a tendency to shy
away from mainstream politics and from constitutional issues when
compared to their predecessors. They also had more of a ‘not-in-my-
backyard’ mentality, seeing specific policy issues as concerns of their
own individual communities and not broader problems of societal de-
velopment and reform (Lui & Chiu 2000: 13; Lai 2000). They stressed
equality in participation and refused to accept the leadership of the old-
er generation of mainstream democrats, preferring to have a more
pluralistic movement that confronted the establishment on various
fronts.1
The years 1991-95 saw a few incidents where social protesters took
confrontational actions that embarrassed senior government officials.2
For the mainstream democrats who were appealing to the broader elec-
torate, these actions were too radical, and they were generally reluctant
to stand behind these movements. This in turn was seen by the grass-
roots activists as betrayal of the pro-grassroots position by the party pol-
iticians. The failure of the mainstream pro-democracy parties to sup-
port some of these more radical movements led to a gradual detach-
ment of the grassroots CSOs from the pro-democracy parties out of
disappointment. The Democratic Party, the flagship party of the pro-
democracy camp, also grew increasingly middle-class oriented after
1997,3 which partly contributed to its detachment from the pro-democ-
racy unions and other grassroots groups. After 1997, the links between
CSOs and the political society were severed, with little mutual trust be-
tween them. The two became more and more ‘specialised’: the political
parties focusing on the parliamentary and electoral arena and had wea-
kened linkage with grassroots CSOs, while the CSOs did not believe
that the partly elected councils were important battlefields. They pre-
ferred to focus on their sporadic, issue-oriented actions in their own is-
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sue areas. It was also relatively difficult for the CSOs and political
groups to form territory-wide coalitions or movements after 1997, as
they often did in the late 1980s.
New Movement Forms after 1997
The detachment of civil society from the political society does not
mean that the social movements in Hong Kong died down after 1997;
they just took on new forms. After Hong Kong became a Special Ad-
ministrative Region (SAR) of China after 1997, the constitutional
framework more or less provided a shelter for social movements and
civil society activities. The Basic Law guarantees a high level of civil lib-
erties rivalling the West for post-1997 Hong Kong. The international
community sees the preservation of Hong Kong’s freedom as the
benchmark by which ‘One Country, Two Systems’ is judged. Beijing
thus has a genuine incentive to keep Hong Kong’s outlook of freedom
to show the West and Taiwan that it is honouring the promises of ‘One
Country, Two Systems’.
Figures showed that social movements went unabated after 1997. Ta-
ble 3.1 shows that after 1997, there were on average more than 2,200
public meetings and processions every year, an average of 6.3 per day,
most of them protests against government policies or at least expres-
sion of policy demands. At one point, public protests were so frequent
that the international media nicknamed Hong Kong ‘the city of pro-
tests’ (Washington Post 28 June 2000, p.A21).
Post-1997 events showed that the CSOs had been effective in using
protests to resist perceived infringement by the state on civil society.
Human rights activists and pro-democracy politicians were quick to
voice their opposition whenever they perceived that the autonomy of
civil society was going to be curtailed. Professional bodies such as the
Hong Kong Journalist Association and Hong Kong Bar Association
played an important role in defending press freedom and rule of law.
State actions that allegedly infringed on press freedom or rule of law
would immediately receive condemnation from these professional
bodies. The religious sector was also adamant in defending religious
freedom and the freedom of speech. For example, in 2000 the Vatican
canonised 120 foreign missionaries and Chinese Catholics martyred in
China, a move not welcomed by the PRC government. An official of
the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO) in Hong Kong asked
the Hong Kong Catholic Church to adopt a low-key approach. The
move was retorted by the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, which accused
the Chinese government of infringing religious freedom and went
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cult’ from both the pro-Beijing circles and the SAR government in
2000-01,5 the Christian churches stood firm in defending Falun Gong’s
freedom to practice in Hong Kong.
The vibrant civil society and vocal CSOs of Hong Kong were key fac-
tors in defending the autonomy and liberty of Hong Kong after 1997
(Holliday, Ma & Yep 2002). The watchful eye of the foreign govern-
ments and international media certainly played a part, as both the SAR
government and the central government did not want to tarnish Hong
Kong’s international reputation as a free city, and the image of ‘One
Country, Two Systems’ and ‘high autonomy’ in that regard. The CSOs,
however, were less successful in forcing the government to change its
policies. With very limited resources, weak horizontal linkage, little col-
laboration with political parties or elected legislators, and only a partly
elected legislature in an executive-dominant system, it was difficult for
the CSOs to effect changes in government policies.
The post-1997 movement industry saw the rise of ad hoc united
fronts formed by different CSOs in various areas. Most social activists
interviewed by the author said that this organisational form began to
become popular in the mid-1990s. CSOs with similar concerns would
join together for a series of actions, usually over a certain policy issue,
cause or incident. There was generally no formal organisation and few
organisational resources (e.g. usually they do not even have paid staff
for the coalition), and the coalitions usually did not even register as a
formal organisation or registered society. The ad hoc united fronts
usually lasted only months, and would be inactive after the passing of
the issue or the series of actions.
A quantitative survey on the social movements after 1997 showed
that this kind of ad hoc united fronts was very common. Based on
newspaper reports from January 1998 to December 20076, I counted
the frequency of social actions (including street-level protests, signature
campaigns, press conferences, public declarations of positions, peti-
tions to the government or the Legco, legal actions, etc.) involving
CSOs in the name of ‘coalitions’, ‘joint conferences’, ‘united fronts’,
etc. The results showed that a total of 453 such coalitions or united
fronts existed and acted during this period. Altogether they had 1764
counts of social actions, on average 160 social actions every year7 (see
Table 3.2).
There are several interesting observations from this survey of united
front actions. Firstly, a large number of them had very limited counts
of social actions in a span of seven years. A total of 219 fronts (48.3 per
cent of total) only had one action count in 1998-2007. Another 173
(38.2 per cent of total) had no more than five actions, which means
86.5 per cent of these fronts had no more than five actions in a span
of ten years. It was not difficult to explain this phenomenon: many of
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these fronts were ad hoc alliances formed for targeted actions against a
specific event or government policy proposal. After the proposal was
dropped or adopted, these coalitions would invariably cease to operate.
The second observation was that these united fronts covered a wide
range of issues, including education, social welfare, unemployment/
poverty, human rights, democratic development and medical issues,
with these policy areas occupying roughly the same proportions. Practi-
tioners of the same trade or industry in defence of their sectoral or oc-
cupational interests made up about 20 per cent of the fronts or 19 per
cent of the action counts. Thirdly, street-level protests such as demon-
strations, rallies or petitions remained the most popular form of social
action. About 50 per cent of the social actions were street-level protests
(rallies or demonstrations). Direct contact with legislators or officials to
voice complaints accounted for less than 10 per cent of the actions.
On the face of it, this mushrooming of counter united fronts, cover-
ing such a wide range of issues, was a demonstration of societal plural-
ism. However, it was not difficult to conceive that these ad hoc united
fronts usually could not accumulate enough resources for sustained
movements to effect government policy changes. They were mostly
formed to express opinions over specific issues. Many of these group
participants were very conscious of their own group identity and were
not willing to subordinate themselves or devote resources to a com-
manding formal organisation. These united fronts would raise objec-
tions to a specific government policy proposal, maybe forcing the gov-
ernment to reconsider the issue if they succeeded in arousing enough
public attention, but they usually could not sustain their participation
and organisation after the initial flurry was over.
Among the 453 counter united fronts, only 31 (6.8 per cent) had ten
counts or more social actions within ten years. Some of them belonged
Table 3.2 Breakdown of United Front Actions by Areas of Concern
Sector No. of Fronts No. of Actions
Professional/sectoral interests 92 (20.31%) 333 (18.88%)
Welfare 59 (13.02%) 259 (14.68%)
Human Rights 31 (6.84%) 110 (6.24%)
Housing 66 (14.57%) 241 (13.66%)
Education 38 (8.39%) 125 (7.09%)
Medical 15 (3.31%) 53 (3.00%)
Environment 17 (3.75%) 30 (1.70%)
Transport 38 (8.39%) 83 (4.71%)
Labour Issues 21 (4.64%) 179 (10.15%)
Constitutional/ Democratisation 18 (3.97%) 171 (9.69%)
Others 58 (12.80%) 180 (10.20%)
Total 453 1764
Source: Author’s calculation from press reports
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to coalitions of pro-grassroots CSOs, which joined hands to demand
better social welfare and better protection for the lower class. These
more active coalitions had something in common: they usually had a
core of more established CSOs that had a longer history or more re-
sources, which allowed them to sustain the movement for a longer per-
iod of time.
The Struggle Against Article 23: CHRF as a United Front
The political movement against Article 23 legislation is the best case to
illustrate the strengths and limitations of the ad hoc united fronts as a
movement organisational form. The movement was a case of civil so-
ciety in self-defence against perceived encroachment by the state (Ma
2005). It marked a rare occasion after 1997, in which CSOs of different
natures joined together in a territory-wide, loosely organised united
front, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF). The movement saw bet-
ter cooperation between the CSOs and the political society, culminating
in the largest indigenous social movement in Hong Kong history.8
For many of the pro-democracy or liberal CSOs, the government’s
proposal on national security legislation in September 2002 (also
known as Article 23 legislation) was an attempt by the government to
control civil society and curtail societal freedom. On 13 September
2002, more than 30 groups formed the Civil Human Rights Front
(CHRF). (Some groups joined later to make the total number of 44
groups by July 2003.) The CHRF was meant to be a roundtable that
could serve as a platform for groups concerned with human rights is-
sues to discuss actions to promote human rights, but when the consul-
tation document on Article 23 legislation was published in September
2002, the CHRF quickly focused its attention on Article 23.
The CHRF typified the organisation, strengths and limitations of the
counter united front as a movement organisation format. The member
groups of CHRF were highly diversified, with very different back-
grounds and widely different views on Article 23 legislation. The 44
groups by July 2003 included human rights groups (four of the 44),
political groups/parties (ten), professional unions (three), religious
groups (six), labour groups (four), student groups (three), feminist, gay
and lesbian groups (seven), and others. The more radical groups such
as the April 5th Movement (a local ‘Trotskyist’ group) rejected any kind
of national security legislation. The human rights groups did not see a
need for Hong Kong to legislate for China’s national security, and
claimed that it should only be enacted when the SAR government was
democratically elected. More moderate members such as the Demo-
cratic Party (DP) agreed in principle to enact laws related to Article 23,
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but demanded that the government should publish a draft legislation
for consultation, in the form of a White Bill, before tabling the legisla-
tive proposals to the Legco.
The operation of the CHRF resembled many of the loosely united
fronts of the liberal CSOs after 1997. It operated in the spirit of inter-
nal democracy and equal participation. Most decisions on CHRF ac-
tions were made in the CHRF plenary meeting, participated in by all
the member groups, in which each member group equally had one
vote. More established members, such as the DP that had 11 Legco
members in 2002-03, or the Hong Kong Professional Teachers Union
that had about 80,000 members by 2003, had the same voting rights
as the non-registered Hong Kong Voice of Democracy that had only
several members. The CHRF had only one full-time paid staff through-
out the campaign against Article 23, and all its actions were manned
by volunteers of the member groups.
The wide range of opinions among member groups means it was
difficult for the CHRF to reach a consensus on many positional issues.
The only consensus was that they objected to the contents of the pro-
posed legislation, since they generally believed that it would hurt hu-
man rights in Hong Kong.9 The united front format, however, allowed
the different groups to reach out to their respective publics, with their
own agendas and action plans, under the overall vague banner of ‘op-
posing Article 23 legislation’.
The mainstream democrats, represented by the Democratic Party
(DP), who used to lead the democracy movement and political move-
ments in the 1980s, more or less took a back seat. The DP thought the
struggle against Article 23 could be used to rekindle the democracy
movement, to show to Hong Kong people that a non-elected govern-
ment could pass laws that inhibit people’s freedom.10 However, the DP
adopted a conscious strategy to refrain from taking the leadership in
this movement. They understood that quite a few CSOs had a deep
mistrust and suspicions against political parties in general, and against
DP in particular, and a DP-led movement would not attract their parti-
cipation. Many younger activists would not accept their leadership, or
were reluctant to accept any leadership whatsoever. The DP saw the
CHRF format as one that could enlist the support of more civil groups
in a movement for a general cause, and the days were long gone when
civil groups would accept a centralised leadership by the older genera-
tion of leaders.11
The CHRF experience epitomised a pluralistic form of mobilisation
by the new generation of social movement. Because the contents of the
National Security Bill covered a wide range of areas, it aroused concern
from various social sectors.12 Human rights activists and pro-democ-
racy politicians saw the government proposals as detrimental to Hong
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Kong‘s civil liberties. Journalists were afraid that they could easily fall
prey to ‘sedition’ or ‘theft of state secrets’ charges with the vague defini-
tion in the Bill. Academics feared that research on China could consti-
tute ‘theft of state secrets’, and discussions on Tibet or Taiwan indepen-
dence could become ‘inciting secession’. The Catholic Church was
worried about the proscription of links with ‘mainland political organi-
sations’, as they had a lot of links with ‘underground churches’ on the
mainland. Even university librarians were worried that they could
easily be guilty of ‘handling seditious publications’.
The Article 23 legislation led to a re-awakening of civil society, mobi-
lising different sectors to join the opposition movement. Under the
platform format of the CHRF, many member groups could ‘agree to
disagree’ and devised their own action plans and mobilised their own
publics without agreeing on a common specific position or concerted
course of action. The Catholic Church mobilised their local churches to
discuss the contents of the Bill. The legislators took up the battle in
the parliamentary arena, as their lengthy questioning of the details of
the Bill led to outbursts from government officials in the chamber, add-
ing fuel to the already burning opposition movement. The DP used
many of their 94 ward offices for community-level mobilisation. In the
weeks before the July 1st march, the DP managed to collect phone
numbers of about 40,000 supporters, and their volunteers and staff
called them up one by one to call on them to join the July 1st demon-
stration.13 The Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) and some leading
barristers made serious efforts to explain the problems with the Bill in
public forums and in the media. In later stages they reached out to
other professional bodies and secondary schools to explain the pro-
blems with the Bill.14 In the last two weeks of June 2003, more and
more professional leaders openly called on their members to join the
July 1st protest, including academics, journalist bodies, medical doctors,
schoolteachers, accountants, social workers, film directors, artists, stu-
dent bodies, and religious groups. My survey of the major newspapers
of June 2003 showed that in that month, 162 groups had openly urged
support for the July 1st demonstration by issuing public statements or
newspaper advertisements.15
A lot of the mobilisation was done through interpersonal channels
and through the cyberspace. Ng Gene-bond was a Form Six student in
June 2003, student union president of his secondary school. One week
before July 1, he got the impression from various Internet newsgroups
and chat rooms commonly visited by teenagers that many teenagers
were really angry about Article 23 legislation. He then set up a website
to call on secondary school students to march together, and spread the
message on various teenager-favoured websites, newsgroups or chat
rooms. Within one week he got more than 100 volunteers, whom he
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had not known before, but who helped him to relay the message
through their own interpersonal networks or through cyberspace. On 1
July 2003, more than 2,000 teenagers showed up at the ‘meeting
point’ for the secondary school students, and they marched together. A
survey of 1,154 participants of the July 1st march showed that 68 per
cent saw interpersonal influences as an important factor that motivated
them to join the march, while 54 per cent saw ‘calls from the Internet’
(including electronic mails from friends) as important. Both channels
had higher percentages than ‘calls from family members’ (51 per cent)
and ‘calls from political parties’ (44 per cent) (Chan & Chung 2003: 9).
This showed that mobilisation through the Internet had become a new
and important channel of mobilisation in social movements in Hong
Kong.
Limitations of the United Front Format
However, the CHRF format exposed its own limitations after the Arti-
cle 23 legislation was defeated.16 The democrats lost no time in trying
to convert the movement against Article 23 into a full-fledged democ-
racy movement after the July 1st march. The rally on 9 July 2003,
joined by 50,000 people, put forward clear goals of universal suffrage
election for the Chief Executive in 2007, and for the whole Legco in
2008. However, it was not so easy for the CHRF to be converted into a
united front for pushing democratic reforms.
Immediately after the July 2003 march, when the CHRF discussed
focussing its next task on demanding full democracy, some of the
member groups were reluctant to join. For example, the Hong Kong
Journalist Association saw itself as a professional association, and con-
sidered it inappropriate to join as a member of a coalition for democ-
racy movement. The Hong Kong chapter of Amnesty International, fol-
lowing the principles set by its headquarters, did not want to join do-
mestic political campaigns. Quite a few of the grassroots CSOs were
afraid that the movement and the CHRF platform would be usurped
by the mainstream democrats to push their own political agendas.
They were wary that the movement was being quickly transformed to
one of chiefly political or constitutional concern, paying little attention
to livelihood or class issues.17 As a result, the member groups failed to
agree to transform CHRF into a full-fledged united front to push dem-
ocratic reforms.
The beginning of 2003 saw a politicisation of the CHRF and the
campaign. The landslide victory of the democrats in the District Coun-
cil election of November 2003 and the large turnout of the 1 January
2004 rally posed great encouragements for the political movement.
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The central government staged a propaganda campaign against the de-
mocrats in early 2004, which heightened political pressure on the pro-
democracy camp as a whole. However, the CHRF still failed to consoli-
date into a more formal organisation.
In mid-2004, some members proposed that CHRF should register
as a legal society under the Societies Ordinance in Hong Kong. The
idea was discussed in the CHRF general meeting but was turned down
by the plenary meeting on 14 August 2004. It showed the extent to
which some of the member groups detested formalisation and pre-
ferred an ad hoc form of organisation. Core participants of the CHRF
revealed that many smaller CSOs feared a formal organisation would
be dominated by the larger and better funded groups, and did not want
to devote their resources to a common secretariat or formal organisa-
tion. They preferred to keep the ad hoc form of organisation, which al-
lowed them to leave the movement at any time should they find it de-
viating from their goals. The mutual trust between the small CSOs and
the mainstream democrats were just too weak for them to form a long-
term partnership and formalised organisation.18
However, this ad hoc form proved unable to sustain the movement.
After July 2004 the democracy movement entered a recession. Intran-
sigence of the central government on the issue of constitutional reform
led to a gradual de-mobilisation of the political movement. By 2008,
the CHRF was reduced to a very loose alliance, with very little partici-
pation from its member groups. Its major role was to hold the annual
July 1st march, which by 2008 had become an annual occasion of civil
society action and voicing of grievances from different social groups
and sectors, somewhat ‘commemorating the “spirit” of the 2003
march’.
Core participants of CHRF reflected on the weakness of this organi-
sational form in leading a territory-wide movement. They pointed out
that while the form was flexible and organic, allowing maximum parti-
cipation of groups without having a high level of consensus, the form
did not have a stable core. Without a stable and well-funded core, the
front was very dependent on the political climate or the initiative of in-
dividual well-funded groups. ‘When the issue or climate was here,
everybody would come and tried to gain something from the move-
ment. When the climate was not there, it would just fall apart,’ said
Chong Yiu-kwong, CHRF convener from October 2004 to September
2005. It was relatively difficult for this organisational form to sustain a
movement for long periods of time.19
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Conclusion
Hong Kong is different from most non-democracies. It has a long tra-
dition of free civil society and rule of law, and the post-1997 constitu-
tion, the Basic Law, guarantees Western-style civil liberties. This pro-
vides shelter for social movements and opposition activities in Hong
Kong. Attempts by the State to encroach on civil liberties will invariably
meet with societal resistance, as in the case of Article 23 legislation in
2002-03. However, although the civil society in Hong Kong is vibrant
and pluralistic, it has relatively weak organisational resources and hori-
zontal linkage. The historical development of social movement in
Hong Kong also led to a detachment of the political society from civil
society, and a lack of mutual trust between CSOs and political parties.
This made it difficult for CSOs to form a territory-wide formalised or-
ganisation to push for progressive social and political reforms. The ad
hoc alliance format is effective as a short-term means to fend off en-
croachment on civil society, as it can coordinate CSOs of similar per-
suasions with relatively low costs, and allow them to mobilise their
own respective publics with due respect to their differences. It is, how-
ever, difficult for this organisational form to accumulate enough re-
sources, experience or mutual trust to build a strong and sustained
movement. Social movement in Hong Kong is bound to be sporadic,
spontaneous, and dependent on the initiative of individual participants,
which makes it difficult to effect institutional changes.
This has profound implications for state-society relations in Hong
Kong. While the constitutional rights and political environment allow
the civil society to maintain its autonomy, the inadequacy of the
electoral institutions and the low integration of civil society mean it is
relatively difficult to push policy changes from below. The CSOs saw
themselves in the light of the opposition, and will continue to have a
more confrontational relationship with the state. The gap between state
and society will persist, as political participation is not effectively chan-
nelled by the existing institutions. Without fundamental political re-
forms, it is difficult to conceive how the current strained state-society
relationship of Hong Kong can be solved.
China is entering a development stage that somewhat resembles
Hong Kong in the early 1970s. Rapid modernisation and industrialisa-
tion have led to various social problems and a gap between public ser-
vices and public expectations. Society is in a stage of liberalisation, but
the power structure remains little changed. The trend of liberalisation
allows the nascent civil society much more room to stage protests, but
the general political environment or the geographical size makes hori-
zontal linkages very difficult. It is possible that the current stage of
sporadic, spontaneous and particularistic protests in China will con-
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tinue for some time. The lesson from Hong Kong is that without better
institutionalisation to bridge the gap between state and society, and/or
incorporation of social groups to form more organic policy commu-
nities, these amorphous CSOs can be driven to become more confron-
tational, leading to a more strained state-society relationship.
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4 Social Movements and the Law
in Post-Colonial Hong Kong
Albert H.Y. Chen
Introduction
Social movements are an important social and political phenomenon
in the contemporary world. Many sociologists, political scientists and
historians have contributed to the study of social movements. As re-
gards the relationship between social movements and the law, Michael
McCann has pointed out in his discussion of a number of social move-
ments that ‘legal norms, discourses, and practices in each case were an
important constitutive element of evolving movement understandings,
aspirations, and strategic action’ (McCann 1998a: 84). In the post-colo-
nial era, the law has become an increasingly prominent arena of social
movement activities in Hong Kong. It is the purpose of this chapter to
undertake a preliminary exploration of social movements and the law
in Hong Kong.
My inquiry will proceed in the following manner. In Part I, I will
consider briefly the definition of ‘social movements’ and the history of
social movements in Hong Kong. Part II of the chapter studies the re-
lationship between social movements and the law. It is intended to pro-
vide the general theoretical foundation for the work in the remainder
of the chapter. Part III will comment on the development of Hong
Kong’s legal system in the post-colonial era and on its relevance to so-
cial movements. It will also provide some case studies of law and social
movements in post-colonial Hong Kong. Finally, part IV will offer
some concluding reflections.
Social Movements and Hong Kong
According to Charles Tilly (2004), social movements were a new politi-
cal phenomenon that first emerged in Western Europe and North
America in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Tilly points out that a
social movement consists of a distinctive combination of three ele-
ments: a) campaign; b) repertoire; and c) WUNC displays (‘WUNC’
being the abbreviation of worthiness, unity, numbers and commit-
ment). The campaign is ‘a sustained, organised public effort making
collective claims on target authorities’ (Tilly 2004: 3). The repertoire of
a social movement refers to the ‘employment of combinations from
among the following forms of political action: creation of special-pur-
pose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions,
vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in
public media, and pamphleteering’ (Tilly 2004: 3). Finally, the WUNC
displays are public representations of WUNC by the participants in the
social movement on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies
(Tilly 2004: 4).
A better understanding of social movements can perhaps be arrived
at by combining Tilly’s definition with that offered by Della Porta and
Diani (1999), according to whom social movements are informal net-
works of interaction among people based on shared beliefs, solidarity
and a common sense of collective identity, who mobilise for conflictual
issues for the purpose of collective action to promote social change,
and make frequent use of various forms of protest and public means
of confrontation. This definition explains that a social movement need
not be tightly organised,1 and the existence of an informal network suf-
fices. It also supplements Tilly’s definition by pointing to the impor-
tance for a social movement of a belief system and a sense of collective
identity among its participants (Melucci 1988, 1989).
The 1970s have been described as the ‘Golden Age’ for social move-
ments in Hong Kong (Butenhoff 1999: 25). According to Benjamin
Leung (1996: 148-9), the colonial government’s expanded role in the
provision of social services since the mid-1970s resulted in an increas-
ing frequency of social conflict and protest actions in areas such as
housing, transport, the environment and education. The most signifi-
cant social movements in the 1970s were the student movement
(Leung 1992; Leung 1996: 155-8), the housing movement (a movement
of residents of public housing estates to improve their housing condi-
tions) (Lui & Kung 1985; Ho 2000), and the public sector labour move-
ment (Leung & Chiu 1991; Levin & Chiu 2000). In a leading work on
social movements in Hong Kong, Lui Tai-lok and Stephen Chiu (2000:
3, 5) summarise their findings as follows:
[W]hile observers of Hong Kong politics are busy with the con-
struction of explanations of political stability,2 waves after waves
of collective actions – from student activism to urban protests
and organised actions of civil service unions – have been wit-
nessed in this so-called politically quiescent society since the
1970s. (...) In our review of the development of social move-
ments in contemporary Hong Kong, I suggest that the emer-
gence of collective actions in the 1960s and 1970s was largely
an outcome of social and political changes within Hong Kong
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society. Subsequent development in the 1980s and 1990s, espe-
cially changes brought about by the process of decolonisation,
has significantly politicised popular mobilisation and collective
actions.
The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 and the colo-
nial government’s policy in the 1980s to develop representative govern-
ment in Hong Kong by opening up the political system to electoral pol-
itics resulted in a changed structure of political opportunities for social
movements in Hong Kong, ‘new rules of the game’ (Lui 1994: 75) and
a new agenda for participants in Hong Kong politics. Most social
movement organisations ‘switched to the political participation mode’
(Lui 1994: 76) in the sense of participating in electoral politics and try-
ing to pursue their agendas through institutional channels such as Dis-
trict Boards and the Legislative Council. Social movement activists be-
came elected politicians instead (Lui & Chiu 2000: 12). Generally
speaking, there was a ‘decline of grass roots protest groups’ and ‘a “hol-
lowing out” of political organisation at the grassroots level’ (Lui & Chiu
2000: 12).
In 1989, the student movement in Beijing and its suppression on
the 4th of June provoked a series of massive demonstrations of an un-
precedented scale in Hong Kong’s history. However, this pro-Chinese
democracy movement was not able to sustain itself in the 1990s de-
spite the well-attended annual vigils in memory of the victims of the
4th of June (Lui & Chiu 2000: 12-3; Wong 2000). On the other hand,
constitutional reforms and the drafting of the Basic Law in the 1980s
stimulated the development of a pro-democracy movement in Hong
Kong (Butenhoff 1999). However, the pro-democracy movement of
Hong Kong was also unable to sustain itself in the 1990s (Lui & Chiu
2000: 13; Sing 2000) despite Governor Christopher Patten’s ambitious
programme for electoral reform which met stiff resistance from the
Chinese side. The 1980s and 1990s also saw the decline of the student
movement (Leung 2000), although in these decades the environmental
movement (Lui & Chiu 2000: 13; Lai 2000) and feminist movement
(Lui & Chiu 2000: 13; Lee 2000) began to assert themselves in Hong
Kong.
After 1997, the economic downturn and the growing dissatisfaction
with the Tung Chee-hwa administration gave rise to an increasing
number of demonstrations and other forms of social protest (Lui &
Chiu 2000: 14-6; So 2002), culminating in the march of half a million
people on the 1st of July 2003 against the proposed national security
law and in the subsequent assemblies and marches demanding the in-
troduction of universal suffrage for the election of the Chief Executive
and all members of the Legislative Council.
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Despite the ‘explosion of social protests’ (So 2002: 407) in the post-
1997 era, it is arguable whether, in general, social movements have
gained in strength after Hong Kong became a Special Administrative
Region. Indeed, unless we define social movements loosely as collec-
tive activities involving public protest and demonstrations, it seems
that there are few social movements in Hong Kong, for many social
protest actions in Hong Kong do not satisfy the more elaborate defini-
tions of social movements discussed above. In the discussion below of
social movements and the law in post-colonial Hong Kong, I follow the
conventional usage of scholars of social movements in Hong Kong and
use a low threshold for the purpose of recognising social movements.
Activities that are usually referred to as social movements in the exist-
ing literature on social movements in Hong Kong are deemed to be so-
cial movements in the following discussion.
Social Movements and the Law
Is it possible to develop a general theoretical framework for under-
standing the relationship between social movements and the law? In
this part, I will first look at how the general theories of social move-
ments may be relevant to this understanding, and then examine the
work of one scholar who specialises in studying law and social move-
ments.
The ‘classical model’ of social movements (Doug McAdam 1982,
1999) was premised on theories of collective behaviour and ‘mass so-
ciety’ that emphasise the structural strains in society and the social psy-
chology of its inhabitants. Such theories throw light on the rise of Naz-
ism and Fascism in Europe before the Second World War. With the
Civil Rights Movements in the USA in the 1960s, the student activism
in Europe and America in 1968 and the ‘new social movements’ (By-
rne 1997: 12) such as feminist, environmental and peace movements,
social movements began to be perceived in a positive light. New per-
spectives were developed by European scholars studying how social
movements respond to the crises of postmodern or post-industrial so-
ciety in advanced Western nations (Touraine 1981). In America, the
paradigms for the study of social movements became shaped by re-
source mobilisation theory and political processes theory. It is these lat-
ter two approaches that seem to be most relevant to the study of law
and social movements.
The insight contributed by resource mobilisation theory is that
whereas structural strains and grievances exist in almost every society,
they do not necessarily lead to social movements. The formation and
development of any social movement depend on effective organisation
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and the mobilisation of resources. Given the existence of a particular
socio-political environment and certain resources at their disposal, the
leaders and participants of a social movement must act rationally and
strategically in order to maximise their influence and to achieve their
goals.
There are at least four ways in which resource mobilisation theory
can throw light on the relationship between law and social movements.
First, depending on whether the legal system is repressive or respectful
of civil liberties, the legal system may either constrain or facilitate mo-
bilisation for a social movement.
[P]olitical freedoms, and the extent of repression by agents of so-
cial control (...) may affect the costs for any individual or organi-
sation allocating resources to the SMS [social movement sector],
serve as constraints on or facilitators of the use of resources for
social movement purposes. (McCarthy & Zald 1987: 26)
Second, litigation may be used as one of the strategies of a social move-
ment, as in the initial phase of the American civil rights movement
(Locher 2002: 273-9; Eyerman & Jamison 1991: 122, 125). Third, inso-
far resource mobilisation theory points out that the use of the media
by a social movement is a significant factor (McCarthy & Zald 1987: 15,
31), litigation or other law-related strategies may generate media atten-
tion and thus attention by members of the public to the issues raised
by the social movement. Finally, resource mobilisation theory recog-
nises that resources include ‘legitimacy, money, facilities, and labour’
(McCarthy & Zald 1987: 22) and both ‘material and symbolic resources’
(Della Porta & Diani 1999: 8); the expression of the demands of a so-
cial movement in legal discourse (particularly the discourse of rights)
or victories in court battles may be quite effective in conferring legiti-
macy on the movement and constitute an important symbolic resource
of the movement.
Political processes theory stresses that social movements are essen-
tially political phenomena and may therefore be studied in ways similar
to those applicable to other political phenomena such as ‘institution-
alised political processes’ (McAdam 1999: 36). What needs to be studied
therefore includes the interaction and alignment of different political ac-
tors within the system and their response to the social movement. The
importance of the internal dynamics of development of a social move-
ment is recognised by this theory, but it also pays particular attention to
the external political environment in which a social movement finds it-
self, or what it calls the ‘structure of political opportunities’. Changes in
this structure may have a significant impact on a social movement and
may sometimes be able to account for its rise and fall. For example, such
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changes may result in a sudden opening up of the political system which
may either be intentional or unintentional (Garner 1996: 50), under-
mine its stability or otherwise improve the bargaining position or politi-
cal leverage of the constituents of a social movement (McAdam 1999:
42-3).
Like resource mobilisation theory, political processes theory demon-
strates that a legal system – as part of the structure of political opportu-
nities for a social movement – that is repressive will increase the ‘risks
associated with movement participation’ (McAdam 1999: 43) and thus
constrain the development of a social movement. Apart from this
point, political processes theory also contributes at least two other in-
sights into the relationship between law and social movements. First,
according to political processes theory, the law-related aspects of the
structure of political opportunities to be studied include not only ‘the
state’s capacity for and tendency toward repression’ (Locher 2002:
267), but also ‘the relative weight and independence of judicial, legisla-
tive, and executive branches in governments’ (Garner 1996: 52). Thus,
the constitutional role of the courts in a particular legal system and, in
particular, whether the judiciary is independent, activist and willing to
develop new legal doctrines to meet the demands of particular social
movements may become highly relevant to the development of a social
movement. In countries such as the USA where the judiciary is indeed
powerful and activist, social movements are more likely to resort to liti-
gation as a means for social reform.
Second, political processes theory points out that an important factor
in the formation of a social movement is ‘cognitive liberation’ (Mc-
Adam 1999: 48) or ‘the subjective transformation of consciousness’
into an ‘insurgent consciousness’ (McAdam 1999: 38, 40). When this
insight is combined with discourse theory, which demonstrates that
the language and discourse that people use shape their interpretation
of their life experience, their perception of the meaning of events and
construct the social reality in which they live (Garner 1996: 15-16), it is
possible to understand how legal discourse matters for social move-
ments. This point has been further elaborated by Michael McCann’s
work on law and social movements to which I now turn.
Drawing upon various studies by scholars of law and social move-
ments and his own empirical research on the movement for gender-
based wage equity in the USA, McCann (1998a; 1998b; 2004) has de-
veloped a fairly comprehensive theory of the relationship between law
and social movements. The theory is largely based on American experi-
ence but can serve as a useful starting point for our inquiry later in this
chapter into law and social movements in Hong Kong.
McCann’s theory should be viewed against the background of the
prevailing ‘leftist’ or ‘progressive’ view of law and social movements
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which has been largely shaped by Marxism and critical legal studies.
According to this view, law legitimises hegemonic social hierarchies
and relations of domination and is thus a negative force in relation to
social movements that try to promote social change and justice. Doubt
is cast on the use of litigation as a means of social reform, because liti-
gation depends on elites such as lawyers and judges whereas true re-
form should and will only come from mass mobilisation. The structure
of the law and of legal institutions itself restricts the opportunities for
challenge of the existing system and its radical transformation, and
eventual defeat in court battles will also be a severe blow to a social
movement. It is also said that litigation diverts precious resources and
attention from alternative tactics involving mass participation in the so-
cial movements themselves.
While not disputing the validity of these critical ideas, McCann
points out that the law can be a double-edged sword for social move-
ments. The law is itself a medium and arena of social struggles, and it
need not be assumed that forces opposing change and progress will al-
ways win in this arena.3 In particular, both legal discourse and litiga-
tion may be turned into a positive resource by a social movement that
is striving to change the status quo. Thus, litigation may be used by so-
cial movements as a strategy that supplements the use of non-institu-
tional channels of mass protests such as marches and demonstrations.
Legal norms and rights discourse may be used by social movements as
positive resources in mobilising support and making gains in social
struggles against the existing system.
McCann (1998a: 83) points out, for example, that the law may have
a lot to do with the formation of a social movement, particularly in
shaping a legal consciousness and a politics of rights which help mobi-
lise support. Legal discourse may be drawn on ‘to name and to chal-
lenge existing social wrongs or injustices’ or to forge a ‘sense of collec-
tive aspiration and identity’ among movement participants (McCann
1998a: 83). It is pointed out that legal norms contributed significantly
to framing movement demands or shaping movement identity in the
civil rights movement in America, the early American labour move-
ment, the women’s movement, the welfare rights movement, the ani-
mal rights movement, and the gay and lesbian rights movements
(McCann 1998a: 84).
The insight contributed by Marxism and critical legal studies to our
understanding of law is that law is largely an instrument of the ruling
elite for the purpose of maintaining its domination, and legal thinking
and discourse – which reflect the interests and worldview of the domi-
nant class – performs an ideological function in shaping the conscious-
ness and beliefs of the oppressed and persuading them to accept the
existing system as natural and legitimate. McCann however points out
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that legal concepts, norms and discourse may at least in some circum-
stances be effectively exploited by social movements in order to chal-
lenge the existing system. This is because law is ‘a quite malleable
medium’ (McCann 2004: 508).4
McCann also analyses the multifold functions of litigation as a possi-
ble strategy of social movements, particularly as ‘a source of institu-
tional and symbolic leverage against opponents’ (McCann 2004: 513).
First, the publicity associated with litigation will enable the issues
which the social movement is concerned about to ‘get on the public
agenda’ (McCann 1998a: 92) or will even to serve to mobilise public
opinion in support of the movement. It is noted that ‘the mass media
tend to be particularly responsive to rights claims and litigation cam-
paigns for social justice, although this evidence is primarily limited to
the US experience’ (McCann 2004: 511).5
Second, as in the case of litigation in other contexts, the threat or in-
itiation of court proceedings may already be able to extract concessions
or a compromise from the other side. The party sued will have to
weigh the costs and benefits of contesting the plaintiff’s claim, the risk
of losing the court battle, and the adverse publicity if the plaintiff’s
claim is perceived by the general public as legitimate or ultimately up-
held in court (McCann 1998a: 91).
Third, if the social movement is able to win some court battles, this
will serve to strengthen the movement by further publicising and con-
ferring legitimacy on its claims, rallying further public support, and
demonstrating that the existing system which the movement seeks to
change is indeed vulnerable and changeable. Litigation can thus contri-
bute to shape – in the terminology of the political processes theory of
social movements – ‘the overall “opportunity structure” within which
[social] movements develop’ (McCann 1998a: 84). It is interesting that
McCann points out that it is not necessary that the judicial victory be
‘conclusive’ and ‘far-reaching’ (McCann 1998a: 86), but even ‘small ad-
vances’ (McCann 1998a: 93) in litigation might be sufficient to enable
the social movement to reap gains.6
Given these strategic advantages which a social movement may be
able to gain from litigation, it is not surprising that it has not only be-
come a popular tool of social movements in the USA, but there has
been ‘a rise of legal leveraging as a key tactic of social movement poli-
tics around the globe’ (McCann 2004: 515). In the USA itself, litigation
associated with several social movements has resulted in substantial
and far-reaching changes in the doctrines of American constitutional
law (Eskridge 2002). However, McCann also points out that the use of
litigation as a strategy might entail considerable risks for a social move-
ment.
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[L]egal gambits are hardly costless guarantees of success for so-
cial reformers (...) Initiating legal action (...) may commit move-
ment supporters to long, costly, high-risk legal proceedings that
they can afford far less than can their institutional foes. Even
more important, eventual defeat in official forums can sap
movement morale, undercut movement bargaining power, and
exhaust movement resources. (McCann 2004: 514)
McCann (1998a: 93) refers to several ‘examples where legal tactics
either failed to generate, or even impeded, progressive change’.
Social Movements and the Law in Hong Kong
In the colonial era, the British legal model and the English common
law were transplanted to Hong Kong. The British tradition of the Rule
of Law and of the independence of the judiciary provided a strong
foundation for Hong Kong’s legal system (Tsang 2001). However, for
most of the time during Hong Kong’s history as a colony, the people of
Hong Kong did not enjoy the full extent of civil liberties enjoyed by the
British people themselves (Wacks 1988). As in other ceded colonies
forming part of the British Empire, the nature of colonial rule was
authoritarian (Miners 1986), with a high degree of concentration of
power in the hands of the Governor appointed by London (Wesley-
Smith 1995). Laws on sedition, assemblies and associations were draco-
nian, although they were not always strictly enforced (Chen 1989a,
1990a). Furthermore, the operation of the legislative and judicial sys-
tems in the English language made local inhabitants feel that the legal
system was alien and imposed on them (Chen 1989b).
The 1980s however saw a fundamental change in Hong Kong’s legal
culture, particularly in public attitudes towards issues relating to the
Rule of Law. The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984
and the prospects of reunification with China alerted the people of
Hong Kong to the fact that the level of the Rule of Law and the protec-
tion of individuals’ rights in mainland China was much lower than in
Hong Kong, and there was a real danger that the human rights situa-
tion in Hong Kong would deteriorate upon Hong Kong’s return to
China. The people of Hong Kong therefore began to treasure the legal
system which they had inherited from the British colonisers, and to
make efforts to safeguard and strengthen it in preparation for the chal-
lenges of 1997. There was a legal awakening in Hong Kong, a rise in
rights consciousness. Law-related current affairs attracted increasing
media and public attention (Chen & Chan 1987; Chen 1990b). A num-
ber of legal controversies in the 1980s testified to the increasing vigi-
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lance of members of the public with regard to human rights and fun-
damental freedoms (Chen 1988b; Chan 1990).
In 1989, the 4th of June suppression of the student movement in
Beijing brought about an unprecedented crisis of confidence in Hong
Kong. One of the measures taken by the British colonial government
to alleviate the difficult situation was the enactment of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991, which incorporated into the domestic
law of Hong Kong the human rights guarantees in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Under this new legal regime of
the constitutional protection of human rights, the courts of Hong Kong
acquired and began to exercise for the first time the power to review
the validity of local legislation on the ground of its inconsistency with
international standards of human rights (Chen 2000: 418-20). As in
other jurisdictions, the opportunity of constitutional review rendered
the courts of Hong Kong more assertive and activist in ensuring that
the law should strike the proper balance between the rights and liber-
ties of individuals on the one hand and the collective interest of society
on the other. A body of jurisprudence and principles of constitutional
interpretation were gradually built up through the accumulation of
case law (Ghai 1997a; Chan 1998; Byrnes 2000). At the same time,
the government conducted a thorough review of existing legislation as
regards its compliance with the Bill of Rights and introduced relevant
amendments to liberalise the law. In retrospect, the most significant
amendments were those made to the Societies Ordinance and the Pub-
lic Order Ordinance, which the Chinese side found to be objectionable,
with the result that the amendments were partially reversed at the time
of the handover in 1997 (Chen 2002: 216).
The Basic Law – the constitutional instrument of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region – restricts the right of individual mem-
bers of the Legislative Council to introduce private members’ bills relat-
ing to government policy.7 In the last weeks before the Basic Law came
into effect in July 1997, the Legislative Council that had been elected
in 1995 in a fairly democratic manner pursuant to the political reforms
introduced by Governor Chris Patten rushed through a number of pri-
vate members’ bills which turned out to be significant in the post-1997
era. An example was the amendment of the Housing Ordinance for
the purpose of ensuring that the rent payable by tenants of public
housing estates in Hong Kong was affordable to them. Another exam-
ple was the enactment of the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance
which declares the Victoria Harbour to be a ‘special public asset and a
natural heritage of Hong Kong people’ and discourages land reclama-
tion within the Harbour. Laws like these, when enforced before the
courts, enable the courts to play a major role in shaping social policies
in Hong Kong in the post-1997 era. This reinforces the already en-
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hanced role of the courts resulting from constitutional review of laws
on human rights grounds as mentioned above and from the protection
given by the Basic Law to various interests and its entrenchment of var-
ious policies.8 Generally speaking, therefore, Hong Kong courts in the
post-1997 era have addressed difficult issues of public policy more than
ever before. Opportunities for social movements to challenge the exist-
ing order or existing policies by means of litigation have also become
greater than ever before.
I will consider below several episodes in the post-1997 legal history
of Hong Kong which illustrate the interaction between social move-
ments and the law. The incidents concerned are classified into the fol-
lowing categories: 1) law as a means to control social movements; 2)
law as a weapon of social movements; 3) law as the contextual environ-
ment of social movements.
Law as a Means to Control Social Movements
As discussed above, the law may constrain the space for social move-
ments by limiting the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, procession
and association without which social movements can hardly mobilise
mass support. In post-colonial Hong Kong, one prominent domain of
legal struggles that is relevant to the space for social movements is that
constituted by the Public Order Ordinance and the Societies Ordi-
nance, which regulate the freedoms of assembly, procession and asso-
ciation. As mentioned above, the colonial laws in these areas were ori-
ginally strict but were liberalised in the 1990s as part of the exercise to
ensure that all existing Hong Kong laws were consistent with the new-
ly enacted Bill of Rights. However, on the eve of Hong Kong’s reunifi-
cation with China, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing
Committee, exercising its power under the Basic Law of Hong Kong to
determine which existing Hong Kong laws could not survive the hand-
over (Ghai 1997b; Ghai 1999: 379-86), decided not to adopt the major
amendments made to the Societies Ordinance and the Public Order
Ordinance in July 1992 and July 1995, respectively.9 The NPC Stand-
ing Committee’s action met stern protests from civil society in Hong
Kong.
Although the NPC Standing Committee nullified the amendments
introduced in the 1990s to the Societies Ordinance and Public Order
Ordinance, it did not actually mandate the restoration of these laws to
their pre-amendment version. A new version of societies and public or-
der legislation for the SAR was enacted by the Provisional Legislative
Council (PLC) on 14 June 1997 in the form of the Societies (Amend-
ment) Ordinance 1997 and the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance
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1997. The new version to a considerable extent preserved the improve-
ments and liberalisations made in the 1992 and 1995 amendments.10
The requirement in the revised law of a ‘notice of no objection’ in
the case of public processions proved to be controversial (Brabyn
2002). In the years following 1997, some demonstrators tried to test
the law by deliberately not applying for a notice of no objection before
the demonstration. Some omitted to do so through neglect or due to
the urgency of the demonstration. It has been pointed out that 126 pro-
tests were organised in 1998 and 183 protests in 1999 without apply-
ing for any notice of no objection (So 2002: 405). However, the govern-
ment did not prosecute any of the organisers. Other organisers of dem-
onstrations complied with the legal requirements, and 1388 protests
were approved in 1998 and 1283 in 1999 (So 2002: 405). It has also
been pointed out that ‘[a]ccording to official figures in the period be-
tween July 1997 and March 2002, about one in seven public rallies
were in fact held without notifying the police in advance’ (Cheung &
Chen 2004: 79).
The only cases in which the government attempted to enforce or ac-
tually enforced the requirements of the Public Order Ordinance with
regard to applications to hold demonstrations occurred in 2000 and
2002. The events in 2000 illustrate the interaction between the law
and the student movement in Hong Kong. On 20 April 2000, about
60 university students demonstrated against a proposal to charge dif-
ferential tuition fees for students in different academic disciplines. On
26 June 2000 – the anniversary of the NPC Standing Committee’s rul-
ing which overturned the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in the ‘right
of abode‘ case (discussed below), about 1200 seekers of the right of
abode, their supporters and students from the Hong Kong Federation
of Students staged a demonstration to protest against the Standing
Committee’s decision. In both cases, the organisers of the protest did
not comply with the procedural requirements of the Public Order Ordi-
nance. Student leaders in both demonstrations were subsequently ar-
rested by the police – five arrested in August 2000 in connection with
the June demonstration, and another five arrested in September 2000
in connection with the April demonstration. The arrests and apparently
impending prosecution of the students prompted a strong reaction
from civil society, with a number of demonstrations and petitions orga-
nised in support of the students, some of the protests being again in
defiance of the procedural requirements of the Public Order Ordi-
nance. The government finally succumbed to the pressure of public
opinion and decided on 5 October and 25 October, respectively, not to
prosecute the two groups of students (So 2002; Cheung & Chen
2004).
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The campaign against prosecution of the students soon turned into
a campaign for the reform of the Public Order Ordinance itself. How-
ever, on this front the government refused to give way. It decided to
table a motion before the Legislative Council requesting legislators to
express support for retaining the Ordinance in its existing form. On 21
December 2000, the Legislative Council after an 8-hour debate passed
the motion by majority vote, and the public debate on the reform of
this area of the law came to an end at least for the time being (So
2002: 414-5; Cheung & Chen 2004: 80).
The patience of the SAR Government in not prosecuting demonstra-
tors who flouted the law came to an end in 2002. In May 2002, Leung
Kowk-hung of the April 5th Action Group, Fung Ka-keung, council
chairman of the Hong Kong Federation of Students, and another stu-
dent activist were arrested by the police and charged with organising
an unauthorised procession in February 2002 (Cheung & Chen 2004:
80). They were convicted by a magistrate in November 2002; the de-
fendants were required to be bound over for 3 months on a recogni-
sance for $500.11 The defence lawyers’ challenge to the constitutionality
of the Public Order Ordinance (i.e. its alleged violation of the freedom
of assembly and procession) was unsuccessful. The defendants ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeal. In November 2004, the Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal by a majority ruling of 2 to 1.12 The case was
further appealed to the Court of Final Appeal (CFA).
On 8 July 2005, the CFA by a majority of 4 to 1 dismissed the ap-
peal.13 The court upheld the requirement in the Ordinance that
organisers of public processions involving more than 30 persons
should notify the police in advance. The court also upheld that the
power of the police to restrict or prohibit processions on the ground of
‘public order’ in the ‘law and order’ sense of maintenance of public or-
der and prevention of public disorder is constitutional, while striking
down the broader concept of ‘ordre public’ as used in the Ordinance
since the concept is too broad and imprecise to satisfy the test of legal
certainty. The court also stressed that in exercising the discretionary
power to regulate processions, the police must comply with the ‘pro-
portionality’ test, otherwise their decisions could be overturned by the
court. This means they ‘must consider whether a potential restriction
is rationally connected with one or more of the statutory legitimate pur-
poses [public order as narrowly defined above, national security, public
safety, etc.] and whether the potential restriction is no more than is ne-
cessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose in question’ (paragraph
96 of the judgment). The dissenting judge agreed that it is legitimate
to impose a prior notification requirement on processions, but dis-
agreed with the view that this requirement can be enforced by the
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sanctions of criminal law. He also believed that the police power of
prior restraint of demonstrations is unconstitutional.
I now turn to another high-profile episode of litigation regarding the
right of assembly and demonstration. This is the case of the prosecu-
tion of Falun Gong demonstrators in 2002, which reveals that apart
from the Public Order Ordinance, the law of obstruction of public
places14 (which traditionally was mainly used against illegal hawkers in
the streets) may also be used to control assemblies and demonstra-
tions. The case concerns a small-scale demonstration staged by 16 Fa-
lun Gong activists outside the entrance to the Liaison Office of the
Central People’s Government in Hong Kong on 14 March 2002. Since
the number of demonstrators was small, there was no need under the
Public Order Ordinance to notify the police in advance or to comply
with procedural requirements which are only applicable to assemblies
involving more than 50 persons or processions involving more than 30
persons. After the protesters refused to leave, despite repeated police
warnings, the police arrested them. There was some physical violence
during and after the arrest. The protesters were charged with obstruc-
tion of a public place, and obstructing or assaulting police officers in
the execution of their duty. After a 27-day trial, the protesters were con-
victed in August 2002 by a magistrate who imposed fines ranging be-
tween $1300 and $3800 on them. They appealed to the Court of Ap-
peal, which gave judgment in November 2004.15 The appeal against
conviction for obstruction of a public place was successful, although
the appeal against conviction on the other charges failed. In an unani-
mous decision, the Court of Appeal held that due regard to the protec-
tion of the right of assembly should be given in applying the law of ob-
struction of public places. It overturned the conviction for obstruction
on the ground that the magistrate failed to address sufficiently whether
the manner in which the protesters exercised their right of assembly
was so unreasonable so as to constitute an unlawful obstruction. The
defendants appealed further to the Court of Final Appeal.
The appeal was successful. On 5 May 2005, the CFA16 unanimously
held that the arrest of the defendants had been unlawful, since the po-
lice officers who carried out the arrest were not able to satisfy the court
that they had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the defendants
had committed the offence of obstruction of a public place. The court
stressed that the offence is not constituted by mere obstruction; the
use of the public place or highway must be unreasonable, otherwise
there could be a lawful excuse for the obstruction. In determining what
is unreasonable use or lawful excuse, the defendants’ right to peaceful
assembly and demonstration should be given due weight. The court
further held that the defendants in the present case could not be con-
victed for obstructing or assaulting police officers in the execution of
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their duty even though physical resistance was involved. Since the ar-
rest was unlawful, the police officers were not actually acting in the
due execution of their duty when they encountered resistance from the
defendants. It was also pointed out that citizens have a right to use rea-
sonable force to resist an unlawful arrest and detention.
In both decisions mentioned above, the CFA stressed the importance
of the constitutional right to freedom of peaceful assembly and demon-
stration which is guaranteed by the Basic Law, the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights and the ICCPR. The CFA’s decisions in the two cases may be
deemed a consolidation of the freedom of demonstration in the Hong
Kong SAR, and the reinforcement of the protection for the physical
space for social movements to operate in Hong Kong.
Law as a Weapon of Social Movements
As discussed above, under some circumstances litigation may be an ef-
fective strategy used by social movements, particularly when accompa-
nied by other social movement tactics such as demonstrations and
other forms of expression of popular support for the cause of the move-
ment. In other words, the law of the state may be turned into a weapon
in a battle against the state and its status quo. In post-colonial Hong
Kong, such battles have included those for the right of abode of main-
land-born children of Hong Kong residents, against the reduction of
civil service pay, against reclamation of the Victoria Harbour, for the
lowering of public housing rent, and against the privatisation of the as-
sets of the Housing Authority. The legal weapons used in these battles
included the Basic Law, the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance and
the Housing Ordinance. I shall discuss the right of abode saga in great-
er detail, and then mention the other episodes more briefly.
The right of abode litigation was initiated immediately after the
handover and reached its climax in the Court of Final Appeal’s (CFA)
decisions in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga in January 199917 on the
appeals to the CFA from lower courts by seekers of the right of abode
in Hong Kong. The applicants were children of Hong Kong permanent
residents, but they were born on the mainland. Some were born before
their parents became Hong Kong permanent residents; some were
born after at least one of their parents became such a resident (e.g. the
children were born on the mainland to women whose husbands were
Hong Kong permanent residents living in Hong Kong); some were ille-
gitimate children. The children claimed the right of abode in Hong
Kong under the Basic Law18 and argued that the immigration legisla-
tion (passed by the Provisional Legislative Council)19 that restricted
such a right was invalid because it contravened the Basic Law. The task
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of the CFA, therefore, was to give a final and authoritative interpreta-
tion of the relevant Basic Law provisions.
The CFA’s decisions in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga in favour of
the applicants for the right of abode had a huge impact on the practical
level in terms of the migrant population pressure generated by the de-
cisions.20 After the decisions were announced, the Hong Kong Govern-
ment conducted sample surveys and statistical studies for the purpose
of estimating the number of people eligible to migrate to Hong Kong
as a result of the decisions. It announced on 28 April 1999 that 1.67
million people (consisting of two generations) would be so eligible in
the coming decade, if the CFA’s decisions were to be implemented. It
was then pointed out that the CFA’s interpretation of the relevant pro-
visions in the Basic Law was probably inconsistent with the original in-
tent behind the Basic Law, of which the National Peoples Congress
Standing Committee (NPCSC) would be the most appropriate inter-
preter. Under the Chinese Constitution21 and article 158 of the Basic
Law, the NPCSC has the power to interpret the Basic Law. On 21 May
1999, the SAR Government requested the State Council to refer the re-
levant Basic Law provisions to the NPCSC for interpretation.
The Government encountered vehement opposition to its proposal
to refer the matter to the NPCSC (Chan, Fu & Ghai 2000) not only
from the right of abode seekers and their supporters who had orga-
nised many demonstrations in support of their cause since 1997, but
also from the legal community of Hong Kong, particularly the Bar As-
sociation and most leaders of opinion in the legal community, as well
as from a significant section of the political elite in Hong Kong, parti-
cularly the Democratic Party and its allies in the legislature, which
comprised most of the directly elected members of the Legislative
Council. The incident was extremely controversial because there is
nothing in the Basic Law which suggests that the executive branch of
the SAR Government can request the NPCSC to interpret the Basic
Law. Furthermore, the reference to the NPCSC was criticised as a self-
inflicted blow to Hong Kong’s autonomy, judicial authority, Rule of
Law and system for protecting individuals’ rights. Nevertheless, on 26
June 1999, the NPCSC issued an interpretation which in effect ne-
gated the CFA’s interpretation of the relevant Basic Law provisions and
upheld the restrictions on the right of abode imposed by the relevant
immigration legislation.22 Thus, the fruit of the court victory was com-
pletely taken away from the social movement for the right of abode.
The interpretation was followed by a series of demonstrations by
right of abode seekers and their supporters in civil society, including
student, religious and human rights groups. On 30 June 1999, 600
lawyers also marched in silence wearing black (Fung 2004: 109). As
mentioned above, even as long as one year after the NPCSC’s interpre-
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tation, a demonstration of 1200 people took place to mark the anniver-
sary of the interpretation, and the event almost resulted in several stu-
dents being prosecuted. However, there was little public support for
the right of abode movement on the whole in Hong Kong. The move-
ment suffered a further setback after the arson attack by some abode
seekers at the office of the Immigration Department on 2 August
2000, which further turned public opinion against the movement for
the right of abode (So 2002: 409).
As in the case of the right of abode seekers, civil servants also used
the Basic Law to litigate their claims against the government. Before
the handover, annual revisions of civil service salaries almost always re-
sulted in pay rises, and there had never been any pay cut. To cope with
the severe budget deficits and to align public sector salaries with those
in the private sector, the government in 2002 decided to introduce a
pay cut (ranging from 1.58 per cent to 4.42 per cent) for Hong Kong’s
180,000 civil servants. In order to implement the pay cut, the legisla-
ture enacted the Public Officers Pay Adjustment Ordinance 2002. A
further pay adjustment ordinance was passed in 2003 providing that
civil service pay would be further reduced by 3 per cent on 1 January
2004 and by another 3 per cent on 1 January 2005. These reductions23
would not however reduce civil servants’ salaries below their salary le-
vels on 30 June 1997. When the last reduction came into effect on 1
January 2005, civil service salaries (for existing civil servants) were re-
duced to the relevant levels of 30 June 1997. The pay cut law was chal-
lenged by several civil servants with the support of their unions as
being an infringement of the Basic Law provision that after the hand-
over the pay and conditions of service of civil servants would be ‘no
less favourable than before’.24 It was argued that even if the actual sal-
ary of a civil servant was not reduced below its 1997 level, the mere in-
troduction of legislation to reduce pay and thus to vary unilaterally the
terms of the existing contract of employment would be a violation of
the Basic Law. The argument failed before the Court of First In-
stance,25 but succeeded before the Court of Appeal,26 which in Novem-
ber 2004 decided by a majority of 2 to 1 that a key provision of the pay
cut law was invalid. The case then went on appeal to the CFA. On 13
July 2005, the CFA27 unanimously upheld the pay cut law and decided
that it violates neither article 100 nor article 103 of the Basic Law.
The first two of the next three cases to be considered involved the
use of ordinances introduced in the form of private members’ bills
(bills proposed by individual members of the Legislative Council rather
than by the government) and enacted at the last minute before the
handover, after which extensive restrictions in the Basic Law on the in-
troduction of private members’ bills came into force. The Protection of
the Harbour Ordinance was such an ordinance. It was initiated by a
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legislator on behalf of the Society for the Protection of the Harbour
(‘the Society’), an NGO which opposes excessive reclamation in Vic-
toria Harbour. The Ordinance declares that ‘[t]he harbour is to be pro-
tected and preserved as a special public asset and a natural heritage of
Hong Kong people, and for that purpose there shall be a presumption
against reclamation in the harbour’. In July 2003 the Society, by relying
on the Ordinance successfully, challenged a reclamation project in
Wanchai before the Court of First Instance.28 That Court’s decision
was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Final Appeal in January
2004.29 Although a similar challenge brought by the Society against
another reclamation project in Central was unsuccessful,30 the series
of litigation succeeded in attracting public attention to the issue of the
protection of the harbour against reclamation and in mobilising public
support for this cause, which was manifested in a number of assem-
blies and marches organised by the Society.
Like the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance, a law to ensure that
the rent charged by the Housing Authority to tenants of public housing
estates in Hong Kong would be low and affordable was introduced
shortly before the handover in the form of a private member’s bill on
an amendment to the Housing Ordinance. The express provisions of
the law were designed to prevent frequent rent increases at a time of
inflation and to ensure that upon any increase the ‘median rent to in-
come ratio’ (MRIR) for public housing tenants would not exceed 10 per
cent. After 1997, Hong Kong experienced deflation. The Housing
Authority did not lower public housing rent, with the result that the
MRIR came to exceed 10 per cent. Several public housing tenants sup-
ported by social movement organisations in the housing movement ob-
tained legal aid and brought an action against the Housing Authority,
claiming that the Authority had the legal obligation to review the rent
and to lower it so as to bring the MRIR down to 10 per cent. The action
succeeded before the Court of First Instance,31 whose decision was
however overturned by a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal in
November 2004.32 The Court of Appeal’s decision was affirmed by the
Court of Final Appeal in November 2005.33
In the celebrated or infamous (depending on one’s perspective) Link
Case, two elderly tenants of public housing estates who lived on public
assistance income, with the support of a few politicians and a social
movement organisation in the housing movement, brought an action
in December 2004 to challenge the privatisation of the commercial
areas (for retail shops) and car parks of public housing estates owned
by the Housing Authority. The privatisation was for the purpose of rais-
ing capital to solve the problem of the Authority’s budget deficit. The
plan was to set up a unit trust (the Link Real Estate Investment Trust)
to take control of the privatised assets and to list the unit trust on the
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stock exchange in Hong Kong and abroad. The action to challenge the
privatisation programme was initiated only a few days before the listing
was to materialise. Although the challenge failed before the Court of
First Instance34 and the Court of Appeal,35 the legal uncertainty created
by the possibility of an appeal to the Court of Final Appeal ultimately
resulted in the privatisation and listing project being postponed. This
was a victory for the movement against privatisation of public housing
assets, particularly in terms of the huge publicity generated by the liti-
gation being top news story for several days. On the other hand, main-
stream public opinion in Hong Kong considered the litigation an abuse
of the legal system by self-interested politicians using the two public
housing tenants as puppets. One of the two tenants dropped out of the
litigation after the first instance decision, while the other appealed all
the way to the CFA. In a unanimous judgment delivered on 20 July
2005,36 the CFA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the legality of the
privatisation project. The CFA held that, as a matter of interpretation
of the Housing Ordinance, the proposed sale of the retail and car park
facilities concerned to the Link Trust was within the powers of the
Housing Authority. The sale did not mean that the Housing Authority
would no longer be able to ‘secure the provision of’ (in the words of
the Ordinance) the facilities concerned to the tenants because the facil-
ities would still be available for use by the tenants after the sale.
Law as the Contextual Environment of Social Movements
Finally, I turn to two famous episodes in Hong Kong’s post-colonial
history in which legal controversies led to massive demonstrations –
the movement against the national security bill to implement article 23
of the Basic Law, and the movement for universal suffrage in 2007-08.
In these two episodes, the law provided the contextual environment of
the social movements. Indeed, the movements would not have oc-
curred but for the existence of certain legal provisions in the Basic Law
of Hong Kong.
Article 23 (BL 23) of the Basic Law requires the SAR to ‘enact laws
on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subver-
sion against the Central People’s Government’. It also addresses state
secrets and the activities of foreign political organisations in Hong
Kong. It does not directly prohibit treason, sedition, subversion and re-
lated actions, nor does it define the precise meaning of these words.
Instead, it empowers and mandates the SAR – in practice its legisla-
ture – to enact laws to define and penalise such actions. Many of the is-
sues raised by BL 23 are considered politically sensitive. Ever since the
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Basic Law was enacted in 1990 and brought into effect in July 1997,
there have been anxieties over the implementation of BL 23.
The publication on 24 September 2002 of the Government’s Con-
sultation Document on Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law
opened a 3-month consultation exercise on the legislative proposal. The
results of the consultation were announced on 28 January 2003 to-
gether with nine sets of clarifications or modifications of the original
legislative proposal. This was followed by the publication of the Na-
tional Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill on 13 February 2003 and its
first reading in the Legislative Council on 26 February 2003. During
the Bills Committee’s deliberations on the Bill, the Government agreed
to some amendments. However, critics said that the amendments were
insufficient (Fu, Petersen & Young 2005), and that in any event the
Government’s timetable of passing the Bill in the Legislative Council’s
week-long meeting beginning on 9 July did not allow sufficient time
for deliberation.
On 1 July 2003, a hot summer day which was also a public holiday
marking the 6th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China and the
last day of the new Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Hong Kong, half a
million Hong Kong residents took to the streets to demonstrate against
the article 23 legislative exercise and to express other grievances against
the Tung Chee-hwa administration. Surprised themselves by the large
turnout, opponents of the Bill demanded that the Bill be shelved, and
planned to organise a rally of tens of thousands surrounding the Legis-
lative Council on 9 July if proceedings on the Bill were to go ahead on
that day. The SAR Government decided to postpone the Bill – the deci-
sion came 3 hours after the Liberal Party withdrew from the ‘governing
coalition’ of political parties on the evening of 6 July in protest against
the Tung administration’s original decision on 5 July to adhere to the 9
July deadline for the passage of the Bill while giving three major ‘con-
cessions’ on the content of the Bill (Chen 2003a, 2003b). On 17 July
2003, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa announced that the Government
would re-open public consultation on the Bill to ensure that its content
would receive broad public support before it was passed into law. How-
ever, in an about-turn on 5 September 2003, Mr Tung announced that
the Bill was to be withdrawn. Since then, the implementation of article
23 of the Basic Law has been shelved indefinitely.
After the demonstration on 1 July 2003, the political climate of Hong
Kong changed dramatically. There was a rising tide of demands for
further democratisation of Hong Kong’s political system (Chan 2004),
as reflected in the pro-democracy demonstrations on 9 and 13 July
2003 and on 1 January 2004 – each attended by tens of thousands of
people – and in the landslide victory of pro-democracy candidates (as
opposed to pro-China candidates) in the District Councils election on
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23 November 2003. Pro-democracy forces called for the introduction of
universal suffrage in the election of the Chief Executive in 2007 and in
the election of all the members of the Legislative Council in 2008.37
They also urged the HKSAR Government to initiate a comprehensive
review of Hong Kong’s political system (together with a full-scale pub-
lic consultation exercise on the matter) as soon as possible so as to en-
sure that new electoral laws could be put in place in time for the elec-
tions in 2007 and 2008.
In early 2004, it was widely anticipated that Mr Tung Chee-hwa,
Chief Executive of the HKSAR, would announce the arrangements for
the review of the political system when he gave his annual policy ad-
dress to the Legislative Council on 7 January 2004. Many people in
Hong Kong were disappointed when the policy address was delivered.
Instead of announcing the arrangements for constitutional review and
consultation or committing the Government to such a review, Tung an-
nounced the establishment of a Constitutional Development Task Force
to study the relevant issues relating to the Basic Law and to consult re-
levant departments of the Central Government in Beijing.
Then came the crucial month of April 2004, in which the fate of
Hong Kong’s political development was sealed. On 6 April 2004, the
NPC Standing Committee exercised the power of interpretation of the
Basic Law for the first time since its first-ever interpretation of the
right of abode,38 bringing the constitutional debate on ‘One Country,
Two Systems’ in Hong Kong to a new climax. The interpretation was
followed by a decision of the NPCSC on 26 April on the issues arising
from the interpretation. These interventions on the part of the NPCSC
amounted to a rejection of the democrats’ demands with respect to
2007 and 2008. The democracy movement was halted, although it has
by no means disappeared. On 1 July 2004, the anniversary of the
march against article 23 of the Basic Law, an estimated 200,000 peo-
ple participated once again in a pro-democracy march.39 On 1 July
2005, by which time Tung had resigned and been replaced by Mr Don-
ald Tsang, the number dropped to less than 20,000.40
Concluding Reflections
By Western and international standards, social movements in Hong
Kong are relatively few, weak, of small scale and of limited duration.
However, Hong Kong does provide an interesting case study of the re-
lationship between law and social movements. It may be seen from
this chapter that theories of law and social movements developed by
scholars on the basis of Western experience are by no means irrelevant
to Hong Kong. The Hong Kong experience vividly demonstrates how
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the law can both constrain and support social movements, and how
the law can become a stage on which the mass media and members of
the public focus their attention as the rights claims of social movement
actors and organisations are fought out.
The story of the legislative changes and debates on the Public Order
Ordinance and the Leung Kwok Hung and Falun Gong cases provide a
classic illustration of how the law can be used to define and limit the
physical space which social movements utilise for protests and demon-
strations, and how an independent and activist judiciary can contribute
to protecting such space by relying on a constitutional proclamation of
the right to freedom of assembly. Whereas these two cases involve the
prosecution of social movement activists defending themselves in
court, in the next four cases discussed in this chapter, individuals with
the support of social movement organisations (as well as legal aid pro-
vided by the Government in four of the five cases)41 took the initiative
to challenge government actions before the courts. In all these cases,
the text of the law was ambiguous enough to sustain the interpreta-
tions advanced by the litigants. Legal discourse was employed to bolster
the legitimacy of their claims before society as a whole. Indeed, in the
right of abode and civil servant pay cases, the legitimacy of the right of
abode seekers’ and the civil servants’ demands was primarily derived
from the law – the language of the Basic Law – instead of from other
sources.
In all these five cases, litigation was used as an instrument or strat-
egy by ‘social movements’ as loosely defined. There were assemblies
and marches in the streets to advance the litigants’ claims in each case,
the size of these activities being larger in the case of the right of abode
seekers, civil servants and harbour protection activists, and smaller in
the case of the housing movement activists who organised the litiga-
tion in the public housing rental case and the Link case. Whereas in
the West, litigation is often used only as a supplementary strategy by
social movements whose principal strengths and activities lie in mass
mobilisation and public protest, in these five Hong Kong cases litiga-
tion was relied on as the principal means for advancing the claims of
the movements which had only limited support in society. Thus, when
the litigation failed (in the civil servants’ case, the housing rental case
and the Link case) or when the NPC Standing Committee settled the
legal issue authoritatively (in the right of abode case), the social move-
ment itself subsided. This testifies to the weakness of the relevant so-
cial movements in Hong Kong.
The social movement against the enactment of the national security
law to implement article 23 of the Basic Law provides a remarkable ex-
ample of the interaction between law and social movements. Many so-
cial movements, such as the classic Civil Rights Movement in the
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USA, campaigned for reform of the law. In the case of the movement
against the national security bill, the objective was to preserve the sta-
tus quo, particularly the liberties of civil society and the very space for
future social movements. This is therefore a movement about the law
and about the legal conditions and possibilities for social movements
themselves. The democratisation movement that followed provides a
classic illustration of how legal discourse can be mobilised to strength-
en a social movement claim. The claim in this case is for democratisa-
tion, and the legal argument was based on the provisions of the Basic
Law that allow fundamental changes to the electoral system in 2007
and 2008. However, insofar as this claim – just as the right of abode
claim – was dependent on the language and interpretation of the Basic
Law, it was ultimately defeated by a legal manoeuvre – again the NPC
Standing Committee’s act as the most legally authoritative interpreter
of the Basic Law.
To conclude, it may be noted that the transition in 1997 to Chinese
sovereignty has not weakened the vitality of the law in Hong Kong. On
the contrary, the life of the law has apparently been strengthened by
the coming into force of the Basic Law and the increasingly activist role
of the Hong Kong judiciary in handling important issues of public pol-
icy. Social movements in Hong Kong have begun to exploit the law
and the legal system for the purpose of challenging government poli-
cies or at least making their claims highly visible before members of
the public in Hong Kong. There is also evidence in Hong Kong’s ex-
perience for the proposition that the law may matter as a symbolic and
legitimating resource for social movements. Furthermore, the story of
Hong Kong law as recounted above demonstrates how the legal bound-
ary of the free space for social movements has been contested here,
and how the law has inspired or provoked social movements in the
post-colonial era. And the story of Hong Kong law and the story of
Hong Kong social movements are likely to continue to be intertwined
in the foreseeable future.
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pants’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 17); there is no need for participants to be loyal to
any particular organisation.
2 [Footnote not in original quotation but added by the present author:] A dominant
paradigm of socio-political studies of Hong Kong is premised on the view that Hong
Kong has been characterised by a high degree of political stability (Kuan 1979) and
has been spared the turmoil and civil disturbances that often accompany the modern-
isation of societies in the developing world (Leung 1996: 159). Political stability has
in turn been explained in terms of the political apathy, ‘utilitarian familism’ and ‘re-
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tional transformation. We must, in Michel de Certeau’s words, analyse law’s “manip-
ulation by users who are not its makers”’ (McCann 1998a: 82).
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As we march into the twenty-first century, there have been several new
forces that have revolutionised the world that we live in, culminating
in a changing sense of social awareness and an emerging sense of so-
cial responsibility. Along with this, the process of globalisation in the
corporate, political and social arenas is advancing, and this has had a
great impact on the people within these different arenas.
Globalisation has resulted in the dominance of power in the hands
of several global key players, creating big global brands and niche mar-
kets for the anointed few large corporate players.2 This is particularly
so in the economic sector where large multinational and transnational
corporations are becoming even bigger global industrial giants, thereby
ousting many small and medium-sized corporations, as well as elimi-
nating local enterprises such as indigenous cottage industries. At the
same time, the globalisation process has also led global players such as
the WTO and the World Bank to play important roles in the creation
and distribution of wealth and aid to different parts of the world, re-
sulting in extreme polarity of wealth between the developed and the de-
veloping countries. This polarity of wealth is not confined to developed
versus developing countries. It is also affecting the rich and the poor
within the developed and developing countries with ever-increasing
wealth gaps.3 As such, many developing countries suffer from huge
debts, which many have been unable to repay. Compounding this are
the issues of fair trade, environmental destruction, and the abuse and
violation of workers’ rights and freedom. In response to these various
forms of social inequality, the anti-globalisation movement has
emerged that attempts to highlight the failure of the world capitalist
system and the globalisation process for creating a more equal and hu-
mane society.4
Back home in Hong Kong and China, the rapid development has
also resulted in great income inequality between the rural and urban
sectors as well as within the urban centres, resulting in a high degree
of rural-urban migration culminating in an ever-increasing floating
population. At the same time, there are other urgent problems that
confront this region and that the state is failing to take actions to reme-
dy. For example, the environment, with deteriorating air quality, en-
croaching desertification, energy shortage, etc., poses great problems
for the emerging economy. Other issues include press freedom, human
rights, workers’ rights, women’s rights, etc. The Chinese leaders are
well aware of the challenges that they face on these matters and know
that the present development path is not sustainable. The ‘harmonious
society’ slogan initiated is nothing other than a way to mobilise ener-
gies in this direction, which explains the emphasis on qualitative in-
stead of quantitative growth during the 11th 5-Year Plan.
Hong Kong, as part of the developed world and now part of China,
can be seen as an interesting place to examine how globalisation is af-
fecting people’s perceptions of the protest movements that have
emerged since the change of sovereignty in 1997.5 As a result of the
economic and political developments faced by Hong Kong, there is cor-
respondingly a heightened political and social consciousness among
the Hong Kong people, who clamour for more political participation.
This has resulted in a proliferation of various political parties and
NGOs fighting for numerous issues, ranging from democracy and hu-
man rights to the environment and better treatment of asylum seekers
and mainland children and wives for resettlement into Hong Kong.
The extent to which this emerging protest space influences the protest
movements in China will be an interesting area to explore, but not
within the space allowed in this chapter. This is particularly so as Chi-
na has, over the last 20 years, become increasingly integrated into the
global economy, with an influx of Hong Kong and foreign personnel
and ideology along with the massive foreign investments that have flo-
wed into the country.
When news of the Seattle anti-WTO and anti-globalisation demon-
strations first broke out6, it was received with muted interest in Asia.
When the violence broke out during the Genoa anti-globalisation pro-
tests in July 2001, fingers were pointed at differing groups of partici-
pants – some at the protestors, others at the authorities. Yet for the ma-
jority in Asia, there was little interest and muted silence. To many in
this part of the world, the ideology embedded within the anti-globalisa-
tion movement is simply beyond their comprehension. Why would
university students want to participate in protest movements against
big MNCs that have made them financially and economically comforta-
ble? Why would they want to protest in favour of the cancellation of
Third World debts that are so remotely far away from their own exis-
tence? These are but a few of the questions that Asians asked in their
attempts to understand what this movement stands for and why there
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is such fervent participation in the movements among people of Wes-
tern nations.
This chapter will examine how the NGOs and students in Hong
Kong have responded to the anti-globalisation protest movements and
attempts to understand the apathy that surrounds them.
Research Methodology
This research is divided into two parts. The first was conducted from
April to August 2002. A questionnaire was issued to 1000 students
from different faculties at the University of Hong Kong, and a total of
843 questionnaires were received, making a total response of 84.3 per
cent. At the same time, key personnel from 10 NGOs were interviewed
on the roles they played in the anti-globalisation movement in Hong
Kong and abroad. The primary aim of the questionnaire and interview
was to investigate the extent to which students and NGOs understand
the issues surrounding the anti-globalisation movement and their par-
ticipation in the anti-globalisation protests that have rocked the corpo-
rate world. The second part of the research involved observing the un-
folding of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organisa-
tion, held from 12 – 18 December 2005 in Hong Kong.
The Economic Basis of the Anti-Globalisation Protest Movement
Among academics and social movement watchers, the emerging global
anti-globalisation movement is represented by an array of shifting
ideologies and social sub-structures that attempt to subvert the emerg-
ing global structures and organisations. This is a response to the pro-
cess of globalisation and the emerging influence of large global cor-
porations both within the boundaries of the nation-states and on the
global scene. The global structures are represented by global capitalism
and transnational political and economic organisations such as the
WTO, IMF and G7 groups of governments. At the superstructural
level, globalisation has resulted in a disproportionate distribution of
wealth between the developed world and the developing world. On a
corporate level, it has resulted in global corporate giants whose wealth
exceeds that of the poorest national economies in Africa and other
parts of the world. It is to be noted here that the top 100 global cor-
porations are far richer than the world’s 100 poorest nations. One of
the key criticisms is the collusion between global corporations, the
transnational politico-economic organisations, and the governments
that work in favour of the big global corporations.
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The process of globalisation has led to an increasing dependence by
the developing countries on the wealthy global corporations in terms of
domestic production and employment, and the heightened debt situa-
tions in all these countries. The penetration of global capitalism in
Third World developing countries has also resulted in the demise of
the small and medium local enterprises, or at best that these localised
industries have been regarded as significant only insofar as they were
servicing the big global corporations. Thus, the national governments
of these countries have come under the ‘control’ of these big corpora-
tions which dictate terms to them to eke out the best possible deal for
themselves. Often one hears the argument from the big bosses of these
big corporations that they are accountable to their shareholders, there-
fore justifying their economic and other forms of exploitation of the
Third World developing countries.
A related issue here is that of fair trade in these Third World coun-
tries, where much of the local population is engaged in primary pro-
duction. Big corporations, with their transnational market links, have
been able to depress the prices for the purchase of primary produce in
these countries, furthering the downward spiral of prices and leading
to greater hardship for the producers and workers in primary produc-
tion. Fair trade here also includes the championing of basic minimum
wages, work environment, working conditions, abolition of child la-
bour, medical care, etc. It is common knowledge that in many of these
countries, wages have been pushed to the minimum, often less than
one US$ per day, with long working hours, ten to twelve hours or
more, and no proper medical care. Such working environments often
result in a high rate of industrial accidents that only come to light
when news of accidents explodes on the world scene. The Bhopal
Chemical Explosion was one such incident.7
Origin and Representation of the Anti-Globalisation Movement
The origin of the anti-globalisation movement, which some would term
‘Peoples’ Global Action’, can be traced back to the gathering of heads of
state and ministers from different parts to the 2nd Ministerial Confer-
ence of the World Trade Organisation in Geneva. At this conference,
while the heads of state were discussing global economic governance,
there was a gathering of people outside protesting free trade (Peoples’
Global Action Manifesto: 1). These protesters came from different parts
of the world to protest the impact of corporate dominance on their lo-
calised social and economic environments. In the Geneva anti-globali-
sation movement, protesters came from 71 countries (Peoples’ Global
Action Manifesto: 1). Since then, at all major economic summits and
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ministerial meetings, anti-globalisation protesters have followed the
trail. Their protests have captured the attention of world media and are
reported widely in print and in electronic media.
While the fight for economic equality, the abolition of Third World
debts, better working conditions and the abolition of child labour re-
main key issues in the anti-globalisation protest movement, the move-
ment has taken on a life of its own. It has diversified from its original
goal and moved to champion different social and political causes for
different groups and communities. While some of these causes are glo-
bal, many are localised and target specific communities or organisa-
tions. This shift in orientation is the result of the hybrid nature of the
protesters that gather in a spontaneous yet organised fashion to protest
for their causes and against various global economic giants and the
governments who are seen to perpetuate and accentuate the plights of
those who are affected by these giants. In short, the various global eco-
nomic forums and ministerial meetings have now become focal points
for the gathering of protesters, who make known their concerns on var-
ious fronts to the world in a public way.
At the global economic forums, various groups have been seen stag-
ing protests outside the venues of these global summits. Each group
has its own agenda: there are groups that care about the global eco-
nomic inequality, the environment, human rights and universal suf-
frage, press freedom, religious freedom, support for sexual and cultural
diversity, gender and ethnic equality, and actions against wars. What
started as protests against economic inequality and global corporate
dominance has resulted in a reorientation of the aims and objectives,
as well as an expansion of the platform of the anti-globalisation move-
ment. Along with the loosely organised groups of individuals, there are
now formal social, religious and political groups, including, in particu-
lar, the various NGOs that come along to protest, each according to its
own agenda and action plan. This anti-globalisation movement is re-
garded as an important ‘Third Force’, culminating in the rise of a
transnational civil society where citizens of the world come together to
protest for common causes that cut across social, political and
economic boundaries in the globalised world that we live in today.8
One of the aspects of the anti-globalisation protests was its non-vio-
lent, peaceful stance. However, as the movement gathered momentum
and as more protesters turned out at the major economic forums, scuf-
fles and violence inevitably have broken out, resulting in injuries and
the deaths of some protesters. This has happened when the govern-
ments of the nation-state hosting the fora have brought out police and
military personnel in full force to deal with essentially unarmed popu-
lations of protesters. The Seattle and the Genoa anti-globalisation pro-
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test marches witnessed the brutality of the police and military against
unarmed civilians.
A second aspect of this protest movement is the expediency with
which news is transmitted through digital space. The ability of the var-
ious groups to make use of the new communication devices has facili-
tated communication among the numerous grassroots organisations,
allowing them to forge alliances and march to the various global eco-
nomic summits (Redden 2001: 1-8). As such, the so-called Ragtag Alli-
ance has now gathered much momentum, as diverse groups semi-
organised themselves under a broad affiliation to contest global corpo-
rate power.
A third aspect here is the manner in which the various protest
groups, both local and translocal, appropriate public spaces to cham-
pion their translocal causes. The ability to use international fora and
the associated public spaces to voice their localised needs and concerns
is a new phenomenon. Unlike the protests of earlier years, these
groups have transcended their national boundaries and have brought
their protests to the global stage where issues that concern their liveli-
hood, environment, human rights, as well as religious, media and per-
sonal freedoms, now have a ready global audience. To a certain degree,
the anti-globalisation movements have allowed groups, especially those
from developing countries, to be heard.
Related to this concern is the reassessment of the impact of the large
global corporations and their transnational movements of capital into
the developing countries. For many decades, proponents of multina-
tional corporations have argued for the huge gains and benefits that
the multinational corporations have brought to the developing coun-
tries and world. Today, as a result of the anti-globalisation movements,
the voices of the people from the developing countries can be heard on
the global stage. We can no longer ignore the fact that almost all the
multinational corporations and transnational corporations are exploita-
tive in nature, exploiting the local labour by paying very low wages, of-
ten as low as US$1 for twelve to fourteen hours work per day. Exploita-
tion of labour includes not only that of adult male and female workers
but often that of children as well. Multinational corporations like Nike
are known to have recruited children to work in their factories in
Indonesia.
Apart from this, exploitation also includes the destruction of the live-
lihood of the indigenous peoples in various developing countries. Large
logging companies have engaged in massive logging in the rainforests
and have displaced indigenous populations living in the forests. An ex-
ample of this is the Penna indigenous people in Sarawak and Sabah,
who were displaced as a result of logging activities. A side effect of this
is the wholesale destruction of the rainforests, bringing about land deg-
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radation and environmental destruction of many endangered species of
animals, birds and insects.
Discharge of industrial waste into the streams and emitting pollu-
tants into the air have also brought about water and air pollution that
has affected the physical and mental health of the people living in and
around these industrial sites. It has now been proven that many health
problems are linked to the operations of these industries. Because of
the collusion between large industrialists and local governments, such
impacts have been under-reported or not reported at all in local print
or electronic media in these developing countries. Likewise, the Wes-
tern media have also taken little interest in such issues. Many of these
issues have been reported by individual journalists who have found it
either a matter of conscience to do so or have done so from an instru-
mental point of view, as such stories sell well to Western audiences.
With the anti-globalisation movement, the plights of people affected by
the problems have been brought into sharper focus. In a small way,
this forces local governments, global corporations and the global popu-
lation, particularly those in the Western world, to reassess these
problems.
Hong Kong as an Emerging Protest Space
Hong Kong is a great metropolis and an international city with the in-
frastructure essential for a capitalist economy. It has hosted some of
the world’s largest multinational and transnational corporate groups.
Through the years, it has also periodically played host to various inter-
national economic summits and leadership meetings. As a relatively
free society under British colonial rule, there was little restriction on
the types of political activities that the people could engage in. Protests
were staged on a regular basis. After decolonisation and the return of
sovereignty to mainland China, Hong Kong has become a special ad-
ministrative region of China. Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong re-
mains autonomous and continues to experience various forms of free-
dom, although fear has resulted in self-censorship in many areas con-
cerning the politics of the region. However, the fear of communist rule
and the return to the dark days of the Cultural Revolution have led to
heightened political consciousness among the Hong Kong people. The
Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 served to remind people of an uncertain
future under communist rule.9 This has resulted in a push towards a
Hong Kong people’s identity. At the same time, the expansion of the
educated middle-class Hong Kong people has led to their greater politi-
cal activity, resulting in several large-scale protest movements in recent
years.10 The April 5th Group has helped organise several successful,
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large-scale, annual protest marches such as the annual candlelight vigil
since 1990 in commemoration of those killed during the Tiananmen
Massacre on June 4, 1989, and the July 1st Protest March to fight for
universal suffrage and democracy in Hong Kong since 2003.
Given this heightened awareness, Hong Kong is gradually emerging
as a viable protest space for the anti-globalisation protest movement. In
2001, when Hong Kong hosted the Fortune Global Forum, it was re-
ported that anti-globalisation activists shunned the city because it was
considered an inhospitable place where there are ‘too few kindred spir-
its to feed and support visiting anti-globalisation protesters’ (Lee 2001
SCMP 5/5/2001). Furthermore, it was reported that the protesters con-
sidered Hong Kong as lacking ‘a strong and non-politically affiliated lo-
cal group that could support their protest action’ (Lee 2001 SCMP 5/5/
2001). Months before the World Trade Organisation Sixth Ministerial
Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005, the Hong Kong Police
Force started preparing for an onslaught of anti-globalisation protesters
coming to the city. It was estimated that over a hundred anti-globalisa-
tion activists, including those from labour unions, green groups, and
fishermen’s and peasants’ groups, would arrive in Hong Kong at the
end of February 2005 to draft protest plans for this forthcoming global
summit (Lai 2005 SCMP 21/2/05). Examples of those attending were
Focus on Global South, Public Services International, Greenpeace,
Friends of the Earth, the Alliance for Food Sovereignty Campaign and
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. However, the
more radical groups, such as Global Resistance and the World Develop-
ment Movement, had no representatives during the preliminary round
of meetings. The reasons for their lack of representation were yet to be
ascertained at the time. A member of a local NGO, Mabel Au Mei-po,
had indicated that they would request from the police a blacklist of acti-
vists in order to know what groups or people had been excluded from
participating in the protests.
Some 70 local unionists, students, green activitists and social work-
ers joined in this meeting. The meeting, and the campaign, were being
co-ordinated by the Hong Kong People’s Alliance Against the World
Trade Organisation (Lai 2005 SCMP 21/2/05). About 250 activists
around the world gathered at City University to draw up action plans
to protest this ministerial meeting (Lai 2005 SCMP 1/3/2005). The HK
People’s Alliance against the WTO hoped to stage a daily rally in Vic-
toria Park for the duration of the summit but had not yet decided on a
route for the protest march. In conjunction with this, the Hong Kong
Christian Institute would also hold an international religious confer-
ence and hoped to attract around 200 participants. The Institute had
also stated that many of the conference participants would join the
anti-globalisation protest march (Lai 2005).
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The organisers of the anti-globalisation protest march anticipated
that at least 5,000 protesters from all parts of the world would gather
in Hong Kong to protest the dominance of the big corporations and
the collusion between the government and these international trade or-
ganisations (Lai 2005). While it was anticipated that there would be a
large turnout of protesters from other parts of the world, it was inter-
esting to see how many local people would participate in the protest.
The actual number of local protesters turning out in December would
be a good indication of the extent to which Hong Kong people under-
stand the objectives of the anti-globalisation movement. However, irre-
spective of the number of local people turning out for this protest,
Hong Kong had started attracting the attention of anti-globalisation
protesters from different parts of the world. If the turnout proved to be
what the organisers expected, then we could safely say that Hong Kong
had indeed turned its corner and become an acceptable protest space
for major international protest events.
Like their Western counterparts, the Hong Kong Police had also
been making preparations for this major event – stocking up on rubber
bullets and sand bags – and making plans to deal with possible out-
breaks of violence (Lai 2005 SCMP 21/2/05). This was in contrast to
the organiser’s call for a peaceful protest and the rejection of the use of
violence. However, the organisers were unable to guarantee that the
protest would be free of violence. On the contrary, they argued that vio-
lence in previous anti-globalisation movements was the result of over-
reaction by the officials and police, as was the case in Seattle (Lai
2005).
From refusal to come to Hong Kong in 2001 to full-scale participa-
tion in the 2005 anti-globalisation protest movement, Hong Kong was
now being regarded as an important international city for the anti-
globalisation protest. Hong Kong, in fact, had become an important
city of multiple spaces – not only an international convention and fi-
nancial hub, but also for protest activism. This goes hand in hand with
the development of an emerging civil society of Hong Kong.
Views from Hong Kong NGOs
While the anti-globalisation protest movement in Hong Kong was still
in its nascent stage, the WTO meeting had provided a rallying point
and impetus for a considerable number of NGOs to rally and partici-
pate in the protest activities. Like those from overseas, each NGO inter-
preted the movement differently. For example, the Hong Kong Asian
Human Rights Commission viewed the anti-globalisation movement
as more than just protests in big cities, although they had also partici-
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pated in such protests. The executive director, Basil Fernando, stated
that:
(…) the anti-globalisation movement is actually happening every-
day in different countries, which is more important than the
protests in big meetings. We don’t care about those protests in
big meetings. What we care about is ordinary people’s daily
lives, their rights for food, medical service, education, employ-
ment.11
To Helen Te Hira, a member of the secretariat of the HK Asian Stu-
dents Association (ASA), the anti-globalisation movement was not new.
She viewed globalisation as an extension of the colonisation of earlier
centuries, where lands were forcibly taken and the colonised op-
pressed. One of the key roles played by ASA, which is an alliance of
student associations from 32 countries, was to bring together European
student organisations and youth organisations from the Asia Pacific to
protest against the modern form of globalisation during the Malina
Summit in 1999.12 She argued that while students from countries
such as the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia had participated more
actively in the anti-globalisation movement, only a small group of
Hong Kong students seemed to care about this. Her argument was that
Hong Kong was a consumer-driven society and that this had led to
many young students focusing on job security, resulting in support for
globalisation. This is in contrast to students from countries that are
based on a labouring economy.13 The ASA also worked with the Federa-
tion of Hong Kong students, which also helped organise anti-globalisa-
tion protest movements and protested on the local scene. For her, the
youth movement played a crucial role in the success of the anti-globali-
sation movement.
In an interview, May Wong, a researcher from the Hong Kong Asia
Monitor Resource Centre, argued that globalisation did not bring much
improvement to the lives of people who were affected by it. She argued
that different groups of people, including workers, joined the anti-glo-
balisation movement because they were negatively impacted by multi-
national capital. The penetration of global capital had inched out the
small retailers and shopkeepers, creating a heightened level of resent-
ment. This also explained the objective of the Asia Monitor Resource
Centre which champions worker’s rights. May Wong, together with
other members from the centre, had participated in the anti-globalisa-
tion protest movement during the East Asian Summit of the World
Economic Forum (WEF) in Oct 2001. She saw the summit as ‘a club
of rich people’ and expressed that:
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So we think we must voice our views and opinions against the
WEF. We oppose the WEF because they don’t make decisions on
global economy in a democratic way. They failed to consult the
public (…). We tried to expose the reality that many Asian people
are suffering the negative effects of globalisation – by dance,
songs and music. We invite different NGOs in Asia to the carni-
val, including protesters from the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan
and Korea.14
In participating in the anti-globalisation march during the World Eco-
nomic Forum, Wong felt that they had been successful in conveying
their message of ‘anti-privatisation’ to the public, while the NGO op-
posed the government’s plan to retrench workers to save cost. The
march had generated positive media publicity, and the message of op-
position to wealth disparity and retrenchment of workers was dissemi-
nated to the general public.15
While Wong did not oppose violent action, such as the scuffle be-
tween the protesters and the police and military at the Seattle and
Genoa anti-globalisation movements, she felt that Hong Kong was not
ready for, or tolerant of, such violence. Violence of this nature was of-
ten attributed to a small group of troublemakers, and the media often
reinforced such a stereotype image, even though the police or the mili-
tary might have started the clashes between the protesters and the
forces.16
In an interview with the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee
(CIC), an organisation which actively monitors China’s labour relation,
the associate director, Chan Ka Wai, emphasised the importance of fair
trade and therefore, even though the NGO did not oppose globalisa-
tion, it participated actively in the anti-globalisation protest movement
in three ways. First, it participated by joining in the protest marches.
For example, CIC members joined the march organised by the Asian
People’s Solidarity Forum and People’s Action against Globalisation of
Poverty organised by the Solidarity and Resistance against Globalisa-
tion from 27-29 October 2001.17 A second method of support was that
CIC provided information on labour issues in Hong Kong and China
to other NGOs, governments, academic and international organisations
such as the UN. A third method was to conduct educational campaigns
on labour issues for local students. Members of CIC visited schools to
educate students on the exploitative nature of MNCs and working con-
ditions in mainland China.18 Through such methods, CIC hoped to
impart to the students and the general public the acceptable standards
for working conditions and fair trading essential in a capitalist society.
In all demonstrations, Chan Ka Wai argued, there is an understand-
ing of the rule of the game (protest) between the demonstrators and
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police, and this rule varies in different countries and that if either side
does not abide by the rule, then violence will break out. Chan argued
that, in many cases, protesters have wanted to protest peacefully, but
chaos has resulted when the police began using force to disperse the
protesters.19
According to Chan Beng Seng, Director of the Hong Kong-based
Documentation for Action Groups in Asia (DAGA), this NGO is a
branch of the Christian Conference of Asia group, and opposes the
negative aspects of globalisation that impact on the economies of small
states. They support sustainable development. Like the other NGO
members, he viewed globalisation as a new form of colonisation and a
conquest of the East by the West in the name of civilisation.20 The
group involves itself in the anti-globalisation movement by direct parti-
cipation in the protest movement, and some members had attended
the World Economic Forum in New York in March 2002. They also
wrote a letter to the French president in 1995 in protest against nuclear
testing in the Pacific. Finally, through their wide Christian networks,
they encouraged religious and secular groups to campaign and protest
for a more equal world.21
One of the active NGOs in the anti-globalisation movement is the
Globalisation Monitor group. Globalisation Monitor is a Chinese lan-
guage magazine set up in 1998 with the general goal of informing
people of the debates surrounding globalisation and putting a stop to
social injustice.22 The editorial board had been composed of members
from the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, Organisation Pio-
neer and Greenpeace, before Greenpeace left the editorial board. Apart
from generating debates on globalisation, this group also played an ac-
tive role in the protest marches. They initiated and organised Solidarity
and Resistance against Globalisation to challenge the Economic Forum
that met in Hong Kong in October 2001 and attracted around 500 pro-
testers.23 In addition, Globalisation Monitor established networks with
other anti-globalisation groups throughout the world. For example, it
was part of the International Rivers Network.24
According to Tim Goodchap, Globalisation Monitor differs from
other NGOs in that it takes on a broader agenda and is interested in
various issues such as labour, environment, housing, wealth inequality
and other issues related to globalisation. Apart from the big protest
movements, the magazine wants to focus on the daily struggles of the
people at the bottom and to highlight their plight.25
Among the NGOs in Hong Kong, there is thus a range of views,
with some considering the anti-globalisation protest movement as rela-
tively successful in conveying their message to the world and others
viewing it as less successful. For example, Chan Ka Wai of the CIC
rated the AG movement at 4 (on a scale of 1-5, with 5 being the most
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successful) in terms of educating the general public. Likewise, Tan
Beng Seng of DAGA and Tim Goodchap of Globalisation Monitor saw
the anti-globalisation movement as having an impact on world eco-
nomic organisations. Since 1992, many of them, such as World Bank,
IMF and UN, have invited NGOs to their meetings and have also taken
into consideration various ideas from the people’s movements.26
Views of Hong Kong Students
From April to June 2002, a standard questionnaire survey was con-
ducted among students of the University of Hong Kong to examine
their views and understandings of the anti-globalisation movement.
Students from different faculties and all years were represented in the
survey. The questionnaire was conducted while the students were in
lecture theatres prior to the start of their regularly scheduled lectures.
Permission was sought from the professors concerned to conduct the
survey. All questionnaires were collected immediately after the students
had completed them.
The University of Hong Kong student population was chosen for
several reasons. First, the principal investigator was a teacher of the
university, which made it easier for her and her research assistants to
liaise with the other academics and seek permission to conduct the sur-
vey in-class in order to ensure a high response rate. Second, the stu-
dents of Hong Kong University had become politically aware and active
in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre Incident in 1989. The Pil-
lar of Shame, a sculpture by the Danish sculptor-activist Jens Galschiot,
remains standing upright on the podium of the Haking Wong Build-
ing, which houses the University’s Student Union. This statue has
been the galvanising point and symbol for student activists as well as
other students who have championed civil liberty, freedom and equal-
ity. Third, the University Student Union has also regularly organised
campaigns and protests championing various social and political issues
in the wider Hong Kong community. Given their heightened social
and political consciousness, it was therefore appropriate to conduct a
questionnaire survey of the student population of the university. Given
the financial constraints, there was no attempt to compare the stu-
dents’ responses with those of other tertiary institutions.
Student Profile
This survey was conducted amongst the undergraduate students, the
majority of whom fell into the age range of 19-21 years old. A total of
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540 female (64.4 per cent) and 298 male (35.6 per cent) students re-
sponded to this questionnaire. Students from the Faculties of Arts,
Business and Economics, Dentistry, Education, Engineering, Law,
Science and Social Sciences responded to the survey.
Knowledge of the Anti-Globalisation Movement
Among the students surveyed, 96 per cent had not joined a social ac-
tion group or an NGO. In regard to their knowledge of the anti-globali-
sation movement, about 68 per cent of the students were unaware of
the 2002 Barcelona protest, and 71 per cent were unaware of the 2001
Genoa protest. About half (48.5 per cent) were aware of the 1999 Seat-
tle protest. Of all surveyed, 49 per cent were aware that these protests
were part of the anti-globalisation movement.
Students also had medium-level awareness that the anti-globalisation
movement attracted different social, religious and political groups to
participate in the protests. Some 54 per cent were aware of the involve-
ment of environmental groups in the protest, and 41 per cent were
aware of trade union participation, 50 per cent were aware of actual
worker participation, 61 per cent were aware of human rights groups’
involvement, and 56 per cent were aware of student involvement. Also,
51 per cent of students stated that these protesters were socialist in ori-
entation, while 35 per cent felt that the protesters were people with a
moral conscience. Over 70 per cent of the students were aware that the
anti-globalisation movement was a movement fighting against wealth
inequality, and 57 per cent agreed that it was a fight against labour ex-
ploitation, including child labour. Hence, a high percentage – 54 per
cent – realised that it was a fight also against big multinational cor-
porations, and 68 per cent were aware of its fight against global capit-
alism. Some 44 per cent also understood it as a fight to eliminate
Third World debt, and 64 per cent saw it as a movement to champion
human rights and human dignity.
While the students seemed to have a good grasp of what the anti-glo-
balisation movement stood for, they remained passive towards partici-
pation. Some 80 per cent stated that they would not participate in the
anti-globalisation protests when given an opportunity to do so; 20 per
cent replied that they would. However, 81 per cent of the students said
that they would become proactive and participate in protest movements
against the exploitation of labour, including child labour; 45 per cent
would protest human cloning and genetic engineering. About 40 per
cent would fight against big multinational corporations and global ca-
pitalism, and 59 per cent would call for the elimination of Third World
debts. Likewise, 79 per cent would protest for a cleaner and greener en-
104 KHUN ENG KUAH-PEARCE
vironment, and 84 per cent would join the protests for human rights
and human dignity. A total of 81 per cent of the students supported a
peaceful protest and demonstration, while 83 per cent were against a
movement that had any form of violence in demonstrations. Up to 94
per cent were against violent forms of demonstrations. In terms of po-
lice force and brutality, 65 per cent were against the use of force and
treatment of the protesters by the police and military. Some 90 per
cent opposed the use of military power against these civilian protesters,
and 71 per cent were against the arrest of protesters by the police or
military personnel; 93 per cent were against police shooting at the pro-
testers, while 81 per cent supported the need for peaceful negotiation.
Given the fact that they generally tended not to be proactive, it is not
surprising that they generally did not encourage their friends and fa-
mily members to participate in this protest movement. Only 36 per
cent mentioned that they would encourage their friends, and 36 per
cent would encourage fellow students to join the movement, while only
11 per cent would encourage family members to do so. Likewise, only
37 per cent would encourage the general public to participate in the
movement.
If the anti-globalisation movement were to hold events in Hong
Kong, only 30 per cent would participate in protests, while 81 per cent
said that they would participate as observers. Around 58 per cent said
they would be happy to become ‘behind the scene’ supporters. How-
ever, only 19 per cent said they would be street protesters.
In terms of the success of the anti-globalisation movement in trans-
mitting its objectives to the general public, 72 per cent said the move-
ment had increased public awareness of the various issues relating to
human rights, religious freedom, better environment, labour exploita-
tion, etc. However, despite this, 71 per cent said the anti-globalisation
protests did not manage to change corporate attitudes towards the
above issues. Likewise, 74 per cent did not think that the movement
had changed the attitudes of the international organisations such as
the WTO, EU and G8, while 71 per cent thought it had not changed
the governments’ attitudes.
Rhetoric vis-a`-vis Action: Anti-Globalisation Protests in Hong
Kong
The test case for Hong Kong as an emerging protest space was seen
when it hosted the six-day World Trade Organisation Sixth Ministerial
Conference in Hong Kong from 13-18 December 2005, when protesters
from all parts of the world, including France, Korea, America, Italy and
Southeast Asian countries, converged to voice their views on anti-globa-
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lisation and other issues. Some 9,000 police were deployed to ensure
law and order and to deal with outbreaks of violence (SCMP 12/12/05:
1). After much hype about the fear of violence, the first day of the
WTO meeting started in a celebratory mood, with many of the protes-
ters dressed up in colourful and fanciful costumes to protest for a vari-
ety of issues including free trade, fair trade, anti-globalisation, the en-
vironment and human rights. There were international and local pro-
testers from the trade unions of various Asian countries and from
NGOs. In Hong Kong, some of the NGOs that participated in the pro-
test included Greenpeace, Oxfam, the Hong Kong People’s Alliance on
WTO (which was an umbrella body of 34 Hong Kong-based NGOs that
included trade unions such as the Community Care and Nursing
Home Workers General Union, Construction Site Workers General
Union and Filipino Domestic Helpers General Union), the Hong Kong
People’s Council for Sustainable Development, the labour unions and
religious groups (SCMP 13/12/06 WTO Supplement). There were also
women’s groups, gay groups, human rights groups and environmental
groups taking part in the protest to fight for their varied causes. It was
estimated that around 4,000 protesters turned up during the first day
(SCMP 12/12/05: 1).
As the WTO meeting progressed through the six days, violence even-
tually broke out when Korean farmers took centre stage with their de-
mands against free trade, which they argued would jeopardise the live-
lihood and the economy of the agrarian sector, an argument echoed by
other groups of protesters including those from France, Africa and La-
tin America, and fishermen from Southeast Asia. As the protesters
marched from Victoria Park to the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibi-
tion Centre and attempted to break through the physical barricade
erected by the Hong Kong police as well as the police lines, scuffles
broke out, resulting in violence, with the police officers using batons
and pepper spray in an attempt to disperse the crowds of protesters.
The increasing confrontations between the protesters, in particular the
well-organised Koreans and the police, resulted in injuries and arrests
and became the talk of the town and the media, with the latter describ-
ing the confrontations in lurid detail, together with photographic de-
tails of the protest. These events also caught the imagination of the
general public, with some supporting the actions of the protesters
while others spoke openly against the disruption caused as a result of
the protest actions. Those who spoke in support understood the effects
of globalisation and the widening wealth gap between the wealthy
countries and corporations and the poorer countries and their citizens;
while those who spoke against the actions were upset because of the
disruption and the inconvenience of the protest, including traffic con-
gestion, the extra time needed to commute and the loss of business.
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It is important to note that, in the run up to the WTO meeting, the
Government had taken upon itself the role of promoter of free trade
and globalisation and had advertised in the local media to push for the
idea of free trade as beneficial to the Hong Kong economy. At the same
time, the local print media, such as the South China Morning Post, ran
a six-day special conference supplement on the theme ‘WTO in Hong
Kong’, providing detailed information on how globalisation had and
would impact farming communities from Asia to Africa and beyond,
and how continued subsidies given by rich countries to their own farm-
ers created an uneven playing field on which the poor farmers in the
less developing countries had been pushed to the brink of starvation.
Topical issues such as the impact on cotton and coffee growers in Afri-
ca were discussed to enable the general public to understand the need
for fair trade instead of exploitation of these growers in the developing
countries. Likewise, the Chinese language newspapers, such as Ming
Pao, Oriental Daily and Apple Daily, also gave extensive coverage. The
pro-China Hong Kong newspapers, however, were more restrained in
their reporting.
Both local NGO groups and the general public were caught up with
this protest march, very much reminiscent of protest marches during
the various political crises that Hong Kong had experienced in recent
years, such as the June 4th candlelight vigil and the July 1st Protest
March, which pointed to issues related to political sovereignty and hu-
man rights. The general public simply wanted to get on with their live-
lihood after a prolonged economic meltdown that had put Hong Kong
unemployment at an all-time high. Many empathised with the protes-
ters, especially the 1,500 Korean farmers who came to protest precisely
to protect their livelihood, destroyed by free trade and globalisation.
Students too came to support these protesters, and some even orga-
nised a hunger strike to express their discontent over the WTO’s push
for free trade that supported the wealthy countries and big conglomer-
ates and destroyed the poor countries and their people, who were
trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty that they were unable to get out of
(SCMP 17/12/05: A4).
Some Analysis
In Imperial China, the Chinese were not encouraged to become politi-
cally aware. Those who were politically active assumed the status of re-
bels or revolutionaries and were persecuted by the Imperial authority.
The only people who could legitimately become politically active were
members of the Mandarinate, and they had to abide by the bureau-
cratic rules found within the Mandarinate structure. The bulk of the
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masses went about their daily routine by being obedient subjects of the
dynastic throne, but there were rebels who protested the imperial bu-
reaucracy and contested to overthrow it whenever the centre was weak.
From the nineteenth century through to the twenty-first century,
with the various waves of migration, Chinese have settled in a dia-
spora. As they became citizens of their chosen countries, Chinese
throughout the world are known to have consciously shied away from
politics and political actions, as in Malaysia and Indonesia where they
controlled over 70 per cent of the economic wealth. In most cases, they
focused on economic pursuits and wealth attainment, and the success
of an individual and a family was, and is still today, measured in those
terms. In Western countries, local Chinese are often held up as ‘model
citizens’, with their hard work and lack of political curiosity ensuring
that their energies are channelled into the pursuit of professional and
business (including ethnic entrepreneurial) skills. It is only in recent
years that we are beginning to see a change in this attitude, as a small
handful of Chinese are beginning to step into the political forefront.
However, they continue to be few and far in between.
The Chinese in Hong Kong had not been politically active for a vari-
ety of reasons. For 150 years, Hong Kong was ruled as a British colony,
and the British administration did not encourage the Chinese to be-
come politically conscious, let alone active. Only a very small number
of the Hong Kong elite were inducted into the colonial administration,
and they served the British colonial administration rather than the
Hong Kong Chinese. Indeed, the Hong Kong Chinese were encour-
aged to pursue economic wealth instead of politics. However, there
were several occasions in modern Hong Kong history when Hong
Kong people protested against the British administration. One of them
was the 1967 Trade Union Protest movement. The protest attracted a
large number of workers and resulted in a crisis situation. The protest
was quickly put down with heavy-handed measures by the British ad-
ministration. After that, the British colonial government kept a tight
rein on the political development of Hong Kong and did not permit
protest movements to take place. Furthermore, in encouraging the pur-
suit of wealth, the British colonial government downplayed the creation
of a local identity.
It is against this background that we can try to understand the Hong
Kong students’ responses to the anti-globalisation movement. It is pos-
sible to group the responses of the students into three categories: 1) the
students’ understanding of the moral ethical issues found within Chi-
nese society; 2) their understanding of the Hong Kong political envir-
onment; and 3) their understanding of the demands of the capitalist
system.
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1 Students’ understanding of the moral ethical issues found within
Chinese society
From our survey, we found that students tended to adopt a positive atti-
tude towards championing various causes that affect the livelihood and
the welfare of the people. Hence, we found that there was a high level
of support for anti-globalisation in the area of championing human
rights, human dignity, wealth equality and the fight against domina-
tion by big multinational corporations. There was also a high level of
opposition to genetic engineering and human cloning. Students’ un-
derstanding of these issues could be seen as having come from their
Confucian-based upbringings and their religious upbringings, as well
as from the colonial education that emphasised equality, fairness, hu-
man rights and freedom. The emphasis on equality and fairness could
later be seen when students from the University of Hong Kong and
other tertiary institutions participated in the protest march against the
WTO meeting, with some staging a hunger strike in support of the
Korean farmers.
2 Students’ understanding of the Hong Kong political environment
Hong Kong students also had a high level of awareness when it came
to championing human rights and freedom. A large number, over 80
per cent of them, indicated that they were willing to join the anti-
globalisation protest movement championing human rights and free-
dom. Apart from the anti-globalisation protest, another indicator here
was the large turnout of students during the July 1st Protest Movement.
This heightened sense of awareness can be attributed to two main fac-
tors. First, towards the end of colonial rule, the colonial governor, Chris
Patten, put in place bureaucratic structures that encouraged political
activities in Hong Kong. This political development led to a heightened
consciousness and active participation in the political arena, particu-
larly in the areas of human rights, democratisation and freedom. A sec-
ond reason could be attributed to Hong Kong people’s fear of com-
munism in general, and this increased after the Tiananmen incident of
1989. Hong Kong people had no confidence in the Basic Law and the
implementation of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy. In this re-
gard, those who were able to do so voted with their feet and chose to
migrate to foreign countries. Many of those who re-immigrated back to
Hong Kong did so after obtaining foreign passports. There were also
many who had no social, economic or political capital to migrate and
so remained in Hong Kong. The fear of these Hong Kong people, as
well as of those who had foreign passports, pushed them to become
proactive to determine the fate of Hong Kong, a place they called
home. These were the people, many old and young, who would fight
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for democracy, freedom and human rights whenever they were called
to demonstrate their Western liberal values.
Likewise, a large percentage of the students said they did not support
the use of violence and force against the protesters by the police force
or the military. Over 90 per cent said that military force should never
be used against peaceful protesters. They also expressed their desires
to have peaceful protests and their hope that anti-globalisation as well
as other protests should be non-violent.
It is possible to argue that decolonisation and the return of sover-
eignty to China have created fear and uncertainty among the Hong
Kong people. This is especially so among the younger generation. As
reflected in our survey, young people from 19 to 21 years old are most
vocal in how they feel about the political situation and their needs to
support and participate in protests for democracy, freedom and human
rights.
3 Understanding the demands of the capitalist system
A counter-argument against the anti-globalisation protest movement is
that globalisation and capitalism are important for the development of
a country. Neo-liberal economic critics argue that without global capi-
talism, the poorer countries would not be able to develop rapidly and
would be pushed further into poverty. Likewise, in Hong Kong, there
is no shortage of neo-liberal economic critics. Many Hong Kong peo-
ple, both the rich tycoons and a large sector of the local population,
continue to uphold this neo-liberal economic view and subscribe to the
ideology of global capitalism. One common argument is that Hong
Kong society needs global capitalism to propel it to a higher level of
economic development. Since the early 1970s, the benefits of the capi-
talist system have enabled Hong Kong, along with the other newly in-
dustrialised countries, to progress rapidly and attain a developed and
industrialised status. Hence, a fight against globalisation would repre-
sent a step backward. This neo-liberal economic perspective argues that
for cities like Hong Kong and Singapore, which are service-oriented
and hi-tech-oriented economies, global capitalism is especially signifi-
cant as it provides employment for their people.
Such an argument found a ready audience among a large section of
the younger population in Hong Kong whose primary concern was to
find a good job with a high salary and then to lead a middle-class life-
style. Among the Hong Kong tertiary students this is an ubiquitous
view, with only a very small group of students expressing alternative
views. As the survey showed, 80 per cent of the students said they
would not participate in the anti-globalisation movement against global
capitalism but would participate for other causes such as exploitation
against labour, environment, gender equality and other social issues.
110 KHUN ENG KUAH-PEARCE
Thus, when it comes to labour exploitation, child labour exploitation
and other forms of economic exploitation that come with global capital-
ism, over half of the students were more willing to protest. Thus, it is
possible to argue that, with a higher level of education and an under-
standing of the socio-economics of the Hong Kong society, together
with a higher level of political awareness, an emerging group of stu-
dents with a social conscience is supportive of protest movements that
fight for justice and wealth equality for all. This was amply demon-
strated during the WTO meeting here as the voices and actions of
these students and their peers could be heard and seen.
In any protest movement, the measure of success is highly depen-
dent on two factors: first, the extent to which the message is success-
fully transmitted to the general public, the government and those con-
cerned; second, the turnout rate, which is a good indicator of the dis-
content of people with the norm. In our survey, we found that the
general student body was reluctant to become part of the anti-globalisa-
tion protest movement, and many also would not encourage others to
participate in the protest. Only 30 per cent expressed a willingness to
march, while 50 per cent expressed that they were happy to help be-
hind the scenes. In this sense, one can argue that the anti-globalisation
movement was moderately successful, as there was a high level of
awareness of the objective of the movement. However, the lack of parti-
cipation also exposed the weakness of the movement. One possible rea-
son may have been its relatively loose structure, with a lack of central
co-ordination for the various social, economic and political groups that
attended the marches. A second reason was the relative nascence of
the civil movement that had emerged in tandem with the emergence
of civil society in Hong Kong, which had yet to arouse political activism
among the population.
Concluding Remarks: Emerging Civil Society and Protest Space
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, as Hong Kong moves into a
new phase of social and political development, Hong Kong people have
become more politicised and aware of various issues that concern their
own welfare and the welfare of Hong Kong society in general. Specifi-
cally, they have become concerned about the democratic ideals and uni-
versal suffrage of a free society; and about human rights and freedom
of speech, religious practice and sexual orientations – to name a few is-
sues. They are also increasingly concerned about the environment, the
rights of various social groups – namely, women, children, the elderly
and the less privileged sector of the population. Furthermore, they are
also becoming more concerned about the widening gap between the
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wealthy and the poor. The WTO meeting in Hong Kong demonstrated
that Hong Kong people are gradually waking up to the great discre-
pancy between the wealthy and the poor countries and between the
rich and poor both in China and Hong Kong itself, the exploitative nat-
ure of the big corporations and the impact of globalisation on all coun-
tries. They are also beginning to realise that they are not immune to
globalisation. They also need to realise that while Hong Kong and its
people might benefit economically from globalisation, this benefit is
derived from the exploitation of the poor growers and workers of the
less developed countries by the big corporations. While it is true to say
that many still lack a social consciousness, the WTO meeting revealed
an emerging group of Hong Kong people, including students, who are
socially conscious and active. In this regard, what we are witnessing is
the emergence of a civil society in which people understand the signifi-
cance of protest action as a strategy to articulate their social conscious-
ness and their demands. In short, we are witnessing an emergence of
a protest ideology, culminating in the creation of a protest space for
such actions to be enacted in the public sphere. Such a development is
possible as a result of the rising educational standard of the masses
and of the free press and the Internet, which not only provide the
masses with knowledge but, at the same time, allow them further in-
teraction.
Among those people who are most concerned about the various as-
pects of development of Hong Kong society are the members of NGOs,
the workers and the students. They serve as the conscience of the peo-
ple of Hong Kong, fighting for a variety of causes. As the anti-globalisa-
tion protest movement has shown, they fight for causes that affect the
general welfare of the population as well as those that affect broader
environmental and global issues, not only locally but transnationally.
The six-day protests co-ordinated by Hong Kong NGOs and partici-
pated in by protesters from all over the world demonstrated that such
actions had become firmly entrenched in the political culture of Hong
Kong citizens. They stand as an important testimony to the Hong
Kong people and the world that Hong Kong has matured into a socially
conscious society and is able to take on global challenges. It also dem-
onstrated to its own people and the rest of the world that Hong Kong
has become an important protest space on a global stage.
A discussion of the anti-globalisation movement in Hong Kong
would not be complete without mentioning its relationship with main-
land China. Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China,
but while some NGOs in China have actively worked to raise aware-
ness of the exploitative working conditions of workers in factories
throughout China, there was a noticeable absence of mainland Chinese
activists in the December 2005 anti-globalisation movement in Hong
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Kong. Why is this so, given the fact that China’s entry into the WTO
and its impact on China’s economic development and globalisation
have greatly affected all walks of life? Furthermore, as attested in other
chapters, there has been an increase in the number of protests by Chi-
nese farmers, workers from state-owned enterprises, women, etc., all of
whom have been strongly affected by globalisation as a result of loss of
markets, loss of income and/or loss of social status. While it is easy to
dismiss this by the fact that the authoritarian Chinese State had pre-
vented the activists from moving across the border to lend their voices
and actions to the anticipated violent protests, along with media black-
outs on the mainland, one might also suppose that there had been
some kind of cross-border collaboration at the administrative level to
stop activists from coming to join this protest movement by simply re-
fusing to issue them visas; after all, a French activist was detained at
the airport for a day while the French Consulate-General in Hong Kong
negotiated his entry into Hong Kong.
Another related issue is the rise of a transnational civil society. Since
Hong Kong has been accorded special administrative region status, its
populace continues to see itself as deeply rooted in the Hong Kong so-
ciety and embraces a heightened sense of identity as Hong Kong peo-
ple, ‘heunggong yan’ (xianggang ren) in Cantonese. This heightened
sense of Hong Kong people’s identity has strengthened since 1997 and
is reflected in their readiness to take to the streets to express it. In addi-
tion, a transnational civil society has arisen that crosses political bound-
aries, where collective identities based on similar ideological orienta-
tions bind groups of people together – an interesting variation of the
case of the ‘imagined community’ of the nation described by Anderson
(1983). Thus, it is possible to argue that, in this sense, Hong Kong has
inched its way into the transnational civil society. Could Hong Kong
serve as an example for mainland China to emulate? To what extent
would the relationship between Hong Kong and China, and Hong
Kong and mainland Chinese activists, exert mutual influence and mu-
tual learning experience between these players that would enhance
trans-border collaboration and result in China, too, becoming part of
transnational civil society? Only time will tell. For now, China remains
at the periphery of a transnational civil community.
Postscript
In 2007, the safety of ‘Made in China’ toy products came into question
as a result of the discovery of a high lead content in the paint used on
toy products, and in September 2008, ‘Made in China’ food products,
namely the tainted milk powder and the related products that con-
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tained high levels of melamine, had put China squarely on the global
stage. Underlying such problems is the moral bankruptcy and greed of
the capitalists for high profit without consideration of the well-being of
the consumers.
Such incidents led to mainland parents gathering spontaneously to
protest and to demand actions for such shoddy and irresponsible acts.
Likewise, in Hong Kong, the media was instrumental in putting this
piece of news at the forefront and forcing the Hong Kong government
to act on this. As people’s voices were heard, the mainland central gov-
ernment too was forced to act rapidly to punish those who were in-
volved in this and to assure its people as well as the global community
of its intention to clear up the food industry. Yet at the same time, re-
strictions were placed on the state-owned media to moderate their re-
porting of such incidences.
There was some information sharing and collaboration between the
governments across the border. While there are small-scale actions on
both sides, people have yet to unite to protest against the big capitalists
in a concerted manner. Until they are able to do so, China will remain
at the fringe of the anti-globalisation movement.
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6 ‘Old Working Class’ Resistance in
Capitalist China:
A Ritualised Social Management (1995-2006)
Jean-Louis Rocca
Since the middle of the 1990s, industrial restructuring has led to a
high level of labour unrest among the workers of state-owned and col-
lective enterprises.1 China scholars have paid attention to this phenom-
enon, attempting to interpret the reactions of workers and to evaluate
the consequences of labour unrest on the political scene. These ana-
lyses are based on two assumptions. First, they assume that the mar-
ketisation of the Chinese economy brought the condition of urban
workers closer to the one of migrant workers. In urban areas, the two
groups are merging into a single working class (Chen 2000; Lau 1997;
Lee 2002). Such a perspective neglects the specificities of the different
categories of workers and considers labour as an anthropological con-
cept. Second, many analyses perceive unrest among laid-off workers in
terms of an alternative between the collapse and the upholding of the
regime. What is at stake would be a basic and head-on clash between
two homogenous forces: dominated people stricken by a subsistence
crisis on one side (Chen 2000) and ruling groups on the other. For ex-
ample, Lee Ching Kwan considers that transition from state socialism
to market socialism would be conducive to the emergence of an ‘insur-
gent post-socialist labour’ (Lee 2002). What is occurring on the politi-
cal stage is perceived through the limited scope of a struggle between
the dominant and the dominated groups. Instead, I suggest looking at
workers’ protests in terms of power relations.
My overall argument is that the two previous assumptions impede
analysis to comprehend the specificities of the ‘old working class’ pro-
test. More precisely, in over-standardising the forms of labour in capi-
talist economies and in concentrating the debate on the future of the
regime, scholars have generally neglected a wide range of determinant
elements. First, we should take into account the historicity of the Chi-
nese working class. If certain characteristics of this class bring it close
to the European ones2, there is no doubt about its original features. In
particular, the historically grounded organic ties set up between urban
workers and officials cannot but determine the power relationships be-
tween angry protesters and ‘red capitalists’. The urban working class
has been built up by the regime, and between the 1950s and the
1970s, it has constituted the main social support of the state apparatus.
Of course, I do not intend to negate the existence of conflicts between
workers and officials. My intention is to recall that these conflicts take
place in a specific situation in which, unlike the European case, the
working class is not an exploited class but a ‘model’ class, the incarna-
tion of the ‘people’, playing a role of reference from an ideological as
well as a social point of view. The situation of the urban workers was
supposed to foreshadow the future of Chinese society. How could these
organic ties be definitively destroyed by the market economy?
Second, it is important not to forget that the marketisation of Chi-
nese society has introduced a new character in the one-to-one confron-
tation between workers and officials. This character is difficult to de-
fine – capitalism, the spirit of capitalism, the entrepreneur’s class, capi-
talist accumulation – but its existence is extensively revealed by the
effects of industrial restructuring. In the case of China, this ‘character’
is all the more difficult to define because it is a hybrid social group,
what some analysts call a ‘red capitalist’ class. Chinese capitalism
seems to emerge from a continual ‘straddling’ between political and
economic positions. The ‘capitalists’ lack independence from the state.
Yet, if we refer to history, the existence of an ‘independent’ and
‘autonomous’ class struggling against a reactionary, if not feudal, state
is far from being proven. On the contrary, capitalism appears to be the
consequence of both close and conflictual relations between state and
entrepreneurs, officials and capitalists, aristocrats and bourgeois (Brau-
del 1985; Wallerstein 1974, 1978, 1980). This assertion does not mean
that the state disappears when capitalism is arising but that capitalism
is a trans-institutional and a trans-class phenomenon emerging from
conflicts and negotiations. For Polanyi, capitalism:
(…) can be personified as the action of two organising principles
in society, each of them setting itself specific institutional aims,
having the support of definite social forces and using its own
distinctive methods. The one was the principle of economic lib-
eralism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market,
relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely
laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the prin-
ciple of social protection aiming at conservation of man and nat-
ure as well as productive organisation, relying on the varying
support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious
action of the market – primarily, but not exclusively, the working
and the landed classes – and using protective legislation, restric-
tive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its
methods (Polanyi: 2001: 132).
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History shows that capitalism based on a never satisfied accumulation
desire can accommodate various social configurations. It is by nature
compelled to take advantage of very different opportunities (Braudel
1985). In the case of China, this definition of capitalism enables us to
understand that Chinese society is not characterised anymore by a
face-to-face relation between the state and the workers, but by a trian-
gular relation between the principle of economic liberalism, the princi-
ple of social protection and the action of the state which has to be ar-
ticulated – sometimes inclining to favour economic liberalism, some-
times to favour social protection – the two previous principles. The
contrast with the socialist period is striking.
Third, to understand the nature of social conflicts, it is essential to
give up the ownership-oriented concept of power. According to Fou-
cault, power is not a thing one can lose or win but a relation that
emerges from the different spheres (familial, economic, etc.). There
are no dominated and dominating groups, but there is a relation of
domination (Foucault 1976). Consequently, there is no domination in
itself but what is going on between the dominant and the dominated
groups. What is important to bring to light is the ability a group has or
does not have to ‘act on somebody else’s actions’, in other terms to in-
fluence another group’s actions. Going back to the subject at stake, it is
essential to know if people who put up resistance to rulers are able (or
not) to curb their room for manoeuvring and to impose policies, which
provide protesters with some benefits. Besides, we have to look at the
means and the justifications (and the ethos) used by protesters. Here,
we are very far from a civil society-based approach. For Foucault, power
and resistance are inextricably linked, the state and the social institu-
tions reciprocally shaping themselves. Consequently, we cannot consid-
er the existence of a so-called ‘civil society’ emerging ‘against’ the state
and the power holders.
Fourth, scholars usually identify capitalism with a unique form of la-
bour relations. Yet through time and place, capitalist economies have
used a wide range of modes of exploitation whatever the distinctions
that are given: formal or real domination of capital over labour, des-
potic or hegemonic (Buravoy 1985), forced labour or free labour, ford-
ism and post-fordism, etc. More importantly, if at a certain time capital-
ism can be defined by a dominant form of labour relations, it can also
be characterised by a certain type of articulation between different
modes of production. In China, migrant workers, redundant workers,
employees of foreign-investment enterprises or technicians working in
high-tech or service industries do not experience the same labour re-
gime. Moreover, numerous urban workers are entirely and simply ex-
cluded from any kind of exploitation. They survive on family help,
meagre social benefits and petty jobs provided by local administrations.
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Each of these categories has its specific working conditions, levels of
income, social and geographic origins, lifestyles and moral ethos. Con-
sequently, it is quite problematic to talk of the Chinese ‘working class‘
or Chinese ‘workers’ in overall terms. In the present period that is
characterised by rapid changes of economic structures, it is crucial to
take into account the specificities of the different labour relations so as
to understand the many-sided nature of resistance.
In social conflicts, the contrast between urban and migrant workers
is particularly striking. Migrant workers protest against employer’s
misbehaviours. Labour disputes generally involve bosses and workers.
The administration is usually not concerned directly and only inter-
venes when workers demand labour bureaus, trade-union support or
arbitration, or when managers use personal connections or bribes to
obtain officials’ support (China Labour Bulletin, 43, July-August 1998,
p. 16). In contrast, in the case of urban workers, the conflicts oppose
protesters and local officials. Redundancies are the consequences of
public policies aiming at economic development. In other terms the
disputes concern ex-allies of the state. Another difference lies in the
nature of the demands. Migrant workers protest against labour condi-
tions: non-payment of wages, dangerous or illegal working conditions,
low level of wages, etc. (Xinhua 26 May 1993; Sing Tao Jih Pao 3 April
1996). As for urban workers, they protest against redundancies, the in-
adequacy of unemployment benefits or the lack of job opportunities.
Their demands take place outside the production process. The social
relations between the members of the two groups are dissimilar. Mi-
grant workers come from different parts of the country and have great
difficulty extending solidarity ties beyond their small circle of compa-
triots. Moreover, the importance of the staff turnover rate prevents
workers from setting up collective actions, whereas even after redun-
dancies, laid-off workers (xiagang zhigong) and workers on early retire-
ment continue to maintain close relationships with their colleagues. If
the ‘labour community’ is gradually weakening, protest movements re-
main shaped by a feeling of belonging to specific groups.
Finally, a fundamental difference between migrant workers and ur-
ban workers’ protests lies in their efficiency. Although having been low-
ered in status by the industrial restructuring, urban workers have dem-
onstrated an ability to get benefits by way of compensation due to the
waning of the socialist labour regime. Laid-off workers remain owners
of their flat, receive unemployment or xiagang benefits and can apply
for a minimum income. Xiagang zhigong are supervised by the re-em-
ployment centres that keep records of the work units, help them to get
a new job and organise training programmes. Laid-off workers can
benefit from tax reduction if they set up an individual enterprise, and
enterprises that hire xiagang zhigong pay lower social contributions.
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People who have lost their jobs can also rely on local networks to get
informal jobs (feizhenggui jiuye). As a result, the lowering of the status
of urban workers has not led to a social ‘disintegration’. Beggars and
people living in shantytowns are of rural origin. Unlike their rural col-
leagues, urban workers have been able to avoid social exclusion result-
ing from redundancies. Urban workers remain distinctively different
from migrant workers.
What are the reasons for the relative success of the urban workers’
resistance to decline in status? Firstly, they maintain a prominent posi-
tion in the urban area. In industrial cities, unemployed people, xiagang
gongren, early retired people and young people who do not have a for-
mal job constitute a significant proportion of the active population. If
we add their family members, it is sometimes the vast majority of ur-
ban dwellers who are directly or indirectly concerned with redundan-
cies. As a consequence, the political stability in major cities depends
on the ability of local officials to limit the impact of the negative conse-
quences of industrial restructuring. Neither the Chinese State nor for-
eign investors want to see China crippled by a major social crisis. Be-
sides, as nearly everybody knows, a worker who has lost his job earns
the sympathy of the public, including that of the police.3 Protest move-
ments are perceived as definitively legitimate and are passively sup-
ported by the great majority of the urban population. The demographic
asset gives an efficiency to protest that is not at all in proportion to the
objective situation of redundant workers.4 Finally, protesters can ma-
nipulate the official discourse. China is still a socialist country, and in a
socialist country, the State must help people to overcome their pro-
blems. Protesters never forget to remind the authorities of this princi-
ple (Tang 2004), compelling them to acknowledge the contradictory
task of the post-socialist state: promoting economic liberalism and deal-
ing with the deleterious action of the market at the same time.
The new power relations lead to a particular mode of administration
of conflicts called ‘ritualised social management’: ‘management’ be-
cause the authorities have set up procedures in order to prevent and
forestall protest movements; ‘ritualised’ since the protests are chan-
nelled into a limited repertoire of actions in order to impose limits on
the dissatisfaction. Workers usually respect these limits unless the
authorities refuse to negotiate. As such, this way of dealing with con-
flicts is built on a common will to preserve the organic ties that are
characteristic of the socialist labour regime. On the one hand, workers
intend to maintain close relationships with local officials and continue
to use socialist rhetoric. On the other hand, the authorities aim at
avoiding any form of general repression that could result in the mar-
ginalisation of the social group. Consequently, a red line that no actor
wants to deliberately cross has taken shape. The line is constantly mov-
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ing as everyone tries to push it a little bit forward, while the signals
sent by each protagonist are attentively analysed. Beyond this line be-
gins a new world in which it is impossible to foresee the reactions of
the partners.
Protest Movements
I was an eyewitness to two protest movements, one in Datong (Shanxi)
and one in Shenyang (Liaoning), and have gathered information on
about two hundred movements which took place in fifty cities from
1996 to 2003.5 In major industrial cities (Shenyang, Changchun, Wu-
han, etc.), protest movements have broken out on a weekly basis and
from time to time on a daily basis. I also interviewed a dozen cadres in
charge of public security and more than forty workers, among whom a
great majority had participated in demonstrations.6
There are two main grounds for disputes. The most spectacular and
violent protests, which are also less common, are induced by redun-
dancies and non-payment of wages. In 1997, riots broke out in
Zhengzhou, Kaifeng (Henan) and Jinan (Shandong). Official buildings
were looted, and police cars were burnt. The same kind of events oc-
curred in Shijiazhuang (Hebei) where 170 persons were hurt (Zhengm-
ing, 242, December 1997: 23-24). In Shaoyang (Hunan), one thousand
laid-off workers looted the local police director’s office to protest
against the arrest of five of them suspected of participating in a protest
movement.7 In Mianyang (Sichuan), in July 1997, more than 100,000
people gathered to demonstrate against the closure of a firm (AFP, 17
July 1997, Zhongwen xinwen she, 21 July 1997). In October 1997, the
Hong Kong television reported a violent clash between policemen and
300 workers in Zigong (Sichuan). They had not been paid for a year.8
In Weinan (Shaanxi), hundreds of workers demonstrated against the
low level of redundancy compensations. Some participants were ar-
rested, and a violent clash occurred with the police (Reuters, 5 Novem-
ber 1999). In Yangjiazhan, the closure of a colliery resulted in a riot in
April 2000 involving 20,000 workers (AFP, 6 February 2000). In the
first part of 2002, several demonstrations took place in Liaoyang gath-
ering up to 30,000 persons.9 The scale and the degree of violence of
these movements can only be explained by the role the ‘labour commu-
nity’ plays in the workers’ imagination. When redundancy or the clo-
sure of the factory occurs, the danwei continues to symbolise the indivi-
duals’ identity. Furthermore, sometimes, it is not only one enterprise,
but a whole city that has to cope with employment restructuring.10
Even when incidents are serious, the local authorities try to avoid a
bloody repression.11 For cadres, the most important task is to limit dis-
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satisfaction and to prevent the spreading of the movement by a clever
balance between repression and negotiations. Protest leaders alone are
subject to arrests and harassment. Arrests do not systematically lead to
criminal cases. In Shaoyang, where clashes were particularly violent,
the local government finally released five workers. In Suizhou, one
demonstrator was arrested, and then released (Internet site, China La-
bour Bulletin, 6 September 2003). In Liaoyang, four individuals were
arrested, but only two of them were sentenced to imprisonment. Gen-
erally speaking, leaders are charged when the red line of dissent has
been crossed (China Labour Bulletin, 40, January-February 1998: 2-6).
Yao Fuxin, one of the Liaoyang movement leaders, acknowledged hav-
ing relations with the China Democratic Party and having participated
in a commemoration of the 1989 movement.12 In fact, protest leaders
rarely cross the red line since they are often very ‘decent’ people from
the point of view of the authorities. To a certain extent, they are ‘believ-
ers’. For example, Lao Zhang was involved in the different political
movements in the 1950s and 1960s. He ran into trouble during the
Cultural Revolution for being active in the ranks of a ‘conservative’
group of workers. He has always believed in socialism and has declared
his regret on his ‘conservative’ past. He has no financial problems as
his daughter is working for a foreign company in Beijing. ‘I was a lea-
der in the past, I have to be a leader now.’ He violently criticises the
way the government is treating old workers and the working class in
general. ‘The government does not take care of the workers; it is just
interested in making money.’ Asked if everything has taken a turn for
the worse since the reforms, he answers that ‘most of the reforms are
good, but it is not normal that retired people do not receive money, that
youngsters cannot get a job and that we have to pay to be treated at the
hospital’.
Dissatisfaction may lead to a clash for different reasons. Too many
redundancies in the same place at the same time very often lead to ser-
ious trouble.13 The low level of compensation is also a very sensitive is-
sue,14 and a more generous compensation does not systematically calm
down angry workers.15 The contempt of the authorities can induce pro-
tests. In Suizhou, the troubles started when the vice-mayor rudely an-
swered workers’ demands (Internet site, China Labour Bulletin, 6 Janu-
ary, 2003). Demonstrators do not appreciate officials not paying atten-
tion to their problems, at least formally. During interviews, many
workers considered that, in doing so, the officials infringed the princi-
ple of heqin heli (common reasons); that is to say, they are not acting in
accordance with what is viewed as a correct or fair attitude. The govern-
ment must respect the people (renmin) and must at least show concern
on workers’ problems.
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This is probably why the role and power of the Bureau of Letters and
Visits (xinfang bumen) have recently been reinforced.16 In Jilin pro-
vince, a lawyer helps plaintiffs (Internet site jl.gao.cn/govjob, 3 Decem-
ber 2003).17 Some provinces promoted young cadres to take charge of
these departments.18 The number of complaints is constantly increas-
ing (Thireau & Hua 2003). Nevertheless, according to the authorities
themselves, the lack of staff and of financial resources, the weak
authority of this administration and the cadres’ conservatism drastically
constrain the role of xinfang bumen and oblige plaintiffs to ‘make trou-
ble’ (naoshi).19
The non-payment of social benefits and the inefficiency of re-em-
ployment measures is the second reason for protest movements. Trou-
bles are generally less spectacular and shorter, but more frequent. The
struggle does not involve the ‘labour community’ but individuals, often
organised in small groups, protesting against their impoverishment.
Such protests are becoming so common that the forms of actions are
being standardised. Protests take the same form in all cities. Here, the
protesters are not shocked anymore; actions take place with a general
feeling of despair and resignation.
The place of protest is very important. It reveals that the main insti-
tution that angry people are tied up with is the municipal government
and no longer the employer. Protests begin with a gathering in the
town centre, generally at the gate of a municipal building. Protesters
sometimes demonstrate in the city centre. The aim is to create distur-
bances to express their anger and to force officials to meet them and
deal with their problems. The demonstration lasts for a few hours or
half a day. An official who assures the protesters that the problem will
be attentively examined usually receives representatives. Police officers
are very numerous on the spot, but they generally do not intervene. Ne-
gotiations can start up peacefully. In Harbin city, two vice-mayors went
to Acheng to put an end to a protest (SWB/FE/2826 1997). In Mian-
yang city, troubles ceased only after the authorities had announced that
social measures were going to be taken in favour of xiagang gongren
and unemployed workers (SWB/FE/3028 1997). In Wuhan, money
was given to 200 retired workers (AFP, 13 April 1998). Xiagang gongren
and retired workers from the Anyuan mining plant in Pingxiang
(Jiangxi), who demonstrated for several days, blocked a train and
threatened to travel to Beijing, finally received 120 yuan per month
(SWB/FE/3244, 1998, Ming Pao, 3 June 1998).
In this process of standardisation of actions, infringement of the
‘rules of the game’ is itself codified. What is at stake is to display reso-
lution and anger while, at the same time, avoiding the conflict getting
out of hand. Workers in Datong and Shenyang recognised that their
objective is to carry on a gradual radicalisation of action.20 The block-
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ing of traffic is a first step in the escalation of conflict. In Anshan, re-
tired workers lay down on the railway between Dalian and Harbin for
forty minutes. They also blocked the main door of the Angang steel
plant for one day. Finally, the police drove them out (AFP, 18 April
1998). A thousand workers blocked a street in Wuhan for three hours
so as to obtain pension arrears. They broke up after being assured that
they would be paid very soon (AFP, 1st July 1998). In Changchun, 200
retired people blocked the traffic in the town centre for a few hours.21
Numerous retired workers protest, but they have a prominent role in
workers’ strategy. When xiagang zhigong, unemployed and retired work-
ers, demonstrate together, the latter are often in the front line. Actually,
it is quite difficult for the police to maltreat ‘old workers’.22 The last
step is to threaten the authorities that they will send representatives to
a provincial capital or even Beijing. Protesters know that local cadres
are not keen on drawing the central authorities’ attention to their mis-
takes in conflict management.
Standardisation can result in a containment strategy that aims at ri-
tualising protests. In 1998, central authorities took new measures to ef-
ficiently deal with the growing number of demonstrations and social
unrest. According to a document published in the Hong Kong newspa-
per, the government plan makes a clear distinction between most of
the protests that are ‘non-political, non-organised and non-oppositional’
and a small number of incidents that rely on foreign forces to over-
throw the regime and to break national unity. Protest movements are
considered as having multiple causes. The masses (including cadres
and Party members) are often not pleased with public policies. The ad-
ministration infringes laws and makes mistakes, officials do not imple-
ment regulations and neglect their duties. The masses’ rights are
flouted, and officials do not try to find solutions to solve disputes. Even
when the demands are reasonable, they are not satisfied. To face these
protest movements, the document described preventive measures that
should be implemented promptly. Leaders should be arrested. Local
government should protect official buildings and public places and
bring ambulances and fire officers to the spot. Within two hours fol-
lowing the beginning of troubles, local officials should inform munici-
pal, provincial and national authorities. These measures should take
into account the nature of the movement. When the demands are fair
or in case of obvious injustice, propaganda should be used to explain
the situation, and it is essential to find solutions. On the other hand, if
protest movements are organised and seditious, it should be possible
to use violent means (Zhengming, May 1998: 17-18).
Repression and negotiation/containment are applied in dealing with
two very different kinds of protest movements. The mass media and
the authorities regularly evoke this essential distinction (Far Eastern
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Economic Review, 27 April 2000). On the one hand, the police forces
have been reinforced (AFP, 19 April 2000 and AFP, 27 January 2001).
On the other hand, guidelines are regularly sent to local governments
to settle conflicts as quickly as possible (AFP, 7 March 2000), notably
just before festivals: National Day, Labour Day, Spring Festival (AP, 18
September 1999). The central government has started a responsibility
system concerning public security. The evaluation of cadres depends
partially on their ability to avoid social troubles (AFP, 19 March 2000).
Yet, classification of protest movements is not based on very firm and
objective elements. If the presence of ‘dissidents’ among leaders, too
much obvious support given by foreign media or too strong a pressure
coming from the international community23 are considered as evidence
of the seditious nature of the unrest, it is often largely subjective, and
the appraisal of the situation remains largely contingent. The local cir-
cumstances are of first importance. Are workers criticising the regime?
Are slogans fair or rebellious? Is the conflict escalating or weakening?
Is a national leader coming to the area? These are the questions the
authorities probably ask themselves before deciding the kinds of mea-
sures that need to be carried out.24
Sometimes we are close to a kind of ‘scientific management’ of so-
cial unrest. For example, in Datong, retired workers who petitioned the
local government are greeted by a board on which protest guidelines
are described.25 In order to respect the law (hefa), protesters must gath-
er quietly and must not shout slogans nor block the traffic. They must
choose representatives who will be allowed to enter the courtyard to
give the petition to officials from the Bureau of Letters and Visits. They
must wait for the representatives’ return and then break up. In case of
troubles, protestors can be fined or prosecuted. There were about fifty
retired workers in the protest movement that I witnessed in Datong.
That day, people arrived at eight in the morning. They scrupulously re-
spected the local regulations. No slogan was shouted; they waited
quietly. When I came for an interview, they were not afraid at all and
explained to me the reasons for their anger. They were people from an
enterprise that was on the verge of bankruptcy. They had not received
their pension for months. They got some money from time to time
(once in cash) after previous protests, but they were far from receiving
the total arrears and had to come back regularly. Actually, the main
problem concerned health insurance rather than money. ‘At my age,
every illness can occur and without money it is impossible to be trea-
ted.’ According to the informants, some retired workers had launched
more radical demonstrations in the past – demonstrations in the town
centre, the blocking of traffic – but without results. In Datong, peti-
tions, gatherings and sit-ins have taken place, sometimes on a daily ba-
sis. Two representatives were discussing with officials in the building
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in order to give them a petition and a file containing the main docu-
ments. Half an hour later they left. The officials assured them that the
case would be dealt with and that they would receive information soon.
But the retired people were not satisfied, and they decided to stay all
morning. The protest broke up at eleven o’clock, but protesters decided
to come every day to pressure the officials. Policemen in plain clothes
were more numerous than protesters, but they did not intervene. They
approached me carefully and told some retired people that I inter-
viewed to leave the spot. We finished the interview some thousand
metres away in a small lane.26
According to the vice-director of the Central Bureau of Letters and
Visits, the central government adopted a ‘directive concerning the
speeding up of the systematisation of letters and visits office work’
(guanyu jiakuai quanguo xinfang bangong zidonghua gongzuo de tongzhi).
Its objective was to quickly and efficiently – scientifically to a certain
extent – deal with social dissatisfaction. The same official considered
that 85 per cent of the ‘visits’ concern real problems (shushi) that must
be treated rapidly so as to avoid complainants trying to involve higher
authorities (Internet site www.people.com.cn, November 2000). The
public prosecutor’s office and the Shandong province Party Discipline
Committee have published a document aimed at providing officials
with a method for treating complaints (Internet site www.dic-sd.gov.cn,
November 2003). ‘We must respect complainants’ and ‘warmly wel-
come them’ because ‘most of them come for serious reasons’; ‘we must
set up a good environment for discussion’, ‘reduce distance between
people’s feelings’ and even ‘open our souls’. Even if what the complain-
ants say appears to be incoherent, one must remain welcoming, and
one must accept all demands. At the first meeting, one must ‘ask for
evidence’ and then ‘make inquiries and write a report concerning cases
which cannot be solved immediately’. ‘It is important to satisfy people.’
The document insists on the attention officials must pay to representa-
tives of ‘collective visits’ (jiti shangfangzhe), notably because ‘they have
increased’ in the last years. ‘They involve a lot of people, they are ur-
gent (jipo) and dangerous.’ When complainants can provide evidence,
we must quickly and precisely answer. When demands are reasonable,
we must investigate and solve the problem. When demands are exces-
sive (guohuo) and impossible to satisfy, the situation must be explained
clearly. Finally, when demands are groundless (wuli), complaints must
be resolutely criticised and educated. Generally speaking, ‘we must
strive to make people involved in petition movements feel that we are
doing the best we can to solve their problems’.
Money plays a key role in the ‘ritualised social management’ of con-
flicts. Without resources, it is impossible to avoid escalation. As noted
in a police review, ‘in the short term, the best solution is money’ (Far
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Eastern Economic Review, 27 April 2000: 48). The central authorities
provide ‘emergency funds’ to prevent troubles and put pressure on the
local authorities to find resources by themselves (AP, 7 March 2000).
Sometimes, protesters go back home with a 100 yuan note.27 Nonethe-
less, too much funds occasionally lead to risky situations. When people
in need hear that some workers have received money, social unrest can
get worse. Hence, the ‘waves’ of protest that start when rumours go
round about emergency funds that have been provided.28 The expecta-
tions are particularly great in the northeast and in central industrial ci-
ties that cumulate all disadvantages. In that case, relying on the central
government’s financial resources appears to be a regular practice. The
local authorities play a very delicate game. On the one hand, they try to
show that they are dealing efficiently with social problems. On the
other hand, they explain that the situation is getting worse because of
the lack of funds.
Discourse and Practices: The State
Workers and authorities expect a certain kind of behaviour from each
other. Nevertheless, the two protagonists are not on an equal footing.
The authorities have a strategic advantage based on their legitimate
monopoly of violence and on their ability to influence social moral va-
lues. In Bourdieu’s terms, the state can use physical and, more impor-
tantly, symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1979) – i.e. a set of legitimate behav-
iours and discourse – to influence people’s actions. Social peace and
economic growth are universally supported guidelines for public ac-
tion. From that point of view, redundancies appear as a necessary sacri-
fice of some individuals for the well being of all. Industrial restructur-
ing is the price to pay for social progress. What is controversial is not
the policy itself, but the pace of change and the nature of social mea-
sures the state will take to avoid social disturbances. On that point, po-
sitions are contradictory. On the one hand, officials advocate develop-
ment of social policies. On the other hand, they complain about the ‘la-
ziness’ (landuo) and the lack of initiative of redundant workers. Protest
movements would be evidence of the inability of urban workers to ac-
cept new forms of work characterised by ‘effort, flexibility and indivi-
dual responsibility’. By contrast, migrant workers appear as ‘ideal work-
ers’, the type of workers China needs.29
In the administration, discourses and practices are not alike. Even if
information is scarce, it seems that the central and local authorities do
not suffer the same constraints. The central authorities require social
peace but do not deny the right of protest. On the contrary, the increas-
ing number of complaints, petitions, and lawsuits prove that from Bei-
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jing’s point of view, social dissatisfaction has to be contained and not
systematically repressed. Articles from prominent power holders advo-
cate the emergence of channels (qudao) through which vulnerable
groups (ruoshi qunti) can express their anger and demands. Social sta-
bility (shehui wending) supposes pacific, ritualised and non-political pro-
test. No violence, no regime challenge, this is the rule. The local
authorities have the same discourse, but they do not have the same re-
sponsibilities. After having drawn overall guidelines – stressing income
growth and social stability – they content themselves with checking
whether the objectives have been met. They are in the position of a re-
feree intervening when the situation turns out badly. When they order
the arrest of protesters, at the same time they often impose sanctions
against officials and pronounce prison sentences against dishonest en-
terprise managers30. As for the local authorities, they have to assume
the contradictions of the reform policy. They have to get rid of the dan-
wei system and to control social unrest without using violence. In case
of spectacular failure, the officials’ careers can be definitively jeopar-
dised. As a consequence, their strategic capacity is limited. Using Fou-
cault’s terms, their capacity ‘to act on somebody else’s actions’ is weak.
They can lie to the central authorities and protesters, take delaying
measures, negotiate with representatives or repress workers, but all
these practices put them on a knife-edge.31 Moreover, ambition – either
political ambition if they want to show off their talents too brutally or
prebendary ambition when they use their power to seize public enter-
prise assets – can lead to officials’ downfall32.
Discourse: Protesters
The protesters’ discourse is clearly revealed by slogans. Their demands
often concern material help: ‘we want jobs and food’, ‘we want rice’,
‘we want to survive’, ‘we want wages’, ‘we want money for living’, ‘we
want our pensions’ or ‘we want food and work’33. Nevertheless, unlike
what some scholars assume, social unrest cannot only be explained by
a subsistence crisis triggered by the waning of the workers’ moral econ-
omy, based on the ‘survival right’ of group members (Chen 2000).34
Besides money and food, injustice plays an essential role: ‘respect for
old workers’35, ‘save the people’ (AFP, 19 September 1998), ‘we have
sacrificed our youth to the Party and now it has dropped us, we ask
our children for help, but they are also fired’ (AFP, 18 April 1998).
Sometimes, slogans are of a more political nature, but they do not op-
pose the socialist regime. On the contrary, they criticise reforms and
support implicitly the new left thesis (Rocca 2002): ‘long live socialism’
(shehuizhuyi wansui), ‘we want a true socialist system and not a false
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one’ (yao shehuizhuyi, bu yao jia shehuizhuyi), ‘down with the new capi-
talist-bureaucratic class’ (dadao xin guanliao zichanjieji). Retired work-
ers are particularly sensitive to injustice. They cannot put up with the
idea that what symbolises their life – a pension – is cancelled by a new
policy.36
As the Liaoyang case revealed to a great extent, corruption is another
source of criticism. But here also what is criticised is not the regime it-
self, but officials and public enterprise managers. They symbolise the
decay of the regime. Yet the choice of this rhetoric also has a tactical di-
mension. Protesters demand a strict and systematic implementation of
anti-corruption policies. In parallel, workers use the rhetoric of the
‘three representatives’. Having promised to defend ‘basic rights of the
people’, the state has to take its responsibilities.37
This discourse, combining reference to socialism (Tang 2004), the
defence of basic rights and tactical identification into new propaganda,
constitutes a moral economy in the sense that economy must respect
an ethos ‘grounded upon a consistent transitional view of norms and
obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within
the community’ (Thompson 1971). In the moral economy of the old
working class, the Maoist period is perceived as a golden age evoked
with nostalgia. Formerly, workers doubled as urban dwellers and as the
incarnation of socialism. Today, like French unskilled workers during
1870-1914, they affirm a new identity in striving to distinguish them-
selves from ‘the other ones’, the ‘alien’ (Dornel 2004). In China, from
the workers’ point of view, the outsiders are two emerging groups: mi-
grant workers and middle class, the non-urban and the new rich. These
two groups represent a principle based upon social and not political
segregation. Deprived of their labour status, workers try to keep their
status of urban dweller. For them, migrant workers are ‘foreigners’
coming to town to seize jobs and to make money. They are perceived
as dishonest and uneducated people. As a consequence, they can be
shamelessly exploited. Urban workers, legally or illegally, rent dilapi-
dated houses at a very high price to migrants,38 and the residents’ com-
mittees require expensive rent fees from them when they open up
shops.39
As for middle-class people, they are considered schemers, as people
making money without creating value. We find here the common op-
position made by populism between productive economy and parasitic
activities (Sternhell 1978). Individual enterprise bosses (getihu), specu-
lators, people working in foreign enterprises or the high-tech service
sector are held responsible for China’s misfortune. This is directly
linked to corruption (AFP, 17 July 1997). The market economy creates
jobs they cannot get because of their lack of skills or the unfair compe-
tition of migrants. Public policies favour the moneymaking sector to
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the detriment of job-creating sectors. Officials are only interested in
eating, drinking, travelling abroad and giving presents to mistresses
and prostitutes. Added to all that, they oppose a lifestyle grounded
upon reasonable consumption, a quiet and secure life and respect for
material labour.40 It is also very important for workers to keep their
distance from migrant workers. The fact that migrants do not enjoy
public services and citizenship rights is perceived as normal. Social
stratification must depend on the ‘quality’ of the groups. As a conse-
quence, what they defend are ‘particular’ rights, not universal ones. It
is the only way to maintain the ‘distinction’.
Old Class/New Class
Most scholars talking about the Chinese working class define it in a
one-dimensional way. There exists only one working class and one la-
bour experience. Yet the decline of the urban working class and the
emergence of a new one are two different – albeit linked – phenomena.
In terms of social origin, working and living conditions or power rela-
tions, they are poles apart. Whereas migrant workers play a prominent
role in economic development but lack social prestige, the urban work-
ing class has lost its dominant position in production but relatively suc-
ceeded in avoiding unemployment and precariousness leading to social
exclusion. Moreover, the analyses of the old working class protest
movement reveal a profound class differentiation among workers. The
old working class ethos is clearly inherited from the socialist experi-
ence. The state is still supposed to be in charge of the reproduction of
the ‘people’, that is to say the part of the population that lives from its
work. To be fair, power holders have to respect them and provide them
with resources. That would be a way of recognising the contributions
of workers to the development of China. The old working class is de-
pendent on the state both from an imaginary and from an objective
point of view. For better or for worse, the old working class is not in-
cluded in economic life anymore. For better, because the state cannot
give them up as they represent the most obvious expression of the poli-
tical ambiguity of the reform policy: China is a socialist society with a
market economy. In such a context, the old working class reveals its
ability to ‘act on state actions’ and to get some benefits from protest
movements: xiagang zhigong status, poverty line benefits, unemploy-
ment funds, etc. In other words, protest movements (or the risk of pro-
test movements) are useful means to influence public policies. For
worse, as the relative efficiency of the old working class protests result
in a high degree of dependence. Workers cannot resolutely oppose the
regime or the reform policy. They have no way out of a ‘stick-to-re-
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gime-based’ strategy, and workers’ complaints are full of nostalgia
rather than full of ‘revolutionary spirit’. Migrant workers are in a very
different situation. They are at the core of the Chinese miracle, but un-
til recently deprived of status and without influence on public policies.
The reform policy has undoubtedly resulted in important changes in
class stratification. Two questions remain. The first one concerns the
possible merging of the two working classes. Some officials advocate
the eradication of the present dual labour market. In that case, urban
workers and the migrant workers would merge in a single class of
workers. But this perspective scares some others. The cancellation of
the hukou system would compel the local authorities to develop public
services (transportation, housing, school, public health, etc.) and would
result in a sharp increase in wages, schools, etc. Moreover, the decision
is politically tricky. If hukou disappears, urban workers will lose the last
element of ‘distinction’41 they can rely upon.
The second question is the issue of the political representation of
the reshaped old working class. Being a dependent group, the old
working class is represented by institutions inside the bureaucratic ap-
paratus. As such, we could consider that the old working class is only a
problem of one generation. The new generation of urban workers who
are well educated and employed would have a completely different per-
ception of labour and show modern social behaviour. Yet, it is far from
evident that all the young urbanites have the ability to get a good job
and to enter the ranks of the middle stratum (Rocca 2007). It is not so
easy for urban people without a university degree to find jobs, and even
recent university graduates have trouble finding a stable and well-paid
position (Rocca 2006). Is it so unbelievable to imagine the emergence
of a group of people who are both keen on competing with migrant
workers and able to enjoy the dream of the middle class?
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7 Justifying the New Economic and Social Order:
The Voice of a Private Entrepreneur1
Gilles Guiheux
Social movements take place in historical, economical, social and cul-
tural contexts that should all be taken into account. They are compel-
ling forces that vary from one country to another, and from one histori-
cal moment to another. They are shaped by the institutional structures
and the ideological arrangements of social actors. In the sociology lit-
erature, the most useful tool linking social movements and the overall
political system is the political opportunities theory (McAdam,
McCarthy & Zald 1996). Most authors underline the key role of the
state and its allies in shaping opportunities. Tarrow (1996) distin-
guishes four main types of opportunities that play a critical role in mo-
bilising social movements: the degree of openness of the political sys-
tem, the instability of political alignments, the existence of possible in-
fluential allies and the division of the elites. Tatzenstein (1998)
emphasises the role of the law and the practices of the judicial system.
But, in any given country, social movements are also related to sym-
bolic discourses. That is why some authors integrate structural factors
into the political opportunities that are not literally related to the politi-
cal system, but rather to a cultural dimension. Gamson and Meyer
(1996), for instance, make a distinction between the institutional di-
mension of political opportunities and the cultural dimension; the lat-
ter includes elements such as legitimacy, class-consciousness, public
discourse and media framework.
Though these theories have been elaborated on the basis of the his-
torical paths of Western democracies, they are useful in pointing out
that social movements take place in an overall context that have politi-
cal, economic, social and also cultural dimensions. In China, there are
an increasing number of social actors who are taking part in the defini-
tion of the new legitimate social, economical and ideological order.
This order is no longer shaped only by the state but by other social ac-
tors as well. This is partly due to the fact that the Chinese Communist
Party has changed its recruitment policy. Notably, the CCP is actively
recruiting the winners of economic reform, reaching out and co-opting
newly emerging social elites, in particular the professional and techni-
cal elites, and private entrepreneurs. Another factor is the proliferation
of the media (at the national and local level, on Internet websites, etc.),
which has increased the number of voices participating in the political
discourse. Thus, a greater number of actors appear on the public stage,
and they have greater latitude in their performances.
This chapter studies one specific actor, a businessman that we look
upon as contributing to the drawing up of forms of legitimisation for
the new economic and social order. Among other non-state social ac-
tors, he is shaping norms and discourses justifying the present social
order; norms and discourses that, in some circumstances, are chal-
lenged by social movements. Thus, we aim at giving a voice to a social
actor who, though close to it, is not, strictly speaking, a member of the
State apparatus and is taking part in the development of a discourse
legitimising the present social and economic order. The analysis is
based on the statements of one entrepreneur, Mr. Mao Lixiang, the
head of the Feixiang group, whose company Fangtai (Fotile in English)
manufactures kitchen equipment.2 The study of this firm is rooted in
straight observable practices as well as in the words of the creator of
the business. I chose this particular businessman because of the visible
and coherent quality of his speech. Mao wrote several books stating his
personal experience, which have appeared as initiation handbooks for
prospective businessmen.3 Mao often gives interviews to the media
(written press, television or radio) and takes part in numerous forums
all over the country. He has thus become a public figure. The manage-
ment professionals validate his speeches as well as his practices. Mao
is regularly asked to intervene in the training programmes of top uni-
versities, particularly in MBAs (Masters of Business Administration), at
Peking and Tsinghua universities. A public figure, Mao dedicates a part
of his time, a third according to him, to promoting family business
across the country. The number of social stages held by Mao Lixiang
indicates that, in China today, private businessmen have the opportu-
nity to speak their minds, thus becoming more and more influential
(Heberer 2003).
One may challenge my intention to generalise from the description
of a singular case. The issue is not new and is in fact a central problem
of the humanities. In the continuation of the weberian epistemological
tradition, Jean-Claude Passeron and Jacques Revel (2005) have recently
tried to endow ‘the cases’ of human sciences with a renewed dignity.
Inspired by their demonstration, my aim is not to limit the analysis,
nor to think up a unique case, but to ‘extract out of it an argumenta-
tion of a more general scope, and whose conclusions can be used
again’ (Passeron & Revel 2005: 9). In fact, championing the interests
of family businesses (in as much as the regime allows him freedom of
expression), Mao Lixiang embodies part of the modernist economic
elite of the country.4 Political authorities know him as such. Thus, to-
gether with eight other private entrepreneurs from the Zhejiang pro-
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vince, Mao Lixiang was invited to take part in a conference with Pre-
mier Wen Jiabao at the end of August 2004 (21st Century Economic Her-
ald, 6 September 2004: 1-2). Indeed, it is not easy to tell how effective
his speech is – stating principles is not enough to convince – but his
ability to express himself through various media (the management lit-
erature, the general public press and the field of politics) is surely a
sign of the effectiveness of his words.
Through an analysis of the way Mao Lixiang speaks of his personal
career, of family firms and of the Chinese economy in general, our aim
is to identify the new ideological and moral order that is in progress in
China today. Actually, if the People’s Republic shows the main charac-
teristics of a capitalist economy (the merchandising of labour, the priva-
tisation of the means of production, the emergence of a class of busi-
nessmen), individualism is rejected as a ‘bourgeois’ value (Wang Xiaoy-
ing 2002), and the reforms have been justified in terms of socialism –
the Party has first introduced the notion of ‘initial step of socialism’ in
1981 and has been regularly referring to it since 1987. However, chang-
ing successfully from a planned economy to a market economy implies
an ideological transformation. The present chapter focuses on identify-
ing the new standards and the new values that make up both the basis
and the effect of such a transition. In the background of Mao’s defence
of family business, what is in question is not only economic action in
all its forms, but also the personal enrichment of a few – Mao’s perso-
nal fortune is estimated at 100 million yuan (Chen & Xu 2003: 298) –
and the emergence of a new social stratification.
Mao Lixiang’s discourses take place in the context of a growing
involvement of business in local and national level policymaking, as
private entrepreneurs are emerging as a lobby able to shape state poli-
cies (Scott 2005; Guiheux 2006). However, we are not only dealing
here with specific interests, but also with the invention of a collective
identity. In a country that is still run by a communist party, social
classes do not exist (and in fact Chinese sociologists do not make use
of the word ‘class’, jieji), and it is hard to predict that social movements
could form according to class location. China is still an authoritarian
state that wishes to maintain, or even strengthen, its monopoly of poli-
tical activities; and it is quasi-impossible for any social force to organise
itself at the national level without being supervised by the Communist
Party. On the other hand, social movements comparable to the new so-
cial movements of the 1960s and 1970s in the West are emerging (Cal-
houn 1995). Their participants are not seeking to gain impossible poli-
tical concessions from institutional actors, and they are not champion-
ing their interests in conventional terms – through political parties or
professional unions – rather, they are seeking recognition of new iden-
tities and lifestyles. Mao Lixiang’s discourse contributes to the forma-
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tion of the collective identity of Chinese private entrepreneurs, identity
being defined as a perception of shared status which may be imagined
rather than experienced directly, ‘emerging out of interactions with a
number of different audiences (bystanders, allies, opponents, news
media, state authorities)’ (Polleta & Jasper 2001: 298).
From a weberian viewpoint, acknowledging the crucial part played
by the values and motives written in the institutions, Mao’s practices
and speech are read as indicators of the Chinese ‘spirit of capitalism’.
We assume that the documents we have based our study upon (Mao
Lixiang’s books, newspaper articles, interviews) produce standards and
meaning and develop arguments in favour of the economic function-
ing in use in the world of business and in the inner working of the
firms. The speech in question is part of the discourse that legitimates
the economic and social system established over the last twenty years.5
Even though the building-up of a new legitimate economic and social
order also implies the use of violence, since one remains in a single-
party system that allows no pluralism, particularly where trade unions
are concerned, we have chosen to take seriously the ideological con-
structions that go along with the transition.
A Career Embedded in a Specific Territory
Mao’s speech takes on meaning as part of a long professional career
across a territory, the north of Zhejiang Province, between the cities of
Hangzhou and Ningbo, where a network of small and middle-size
businesses started developing as early as the 1960s. After 1978, Mao’s
career followed the institutional transformations involved in the politics
of reform and opening-up led by the central government.
Mao Lixiang was born in 1942 to a poor family of Cixi, about sixty
kilometres west of Ningbo. Cixi had 460,000 inhabitants in 1949, and
around 1 million at the end of 1990 (Cixishi gonganju bian 1998: 251-
253). On leaving secondary school, he entered professional life as a
teacher and taught for two years. In 1965, at 23, the young man be-
came an accountant for a commune and brigade enterprise (shedui
qiye).6 He kept the job until 1974. From 1974 to 1994, he was in
charge of sales for the same firm; the company employed about forty
people and worked as a subcontractor, making parts for Shanghai
State-owned enterprises (car industry and radio-set companies). In fact,
the city of Cixi, in the second half of the 1960s, was an area of quick
development for this type of business. The number of small-town busi-
nesses went from 19 in 1964 to 106 in 1970 and reached 186 in 1974,
without there being any notable change in the demography of other
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types of businesses (Cixi shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangong-
shi 1992: 381-382).
A Township and Village Enterprise within the Contract Responsibility System
In 1985, Mao became the manager of a factory located near Cixi, in the
zhen of Zhanghe, the ‘Factory Number 9 Producing Radio Parts’. Offi-
cially, it was a collective plant owned by the local government, subcon-
tracting pieces for Shanghai TV-set manufacturers. The local adminis-
tration had supplied the money for the purchase of the first six ma-
chines. The working capital, barely 2,000 yuan, was provided by Mao
himself (Chen & Xu 2003: 307). As a matter of fact, the business was
granted to Mao within the limits of the contract responsibility system
(chengbao zhi). The system, initially set up for the farmers’ land as part
of the decollectivisation reform, took the shape of a contract between
the business manager and the administrative unit he was attached to
(here, between Mao and the Zhanghe zhen). The contract set the yearly
rent that the firm had to pay to its administrative unit, in return for
which the manager was the master in his own firm. Though the firm
was collective de jure – consequently entitled to the privileges granted
to any business controlled by local authorities, particularly when it
came to getting credit – it was a private firm de facto. Within the firm,
Mao faced up to all the responsibilities: ‘I was, at the same time, the
chairman of the board of directors, the general executive and the sales
manager’ (Chen & Xu 2003: 300).
When it was founded, the firm was a subcontractor for Shanghai
plants. But, in 1986, because of over-production, the market went
through a crisis. Within a few months, Mao lost his customers. He
then started looking for another type of production (Mao 2002: 34-37).
Following a friend’s advice, he travelled to Xinyang (Hunan Province)
and visited a manufacturer of measuring instruments who was sup-
posed to have invented a new product. However, when Mao got there,
the information proved wrong. From Xinyang, he went north to Beij-
ing, to the Electronic Techniques Research Institute. There, a friend
showed him another product, an electric fire-lighter (dianhuoji); Mao
decided to start manufacturing the item. The setting-up of the new pro-
duction lines took only forty-five days.
The new product got a good reception in the market. Mao sent his
salesmen all over the country, travelling himself to the main cities like
Beijing and Shanghai. He was awarded the ‘Golden Eagle Prize’ by
Zhejiang Province, a prize meant to reward creative businesses (Mao
2002: 36). The product was exported, first through an international
business company, from 1986 to 1989, then directly. In 1989, Mao
took part in the Canton Trade Fair for the first time and signed his first
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contracts with foreign customers.7 The firm, from then on the first
Chinese manufacturer of fire-lighters, was quoted among the first hun-
dred exporters from Zhejiang Province, and it had become one of the
first few national small-town businesses doing export trade. Mao was
given the nickname of ‘worldwide king of the electrical fire-lighter’. In
1992, the firm changed name and became the Feixiang Group (Feix-
iang jituan). Between 1986 and 1992, the number of employees in-
creased tenfold, from 100 to 1,000. Mao had probably taken advantage
of the fact that he was the first one to produce such an article. That en-
abled him to make huge profits. This was the case for many town and
village enterprises that came first into a specific market (Byrd 1990:
97). However, Mao became a victim of his success: other businesses
started manufacturing the same products in Cixi and in the neighbour-
ing places of Ningbo and Yutao. A cutthroat competition between man-
ufacturers brought the prices down drastically, from US$1.2 to US
$0.35 per unit. In 1993, Mao started thinking of manufacturing a dif-
ferent kind of product.
The Founding of a Private Firm
In 1995, Mao Lixiang spent 5 million yuan on establishing a new busi-
ness, Fangtai (Chen & Xu 2003: 303). The firm was established as a
private limited company; it was a joint stock company, in which Mao’s
family owned 80 per cent. Mao was the chairman of the board of direc-
tors (dongshizhang); his wife was the president of the observation com-
mittee (jianshehui zhuxi) and his son, Mao Zhongqun, the executive
manager (zongjingli). No other member of the family was employed.
Betting on the improvement of the housing conditions of Chinese city-
dwellers, the new firm, at the beginning, manufactured extracting-
hoods for the kitchen; then it diversified into manufacturing all the
kitchen facilities and furniture.
The history of Mao Lixiang’s professional career calls for several re-
marks. First, it helps to draw a portrait of a captain of industry (light
industry though it may be) – that is to say, of a businessman whose ac-
tivities developed gradually: he went from subcontracting for big
Shanghai companies to manufacturing and trading under his own
brand, and he progressively hoarded a wealth of experience and a capi-
tal of acquaintances, of abilities and of resources that were all made to
work for the economic growth of his activities. Contrary to those in
China who, over the last twenty years, have made a fortune at the stock
exchange or in real estate, Mao may consider himself a genuine entre-
preneur who has created products (at the start, manufacturing pro-
ducts for the Shanghai TV industry, then making electrical fire-lighters
and going on to producing all sorts of kitchen facilities), setting out to
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conquer new national or international markets (the Canton Fair and its
attendance of foreign buyers). This industrial history allows Mao to
play the role of a spokesman.
Second, Mao’s career has logically found a place in the record of the
institutional transformations of the last two decades. For twenty years,
from 1965 to 1985, Mao worked as a salaried employee of a collective
business owned by the local government; then he set up a business on
his own account within the bounds of the contract responsibility sys-
tem, the only possible choice in the mid-1980s. The firm was officially
collective, but it depended on Mao himself to bring the capital, and he
was also responsible for the profit and loss. The public feature was just
for show, since Mao only ‘displayed the state label’ (guale gongjia de pai-
zi) (source: interview). Ten years later, after a company law had been
passed in 1993, Mao was able to set up a legally private company with
the profit he had saved from his previous activities. His past as a sales
manager for a small town enterprise (from 1974 to 1994) was equally
helpful to train Mao as an entrepreneur: ‘Those were difficult years. At
the time, the economy was planned, but we were not allowed any raw
materials. Materials were given to state-owned firms, and their sales
were warranted; but as to us, we had no guaranteed supplies; we had
to find our own raw materials and our own market,’ Mao confided in
an interview. Managing a small town enterprise and being responsible
for its profit and loss had thus enabled Mao to acquire the necessary
abilities to become a business manager in a market economy.
By 1995, the founding year of Fotile, Mao already had thirty years of
experience of doing business in Cixi. The continuity between the var-
ious firms was hardly linked to their productive activities or to the com-
mand of a technological skill, since they ranged from the manufactur-
ing of pieces for TV sets to that of fire-lighters and then of kitchen
equipment, all of them non-sophisticated products, technologically
speaking. In the accounts he gives of his business ventures, Mao in
fact suggests that changing from one product to the other happened,
so to speak, by chance, while he also stayed in line with the local record
of small mechanical and electric products industry. Hence, as electric
fans had been made in Cixi for twenty years, Mao decided in 1995 to
start manufacturing kitchen extractor hoods. Over forty years, this is
less the record of a firm than the record of an individual who succes-
sively managed several businesses with different legal statuses and dif-
ferent productions. Their common feature is their manager, a feature
of Chinese private enterprises noted by Barbara Krug and Laszlo Polos
(2004: 86-87).
This is probably why Mao Lixiang never thought of setting up in any
place other than Cixi – a choice he justifies by the quality of the local
industrial infrastructure. Indeed, the local prosperity is linked to a net-
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work of small and middle-sized enterprises that have been working for
a long time as subcontractors for the big Shanghai industry. So all the
supplying of Fotile can be done locally: ‘whatever the piece, it could be
manufactured in Cixi’ (source: interview). As a matter of fact, the
small-town businesses have played the greatest role in the local eco-
nomic development between 1978 and 1987. In that lapse of time,
their number went from 275 to 921, while the value of their production
multiplied by eleven. Firms mainly produced household appliances
(electric fans in the 1970s and 1980s, ovens and irons in the 1980s
and 1990s) and electric components for the Shanghai TV, car and elec-
trical appliances industries (Cixi shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui
bangongshi 1992: 293, 382). Today, the road from Ningbo to Cixi runs
across a landscape now urban, not rural anymore, and continuously in-
dustrialised. The recent opening of a bridge across Hangzhou Bay
(May 2008) will strengthen the link with the metropolis since, from
now on, it takes less than an hour to travel from Cixi to Shanghai.
The Firm and the Market Economy
At the end of his career, a career exemplary of the adjustment of a
whole region to the institutional transformations, Mao Lixiang, today
in semi-retirement, expresses his own way of looking at business and
at the organisational method of the Chinese economy, in both special-
ised spaces and public spaces – at university conferences, in manage-
ment books, at businessmen forums and in the media. Our study is
based on a selection of articles put together in order to ‘pass on a
worthwhile statement to the younger generations of entrepreneurs’
(Mao 2002: 1). In order to give the book a scientific character, an econ-
omist or a consultant manager comments on each text; the comments
run from a few paragraphs to a few pages in length. Beyond a mere in-
dication of the vocabulary, I mean to underline the ideological sets of
rules that are evoked, and also to identify a number of arguments that,
in a way, are turned into a system. Three main themes come to light in
Mao’s discourse: the firm as an organisation, the market as a space of
confrontation of the producers, and the necessary collaboration with
public authorities.
The Firm as an Organisation
Mao deals with the firm as an organisation from two angles: from the
point of view of the manager’s responsibilities and the part he plays,
on the one hand; and from the point of view of the rallying of employ-
ees to serve the organisation’s interests, on the other.
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The entrepreneur appears as someone who must be both solitary
and creative. He must ‘keep away from the world’ (chaotuo), a phrase
with a triple meaning: ‘Turn away from daily matters in order to apply
one’s energy to major problems; reject common ideas in order to think
differently, in a creative way; keep away from the common practice of
human relationships (renji guanxi)’ (Mao 2002: 10-12). The entrepre-
neur’s solitude (gudu) is a warrant of his ability to break new ground.
‘Innovation, this is where the company’s vitality lies’ (Mao 2002: 57).
Not only does this characterise the boss; it should also distinguish each
and every employee; the same requirement is found in one of the slo-
gans of Fotile: ‘Be sincere, respect the company, study, innovate’
(zhengcheng, jingye, xuexi, chuangxin). Innovation, as a matter of fact, is
not restricted to technology; it also concerns the methods of organisa-
tion as well as the discovery of new markets (Mao 2002: 59). There is
a popularised version of Schumpeter’s definition of the entrepreneur.8
The insistence on the crucial part played by the head of the business
perfectly fits in with, and goes in the same direction as, the reforms
started in 1978, the aim of which was to make the firms and their
managers responsible for their profit and loss. Here, Mao Lixiang’s
ideas are utterly in keeping with all that has been written and pub-
lished to pay tribute to business managers as the heroes of contempor-
ary Chinese society.9
The manager’s solitude has another meaning: it allows him to ‘keep
away from human relationships’ (Mao 2002: 12). This is a call for giv-
ing up what Mao elsewhere describes as ‘the methods of management
characteristic of the previous step in the history of Chinese develop-
ment’. Aware of the pressure of human relationships on economic life,
Mao wishes for decisions to be made, from now on, regardless of these
pressures. In short, he recommends the use of modern management
methods against the Chinese social tradition. What he speaks about is
the necessary economic modernity that should break from the old so-
cial practices. The entrepreneur must be modern, contrary to what
Marie-Claire Berge`re (1994) has called ‘the old man’. What threatens
the entrepreneur’s interests are the Chinese social practices, such as
those that can be read in the long national history, from which he has
to break away. What Mao Lixiang says can also be understood as the ra-
tionalising of a practice that can be observed in many private family
businesses, where actual power is fully in the hands of the entrepre-
neur, a charismatic authority.
In addition to the question of its management, the firm is consid-
ered as a human community; according to Mao, its major asset is its
people. ‘Modern management must consider man as its main re-
source’; it must ‘put the people first’ (yiren weiben) (Mao 2002: 116-
118). Such words are in keeping with the change-over from a planned
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economy – where firms were completely involved in their task of pro-
duction and where staff management was strictly a book-keeping and
administrative matter – to a market economy, in which it has become
important to motivate the staff, and where success is determined by
the efficient management of men. It is from this viewpoint that Mao
comments on the necessity to build a firm as a community of men fo-
cusing on common aims – hence the importance given to creating a
team-spirit (tuandui) or the necessity to ‘create the Fangtai spirit to-
gether’ (gongzhu Fangtai hun) (Mao 2002: 136-141) and a corporate cul-
ture (qiye wenhua). What has to be created in the employees is the feel-
ing that they belong to the company.
The phrase ‘put the people first’ is also inspired by Confucian think-
ing and suggests the benevolent attitude the manager must have to-
wards his employees, similar to the prince’s towards his people. It is
also the same slogan that has been used by the Chinese leadership
since the fourteenth Party Congress (November 2002) to emphasise its
concern for the people. In addition, in the importance given to men as
a resource of the firm, there is somewhat of a ‘socialist’ echo. Mao Li-
xiang, in fact, does not rid himself of a rhetoric inherited from the time
of the planned economy and from the work units acting in the eco-
nomic, social and administrative fields. Mao thus appoints the firm to
‘rise up to the employees’ material, spiritual and affective needs, and to
set up relationships of confidence and equality between individuals, in
order to guarantee the working and vitality of the firm in the long run’
(Mao 2002: 116).
In another passage, Mao insists on the permanence in contemporary
Chinese economy and society of supposedly traditional values, particu-
larly ‘loyalty and sincerity’ (zhongcheng).
Traditional Chinese culture particularly insists on loyalty and
sincerity. The zhong character in Confucian culture means loy-
alty. That unquestionable loyalty allowed the feudal political sys-
tem to be maintained for 2,000 years (…). In modern manage-
ment, loyalty and sincerity must be a principle of behaviour for
the employees. (…) Modern loyalty – we must consider it from
the point of view of the market, we must use it, and everybody
should try to be loyal towards the group, towards the company.
(Mao 2002: 152-153)




Mao Lixiang’s discourse is organised around a second theme: market
as a space of confrontation between the producers. It is, in fact, the
idea of competition by which Mao chooses to characterise the market
economy:
The market exists; anyone may take part in it (…). The market is
like white rice, and the firms are like hens and ducks [trying to
eat the white rice] (…). Competition in the market is something
positive, it is only through competition that society can progress.
(Mao 2002: 18-19)
Here, Mao puts into words a popularised version of the liberal theory:
the free competition of individual interests (pointedly the firms’ inter-
ests) produces the common good.
Mao emphasises that firms should find and keep a trademark – the
very condition of the reputation of their products and consequently of
their success. He illustrates his statement by giving foreign as well as
Chinese trademarks as examples (Coca-cola, Pepsi-cola, 555 and Pierre
Cardin, as well as Wahaha, Hongtashan, Hai’er and Changhong).
Adopting a trademark is all the more important as Chinese products,
in the future, will have to face a growing competition from foreign pro-
ducers once China has become a member of the World Trade Organisa-
tion (Mao 2002: 244-248). The notion of trademark had, in fact, reap-
peared with the 1978 reforms. During the Maoist period, products did
not bear any label, but only the references of the factory where they
had been manufactured (indications of the place and often a number),
except for a few companies already well established before 1949.
Together with the importance of the trademark, Mao Lixiang men-
tions the practices of imitation, declaring that imitation is ‘a malignant
tumour’ (Mao 2002: 256). In another passage, he talks of ‘orderless
competition (wuxu jingzheng) [which] allows firms and trades people
who do not create products, do not use advertising and do not set up
sales networks, to make a lot of profit in a very short time’. He quotes
the case of his own activity: ‘At the beginning, in Cixi, there were only
two plants manufacturing extracting-hoods (…). But once the media
had reported “the Fangtai phenomenon”, there were more than ten es-
tablishments’ (Mao 2002: 18). Since then, Fangtai has been equipped
with a legal department, partly to fight this curse. But, Mao thinks,
firms pay their due taxes and are in a position to require from local
authorities that they protect them ‘in accordance with the law’. So he
wishes for a local state that would be more helpful in the enforcement
of the law, a guarantor of order in the market.
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Firms and Local Governments
Mao Lixiang considers, indeed, that the state is an indispensable part-
ner of businesses. In China, entrepreneurs ‘can only rely (bang) on the
government’ (Mao 2002: 20-22). To the question ‘must we run after
the market or must we run after the mayor?’ (in Chinese, the phrase is
homophonic: zhao shichang haishi zhao shizhang), Mao answers that, of
course ‘the market is very important, but you absolutely cannot forget
the mayor. As a matter of fact, the links between the Chinese economy
and the government are very strong. You cannot do without the mayor!
Our market economy is only emerging, it is still in a phase of develop-
ment, competition in the market is often disorderly, you have to rely
on the government to coordinate [the company’s actions in the market].
When laws or rules are issued, it takes some time before companies
adjust to the new environment, and there too the government has to
play the part of coordinator (xietiao). Local rules are too numerous; if
you want to develop, you can only rely on the government’s help. La-
bour is also a matter of concern, social relationships (shehui guanxi) are
also matters that can be solved only with the government’s help. Many
say you have to run after the market and not after the mayor, but not
to seek the mayor’s help is a harmful mistake!’ (Mao 2002: 313-314). In
the transition phase that characterises the Chinese economy – from a
planned economy to a market economy considered not quite achieved
– a relationship of cooperation between businesses and the local ad-
ministration seems indispensable, in Mao Lixiang’s opinion; the main
reason he puts forward is the disorder that characterises today’s mar-
ket, a result of the inadequate legal and statutory system.
If Mao considers relying on the local governments as necessary, he
nevertheless underlines the dangers of such cooperation. ‘While you
rely on authorities, you might fall into a situation from which it would
be very difficult to get out of, or, to borrow a popular phrase, you might
become the government’s supporter, and then you could not develop
anymore’ (Mao 2002: 20). Here, he mentions ‘the dangers of a too-
near proximity that, instead of benefiting the firm, would on the con-
trary prove harmful; the firm would appear as the accomplice of local
authorities collecting excessive taxes from the companies in their dis-
trict’. Authorities, exactly like family members, may become predatory
on the company:
Running a company is a difficult task (…). The Fire Department,
the Labour Office, the Commerce and Industry Bureau, the
Land Bureau, the Protection of Nature Office, the Tax Depart-
ment, they all come and see you (…). If the business manager
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makes profit, his brothers, relatives, friends, neighbours, school
fellows, all come and call on him. (Mao 2002: 331-332)
At the end of this first clarification, three types of rhetoric can be iden-
tified in Mao Lixiang’s discourse on business and the market: the first
mentions modernity associated with market economy, the second re-
fers to the Chinese tradition, and the third bears the mark left by thirty
years of planned economy. The conversion to the benefits of the mar-
ket is indicated by the increase in value of competition, of innovation,
of the manager’s daring, of corporate culture, of the employees’ ability
and of the importance granted to marketing. In the same way, refer-
ring to exemplary entrepreneurs – whether they are Americans like
Lee Iaccoca, the former chairman of Chrysler (Mao 2002: 10, 175); Ja-
panese, like Akio Morita, the chairman of Sony (Mao 2002: 138); or
Chinese like Zhang Ruiming of Hai’er (Mao 2002: 17, 139) – makes
room for China in a globalised economy where all the companies are
defined according to the same criteria of efficiency. Tradition, when it
is called for, shows positive dimensions that must be perpetuated – em-
ployee loyalty towards their employer – and negative dimensions that
must be given up – the importance of social relationships seen as
harmful for an efficient management. Explicit references to the past al-
ways allude to a pre-revolutionary past, that of a moral and social tradi-
tion.
In the importance given to the relationship with the government,
one can find the implicit mark left by thirty years of planned economy.
As a matter of fact, Mao repeats that the Chinese market economy is
incomplete and he insists on its imperfections. He calls for a more pre-
dictable and institutionalised state to coordinate enterprises’ actions,
taking up the point of view of certain economists close to the Chinese
leadership. Not to be found in these comments is the Communist
Party, of which Mao Lixiang has nevertheless been a member since
1991 – but it does come to light in Mao’s nationalistic rhetoric: Mao
greets the success of Hai’er and wishes to turn his own business into a
‘national industry’ (minzu gongye) with markets both at home and
abroad (Mao 2002: 2). While stating his own ambition, he reiterates
the Party’s aims to rebuild a great and powerful country. His entrepre-
neurial nationalism echoes the state nationalism. As to the workers,
they are really kept out, except in the theme of rallying the labour-force
into teams and creating a corporate culture capable of raising a feeling
of membership and loyalty. It is true, however, that Mao Lixiang’s state-
ments are meant to be read mainly by managerial staff.
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Defence and Illustration of the Family Firm
In addition to delivering a general discourse on the aims and con-
straints of entrepreneurial action, Mao Lixiang writes in defence of fa-
mily business (jiazu qiye), making a pro domo plea. In fact, this type of
organisation of economic activity has roused quite an interest, from
both the media and the academia. Over the last ten years, the private
sector – mostly made up of private businesses, a feature shared by
many other economies – has become one of the driving forces behind
Chinese growth. Media and specialists underline the need to find solu-
tions to four urgent issues: the handover from the founders’ generation
to a new one, the professionalisation of the management (is the reli-
ance on family members still practicable?), the technological upgrading
of enterprises (whereas small and medium-sized enterprises are mostly
labour-intensive) and the impossibility of resorting to banking credits
(or the resort to informal financial sources) (Zhang, Ming & Liang
2002). More generally, the issue at stake is the sustainability of family
enterprise as the driving force behind Chinese economic growth. After
reviewing the particular case of Fangtai, I will attempt some analysis of
this case study.
Fangtai, a Family Business
In 1985, at the time of the founding of his business within the contract
responsibility system, Mao Lixiang was both the general manager and
the sales manager. In order to ‘improve the management of the firm’,
he called on his wife, who was then the production manager of a textile
plant and a specialist in management and finance. She was offered a
job as the deputy manager of the firm. But it was understood that ‘no
one else in the family could enter the business and hold a responsibil-
ity as part of the managerial staff’ (Mao 2002: 157).
In 1995, when Fotile was established, Mao justified appealing to his
family by the risk he was running: ‘the risks were great. At that time,
no one wanted to invest in us, only my wife, my son and daughter
agreed to support the project’ (Mao 2002: 157). Mao Lixiang’s son, Mao
Zhongqun, had just graduated from the electrical engineering depart-
ment of Jiaotong University in Shanghai. He was asked to take a direct
part in the management of the business. Mao’s daughter and son-in-
law were only contributing to the capital – they were 12 per cent share-
holders of Fangtai (Mao 2002: 165-166). They were the managers of
their own business and were going to become suppliers of pieces –
first by producing pieces for the manufacturing of electric fire-lighters,
then by making fans to be fitted on extracting hoods.
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Mao Lixiang and his son both declare there was a negotiation be-
tween father and son, the latter only joining his father in his new in-
dustrial project (and giving up the plan to undertake graduate studies
in the US) under a twofold condition: that the company be set up in
an urban area, and that they manufacture a new product. Mao Zhong-
qun is supposed to have convinced his father to set up Fangtai in the
Cixi economic development zone. He is also supposed to have been
the one who chose to manufacture extracting-hoods. Both father and
son thought that the market of kitchen equipment was promising, be-
cause of the growing demand of consumers for home improvements.
Mao Lixiang favoured the manufacturing of microwave ovens because
the advanced technology involved would make obtaining financial help
from the government easier. But Mao Zhongqun wished to start the
manufacturing of extractor hoods, a much simpler item. The latter’s
choice prevailed.
Father and son also seem to have negotiated the choice of a name
for the company. Mao Lixiang suggested Feixiang, a combination of his
own and his daughter’s given names, the latter being the name of his
previous firm that made firelighters, but his son supported the idea of
inventing a new brand. In fact, they finally chose a trademark imported
from Hong Kong, Fangtai, borrowed from the name of a lady-presenter
(Mrs. Fang) of a very popular television programme produced in Hong
Kong (by ATV channel), who is also the author of a cooking magazine
sold all over South-East Asia, Dongfang shiji. Concerning the premises
as well as the company name, Mao’s son seems to embody the break
from the past, together with a more modern vision.
Mao reports being responsible for the conditions of the establish-
ment of his business and the methods of power-sharing between him-
self and his son (Mao 2002: 163-164). The co-operation between the
two men progressed in three stages. First, between 1996 and 2000,
father and son worked closely together. The son worked on perfecting
the manufacturing of new products while the marketing and the inside
management were shared. Between 2000 and 2005, the father slowly
retired from active management. The son was general manager, while
Mao Lixiang was chairman of the board of directors, declaring he had
totally retired from the management. Between 2006 and 2010, Mao
Lixiang intends to give over his chairmanship to hold only the position
of member of the board of directors, after which he will permanently
retire.
From this account, remember the two arguments Mao gives to justi-
fy the family feature of the business: the risk involved (only members
of the family are ready to share the risk); and skills. As far as skills are
concerned, Mao’s son presents the best credentials: a graduate from
Shanghai Jiaotong University in 1994, he got an MBA from the Sino-
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European Business School, also known as China Europe International
Business School (CIEBS), in 2002. Mao Lixiang, a charismatic man-
ager whose figure is closely associated to his firm’s endeavours to show
that he shares his power, at least with his son.
The Three Steps in the Development of Family Firms
Beyond giving an account of the establishment of his own business
and of his methods of management, Mao champions family business:
There are some people, among economists and public adminis-
trations, who oppose the family system; they consider that it
goes against modernity. But there are others who consider that,
within the bounds of oriental culture, there is no getting away
from a family system. When I lecture at Tsinghua, Beida or
Beishida, many students ask my opinion on the family system. I
answer them: ‘Today, it is impossible for Chinese private busi-
nesses not to be family businesses, but they should not be too
much so.’ (Mao 2002: 61)
Forestalling his detractors, Mao says he is in favour of family business
and that, at the same time, he is aware of the dangers of turning too of-
ten to this kind of help. He held a similar position on the matter of
proximity to local authorities: one may be near, but not too near.
Mao takes up again the arguments he developed about his own
choices: not enough available abilities and skills and too much risk.
When setting up a business, ‘only your wife and children can support
you. It is the only possible choice’. Thus, you can only look for help
from the family system (jiazuzhi). ‘If you do not use the family system,
then no one will want to get involved in such a fight [the establishing
of a business]. Using your family, your relatives, your friends, your
schoolfellows and your children, this is the best way to start’ (Mao
2002: 310).
Then, ‘private companies must give up their previous method of
management and part management from ownership, train the employ-
ees inside and look for new talents outside the establishment’ (Mao
2002: 160). You must therefore ‘reduce the family system’ (tanhua jia-
zuzhi). If you do not reduce the family system, if you do not set up a
modern managing system, then there is no way to attract people of
great ability into the company.
Mao insists on the need to separate management from ownership
and to look up for able managers, but the level of confidence in the
employees is not high enough, so family management is still relevant.
‘The legal environment must still be improved, the technological qual-
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ity of many managers as well as their moral qualities are not yet good
enough; in an environment where confidence is missing (…). I have
chosen my son to be my heir’ (Jinggji guancha bao, 29 April 2002).
Mao maintains that Chinese firms are halfway between the chandle-
rian business model run by managers and the model of traditional hu-
man relationships.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we brought to light the ideological context in which so-
cial movements take place, while analysing the discourse of one social
actor contributing to a new language of legitimacy. Though social
movements often originate in the lower social strata, our hypothesis is
that the discourses of the ruling classes have to be taken into account.
The Fotile case does not exhaust the subject of the variety of firms in
today’s China. It should be compared particularly with the firms that
were directly inherited from the time of the planned economy, whether
they are large state-owned corporations or collective firms. However,
this defence of family business deserves some attention because this
type of organisation represents a growing part of the Chinese economy.
Mao Lixiang’s discourse on business and the market uses two styles
of argumentation, one referring to the rationality of the market and the
other pointing at human relationships. The first one is exemplified by
practices that go in the opposite direction from the planned economy
and are bound to spread: the creation and protection of trademarks that
must be promoted, the constant use of innovation, the aggressive con-
quest of markets, the promotion of corporate culture, the rallying of
competent managers. Human relationships are partly put aside as ob-
stacles to efficiency, and partly justified: the still indispensable part
played by the family because of the lack of available abilities as well as
the impossibility of trusting employees. In the same way, the need for
the firm to have close relationships with the local authorities and with
the state is justified by the failings of the market, a market unable to
play its part as a coordinator of individual initiatives, or because of a
general disrespect of regulations.
Such an account appears as a heterogeneous combination of argu-
ments put together in favour of the cause of the managers of family
firms. The use of a rhetoric at the same time modernist (the creative
and solitary entrepreneur), socialist and Confucian (putting people
first) and traditional (the part played by the family) reflects Mao’s op-
portunism, as well as the combination of values characteristic of to-
day’s China.
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Mao Lixiang uses these arguments in favour of both his own inter-
ests and those of his peers, the private entrepreneurs – particularly
those who have, just as he has, first developed their careers in the col-
lective sector in the shelter of bureaucratic protections before setting
up their businesses on their own account. It is thus possible to ascribe
Mao’s arguments to the practical logic with which they were produced
to the real situation of their speaker and to his specific interests.
However, this discourse is not only a speech of justification. The jus-
tifications expressed are useful to the capitalist transformation of Chi-
na, while they also try to restrain the protagonists. The references to
foreign models are linked to the fact that Chinese firms are not only
the suppliers of the global market but also face direct competition from
foreign companies in China itself. The insistence upon the professio-
nalisation of management and the call for skilled people go together
with the spreading of management sciences in Chinese universities.
The praise of the business-manager’s qualities goes hand in hand with
the changes in legislation, particularly since private ownership has
gained constitutional protection. The business manager’s legitimacy is,
from now on, submitted to his professionalism. Likewise, Mao Lixiang
condemns an ‘orderless market’ in which the rights of intellectual
property are not respected, and imitation is the rule.
Within the scope of an authoritarian state whose mutation is far
from complete, the institutions liable to rule competition and to struc-
ture the relationships between employers and employees are not yet es-
tablished, and the nuclear family seems to be the institution most cap-
able of securing the economic modernisation of the country. This is in
the line of an endless debate, initiated at the time of the first Chinese
modernisation, that dealt with the credit due to family as an institution
made to serve the renewal of the Chinese nation (Glosser 2003: Chap-
ter 3). More widely, the matters of the economic role of the state and of
the importance of personal links of confidence in business manage-
ment are well-known issues for the historians of the Chinese economy
(Gardella et al. 1998). Interestingly, the discourse on family business
in today’s China may have more in common with other discourses ex-
pressed during an earlier phase of the modernisation of China, such as
that of the first half of the twentieth century, than with the interna-
tional contemporary discourse on globalised capitalism. The originality
of Mao Lixiang’s speech, when compared to that of his peers of the
twenty-first century, may be his call for the fast building of a regulatory
state, at a time when the latter is trying to take the place of failing
authorities (Berge`re 1989). Behind and beyond the record of a career
and the championship of family entrepreneurship, one finds a contri-
bution to the construction of a collective identity of family business-
men and to the building of a new economic and social order.
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Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in China Perspectives, 2005 (58): 22-31.
2 Fotile manufactures kitchen range hoods, burners, water fountains and also kitchen
furniture (see the firm’s website: http://www.fotile.com). In 2002, it employed more
than 3,000 people and controlled fifteen to twenty per cent of the Chinese market. It
was the second biggest Chinese firm on that market (interview, 23 July 2002).
3 Feixiang de guiji (Under the Influence of Fotile), Feixiang de guanli (The Management
of Fotile), Feixiang de suiyue (Fotile’s Years), Guanli qianqian jie (Management Princi-
ples). An economic journalist, Mr. Liao Min, has become the most active promoter of
the ‘Fangtai model’ through press articles and several books. He has notably pub-
lished Fangtai lunjian: Mao Zhongqun yu Liao Min duihualu (The Fangtai Sword: A
Dialogue Between Mao Zhongqun and Liao Min), Beijing: Qiye guanli chubanshe
(2002) and more recently Fangtai fangfa (The Fangtai Method), Beijing: Qiye guanli
chubanshe (2006). The contents of these books are very similar to one another.
4 At the end of 2006, there were 4,869 million firms registered as ‘private’ (siying) in
China (Xinhua, 13 December 2006). Most of them are family businesses. It is the
more dynamic part of the Chinese economy. To these ‘private’ firms, we should add
the ‘individual’ ones (geti gongshanghu), that are also family run and owned. On the
definition of the private sector, see Gilles Guiheux (2002).
5 Luc Boltanski and Eva Chiapello (2005) read the management literature as a dis-
course on French capitalism. The material I am using is different in nature (it is not
from scientific textbooks), but it carries similar meanings. Jean Gadrey (2001) has
underlined that articles from newspapers and magazines might be more typical of
the ‘spirit of capitalism’ and more efficient in spreading norms and producing mean-
ings than scientific literature. A common point between the texts analysed by Bol-
tanski and Chiapello and my material is the public they are aiming at: future entre-
preneurs or managers.
6 The growth of commune and brigade enterprises in the second half of the 1960s can
be partly credited to the lack of goods produced in urban areas because the Cultural
Revolution had forced many enterprises to stop production. In 1984, the commune
and brigade enterprises became ‘town and village enterprises’ (xiangzhen qiye) since
the communes did not exist anymore (Byrd & Lin 1990: 11).
7 Since 1957, the Canton Trade Fair (Zhongguo chukou shangpin jiaoyi hui) takes
place twice a year, in spring and autumn.
8 Schumpeter distinguishes five types of innovation: new products, new methods of
production, new forms of organisation of the industry, new markets, and new inputs.
The Chinese press and media (such as Zhongguo qiyejia) have played a significant
role in popularising the economic theory of entrepreneurship.
9 Not only in media, but also in literature and movies.
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8 The Rise of Migrant Workers’ Collective Actions:
Toward a New Social Contract in China1
Chloe´ Froissart
Studies of Chinese society and politics have outlined how legalisation,
that is the governmental project to promote a rule by law, has abetted
the rise of rights claims in China. As recent as the 1990s, both peas-
ants and state workers started to rely on newly enacted regulations to
defend their rights, resorting to actions ranging from litigations to sit-
ins and demonstrations (Lee 2002; Gallagher 2005; O’Brien & Li
2006). Although migrants from the countryside are known in Chinese
cities as a new working class whose rights are commonly violated, they
long kept themselves out of popular contention. These past few years,
however, migrant workers have been increasingly resorting to concilia-
tory bodies and tribunals along with strikes and demonstrations to set-
tle labour conflicts. Unlike peasants and state workers, migrants’
claims for rights protection are supported by Chinese so-called NGOs
that first appeared toward the end of the 1990s and the beginning of
the 2000s. These organisations function as substitutes for trade
unions from which these workers were long excluded and that are now
increasingly deemed inefficient and sometimes illegitimate means of
representation. NGOs also lobby authorities to improve migrant work-
ers’ conditions, and thus appear as social structures capable of organis-
ing migrants’ resistance and interacting with the state on a sustained
basis. I will first try to grasp the reasons why collective actions that
have recently appeared among migrant workers emerged at this speci-
fic moment and how both political opportunities and constraints con-
tributed to their specificity. I will then evaluate the NGOs’ impact on
migrants’ resistance: to what extent do NGOs foster migrants’ emer-
gence as an autonomous self-conscious group capable of negotiating a
new social contract in China? Finally, considering how the Party has
been responding to this unprecedented social mobilisation, I will evalu-
ate its impact on state-society relations.
Nurturing the Soil of Collective Action: The Failure of the
Campaign for the Protection of Migrants’ Rights
As Tarrow (1994: 2) observes, contentious actions are shaped both by
‘changing political opportunities and constraints’. Individuals resort to
actions in order to defend their rights, not so much once they are actu-
ally aggrieved but when changing political conditions abet the rise of
new and previously unacceptable forms of contention.
Outsiders are Given a Legitimate Place in Urban Society
Since the end of the Cultural Revolution and Deng Xiaoping’s return
to power, the Chinese Communist Party has increasingly attempted to
build its legitimacy upon the construction of a ‘rule of law’, also called
‘socialist legal system’, that aims to ground relations between social ac-
tors on the one hand and society and the state on the other upon the
mediation of the law (Lee 2002; Gallagher 2005). Under such a sys-
tem, the Party relinquishes its revolutionary mission, while the state
strives to bolster its regulatory capacity. In other words, the Party that
now claims to ‘rule according to the law’ tries to turn the law into an
instrument of its power and legitimacy. While the ‘construction of a so-
cialist (...) rule of law’ was enshrined in the Constitution in 1999, Chi-
nese leaders have repeatedly stressed their opposition to any ‘Western-
style democratisation’, in other words to political pluralism and checks
and balances. Under the rule of President Jiang Zemin, the socialist
rule of law was mainly understood as a means to strengthen market re-
forms. However, since the Hu-Wen leadership came to power in 2002,
it has rather been seen as a way to buy out social stability by increasing
channels for citizens to seek legal redress for their grievances. The con-
cept of ‘rule of law’ thus further developed into a new ideology of ‘citi-
zenship’, with both juridical and social contents. This ideology empha-
sised more equality between citizens and the protection of their legal
rights while fostering new public policies in favour of those left behind
(ruoshi qunti).
Migrant workers started to benefit from the central state’s new com-
mitment circa 2003. Until then, and according to the hukou system in-
herited from the Maoist period that binds rights to residency and in-
duces a differential treatment between the so-defined ‘agricultural po-
pulation’ and ‘non-agricultural population’, they were mainly
considered as outsiders working in the cities on a temporary basis.
They were not only deprived of any social rights, but authorities also
turned a blind eye to the pervasive violation of their basic rights under
the labour law. It was thus generally held that although migrants chan-
ged their profession and were working in the cities for many years,
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their status remained that of peasants, that is, of second-class citizens.
Starting from 2003, however, a number of important policies were is-
sued by the central government that basically acknowledged migrant
workers’ right to have rights. The Notice on Successfully Managing the
Employment of Rural Workers in the Cities and Their Access to Public Ser-
vices in January 2003 was a milestone: this was the first time since the
founding of the PRC that the central government had issued a docu-
ment specifically addressing migrant workers’ issues. This notice,
along with the First Document2 in January 2004 and the Notice of the
General Office of the State Council Regarding Furthering the Work of Em-
ployment Management and Services for Rural Residents Entering Cities to
Work in December 2004, requested equal access to employment and
education, emphasised that under the labour law, migrants enjoy the
same working conditions as urban residents and introduced a number
of measures designed to improve their living and working conditions
in cities (Guowuyuan 2003, 2004a, b). The central government then
insisted that the national law is universal and should protect everyone
equally, thus prevailing over the hukou system. The Centre’s commit-
ment to uphold this policy was embodied in campaigns to clear mi-
grants’ back pay launched annually on Chinese New Year’s Eve. In Au-
gust 2003, a circular was issued by the All China Federation of Trade
Unions (ACFTU 2003) to urge migrant workers to join the trade un-
ions, a right that has, in practice, often been denied to them thus so
far.3 A year later, the ACFTU (2004) published another circular that
took concrete steps to make it easier for migrant workers to join trade
unions, for example enabling them to enrol at their places of origin or
via employment agencies. In addition, the Centre tried to foster local
authorities’ responsibility towards migrants by a demand to facilitate
their access to state institutions like arbitration committees and tribu-
nals and launched a campaign in October 2003 for migrants’ wide-
spread legal training, in an attempt to channel their grievances into le-
gal redress. This central programme led to the mushrooming of train-
ing sessions organised by governmental agencies at every level, mass
organisations, so-called ‘Government Operated Non Governmental Or-
ganisation’ (GONGO), and Chinese as well as foreign NGOs.4
Three main reasons account for the central state changing policy to-
wards migrant workers. First, following the new commitment on re-
storing the socio-economic balance between rural and urban eras, the
Hu-Wen leadership acknowledged that migrant workers’ remittances to
villages represented a vital support to the rural economy and should be
secured as such. Second, according to nationwide surveys, migrant
workers’ stay in the cities had already expanded greatly, while they re-
presented 60 per cent of the workforce in the secondary and tertiary
sectors.5 The discrepancy between their alleged status as temporary rur-
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al workers and the place they de facto occupied within urban society
and economy had become too obvious. Third, increasing delinquency
and criminality among migrant workers since the 1990s as well as
growing discontent over unpaid wages were threatening the social or-
der. The state thus attempted to change its failing image as being pre-
datory and discriminatory against migrants to a regulatory state now
committed to serve them. Although the Centre changing policy to-
wards migrant workers was purely instrumental and did not reflect a
liberal conception of citizenship based on natural and inalienable indi-
vidual rights, it did however provide them with a legitimate place in ur-
ban society and durably affected their relations to the Party-state, as I
will argue hereafter.
Confronting Official Discourse with Unchanged Conditions: Growing Distrust
of the Party and New Opportunity for Claims
As Lee (2002: 197) notes, ‘the construction of a rule by law is a double-
edge sword’. It first bolsters the state legitimacy by creating new hopes
among migrant workers that their condition could improve under the
protection of the state. In the short term, the Centre changing policy
has had quite a strong symbolic impact for migrants, who were thank-
ful for the public acknowledgment of the legitimacy of their rights. In
December 2003, the Beijing municipality supported an exemplary trial
against a construction company that owed over 5 million yuan to a 500
migrant-worker team, but the court decision was quite difficult to en-
force since the company did not have enough money to pay the
wages.6 As a migrant who was a member of the worker team reported
to central television: ‘It’s such an honour for us that the government
pays attention to our case, no matter if we can get the money back, the
most important thing is that the authorities side with us’ (CCTV 1, 4
December 2003).
However, the legalisation drive encouraged the rise of new claims
when migrants realised that promises could not be kept, and that ‘“rule
by law” exists more as an ideological discourse than an institutionalised
reality’ (Lee 2002: 196). Despite a nationwide political campaign, the
protection of migrant workers’ rights did not, in fact, improve dramati-
cally. According to workers’ statements, working conditions in factories
did not change: unpaid salaries, long unpaid overtime, lack of respect
of security norms, frequent industrial accidents, absence of social se-
curity or support from the employer in case of work injuries or profes-
sional diseases are still the lot of migrant workers.7 In August 2004, a
year and a half after the launching of the first campaign to clear back
pay, Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan revealed that more than 360 billion
yuan in unpaid wages remained owed to migrant workers (China Daily,
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26 August 2004), while the total wages in arrears across China accu-
mulated from 2005 to July 2007 to 66 billion yuan (China Review, 23
October 2007). Workers thus started to show a growing distrust of the
capacity of the Party-state to implement its policies, as outlined by this
remark made by a migrant working in a Shenzhen factory:
Newspapers spent their time reporting that migrants’ salaries
have to reach minimum wage, the government also says super-
vision should be reinforced to check illegal practices such as
back pay or overtime, but it’s very hard to implement. Once out,
a newspaper is already out of date and the government doesn’t
stick to its words, for what reason? (China Review, 23 October
2007)
Indeed, although state media widely reported impressive rates of enrol-
ment in trade unions8, the ACFTU – the sole trade union allowed in
China as a mouthpiece of the Party – did not change its mode of func-
tioning, and thus remained unable to make a difference in workers’
life. According to the Trade Union Law of the PRC, the trade unions’
mission is as much to protect workers’ rights as to help the enterprise
to ‘raise productivity and improve economic efficiency’. The ACFTU
thus does not act as a true representative of workers but rather consid-
ers itself as a bridge between labour and management that seeks to fa-
cilitate compromise when conflicts arise between the two sides. In fact,
as trade unions are beholden to the management which, most of the
time, appoints the trade union representative within the enterprise, un-
ions generally have no choice but to side with the management.
Independent reports thus showed that newly created trade unions
were no more than empty shells that were not truly functioning, and
emphasised migrants’ quick and deep disillusionment. The president
of a trade union set up in a Beijing construction company that mainly
employed migrant workers reported that more than half of the mem-
bers told him a year after the branch was created, ‘Whether this trade
union was created or not, it would have been exactly the same’ and ‘for
us migrants, joining trade unions is not really consequential’ (CLB
2005: 26).
My interviews in the Sichuan province capital showed that some mi-
grant workers were already reluctant to join trade unions. Only one
month after the foundation of a trade union in the Chengdu migrant
workers’ labour market, the branch had already been closed for failing
to recruit members.9 Migrants were scathing about the union: ‘No
point to seek trade unions’ help. They take your money and run’; ‘Trade
unions serve the capital, not the people’; ‘Trade unions are full of con-
men, and they never settle conflicts’ were widespread statements. Mi-
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grant hostility towards the trade union can be explained by the specific
situation of the labour market, which is under the jurisdiction of the
urban district government but in reality functions on a purely private
and mercantile logic, a situation of which the market administration
also takes advantage. Huge amounts of money are extorted by the em-
ployment agencies from the workers who cannot find proper jobs.
Hence, migrant workers equate the trade union with the administra-
tion and the private agencies. Some said about the campaign on back
pay clearance: ‘It is not enough to issue new policies, they have to be
enforced.’ During these interviews, migrant workers were clearly deny-
ing the Party-state ability to protect their rights, govern with benevo-
lence and preserve social order that are, as recalled by Shue (2004),
the main grounds on which the CCP claims its legitimacy.
The Party’s inability to prevent labour conflicts in a context of grow-
ing rights consciousness led to a dramatic increase in legal disputes.
According to the ACFTU, arbitration committees across the country ad-
mitted 314,000 cases in 2005, a 20 percent increase over the previous
year (China Daily, 30 January 2007). However, many workers still com-
plain about being forced to rush from one review office to another and
about the difficulty of getting their cases accepted due to the collusion
between authorities and entrepreneurs. Likewise, delay in trial or in en-
forcement of court decisions as well as arbitrary and steep procedural
fees still deter many workers from suing their employers, leaving them
with no choice but to take to the streets.
The official discourse about promoting legalisation and citizenship
rights for migrant workers created expectations that political institu-
tions could not satisfy and provided a fulcrum on which claims could
be mounted. The Party’s strategy to fight against social instability
hence proved somehow counterproductive, encouraging direct confron-
tation with the state and giving rise to a new form of contention
termed by Kevin O’Brien as ‘rightful resistance’.
The ‘Power of the Powerless’: Believing the Party-State at its
words
A strike that was conducted in a Shenzhen factory in October 2004 of-
fers an interesting case to study the forms of contention that migrants
increasingly employ to gain support and force opponents to comply
with the law.
In Hai Yan Electronic Factory, a Hong Kong-Guangzhou joint ven-
ture manufacturing electronic components, the workers were paid 240
yuan monthly for a regular working day of 12 hours, and 15 hours dur-
ing peak times, seven days a week. Since the fixed salary was very low,
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they regularly worked overtime, although they earned only 2 yuan an
hour. Workers also had to pay for their accommodation and food.
There was no trade union branch in the factory, and none of the com-
plaints lodged by workers to the management and government offices
was accepted. Workers resigned themselves to this impasse until the
day they came to know that the Shenzhen municipality government
had fixed the monthly minimum wage at 610 yuan. The news spread
quickly. The workers decided to organise a collective action and printed
flyers that were posted in the dormitories as well as distributed by
hand. On 6 October 3,000 workers went on strike for one day and a
half, and the morning of the second day, they took to the streets and
blocked the main highway linking Shenzhen to Hong Kong for four
hours in an attempt to push the government to intervene. They were
successful. Although the demonstrators were forced back to the factory
by armed policemen, officials from the municipal and district Labour
and Social Security Bureaus held negotiations with workers’ represen-
tatives and both managements from China and Hong Kong, which
were compelled to enforce the legal minimum wage. Workers obtained
a 170 per cent increase of their salaries. Overtime is now paid at 5.4
yuan per hour from Monday to Friday and 7.2 yuan per hour on week-
ends and national holidays, and is limited to 40 hours a month. More-
over, the management has to contribute to workers’ social security.10
This strike is a good example of ‘rightful resistance’, defined by
O’Brien (1996: 33) as a form of popular contention that demands ‘scru-
pulous enforcement of existing commitments’ and ‘employs the rheto-
ric (…) of the powerful to curb political and economic power’. As this
kind of resistance ‘operates near the boundary of an authorised chan-
nel’ (the Chinese Constitution does not acknowledge the right to strike,
and demonstrations are still banned in China as an attack on the social
order), it has to win public support. Indeed, staging a demonstration
on the busiest traffic avenue is a way to draw public attention, and
workers were again successful. The main reason why this strike had a
positive outcome was its wide coverage by the local press. It was the
Guangzhou press, especially the outspoken Nanfang Dushibao (South-
ern Metropolis News) that first reported the demonstration and so forced
Shenzhen newspapers to mention it. As the latter are directly under
the control of Shenzhen authorities, they were rather scathing about
the strike, and denounced it as an illegal action inducing social disor-
der (Shenzhen wanbao, 8 October 2004). But the Nanfang Dushibao
sided with the workers and pointed to local authorities’ responsibility
in the demonstration: since the complaints lodged by workers in the
past had been ignored, there were no means left but to take to the
streets.11 Chinese media are now increasingly reporting on strikes, and
whether the reports are sympathetic to the workers or not, they impose
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pressure on local authorities to settle the conflicts. The press reports
led to many postings on the Internet, most of them accusing local
authorities of failing to do their duty and supporting the workers’ col-
lective action.12 Local NGOs also supported the migrants’ cause. One of
them, the Shenzhen Institute of Contemporary Observation, explained
to the local authorities that if workers had taken to the streets, it was
not to create social disorder but to express legitimate claims.13 This
pressure obliged the police to free the two leaders of the demonstration
who had been arrested two weeks before, and the labour authorities
imposed a record fine of nearly 2 million yuan on the factory manage-
ment, thus enacting an exemplary punishment (China Daily, 10 De-
cember 2004).
The economic context was also favourable for the successful resolu-
tion of the strike. Since March-April 2004, the Pearl River Delta had
been suffering from a workforce shortage that local authorities had to
publicly acknowledge. Since the media frequently related this shortage
to bad working and living conditions in the factories, alleging that mi-
grant workers were now ‘voting with their feet’, local authorities were
forced to take measures to protect migrant workers’ rights better. They
also had to face the pressure of foreign companies and joint ventures
worried about their public image. Following increasing international
pressure, these companies are now seeking to enforce the corporate
codes of conduct in the Chinese factories that produce their goods.14
The Hong-Kong-based Computime Ltd was indeed favourably disposed
to increasing the salaries and had encouraged its Chinese counterpart
to do so in the past, but the latter was reluctant to comply. Shenzhen
authorities are thus gradually forced to change their tactic to attract for-
eign investments and companies; whereas they had previously made
the most of an abundant cheap labour force, they now also have to take
social stability and economic efficiency into account.
Recourses to collective action reveal a significant change in the way
migrants understand their relation to the state. Before the central gov-
ernment assigned them a legitimate place in the cities, migrant work-
ers saw the state (whether central or local) as distant, unfavourable or
even predatory to them (Solinger 1999; Li 2003). Therefore, they gen-
erally avoided contacts with authorities and rather sought support from
family members and personal relations when aggrieved. Aware of
being unwanted guests in the cities, they were rather wary about voic-
ing their claims. Migrants now stick to the state’s promise to rule ac-
cording to the law and protect their rights to put it to the test by using
its own rhetoric and values.
This kind of resistance thus arises when rights promised are not en-
forced and aims to compel authorities to stick to their promises. It dif-
fers from social movements in the sense that, as observed by Kevin
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O’Brien (1996: 32), it ‘operates within the frame of official norms (yet
in tension with them)’ and does not rely on the ‘us against them’
model. Far from calling the regime into question, protesters are cau-
tious about not being seen as a political challenge and try to appear as
loyal defenders of the law and government policies as much as of their
own interests. Therefore, they do not demand an institutional guaran-
tee of rights but rather authorities’ ad hoc intervention to settle conflicts
and, while trying to rally a broader public opinion, seek government
approval of their collective action. Such popular protests are progres-
sively tolerated and more likely to be effective provided that they are
not politically threatening for the regime. Strikes indeed remain tem-
porary episodes of resistance based on corporate-based solidarity and
aim at immediate economic compensation from employers. Although
there are many examples of such kinds of resistance among mi-
grants15, workers from different factories seldom try to rally themselves
upon common claims. This is one of the main differences between mi-
grant and state workers’ collective actions: the latter dare to push the
limits of political constraints further by attempting to generalise their
grievances and associate (chuanlian) beyond the limits of their work-
unit, although their movement still lacks proper organisation and coor-
dination, as shown by demonstrations staged in Liaoning and Jilin pro-
vinces from March to May 2002 (Human Rights Watch 2002). More-
over, whereas migrant workers try to rally local authorities, state work-
ers dare to express explicit claims against them, often referring to
central policies to expose unlawful collusion between local officials and
entrepreneurs (Lee 2002; Gallagher 2005).
In short, claims are usually mindful and circumscribed, loyal and
economically oriented rather than politically oriented, reactive rather
than proactive, spontaneous rather than well-planned and organised,
local and parochial rather than national and autonomous. The charac-
teristics of migrants’ resistance are both the result of a lack of political
consciousness and of a conscious strategy in a regime where civil so-
ciety is not institutionalised: aggrieved workers know the rules of the
game and are aware that they can win a little provided that they do not
lose a lot. However, the outcomes of such a resistance that, in contrast
to social movements, does not induce breakthrough institutional
changes, are often non-sustainable: nothing prevents the companies,
once they are not under media spotlights any more, from resuming
their previous management style, and some of the Haiyan workers
were actually fired after the strike.16
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The Quest for New Forms of Representation: NGOs as Catalyst
of Migrant Workers’ Social Movement?
Growing distrust of the Party-state ability to implement its policies has
led some migrants to seek support outside the Party framework, from
so-called non-governmental organisations that tend to replace trade un-
ions as legitimate means of representation of migrant workers’ inter-
ests. Social organisations have developed in China in the past few
years, providing social services that the party and the state did not want
to or could not provide at first. The ones devoted to serving migrants
offer a space of sociability to isolated workers, professional and legal
training, general and health education and advice on urban life. Their
main activity however is to provide support to aggrieved workers, hence
providing a substitute for the discarded official trade unions. A grow-
ing number of migrants are seeking their help, and are working for
them as volunteers during their free time. Most of these organisations
also try to influence public policies, and lobby authorities in the name
of migrant workers. Do these NGOs nurture migrants’ self-organising
capacity so much that they eventually turn their resistance into ‘conten-
tious collective challenges based on common purpose and social soli-
darity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities’?
(Tarrow 1994: 4-5). Can NGOs help migrants generalise their grie-
vances, elaborate a political reflection to tackle these grievances, and
eventually propose an alternative value system that supports collective
action for change? As a ‘third sector’ (di san ge bumen) exceeding the
limits of the workplace and capable of amassing large numbers of
otherwise unconnected people, can they foster class-specific or cross-
class mobilisation by strengthening solidarity that relies on a common
purpose?
Growing out of the State?
The state had to acknowledge the growing influence of such organisa-
tions by issuing and regularly reviewing regulations in an attempt to
impose a kind of Leninist control over them. The principles of coopera-
tion, control and cooptation are indeed at the core of the legislation
regulating these organisations (Guowuyuan 1998). They are for exam-
ple submitted to a dual track registration system according to which
they first have to be sponsored by a state organ before being allowed to
register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs or its local bureaus. They
should not oppose the basic principles set out in the Constitution (basi-
cally, Communist Party’s rule and official ideology), endanger national
security and unity, harm national interest nor go against social moral-
ity. The legislation thus provides that these organisations should be an
extension of the state or at least serve as its auxiliaries.
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However, many organisations enjoy, in practice, much more autono-
my. The organisations I surveyed have very different sociological pro-
files and can be ranged into three categories according to their degree
of autonomy and the profile of their founders.
First, there is the Migrant Women’s Club (Dagongmei zhi jia) that
was founded in 1996 in Beijing by the chief editor of the National Fed-
eration of Women publishing house and is supported by a famous re-
presentative of the Beijing Municipality People’s Congress who is a
member of its management committee. Despite its close connections
with high-ranking officials, this organisation is not a ‘Government Op-
erated Non-governmental Organisation’ (GONGO)17: it is registered as
an enterprise with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce and is finan-
cially independent. Second, there is the Beijing Cultural Communica-
tion Centre for Facilitator (Beijing shi xiezuozhe wenhua chuanbo zhong-
xin) founded in Beijing in 2003. This organisation was set up by urban
residents and is not directly related to a state agency, although it has
many governmental connections. Its founders are two defectors from
the Migrant Women’s Club who were also previously working for the
National Federation of Women publishing house and thus are well
connected to officials and the media. Third, there are NGOs run by mi-
grant workers who think that migrants should only rely on themselves
to defend their rights. The Home of Fellow Peasants (Nongyou zhi jia)
was founded in 2002 in Beijing by a music teacher coming from the
countryside who somehow became famous singing about the migrants’
condition. Shenzhen Service Centre for Industrial Security and Health
(Shenzhen dagongzhe zhiye anquan jiankang fuwu zhongxin) was set up
in 2003 in Shenzhen by an injured migrant worker with the support
of a Hong Kong rights defence group.
All these organisations managed to circumvent the law in many
ways. First, they are registered as businesses with the municipal Bu-
reau of Industry and Commerce and are financially completely inde-
pendent, regarding both their sources of funding – coming from for-
eign foundations – and the way they spend their money. The dual track
registration system constraint is indeed very often evaded in reality: out
of the three million NGOs counted by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in
2005, only 280,000 were registered as social organisations, others
were known as enterprises (Kaifang, 12 June 2005). Registration as a
business operation requires a minimal management structure with a
high degree of autonomy. Their half-legal status is tolerated as long as
they prove their loyalty to the Party and their contribution to the public
good. NGOs hence manage to circumvent the principle of direct con-
trol that is at the core of the legislation and cannot be considered as an
extension of the state despite the CCP efforts to ensure a Leninist kind
of control over them.
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However, as their status is very insecure, NGOs need to provide a to-
ken of obedience to the Party. Beijing organisations in particular are
keen to seek support among influential officials and try to develop pro-
grammes in collaboration with public institutions in the hope of being
acknowledged as official partners of the state. On the other hand,
authorities remain obsessed with the idea that these organisations –
that are financed by foreign foundations – could serve a foreign politi-
cal agenda and stir up a colour revolution as in the ex-Soviet repub-
lics.18 The state thus tries to prevent NGOs from growing more autono-
mous and developing political activities by combining repression with
cooptation: in 2004 Beijing Facilitator won the title of ‘Outstanding Or-
ganisation for Education and Social Service to Young Migrants’
awarded by the Communist Youth League Beijing Committee; the
Training Centre for Rural Women that is affiliated to the Migrant Wo-
men’s Club won the award of the ‘Best School Founded by Social
Forces’; the leader of Home of Fellow Peasants was elected ‘Nationally
Outstanding Young Migrant Worker’ in 2005 because he had given in-
formation to state organs about migrant workers.
Enhancing or Channelling Migrants’ Resistance?
NGOs widely propagate legal knowledge and promote rights awareness
among migrant workers. As a young migrant volunteer in the Shen-
zhen NGO, put it: ‘Only after attending the classes did I know that
overtime should be paid, that when you get hired by a company you
are not supposed to pay a deposit to your employer but you are sup-
posed to sign a work contract with him.’19 Beijing NGOs also hold
workshops aimed at building up group identity and self-confidence.
Migrants share their experiences and draw lessons from them, analyse
the role played by social and political structures in the difficulties they
encounter, as well as the widening discrepancy between their place in
society and their growing contribution to China’s economic develop-
ment. Participants also analyse legal cases, assess the legality of ver-
dicts brought by conciliatory bodies and tribunals, and become aware
of the gap between law stipulations and real situations.
NGOs are also actively engaged in defending migrants’ rights. They
not only offer free conciliation with employers, but also facilitate mi-
grants’ access to administrative arbitration and tribunals by giving pro-
cedural advice, helping build up a judicial record, providing free or
low-rate legal services, acting as an intermediary between migrants and
uncaring officials or inefficient institutions. Beijing Facilitator and Mi-
grants’ Women Club sometimes manages to compel public institutions
to take workers’ grievances into account by locating influential allies,
mobilising the media and gaining support from the wider public.
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Many workers I interviewed admitted that they would never have ob-
tained or even sought legal redress without the help of these organisa-
tions.
However, while providing an active support to migrant workers,
these organisations also stick to the governmental project to increase
the recourses to legal procedure as a way to diffuse recourse to collec-
tive actions, and compensate for the lack of juridical guarantee of legal
rights by being an alternative to the failings of Chinese institutions.20
Beijing NGOs indeed admit that one of their aims is to prevent work-
ers from taking to the streets. NGOs’ mobilisation thus appears as a
hindrance to the development of social movements: they contribute to
keeping conflicts in the private sphere and preventing the political ex-
pression of grievances. They indeed foster a top-down form of ‘citizen-
ship’ education: migrants are supposed to be helpless and ignorant,
and organisation leaders appear as benevolent parents or teachers who
exercise a moral authority over their children/students. Speaking of the
founder of Beijing Facilitator, who they call ‘Professor Li’, workers say:
‘She shows us unstinting love.’ NGOs aim to build up solidarity among
migrants upon apolitical symbols, like the one of ‘home’ (jia), a word
that appears in most of these organisations’ names, and evokes com-
munitarian rather than political bonds. NGOs indeed try to appear as a
family for isolated workers away from their home and emphasise self-
development and mutual aid among their members, as shown by Beij-
ing Facilitator’s motto: ‘helping people help themselves’. NGOs’ work
style thus recalls mass organisations’ paternalism and autocratic tradi-
tion: they convey the official conception of citizenship as being both
moral and passive, teach migrants about their rights as much as they
remind them of their duties toward the Party and the society. While
‘educating’ migrants to defend their rights within the framework of
what is deemed politically correct, they also strive to nurture their con-
fidence in the state’s ability to reform itself and claim to have an active
role in fostering actual changes. Beijing NGOs thus somehow foster
the ‘civic morality’ (gongmin daode) promoted by the Party and whose
core principles are: ‘patriotism and compliance with the law, civility
and honesty, unity and kindness, frugality and self-improvement, com-
mitment to one’s work and contribution to society’.21
Beijing NGOs thus appear to some extent as transmission belts, fos-
tering official ideology among migrant workers and exerting a kind of
social control over them in order to maintain stability and pre-empt mi-
grant workers’ emergence as an autonomous group. But the Shenzhen
organisation developed a different strategy. Opposed to any moral-
boosting education, it first and foremost spreads legal and job security
information among workers and encourages them to go to court and
help one another by acting as legal representatives for each other. The
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Shenzhen Service Centre for Industrial Security and Health and simi-
lar organisations in the Pearl River Delta have indeed been the cradles
of a new breed of ‘citizen agents’, former workers who turn themselves
into self-taught ‘barefoot lawyers’ offering cheap legal aid to fellow mi-
grants involved in labour disputes. The aim of this organisation is to
encourage migrants’ autonomy and broader solidarity among them
while putting pressure on legal institutions in order to compel the state
to enforce breakthrough reforms. This bolder stance is closely linked to
the characteristics of Shenzhen, which is far away from the centre and
where migrant workers are concentrated in industrial districts, thus
having few connections with the local urban population. Workers in
Shenzhen generally join labour organisations because they are ag-
grieved and eager to defend their rights, whereas many members of
the Beijing organisations mentioned above are employed in the service
sector and are also looking for a place of sociability and an opportunity
to improve their general knowledge. More importantly, migrants’
NGOs in Shenzhen have close relations with foreign labour groups,
especially the ones based in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong rights de-
fence groups, which act as counsellors and supervisors to these organi-
sations, infuse other political references and connect them to interna-
tional workers movements, such as the ‘people’s organisations’ in Thai-
land, insisting that workers should speak for themselves and strive for
autonomy. There are now around twenty organisations made up of mi-
grant workers in the Pearl River Delta. However, as NGOs run by mi-
grants, especially those with such an international exposure, are politi-
cally very sensitive and are even more likely than other organisations to
be banned at any time, they are reluctant to unite and make every ef-
fort not to be seen as a political threat to the regime.
Helping the PCC to Adapt
Some of the Beijing NGOs, like Migrant Women’s Club and Beijing Fa-
cilitator, initiated advocacy meetings attended by academic specialists,
social workers, high-ranking officials and cadres of mass organisations,
but also migrant workers who are encouraged to speak for themselves.
These meetings are based on the principle of a pragmatic cooperation
between state and society in order to find a solution in common. Even
Sun Heng, the migrant worker who founded Home of Fellow Peasants
because he thought that migrants should not be represented by urban-
ites and intellectuals, attends these conferences because he is per-
suaded that ‘society cannot be changed by a social class but by the co-
operation between different social spheres’.22 These meetings indeed
aim to inform authorities about the needs and difficulties of migrant
workers, make them aware of the pervasive violation of their rights, try
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to identify the reasons for rights infringements and suggest remedies.
While there is a growing awareness among non-official participants –
including migrants – that the main problem to be tackled is not the
lack of legislation but the lack of implementation of existing laws,
those meetings seldom give rise to claims for bold political reforms but
rather for the design of new public policies in favour of the migrant
worker. Representatives ground their claim on the fact that migrants
have already become a new working class that has superseded the old
working class of urban state workers, and contribute the most to the
nation’s well-being. Migrants therefore should enjoy rights commensu-
rate with their growing contribution to national development. While
enhancing the migrants’ public image, NGOs try to foster a morally
based social contract between authorities and migrant workers, recal-
ling the moral commitment the state used to have toward state workers
under socialism (Gallagher 2005: 60-61). Migrants’ supporters also use
utilitarian arguments to gain support among officials: rights should be
granted to migrant workers in order to improve economic development
and administration efficiency, as well as to maintain social stability.
Participants therefore do not challenge the state instrumental concep-
tion of rights: they rather try to persuade the Party that its interests are
identical to those of migrant workers and that improving their lot will
benefit the entire nation. NGOs thus sustain an apolitical stance, treat-
ing political issues as if they were exclusively moral or administrative
in nature, and proposing technical remedies to achieve a goal that is
supposedly shared by the Party-state and the society altogether.
While fostering the integration of a social group that was previously
excluded, NGOs also actively participate in the PCC efforts to establish
a ‘consultative Leninism‘ that consists of – as defined by Richard Baum
(2007: 8) – ‘substituting paternalistic consultation for autonomous po-
litical participation, co-optation for representation, advice for empower-
ment, and consensus building for the clash of conflicting interests’.
Such consultative conferences indeed respond to the inclusive strategy
of the state that tends to allow some kind of representation to each so-
cial group within the political system as a means to prevent claim radi-
calisation and growing autonomy for the society. They also enable top
officials to gather field information they would not otherwise be able to
get, somehow functioning as ‘fire alarms’ intended to alert central
authorities to the existence of serious problems at the local level and
helping them to design public policies that better meet people’s expec-
tations. Such conferences do not shift the power balance in favour of
society – political decisions remain uncontested in the leaders’ hands –
do not promote the Party accountability to society, and somehow con-
tinue the status-based structure of Chinese society: migrant workers’
‘rights’ should be protected according to the new economic role per-
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formed by this group while remaining subordinated to the Party’s in-
terests. The Shenzhen NGO thus questions this mode of representa-
tion within the political system that, according to its leader, ‘does not
promote autonomous development of migrant workers as a group and
tends to bolster the Party legitimacy’.23 He views Beijing organisations
as ‘Counsellors to the Prince’ beholden to the state and as illegitimate
representatives (being urban, non-elected, close to power) of a popula-
tion deprived of any direct means of political expression. Beijing NGOs
indeed help the Party to adapt and remain in power, but to which ex-
tent and for how long?
Questioning the Consolidation of a ‘Consultative Leninism’
The Party has responded to growing social discontent and mobilisation
by consolidating and institutionalising consultative Leninism, both at
the national and the grassroots levels. Consultative Leninism is basi-
cally the means through which the PCC strives to build up a ‘harmo-
nious society‘, whose quest is defined by the Vice-Chairman of the Chi-
nese People’s Political Consultative Conference as the desire to ‘reach
unanimity… by harmonising various interests, synthesising different
opinions and defusing complicated contradictions’.24 Similarly, the
ACFTU chairman reiterated at a speech to the union’s executive com-
mittee in December 2006 that the unions’ mission was to represent
and defend workers’ specific interests while promoting the develop-
ment of the enterprises and protecting the overarching interests of the
nation as a whole (CLB 2007: 37). As outlined by Baum (2007: 8), the
implication of these formulations is strikingly authoritarian as it ‘pre-
supposes the existence of a paternalistic, super ordinate authority –“a
benign despot” – that is capable of faithfully reflecting, representing
and mediating the full spectrum of “legitimate” societal interests while
suppressing persistently discordant ones’. More specifically, the utopia
of a ‘harmonious society’ where all social contradictions are eventually
absorbed within the Party appears as the last avatar of the phantasm of
unity that is at the core of the totalitarian regime according to Lefort
(1994).
The Party has thus striven to deal with social unrest by increasing its
inclusiveness and representativeness, while designing administrative
adjustments in an attempt to create more effective institutions without
proceeding to core political reforms. Consultative Leninism was institu-
tionalised at the national level in March 2008 when three migrant
worker representatives were allowed for the first time to sit in the Na-
tional People’s Congress. The representatives were co-opted for having
first been elected ‘model workers’ by the ACFTU and already relayed
170 CHLOÉ FROISSART
some of migrants’ ‘legitimate’ claims – such as improved living and
working conditions, low cost transportation during the Chinese New
Year and increased school enrolment for their children. This newly
gained political representation might be highly symbolic but nothing
more, falling short of promoting true political empowerment or politi-
cal equality. Migrants account for over ten per cent of China’s popula-
tion, but only one-tenth of one per cent of NPC deputies. While this
new form of representation does not mean – as it was widely claimed
by the Chinese media – that migrant workers are now treated on an
equal footing with other citizens, it also tends to divide workers from
rural and urban origins, notifying the latter that the new working class
already supplanted them both politically and in collective representa-
tions.
At the enterprise level, consultative Leninism has been promoted
through the ‘collective consultation and the collective contract system’
developed by the government and the ACFTU over the last two decades
and according to which workers’ demands should in theory be dis-
cussed. A notice issued by the ACFTU in March 2006 (ACFTU 2006)
and the Labour Contract Law enacted on January 1, 2008 both seek to
consolidate this system and make it more binding. Yet, because of the
lack of genuine worker participation in negotiations and the lack of
trade union true bargaining capacity, collective contracts – when signed
– hardly meet workers’ demands and have proved ineffective in pre-
venting disputes.
The ACFTU also adopted a more aggressive approach to expand
membership in the private and foreign-owned sectors, particularly with
regard to a number of well-known transnational companies that had re-
fused to allow unions. The battle against Wal-Mart – won in less than
two weeks in July 2006 – was a milestone. The ACFTU won it by com-
bining a ‘name and shame’ tactic and grassroots union organising, a
task not attempted since the early 1950s.25 This was a highly symbolic
victory in two respects: first the giant retailer, which employed at that
time more than 30,000 people in sixty-two outlets scattered in more
than thirty cities, was one of the biggest foreign employers in China;
second, Wal-Mart was well-known for always having successfully op-
posed union presence in its stores, including in the United States. This
initial victory enabled the ACFTU to dramatically expand membership
in foreign-owned enterprises. According to the ACFTU national leader,
73 per cent of China foreign-owned and -invested enterprises had a
union branch in March 2008 and 51 per cent of migrant workers were
already enrolled.26 However, the dramatic expansion of the ACFTU in
this particular sector is also due to its failure to truly act as a trade
union. As stressed by a Wal-Mart spokesman, the giant retailer conces-
sion was to be explained by the fact that ‘the union in China is funda-
THE RISE OF MIGRANT WORKERS’ COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 171
mentally different from unions in the West (…). The ACFTU has made
it clear that its goal is to work with employers, not promote confronta-
tion’.27
Since 2006 and the issue of Certain Opinions Concerning Resolution
of the Migrant Workers Problems by the State Council, unions have
nonetheless striven to become more proactive in defending migrants’
rights. Echoing the document that contained a number of policies ad-
dressing migrant workers’ wages, employment, technical training, la-
bour protection, social security and public management and services,
the ACFTU has conducted numerous inspections to check if the man-
agement has signed contracts with their employees and monitor the
implementation of work safety measures and minimum wages stan-
dards, particularly among foreign-invested and private enterprises
where migrant workers are concentrated. But a ridiculous number of
companies were actually prosecuted. The ACFTU also focused on pro-
viding legal assistance to aggrieved workers or, so to speak, after-the-
fact assistance, instead of dealing with the roots of social unrest.
The Party has also kept on amending the law to better meet workers’
demands. The year 2008 has seen the promulgation of three major la-
bour laws: the new Employment Promotion Law, Labour Contract Law
and the Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law. The first one
promotes greater equality before employment, the second one en-
hances job security, fostering long-term contracts and adequate finan-
cial compensation in case of redundancy. Finally, the Labour Dispute
Mediation and Arbitration Law for the first time makes arbitration com-
mittee rulings in routine cases legally binding, abolishes the arbitration
application fee, and extends the time limit for filing an arbitration case
from 60 days to one year. However, without systemic reforms to in-
crease procedures’ transparency and arbitration committees’ account-
ability as well as to greatly increase their sources of funding, the law is
doomed to have little impact.
For the time being, legislative progress without systemic changes
has only been able to expand the gap between rights promised and
rights enforced, thus continuing to nurture frustration and discontent.
According to CLB (2007), since 2005 the scale, frequency and duration
of industrial action have increased and labour unrest evolved from ran-
dom, sporadic outbreaks to regular occurrences. Although migrant
workers’ collective actions are still devoid of both the broad solidarity
and sustainability that characterise social movements according to Tilly
(1995) and Tarrow (1994), strikes, like the Haiyan one, that resort to
public demonstration and blockades have become increasingly com-
mon: currently, in the Pearl River Delta alone, there is at least one
strike involving more than a thousand workers every day. Recent out-
breaks also show a tendency toward tactical escalation. Migrant work-
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ers have become less reluctant to unite beyond the enterprise bound-
aries. In July 2005 for example, more than 500 workers from Toshiba
Dalian Company, located in the development zone in the city of Dalian,
went on strike as the management increased the production line while
keeping on paying low wages. When workers obtained a wage increase
of 150 yuan a month, the strike spread to other Japanese-invested high-
tech enterprises in the development zone and eventually involved some
30,000 workers at over a dozen companies (Zhan 2005). Collective ac-
tions also tend to become more organised and autonomous and claims
more proactive as shown by a strike staged by hundreds of crane opera-
tors at the Yantian International Container Terminal in Shenzhen in
April 2007. The workers themselves organised a delegation to engage
in collective bargaining with the management and successfully nego-
tiated a settlement that significantly increased wages and benefits and
ended the strike. They also demanded the establishment of a trade
union and the right to elect the union head, which they did not obtain:
as usual, the Shenzhen federation of trade unions and the manage-
ment jointly set up the trade union in a top-down manner.28 Migrant
workers are now keener to call the regime into question. As many now
commonly say: ‘What matters now is not that there is no law to rely on
but that the law is not reliable, its implementation is not strict and in-
fringements have no limits’ (Xianzai zhuyao de wenti shi you fa bu yi,
zhifa bu yan, weifa bu qiong).
Tackling the Core of the Problem: Adjusting the Balance of Power between
Workers, Management and Local Authorities
As administrative adjustments increasingly appear unable to curb so-
cial instability, the idea that more autonomy and empowerment for so-
ciety might be the only way out is slowly emerging. Whereas in the
past, the Chinese government adopted a harsh approach towards la-
bour protests, often detaining their leaders, it now somehow acknowl-
edges the legitimacy of such actions. In 2005, the Minister of Public
Security admitted that ‘at the current stage, mass protests are essen-
tially manifestations of social and economic tensions. They are not op-
positional and do not have a clear political motive’.29 A year later, Pre-
mier Wen Jiabao echoed him saying: ‘There have been problems in
some areas of the interests of the masses being harmed, to the point of
mass protests occurring, and many are due to government bureaus
and their employees not doing their jobs according to our laws and po-
licies.’30 These statements represent a huge victory for ‘rightful resis-
ters’, one of their claims being to seek legitimacy for their action. They
actually show how much small-scale, unorganised, apolitical yet reiter-
ated protests can be successful in pushing back the limits of what is
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permitted and in opening up the social space in an authoritarian re-
gime. Within the scope of a few years, workers’ collective actions have
evolved from being forbidden and thus transgressive, to being tolerated
and now nearly accepted and contained. At the same time, while alert-
ing the public to the discord that exists between the centre and local
governments, these statements also prompted them to take corrective
steps.
At the local level, some union officials also see the official recogni-
tion of the right to strike as the only way to counterbalance the power
of management. Not surprisingly, Shenzhen is leading the way. In
April 2008, the Vice-chairman of the Shenzhen Federation of Trade
Union called on the government to establish guidelines for strike ac-
tion and thus enable the peaceful resolution of disputes.31 The Stand-
ing Committee of the Municipal People’s Congress responded to this
call in June 2008 by issuing Draft Regulation on the Growth and Devel-
opment of Harmonious Labour Relations in Shenzhen Special Economic
Zone. The regulations stipulate that when a major dispute breaks out,
the government can order management not to take any action that is
liable to exacerbate the conflict for a period of 30 days. However, the
regulations still fail to call a strike a strike (the taboo word has been re-
placed by terms such as ‘work stoppage’ and ‘slowdown’) and empower
local authorities to order employees to return to work. Yet, by clarifying
the rights and obligations of employers, workers and authorities, these
regulations slowly bring strike action within the scope of legal regula-
tion.
More importantly, the Shenzhen’s Implementing Regulations for the
Trade Union Law, enacted on August 1, 2008, theoretically put an end
to the consultative Leninism model at the grassroots level by redefining
the trade unions’ mission and fostering workers’ participation. They ex-
plicitly promote ‘collective bargaining’ (jiti tanpan) against ‘collective
consultation’ (jiti xieshang), providing clear guidelines on how the pro-
cess should work in both preventing and handling labour disputes, and
thus formally grant workers the right to actively negotiate the terms
and conditions of employment.32 As observed by CLB,
[the Regulations do] not contain a single reference to the tradi-
tional tasks outlined in the Trade Union Law, such as helping
the enterprise to restore normal production in the event of a
work stoppage or slowdown. Instead the regulations make it
clear that during a labour dispute, the role of the trade union is
to represent workers in negotiation with the management.33
While stating that trade unions represent workers and no one else, the
regulations are the first but potentially decisive crack in the ideology of
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a ‘harmonious society‘. At the enterprise level at least, they officially ac-
knowledge the Party’s failure in building up consensus and unity and
the necessity for it to represent one segment of the society against an-
other. Yet, trade unions still have a long way to go to regain workers’
confidence and actually win their independence from management.
Conclusion
Migrants started to resort to collective actions when the Centre chang-
ed its policy toward them and acknowledged their right to have rights.
Once the state gave them a legitimate place in the society, migrant
workers gained the opportunity to legitimately claim it. Even though
migrants’ collective actions do not challenge the regime, as social
movements would do, and remain circumscribed to corporate-based
economic claims, they reveal that migrants now tend to consider them-
selves as fully fledged citizens, expecting more equality before the law
as well as a more contractual relationship with the state. Meanwhile,
migrants’ growing distrust in the Party-state’s capacity to act as the
guardian of rights has led them to find alternative redresses outside its
framework. However, despite regional variations in political orienta-
tion, NGOs hardly act as catalysts of social movement. Although they
nurture migrants’ rights awareness and contribute to building up their
new social identity, they mainly focus on channelling migrants’ resis-
tance into an institutionalised framework by enhancing their ability to
seek legal redress. Both migrants’ collective actions and NGOs’ mobili-
sation originate in the growing chasm between rights promised and
rights enforced and appear as an attempt to compensate for institu-
tional failings, filling the gap in the political system without opposing
it. However, they have also been able to open up the social space and
push back the limits of what is permitted while putting continuous
pressure on the Party to adapt and better meet migrant workers’ de-
mands. As advocacy groups co-opted by the Party that try to bargain
with the state on a cooperative rather than contentious basis, Beijing
NGOs have directly contributed to the regime move toward a consulta-
tive Leninism. While preventing migrant workers’ emergence as an
autonomous group, they also have been effective in influencing policy-
making processes and have contributed to integrating a social group
that was previously excluded, yet within the framework of an increas-
ingly sophisticated authoritarian regime. However, the Party’s attempts
to reflect and synthesise the whole spectrum of social interests and to
set up more effective institutions relying on administrative adjustments
have proven ineffective in building up a ‘harmonious society’. In
Shenzhen, where workers’ protests have been escalating and NGOs
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have been keener on fostering migrants’ autonomy, recent measures
seek to redress the huge power imbalance between workers, manage-
ment and local authorities. These breakthrough measures might well
be tactical adjustments to give more power to the society in the eco-
nomic realm in order to thwart political demands. But they nonetheless
are the first official disowning of consultative Leninism and may also
be the first step toward the recognition that ‘democracy has a superior
capacity to adapt, reconcile, represent and respond to a plurality of
emergent social forces and stresses’ (Baum 2007: 13). At least, these
measures reflect the capacity of ‘rightful resistance’ to slowly change
power relations at the grassroots level.
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9 Grassroots Activism and Labour Electoral
Politics under Chinese Rule, 1997-2008
Ming K. Chan
The past eleven years witnessed many twists and turns in Hong Kong
labour politics after the British colony’s 1997 retrocession to become
the PRC’s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). As its
colonial polity was transformed into a partially democratic self-govern-
ing SAR, 1997 yielded space for grassroots political participation. Since
1985, there have been eight rounds of Legislative Council (Legco) elec-
tions in three phases: first, the functional constituency indirect elec-
tions introduced in 1985; second, the directly elected geographical con-
stituency seats added in 1991; and third, the HKSAR Legco elections in
1998, 2000, 2004 and 2008. This chapter will delineate unionists’ in-
put into legislative elections during 1997-2008 to amplify labour-elec-
toral politics interactive dynamics with the class line as a crucial clea-
vage.
Dimensions of Labour Unionism and pre-1997 Political Activism
Hong Kong’s labour movement had been closely linked to mainland
China, as local workers’ activism has been marked by anti-colonial out-
bursts since the 1840s. A century later, a partisan divide from China’s
Civil War polarised local labour unions – the pro-Beijing Hong Kong
Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) vs. the pro-Taipei Hong Kong and
Kowloon Trades Union Congress (TUC), both founded in 1948. The
1951 UN embargo against the PRC reoriented Hong Kong’s economy
from China trade to export manufacturing while China’s 1949 regime
change unleashed an influx of mainland Chinese to provide the man-
power and skills for an economic take-off.
The left-right rivalry enabled the colonial regime and employers to
play a ‘divide and rule’ game among unions. The TUC unions suffered
from undersized membership while the FTU unions had a larger base.
Leftist labour militancy stimulated by China’s Cultural Revolution trig-
gered the 1967 riots when anti-colonial sentiments transformed an in-
dustrial dispute into violence that disrupted daily life by pro-Beijing ac-
tivists who killed several and injured dozens. With community support,
the colonial regime responded with firm measures against the riots
that faded as Beijing did not wish to take over Hong Kong while the
mainland was in turmoil. After the riots, the colonial state adopted re-
forms on public housing, compulsory education, welfare, health care
and industrial legislations to mitigate inequalities and class tensions.
These helped clip militant unionism. With the FTU in retreat, the
TUC collaborated with the colonial regime that rewarded the moderate
right by appointing an ex-TUC secretary to the Legco as the first union-
ist-legislator in 1976. The TUC representatives also sat on the Labour
Advisory Board, which was boycotted by the FTU until 1982 (Chan
1986: 237-239).
The 1997 retrocession yielded a new politicisation of Hong Kong la-
bour, from Chinese politics on Hong Kong soil to local politics by lo-
cals in elections. Also significant is the concurrent process of Hong
Kong/mainland economic integration as China’s post-1978 reforms
shifted Hong Kong from an export-oriented industrial base to a China-
market service hub. The relocation of local manufacturing into the
Pearl River Delta and the influx of mainlanders/imported labourers im-
pacted Hong Kong’s labour market, wage level and social services over
the past quarter century.
Political divisions and the proliferation of small size unions have
characterised Hong Kong labour unionism. Besides the left-right di-
vide, traditional guild mentality also caused fragmentation along nar-
row skills, trade, and locale demarcations. The local pattern of many
small-scale work units forming the bulk of manufacturing employment
hampered systematic unionisation, especially among the service sector
unions that in 1984 included 148 civil servants unions (93,273 mem-
bers) and 26 social service unions (80,709) (Levin & Chiu 2000: 151).
Hong Kong then had 383 employees’ unions with 351,820 members for
a 15 per cent union density among a 2.54 million member workforce –
not a sign of strong unionisation (GIS 1985: 106-109). Nearly half of
union members were affiliated with either the FTU (73 unions/
168,000 members, mostly industrial unions of textile, transport, utili-
ties and construction hands) or the TUC (71/35,700, mostly craft
unions in the restaurant and building trades) (GIS 1985: 109).
Since the mid-1980s, Hong Kong has experienced a steady expan-
sion of labour unions in membership and density (Lethbridge & Ng
1993: 77-78). Of note were the partisan realignment and sectoral clea-
vages due to 1997 and economic changes. At the end of 1999, Hong
Kong had 583 workers’ unions with 674,433 members, a 21.45 per cent
density among 3.53 million employed workers (Labour Dept. 2000: 51).
Half of these unions were affiliated with one of the five labour federa-
tions: the FTU (130 unions/278,063 members), TUC (57/22,696),
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU, 47/983,379), Fed-
eration of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions (FLU, 44/28,946),
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and Federation of Civil Service Unions (FCSU, 18 unions) (Registry of
Trade Unions 2000). Such growth occurred amid a prolonged 1998-
2003 recession which burst the stock-property markets’ bubbles and
drove unemployment to 8.7 per cent in mid-2003. By the end of 2007,
the HKSAR had 731 unions with 686,371 members at a 21.09 per cent
density, with 176 unions linked to the FTU (311,184 members), 30
TUC (19,264), 76 CTU (116,669) and 62 FLU (34,125) (Registry of
Trade Unions 2008).
The 1984 Sino-British accord on Hong Kong’s retrocession uplifted
the FTU, whose more moderate stance on livelihood and community
service with proactive recruitment have contributed to its expansion
since the 1980s. In contrast, the TUC with an aging membership had
been in decline. The Kuomintang regime’s localisation in Taiwan and
mainland detachment undermined the TUC, whose fate as a major la-
bour force was sealed by 1997. The FTU’s ascendancy has been coun-
tered by the rising third force of independent unions, mainly among
public service, utilities and transportation white-grey collars, which pro-
pelled the CTU’s rapid growth as its core. Established in 1990 with
Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (CIC) director Lau Chin-
shek as chair and Clothing Industry Workers General Union’s Lee
Cheuk-yan as executive director, the CTU initially drew 22 unions and
4 labour federations with nearly 100,000 members. By late 2007, it be-
came a 76-union/116,669-member network (Registry of Trade Unions
2008). Neither FTU- nor TUC-linked, these CTU unions have been ac-
tive in political and livelihood campaigns as supporters of pro-democ-
racy parties/candidates. Thus, 1997 realigned local labour politics into
a FTU vs. CTU reconfiguration over democracy and relations with Beij-
ing as unionists became active political players, forming alliances with
political parties in elections and legislative manoeuvres to promote la-
bour interests.
The mainland’s marketisation revived Hong Kong’s China trade hub
functions and triggered a tertiarisation process with a rapid service sec-
tor growth but a manufacturing decline since the 1980s. The public
sector grew in the sunset colonial era’s welfare and social service ex-
pansion – 218 civil service unions (254,021 members) and 65 social ser-
vice unions (96540) in 1997 (Levin & Chiu 2000: 152). As deindustria-
lisation proceeded, Hong Kong industrial plants relocated north due to
much lower land and labour costs, manufacturing employment sharply
declined. In mid-2008, manufacturing absorbed 152,200 (less than 5
per cent vs. 1981’s 41 per cent) of Hong Kong’s 3.67 million work
forces while trade services surged from 20 per cent of 1980’s GDP to
2004’s 40 per cent, to account for over 70 per cent of Hong Kong’s ex-
ternal earnings (Tung 2005). Hong Kong has a growing crop of white-
grey collar service workers, who are younger and better educated, more
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assertive on labour rights and livelihood demands, and more election-
eering active than traditional blue collars (Louie 1993: 35).
Labour Activism in the Colonial Sunset Era, 1984-1997
A breakthrough in Hong Kong’s labour movement was the unprece-
dented labour politicisation that shifted from socio-economic to politi-
cal unionism in the 1984-1997 transition. This was an unspectacular
period for local industrial conflicts, as the numbers of work stoppages,
workers involved, working days lost and other labour disputes all de-
creased, reflecting production closures that terminated employment re-
lationships. The 1984 Sino-British accord triggered two processes –
limited democratisation before 1997, and the 1985-1990 drafting of the
HKSAR Basic Law – that polarised public opinions, divided political ac-
tivists and resulted in serious PRC-Hong Kong-UK discord. In Septem-
ber 1985, Hong Kong’s colonial regime conducted the first Legco elec-
tions, for 24 indirectly elected members. Among the twelve functional
constituency seats, the two allotted to organised labour on a one-union-
one-vote basis were split without contest between FTU vice-chair Tam
Yiu-chung and TUC leader Peng Chun-hoi. The FTU (166,386 mem-
bers) and the TUC (35,556), each with about 70 affiliated unions, were
able to divide the field among the 391 unions (359,000) in 1985 (Regis-
try of Trade Unions 1986). Both were re-elected without contest to sec-
ond three-year terms in 1988. This corporatist electorate might have
been caused by union proliferation since the mid-1980s (Ng & Ip
2000). A major third force organ, the Hong Kong Professional Tea-
chers’ Union, was the second largest union, with over 40,000 mem-
bers. Its then chair, Szeto Wah, was elected to the Legco education
functional seat and was re-elected without opposition in 1988 (Chan
1992: 18).
To gain electoral support, the FTU built an extensive branches net-
work to penetrate into working class neighbourhoods to earn a social
service bonus to compensate for its political deficits. Yet, such efforts
did not earn it electoral success until after 1997 (Chan 1992: 17-18).
The 1985-1988 Legco functional elections were not the main thrust of
labour political mobilisation as unionists were engaged in the triple de-
mocratisation struggles – the 1987-1988 debates on Legco direct elec-
tion, the 1985-1990 Basic Law controversies, and the June 4th, 1989,
Tiananmen Incident protests.
In May 1987, the colonial regime conducted public consultation on
further democratisation, with possible direct election of some Legco
seats in 1988. But Beijing opposed this as undermining Hong Kong’s
‘stability and prosperity’. Spearheading the anti-direct elections forces,
the FTU joined conservative businessmen to label early introduction of
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direct elections as undermining confidence and prosperity. Claiming a
lack of consensus, the colonial regime rejected the 1988 direct elec-
tions option.
In 1985, Beijing established a Basic Law Drafting Committee
(BLDC) of 59 members (including 23 Hong Kongers, mainly business
and professional elites with two unionists Tam and Szeto) and a Basic
Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) of 180, including thirteen labour
figures, to collect public opinion on the Basic Law drafts (Chan 1991).
Most independent unions lobbied for a more democratic HKSAR polity
with universal suffrage and the guarantee of union recognition, collec-
tive bargaining and social security rights. The FTU proposed a single-
chamber HKSAR Legco (with 45 per cent of the seats to functional
groups, 40 per cent by direct elections, and 15 per cent by an electoral
college); but it soon ditched its own proposal to support an unpopular,
Beijing-endorsed, bicameral model (Mushkat 1990: 3). In the Basic
Law, promulgated in April 1990, the rights to strike and union partici-
pation are included, but union recognition and collective bargaining
are not. As a BLCC/BLDC minority, unionists had little influence in
the drafting, in which the FTU’s legitimacy was compromised by its
lopsided collaboration with conservative elites, without gaining sub-
stantial concessions in return.
The 1989 Tiananmen crisis further challenged the FTU’s tight bal-
ancing act between grassroots interests and pro-Beijing loyalty. From
the start, Hong Kong’s pro-democratic activists, including many non-
aligned unionists, embraced their mainland counterparts and became
leaders of the local protest movement. They formed the Alliance in
Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China to link the
many local pro-democratic bodies, civic groups and labour organs. Sze-
to Wah was elected chair, while Lau Chin-shek and Lee Cheuk-yan be-
came executive committee members of the Alliance that was con-
demned as ‘subversive’ by Beijing (FEER, 3 August 1989). Not Alli-
ance-linked, the FTU also criticised Beijing’s crackdown as FTU chair
Cheng Yiu-tong and vice-chair Tam Yiu-chung were at the forefront of
the May protests.1 Many FTU unions joined other unions to support
the Beijing protesters. Yet, as Beijing reined in the Hong Kong leftists
after June 4, the FTU fell in line, further deepening local labour’s di-
vide over democracy.
To compensate for its political liability, the FTU projected itself as la-
bour’s socio-economic champion and even allied with the TUC, as in
the 1989 bus drivers’ strike over pensions, and in opposing imported
labour. Such left-right collaboration reflected a labour realignment with
the independent unions posing an increasingly serious challenge to
the left. The FTU operated in a ‘scissors style’ – the left and right
against the middle and the left-right splitting of the two Legco labour
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seats. To facilitate Beijing’s united front to win the tycoons’ support for
1997, the FTU practised ‘industrial pacifism’ by becoming more re-
strained in industrial disputes to toe Beijing’s ‘stability and prosperity’
line during the 1990s. Unlike the CTU’s aggressive livelihood strug-
gles against big business and the colonial regime, the FTU, with a hid-
den political agenda in its socio-economic unionism, broke ranks with
other unions on labour rights and community issues and avoided pub-
lic protests.
Labour and the 1991/1995 Legislative Elections
The 1991 Legco elections triggered a major realignment of the 60 seats
– 18 directly elected form nine double-seat geographic constituencies,
senior official seats reduced from ten to three, appointed members
dropped from twenty to eighteen, and functional constituency seats in-
creased from fourteen to twenty-one. The last British-conducted Legco
polls in 1995 included twenty directly elected, thirty functional and ten
electoral college seats. These direct elections institutionalised grass-
roots political participation that was cemented by organised labour’s
links with the new political parties. In April 1990 the democratic
camp’s major party, the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK),
was formed with organised labour among its major pillars, beside pro-
fessionals and academics, as six of its central committee’s thirty mem-
bers were unionists, including Szeto Wah and Lau Chin-shek. Other
non-aligned unionists sat on the UDHK organising committee and
were active in the 1987-88 direct election advocacy and the 1989 pro-
tests (Chan 1992: 26).
Both Peng Chun-hoi-TUC and Tam Yiu-chung-FTU were returned
without contest to their labour seats in the September 1991 Legco in-
direct elections. The UDHK’s Cheung Man-kwong, who succeeded
Szeto Wah as Professional Teachers’ Union head, won the education
seat with nearly 90 per cent votes against the head of the leftist Hong
Kong Federation of Education Workers. Another UDHK unionist Ho
Man-ka took the health care functional seat (Chan 1993: 234). The first
ever direct elections for Legco’s geographic constituencies on 15 Sep-
tember 1991 yielded a democrats’ landslide that took sixteen of the
eighteen seats and 65 per cent of the popular votes from over 750,000
(39 per cent) of 1.9 million registered voters (Chan 1993: 235). The
UDHK direct poll winners included two eminent unionists, Szeto
Wah, and Lau Chin-shek, who defeated FTU vice-president Chan Yuen-
han (Chan 1993: 235, 250). Chan’s fate as the only FTU direct election
contestants was shared by all leftist direct poll candidates. The 1991
elections confirmed local organised labour’s political realignment, espe-
cially the independent unions’ increasing significance, not just due to
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their size (56 per cent of unionised workers among 469 unions/
469,700 members) but also due to their leaders’ UDHK link. They
had yet to put their weight behind a single candidate with sufficient in-
stitutional support to dislodge the TUC’s Peng from his labour seat oc-
cupied since 1985, despite the widening FTU (84 unions/176,100
members)-TUC disparity (69/30,600) (GIS 1992: 109). Predicated on
‘patriotic’ criteria rather than on a class line, the leftist unions placed
political objectives above labour interests in a leftist labour-conserva-
tive/business collusion against the pro-democratic camp, hence the
FTU’s active support of both other leftist candidates and tycoon-spon-
sored contestants. The 1991-1995 Legco had a majority of pro-business
and pro-Beijing appointed and functionally elected members.
Producing an all-elected chamber, the 17 September 1995 Legco polls
were conducted under last British Governor Chris Patten’s reform,
which enlarged grassroots representation through indirect elections in
which the 29 functional and ten election committee seats were filled
more representatively against Beijing’s preferred corporatist approach.
The Sino-British discord focused on the nine new functional constitu-
encies for which Patten enfranchised almost a million working persons
as functional voters and made all elected District Board (DB) members
Election Committee voters to elect ten Legco seats (So 1997: 61-68).
With a 36 percent voter turnout, a record 920,000-plus voters voted in
the twenty single-seat geographical constituency polls in which the
democratic camp took 64 per cent of the popular votes and gained a to-
tal of 29 seats; the Democratic Party (DP, the UDHK-Meet Point
merged new organ), 19 seats; and other democrats, 6 seats. The pro-
Beijing circle suffered another setback in 1995. Allied with the FTU,
the Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB, a pro-
Beijing middle and working class party formed in 1992) took only one-
third of the popular votes and seven seats. The top three DAB leaders
were all direct-elections losers. By moving from his labour seat held
since 1985 to the direct poll, DAB vice-chair/FTU vice-president Tam
Yiu-chung failed to re-enter the Legco. CTU’s Lau Chin-shek won a di-
rectly elected seat on a DP ticket, while among the two FTU direct poll
candidates Chan Yuen-han won (So 1997: 71-72; Kuan 1996).
In the functional polls, the CTU and the FTU each supported 6 can-
didates among the 35 candidates for the nine newly created functional
seats, and both emphasised livelihood on their platforms (FEER, 20
April and 28 September 1995). Besides the two labour functional seats
(one won by FTU president Cheng Yiu-tong to replace Tam, another by
moderate FLU leader Lee Kai-ming who replaced Peng Chun-hoi),
unionists gained four of the nine new functional seats returned by
‘universal’ polls of persons working in the specific fields. His advan-
cing age and the TUC’s sharp decline (64 unions/25,438 members vs.
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FTU’s 118/258,186) made Peng’s Legco retirement inevitable (Registry
of Trade Unions 2000: 71). Retaining the functional seats in education,
health care, and social work, the DP took the new functional seats in
primary production and business service. In total, nine unionists – four
CTU, three FTU, one FLU, and one independent – were elected to the
60-seat Legco (Chow & Fosh 1999: 71).
While secondary to democracy and the attitude toward Beijing, em-
ployment and livelihood issues featured prominently in their 1995 plat-
forms. Like 1991, political stance, not the class line socio-economic is-
sues, formed the main cleavages between the democratic camp and the
DAB-FTU in 1995 (Sun & Wong 1996: 181-186, 192). The DAB top
three’s defeat shocked the pro-Beijing camp. The DP and CTU had
solid democratic credentials while their pro-welfare and anti-labour-
import stances appealed to the grassroots and neutralised the DAB-
FTU’s livelihood stance with its June 4th stigma.
The 1991-1995 elections, especially for the directly elected seats, re-
dressed the historical power imbalance between business and labour in
the colonial legislature. More labour-related issues were brought into
Legco discussion due to labour’s stronger political clout. A pro-labour,
grassroots ‘issues majority’ emerged in the 1995-1997 Legco, livelihood
issues filled the Legco agenda, and private member’s bills were passed
to improve labour rights like union recognition and imported labour
limits (Louie 1996: 59-62). The 1990s Legco direct elections institutio-
nalised grassroots political participation and politicised labour issues,
thus transforming the Legco into an arena for political unionism, class
politics and labour interests debates (Ng 1999: 258-262).
Labour in HKSAR Electoral Politics, 1998-2000
The democratic camp’s 1990s electoral success provoked a democratic
regression by the pro-Beijing bloc-big business axis in the HKSAR. In
early 1996 Beijing established a HKSAR Preparatory Committee and a
400-member Selection Committee to choose the first HKSAR Chief
Executive with the FTU and the DAB (23 and 42 seats) providing a
grassroots presence on this tycoon-dominated body (Pepper 2000:
429-435).
Beijing also set up a ‘Provisional Legislative Council’ (PLC) to replace
the all-elected colonial Legco on 1 July 1997. To protest this unelected
PLC, all democratic Legco members except Frederick Fung boycotted
the PLC. Yet the FTU was allotted only four PLC seats and the DAB se-
ven seats (So 1999: 231; FTU 1999:41). The business-dominated PLC
endorsed the rollback of pro-labour legislation passed in June 1997 by
the last colonial Legco. Besides endorsing the reintroduction of ap-
186 MING K. CHAN
pointed District Boards and Urban/Regional Councils seats, the PLC
adopted a proportional representation system for the HKSAR Legco
1998 election’s twenty directly elected seats. For the 30 functional seats,
the nine new constituencies were reallocated with corporate voting re-
adopted for most seats, thus disenfranchising many functional voters,
who numbered almost a million in 1995 but only just over 120,000 in
1998. Labour received a third functional seat, but labour functional vo-
ters were reduced from 1995’s 2,001 to 1998’s 361, with each union a
corporate voter instead of union officials as voters. The Election Com-
mittee, formed by all elected DB members in 1995, was replaced by an
800 electorate of four socio-economic sectors (Baum 2000: 446-448).
Labour and the 1998 Legco Elections
The first HKSAR Legco elections on 24 May 1998 drew a record 1.5
million voters (53 per cent turnout). The democratic camp received 65
per cent of the direct poll votes, similar to 1991/1995, but took only
fourteen directly elected seats (two less than 1995), five functional seats
(three less than 1995) and none of the ten Election Committee seats
(three less than 1995) (HK Economic Daily, 25 May 1998). Despite their
reduced Legco presence to nineteen, the 1998 results vindicated the de-
mocrats’ ‘return to Legco’ dual focus campaign – democracy and socio-
economic justice for the middle/working classes amid a worsening eco-
nomic crisis. They were critical of the HKSAR regime on socio-eco-
nomic problems and democratic regression without direct criticism of
Beijing in the altered political realities (Chan 2003).
The four direct poll seats gained by the new Frontier group – two of
its winners, Lau Chin-shek and Lee Cheuk-yan were CTU leaders – re-
flected such bi-focal appeal with union links (Lo 1999a: 17, 23). The
DP winners in nine direct poll and four functional seats included
unionists Szeto Wah and Cheung Man-kwong. The new electoral sys-
tem facilitated the pro-Beijing bloc’s gain: the DAB’s ten seats (five di-
rect poll, three functional and two Election Committees) (HK Economic
Daily, 26 May 1998). Its pro-Beijing negative image was partially com-
pensated for by its strong livelihood platform. Reflecting labour con-
cerns in a recession, all five labour leaders – Lau, Lee, Tam, Chan
Yuen-han and Leung Yiu-chung – easily won direct polls. The FTU
took two labour functional seats with the third occupied by FLU leader
Lee Kai-ming in the first real labour-seats contest, as five unionists
competed for three seats among 339 union votes (Lo 1999: 19). There
were ten union-linked Legco members in 1998-2000: five FTU, three
CTU, two DP/Professional Teachers’ Association. FTU leaders Tam
Yiu-chung and Chan Yuan-han were among the four DAB cadres in di-
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rect poll seats. In mid-1997, Tam became the first unionist appointed
to the Exco (FTU 1999: 43).
Analysis of the 1998 election issue voting patterns shows the impact
of class and economic issues in voter preference. As most direct poll
voters self-identified as lower class, over 70 per cent of the respondents
regarded the economy (52 per cent) and the class issue (19 per cent) as
key concerns (Wong 1999: 107-118, 124-127). Besides the planks on de-
mocracy and criticisms of the PLC and the HKSAR regime, the DP
placed ‘labour and employment’ as its 4th ranked campaign item, fol-
lowed by ‘economic relief’ and ‘social security’. The DAB offered ‘la-
bour protection’ as the 5th ranked plank, while the Frontier put ‘em-
ployment’ as its 8th priority (Lo 1999: 89-111).
The grassroots’ demographic majority, the intensification of the class
cleavage and the politicisation of labour issues became increasingly
crucial in post-1997 contests. The democratic camp soon became em-
broiled in internal discord over class and socio-economic policies. Lee
Check-yan’s introduction of a minimum wage bill into the Legco in
April 1999 lit the fuse that blew open the DP’s division over its class
identity and support base to intensify its Young Turks vs. mainstream
leadership debate on street protests vs. parliamentary manoeuvres
(HKEJ, 17 April 1999; Sing Tao, 20 September 1999; Yazhou Zhoukan,
20 September-2 October 1999; Ma 2000b). The DP split deepened in
May 1999 over Lau Chin-shek’s dual DP-Frontier affiliation while the
DP accepted Lau’s two (CIC/CTU) labour hats. Lau left the DP in mid-
2000 on the refusal to end his Frontier ties. Supported by young Turks
[0], Lau had toyed with the formation of a ‘labour party’, an idea not fa-
voured by Lee Chuek-yan and other CTU cadres (Sing Tao, 16 June
2000).2
Labour and the 2000 Legco Elections
The 10 September 2000 Legco elections did not alter the partisan
alignment but yielded keen labour politics signs. The 43.57 per cent
turnout for the 24 direct poll seats was almost 10 per cent lower than
in 1998. Still the largest party with twelve Legco seats, the DP’s popu-
lar vote share declined from 1998’s 42.9 per cent to 34.7 per cent. De-
spite vice-chair Gary Cheng’s conflict of interests scandal, the DAB
gained 29.7 per cent of the popular votes (25 per cent in 1998) with
eleven seats – seven directly elected, three functional, and one election
committee seat (Ming Pao, 11-13 September 2000). After losing the
late-2000 by-election to fill Cheng’s void (who resigned under pres-
sure), the DAB commanded only ten seats.
Public concern for livelihood issues helped the grassroots/labour-
linked candidates. All five labour leaders who won in 1998 easily re-
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tained their direct poll seats. Three of the FTU winners were DAB-
FTU joint candidates, two in direct elected seats and another in a la-
bour functional seat, while a FTU cadre took a second labour seat and
a FLU unionist took the third labour seat (SCMP, 12 September 2000).
Four democratic direct poll winners had labour credentials: Szeto Wah,
Lau Chin-shek, Lee Cheuk-yan and Leung Yiu–chung. The DP’s
Cheung Man-kwong retained his education seat vs. a pro-Beijing rival.
ADPL’s Frederick Fung, a 1998 loser due to his PLC tint, returned to
the Legco (Ming Pao, 11 September 2000). While labour components
in the new Legco remain unchanged, the popular vote distribution re-
flected a partisan realignment – 61.9 per cent democratic camp, 30.6
per cent pro-Beijing and 6.6 per cent conservative.3 With the leftists
keeping their 1998 support level, the DAB brought other pro-Beijing
candidates from the FTU and the pro-business Hong Kong Progressive
Alliance (HKPA) under its banner in the direct polls. The democrats’
failure to gain any of the four new direct poll seats was alarming as
their discord over socio-economic policies undermined grassroots sup-
port (Ming Pao, 12 September 2000). The DAB-FTU’s gain despite the
Gary Cheng scandal revealed their mobilisation capacity through local
branch networks.4
The democratic camp’s Legco presence stood at twenty seats after
the December 10 by-election in which democrats supported indepen-
dent barrister Audrey Eu to defeat the DAB candidate and four inde-
pendents (Yazhou Zhoukan, 18-24 December 2000). To mobilise the
‘patriotic’ labour votes, the FTU stationed top leaders around polling
stations at major working class public housing estates on by-election
day.5 Yet the DAB-FTU’s impressive campaign resources could not pre-
vent this democratic landslide (Bauhinia Magazine, January 2001: 13).
Eu’s professionalism was a key asset, reinforced by input from DP/
CTU/Frontier leaders who galvanised middle and working class voters
for Eu. This by-election win was a rare successful cooperation in the
fractured democratic camp, still a minority in the 2000-2004 Legco
against the pro-Beijing loyalists’ 24 seats and the conservative-moder-
ates’ sixteen seats (HKEJ, 12 September 2000).
Labour in Mass Mobilisations and Electoral Contests, 2003-2004
The Article 23 Debacle and Direct Elections Advocacy6
At the start of his second term in July 2002, Chief Executive C.H.
Tung introduced a new political appointee system and inducted the LP,
DAB and FTU chairs into the Exco to form a ‘ruling coalition’. Tung
soon began a daunting task – enactment of a national security law
against treason, subversion and sedition, and for official secrecy protec-
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tion as stipulated by the Basic Law’s Article 23. The autumn 2002 pub-
lic consultation of the draft bill, with its proposed illiberal provisions
impairing civic rights and freedoms, soon triggered heated debates and
fierce protests that drew global media attention.
This controversy was sidelined during March-June 2003 while the
HKSAR was engulfed in a ‘severe acute respiratory syndrome’ (SARS)
epidemic that originated from Guangdong. Besides a death toll of 299,
this public health crisis caused panic and inflicted heavy economic
losses in Hong Kong. Forfeiting the popular relief after Hong Kong
was delisted as an infested area on 23 June 2003, Tung’s decision to
enact the bill by a 9 July deadline provoked the largest protest in Hong
Kong history against a local government. A mass rally of 500,000 on 1
July 2003 was fuelled both by stern opposition to the bill’s contents
and the regime’s unyielding stance as well as by Tung’s flawed policies,
regime blunders and dismal leadership in an economic recession. Re-
sponding to the protesters’ demands – his resignation and greater de-
mocracy – Tung conceded on the bill’s most criticised provisions. After
the Liberal Party chair’s 7 July Exco resignation, Tung deferred enact-
ment to avoid certain defeat and accepted the resignation of the secur-
ity and financial secretaries. He eventually shelved the bill in Septem-
ber 2003.
To restore Hong Kong’s political stability amid demands for Tung’s
resignation, Beijing professed strong support for the Tung regime, lest
the HKSAR ‘people power’ set a dangerous example for the mainland
populace. Beijing opted to uplift Hong Kong from its malaise of social
discontent and economic pains with relief measures like the Closer
Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), individual mainlander
tourism to Hong Kong, HKSAR banks’ Renminbi service and the
building of a Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge. The 2003 ‘people
power’ tidal wave was a watershed in HKSAR politics, and Tung’s deba-
cle delegitimised the DAB-FTU bloc for their insistence on the unpop-
ular bill’s enactment by 9 July. The anti-Tung regime victory galvanised
support for the democrats and propelled to the forefront the Civil Hu-
man Rights Front, founded in September 2002 as a pan-democratic
coalition of 48 women, labour, grassroots, social, religious, academic
and minorities groups to oppose the bill. The Front has since been a
vocal force in the campaign for 2007-2008 direct elections over Bei-
jing’s objection, and its spokesman, Richard Tsoi, was CTU chief Lau
Chin-shek’s legislative assistant.
These reenergised pro-democratic activists soon mounted an aggres-
sive campaign against the patriotic bloc in the 23 November 2003 Dis-
trict Councils elections, when a record one million (44 per cent) voters
yielded a democratic camp victory, taking 161 of the 326 contested
seats. The DP won 93 seats (86 in 1999) among its 120 candidates.
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The pro-Beijing DAB suffered its worst defeat, gaining only 62 seats
(83 in 1999) among its 204 candidates, and party chair Yok-sing Tsang
soon resigned. While organised labour networks on both sides played
vital roles in the November 2003 electioneering, it was the high-pro-
filed direct involvement of many middle-class organs and professional
leaders that reshaped the HKSAR electoral and party politics. Building
upon their November 2003 triumph, some 100,000 joined in the 1
January 2004 rally for faster democratisation – direct election of the
Chief Executive in 2007 and of the entire Legco in 2008. Alarmed by
such a people power upsurge, Beijing intervened to counter the calls
for 2007-2008 universal franchise. On 6 April 2004, in a major depar-
ture from Beijing’s self-restraint on local autonomy, the National Peo-
ple’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) issued an interpretation
of the Basic Law provisions on electoral changes that abrogated to Bei-
jing the power to approve any HKSAR electoral reform, which could
only be initiated by the Chief Executive according to ‘actual need’ and
‘gradual and orderly progress’ for ‘balanced participation’ by all local
sectors, classes and circles. Hence, Beijing ruled out HKSAR direct
elections in 2007-2008 and fixed the same half (directly elected) and
half (functional) ratio among the seats in the 2008 Legco elections.
Labour and the 2004 Legco Elections
The third HKSAR Legco included an equal number (30) of directly
elected geographical and indirectly elected functional seats. Despite the
NPC’s April veto of direct 2007-2008 elections, the democrats’ 2004
Legco campaign still focused on democratisation. From the sentiments
of the 200,000-strong 1 July 2004 march against Beijing’s verdict and
Tung’s lacklustre performance, many had predicted a democratic vic-
tory in the September 2004 elections. However, the HKSAR populace
responded favourably to Beijing’s mid-2004 conciliatory gestures for a
democratic camp/Beijing dialogue. While Lau Chin-shek embraced de´-
tente with Beijing, hardcore democrats (such as Sezto Wah) remained
sceptical7, leading to an internal split on relations with Beijing over de-
mocracy. The mid-2004 electoral campaign unfolded amid an
economic rebound partly engineered by Beijing’s up-lifting measures.
The PRC athletes’ impressive gains in the August 2004 Athens Olym-
pics and the 50 Chinese Gold Medallists’ visit to Hong Kong right be-
fore polling induced among HKSAR voters a strong nationalistic pride
that was beneficial to pro-Beijing candidates.
The 12 September 2004 legislative election results sent a host of
mixed signals (Apple Daily, HKEJ & Ming Pao, 14-15 September 2004).
Out of 3.2 million registered voters 1.78 million (55.6 per cent turnout)
cast their ballots for 30 directly elected seats. The fragmented demo-
GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM AND LABOUR ELECTORAL POLITICS UNDER CHINESE RULE 191
cratic camp captured only 25 seats (18 direct poll seats with 61.8 per
cent vote share and 7 functional seats). The DP retained only nine
seats. A new pro-democratic force was the Article 45 Concern Group,
whose four candidates, all barristers, easily won with middle-class sup-
port. The pro-Beijing parties got a 25.7 per cent vote share, and the
pro-business circle received 11.5 per cent. The DAB with thirteen seats
became the Legco’s largest party. The pro-business LP was second with
ten seats, including two direct poll seats for its chair and vice-chair.
Such results vindicated Beijing’s softer tactics since mid-2004, while
its beneficial measures did uplift both Hong Kong’s economy and pub-
lic mood. In the 2004-2008 Legco, besides the DAB, LP, and FTU
(each has an Exco member), the HKSAR regime also enlisted several
independents to form a pro-regime majority on political issues; but on
socio-economic policies with divergent class interests, a ‘loyalist’ major-
ity could not be assured. The 2004 poll results revealed patterns of po-
litical malaise that continued to plague the labour movement.
1. Most labour legislators, like Lau Chin-shek (19 per cent), Chan
Yuan-han (18 per cent), Lee Cheuk-yan (10 per cent) and Leung
Yiu-chung (13 per cent vs. Tam Yiu-chung’s 25 per cent in the same
constituency), suffered a popular vote share decline.
2. First-time candidates with strong middle-class appeal did well in
the direct polls – Albert Cheng and Leung Kwok-hung as well as
barristers Alan Leung and Ronny Tong of Article 45. Direct poll
winners LP chair Michael Tien and vice-chair Selina Chow, both ex-
functional seaters, were helped by their anti-Article 23 stance.
3. Lau Chin-shek’s vote share decline was partly due to his political
‘repositioning’ for a dialogue with Beijing in June 2004 that pro-
voked condemnations from some democrats. This forced Lau to
contest the 2004 polls as an independent. The CTU was also hurt
by Lau’s mid-2005 support of Donald Tsang as replacement Chief
Executive.8
4. Two FTU-DAB joint-list candidates, unionist Chan Yuan-han and
businessman Chan Kam-lum had to run on separate lists after fail-
ing to coordinate campaign strategies. This FTU vs. DAB split
stemmed from their increasingly divergent class identities and so-
cio-economic stances as the DAB tried to gain middle class votes
(Lo et al. 2005).
5. The democrats’ setback stemmed from strategy errors and inter-
party coordination failures. Except for Lee Cheuk-yan and Leung
Yiu-chung, most democratic contestants did not prioritise grass-
roots economic concerns but over-emphasised political demands.
Media limelight on scandals overshadowed livelihood issues in an
election run on personalities and ideological labels. Most platforms
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aimed to attract middle-class voters whose role in the 2003 protests
obscured crucial working-class inputs.
6. Ex-FTU Legco incumbent Chan Kwok-keung’s defeat as an indepen-
dent for a labour seat revealed internal tensions of the FTU that
fielded new functional candidates in 2004.
Labour and the 2008 Legco Contests
The sudden C. H. Tung to Donald Tsang leadership change engineered
by Beijing in March 2005 validated the protests against Tung’s flawed
governance. HKSAR chief secretary and ex-colonial civil servant Donald
Tsang won an unopposed contest in June 2005 as the replacement
Chief Executive for Tung’s remaining two years. On the momentum of
an economic recovery since 2004, Tsang was initially blessed with fall-
ing unemployment (3.2 per cent in mid-2008, a 10-year low), high
GDP growth and wage increase for many workers. Yet, inflation surged
to 6.3 per cent in July 2008.
Despite the economic uplift, the state-society front was punctuated
by grassroots and middle class protests against questionable regime de-
cisions. The number of strikes in the mid-2000s remained very low,
but there were over 1,000 labour disputes per year, mainly involving
wage/benefits payment defaults (Labour Department 2000-08). The
2007-2008 industrial relations scene was rocked by collection actions
to redress the uneven distribution of gains from the post-2003 re-
bound. A 36-day strike by construction site steel-bar benders who
gained a 15 per cent wage hike in mid-2007 (Ming Pao, 14 September
2007), and four short strikes of transport workers employed by bever-
age-food suppliers in July 2008 (that yielded 4.5-8 per cent wage in-
creases) crested labour actions to recover salary/benefits lost in the re-
cession (Chinaworker.info 2008). The effective coordination of anti-glo-
balisation protests at the late 2005 WTO summit in Hong Kong by the
CTU’s People Alliance on WTO testified to labour activism on a grand
scale.9
The Tsang regime’s failure to pass its modest, Beijing-endorsed
2007-2008 electoral reform with a required two-thirds Legco majority
on 21 December 2005 revealed the limits to Beijing’s ‘economic bene-
fits to defuse political demands’ strategy and led to Tsang’s reorienta-
tion toward socio-economic issues. On bread and butter concerns, the
pro-Beijing unions had room to collaborate with the independent
unions while they continued to disagree on political matters. After the
2004 Legco defeat of a minimum wage bill, Tsang in mid-2005 pro-
mised to reconsider the issue. Yet, Tsang fell short in his October
2006 Policy Address that instead of setting a mandatory minimum
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wage for all workers introduced a ‘Wage Protection Movement’ (WPM)
for cleaners and security guards to be supported voluntarily by employ-
ers/contractors (Tsang 2006: 12). Citing opposition from the Labour
Advisory Board’s employer representatives, Tsang adopted a softer ap-
proach to please the business chambers and employers’ organs whose
support he needed in his 2007 Chief Executive re-election. Tsang’s
WPM proposal provoked strong criticisms from the unionists. Under
pro-Beijing pressure, Chan Yuan-han and her FTU Legco peers ac-
cepted the regime’s compromise to review the WPM after two years be-
fore taking the legislative option10 (Ming Pao, 27 October 2006). Orga-
nised labour also joined business bodies in opposing a goods and ser-
vices tax (GST), as proposed in a July 2006 consultative paper. Facing
stern opposition from all social classes, this GST proposal was soon
shelved. To lift Hong Kong from the webs of ‘deep-rooted conflicts and
internal problems’ (as Premier Wen Jiabo said) has remained a
challenging task.11
With Beijing’s blessing and business support Donald Tsang in
March 2007 won a Chief Executive second term for five years in a lop-
sided election by defeating pro-democratic challenger Civic Party legis-
lator Alan Leong with over 80 per cent of the 800-member Election
Committee votes. But Tsang was unable to suppress the popular de-
mands for the 2012 direct election of the Chief Executive and the entire
Legco. Once again, Beijing stepped in to defuse the democratisation
crisis. On 29 December 2007, the NPCSC set a timetable for the direct
election of the Chief Executive in 2017 and for the entire Legco by
2020. This breakthrough decision pre-empted the democrats’ signature
battle cry for faster democratisation in the 2008 Legco electoral cam-
paign.
Of the HKSAR’s 3.37 million registered voters, only 1.515 million
(45.2 per cent) cast their vote on 7 September 2008 for the directly
elected Legco seats. This low turnout (vs. 2004’s 1.784 million votes/
55.64 per cent) was commonly attributed to the lack of big issues fac-
ing the voters. Rather a mixed bag of secondary livelihood concerns
filled the campaign platforms of a record number of 142 candidates on
53 tickets contesting the 30 direct poll seats. Despite the low turnout
and retirement of political superstars, the predicted pan-democratic
rout did not materialise, but yielded surprising results of profound sig-
nificance (HKEJ, Ming Pao, Apple Daily and Oriental Daily, 8-9 Septem-
ber 2008).
Faring much better than expected, the democrats captured 23 of the
60 Legco seats (19 direct poll and 4 functional seats), down from a pre-
vious 26 seats (with Anson Chan’s late 2007 by-election win) but still
over the 21 seats threshold to veto future electoral reforms. The demo-
cratic camp received 899,223 direct poll votes/59.34 per cent, slightly
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lower than 2004’s 61.8 per cent with a loss of 0.17 million votes. Speci-
fically, the DP with 8 seats (7 direct poll and 1 functional), 1 less than
2004, remained the democrats’ flagship party even though its vote
share declined to 20.63 per cent with 321,692 votes, some 0.15 million
fewer than 2004. The middle-class-based Civic Party retained 5 seats
(all winners were lawyers, 4 direct poll and 1 legal-functional), 1 fewer
than 2004 with 2070,000 votes (13.66 per cent). The radical, diehard
democratic upstart LSD took 3 direct poll seats with 153,390 votes (10.1
per cent). The two pro-democratic labour/grassroots organs both re-
tained their sole Legco seat in the NT-West direct polls, the Neighbour-
hood and Workers Service Centre (NWSC)’s Leung Yiu-chung got
42,441 votes while CTU’s Lee Cheuk-yan gained 42,211 votes (both 2.8
percent). The grassroots, public housing-based ADPL’s Frederick Fung
was re-elected with 42,2111 votes in Kowloon-West, and an ADPL mem-
ber heading the Social Workers’ General Union won the social welfare
functional seat. The Frontier’s Emily Lau was re-elected in NT-East and
the Civic Act-Up’s Cyd Ho revenged her 2004 defeat by winning in
Hong Kong Island.
The pro-Beijing DAB with 13 seats remains the Legco’s largest party.
On its own the DAB gained 10 seats with 311,436 votes, and it claimed
another three FTU seats (1 labour-functional and 2 direct poll) whose
winners are DAB members but ran on FTU tickets, yielding the DAB-
FTU a combined 397,747 votes (26.21 per cent). The conservative pro-
business LP received only 78,633 votes (5.19 per cent) with all its four
direct poll contestants defeated. The blow was especially severe as the
LP lost its only two directly elected seats held by party chair James Tien
and vice-chair Selina Chow. Both soon relinquished their party leader-
ship posts, and Chow also resigned from the Exco. Its total Legco line-
up now stands at 3, after losing the tourism functional seat, the resig-
nation of Lau Wang-fat (a Legco veteran who took unopposed the
Hueng Yee Kuk – New Territories affairs consultative body – seat in-
stead of his 2004-08 District Councils seat) and of three other func-
tional seat winners from the LP. With other pro-Beijing but non-party
affiliated candidates’ 102,518 votes (6.76 per cent), the pro-establish-
ment camp collected a total of 603,544 votes at a 39.82 per cent share.
The non-partisan candidates took in a combined 43,848 votes (2.89
per cent). As a whole, the previous pattern of direct polls vote share ra-
tio of 6 (democrats): 3 (pro-Beijing): 1 (business and independent)
seems to remain despite 2008’s low turnout and the LP debacle. View-
ing from the class line and labour issues perspectives, several pertinent
points emerge.
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The Class Line and LP Debacle
The LP’s direct poll rout must not be over-stretched to indicate a perva-
sive anti-business sentiment among most HKSAR voters (Ming Pao, 17
September 2008). Rather, a combination of factors sealed the LP direct
poll candidates’ fate. Its grossly inadequate local network with poor
community service limited its voter mobilisation capacity, a defect that
the small (300 members) Civic Party also shares. LP leaders James
Tien and Selina Chow’s 2004 gain of two direct poll seats partly re-
sulted from their July 2003 defection that doomed the Article 23 enact-
ment. By 2008 their anti-Article 23 halo had faded, while two previous
major sources (pro-regime ally DAB and the rural votes under erst-
while LP legislator Lau Wong-fat) of local support in NT-East/-West for
Tien, and Chow did not deliver the votes this time. Recent public up-
roars against ‘official-business collusion’ (over a retired housing offi-
cial’s conflict of interest employment by a property giant) tarnished the
LP’s public image.
Some business leaders criticised the LP’s narrow base and pro-
tycoon bias that failed to represent other business interests and its ‘out
of touch’ stance on issues like minimum wage that enjoyed business
support (Ming Pao, 23 September 2008). Calling the LP defeat a local
politics ‘earthquake’, one academic attributed this to its being pro-
regime and pro-big business when the Tsang regime’s public approval
plummeted after recent political scandals while big business’s popular
esteem also suffered in official-tycoon collusion scandals and over op-
position to fair competition and minimum wage laws (Michael De-
Golyer, Hong Kong Journal, Winter 2008). Another scholar called for
the founding of a new party more fully representative of business inter-
ests to contest future direct elections (S.H. Lo, HK Economic Times, 12
September 2008).
The LSD’s impressive debut – 3 direct poll seats gained by its 5
slates, one in each geographical constituency – was not solely due to its
strong grassroots appeal but also to middle-class voters’ dissatisfaction
with Tsang’s performance. A novice among its three winners, LSD
chair Raymond Wong, a popular media commentator/regime critic,
collected many votes from middle-class residents in up-market high-
rise blocks (Ming Pao, 11 September 2008). The middle-class-identified
Civic Party’s gain (207,000 votes/13.66 per cent) is considerably higher
than the combined total (127,017 votes/8.39 per cent) of the democrats’
three grassroots organs (NWSC, CTU and ADPL each got over 42,000
votes/2.8 per cent). The DP’s 312,692 votes/20.63 per cent came from
middle-class voters with some grassroots input. The same applies to
the two small pro-democratic organs with only one slate each who both
won – Emily Lau and Cyd Ho.
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In the pro-regime camp, the DAB has moved up the social ladder to
cater more to middle-class interests, especially after its 2005 merger
with the HKPA of pro-Beijing business/professional elites. The FTU
fielded only two direct poll slates both headed by a FTU veteran who
won with a total of 86,331 votes, 7,678 higher than the LP’s 78,633
votes but below the DAB’s 311,416 votes. Such patterns indicate that
political bodies identify mainly with the grassroots remaining minor
partners in their own camp. While the LP is now totally (3) functional
seats based, the FTU’s four legislators are half in direct poll and half in
unopposed labour-functional seats. Like DAB chair Tam Yiu-chung
who is concurrently a FTU vice-president, three of these FTU legisla-
tors are also DAB members, thus cementing the DAB’s multi-class
base (of 10,000 plus members) through interlocking leadership and
overlapping membership with the FTU as the largest pro-Beijing organ
(311,184 members in 2007). The middle-class or mixed-class parties
still outshine the smaller grassroots organs in elections, even though
the largest parties are courting middle- and working-class voters with
multi-class platforms.
Labour Issues on Campaign Platforms
The democrats’ unexpectedly strong performance confirms their still
considerable popular appeal as champions of socio-economic justice,
advocates for middle/working-class livelihood and as vigorous watch-
dogs safeguarding civic liberty and the rule of law. The DAB can claim
a similar mandate in the first two, but as a pro-regime party, it can
hardly meet public expectations of a vigilant regime critic. There were
hidden class tensions on bread and butter issues in both camps, espe-
cially among democratic direct poll contestants who did not coordinate
platforms, allocate votes or campaign zones on any systematic basis. A
content review of their campaign platforms will reveal their differences
on socio-economic issues besides a shared commitment to fuller and
earlier universal franchise direct elections.
For instance, the Civic Party has built much of its appeal on its four
direct poll winners’ professional integrity as barristers. Besides a com-
mon democracy stance, the platforms of all Civic Party contestants,
those of most DP candidates and other pan-democratic runners
showed a similar concern for improving grassroots livelihood with
anti-poverty measures, increased welfare and stronger labour protection
provisions. Often criticised as elitist aloof from the masses, the Civic
Party candidates’ clear support for enacting minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour laws and for criminalising wage payment defaults by em-
ployers can be viewed as an attempt to broaden its voter base by reach-
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ing out to the grassroots and as a manifestation of their crusade for so-
cio-economic justice.
Unlike the Civic Party candidates’ common stance on universal
minimum wage law, some DP candidates’ platforms also endorsed
such a law but would limit it to only cleaners and guards (like solicitor
Andrew To re-elected in Kowloon-West). Still, no reference to the mini-
mum wage appeared on the platforms of some DP candidates like DP
chair Albert Ho, a solicitor re-elected in NT-West, and Nelson Wong, a
social worker who won in NT-East after his 2004 defeat. Ho’s omission
of labour issues might stem from a deliberate avoidance of clashing
with CTU’s Lee Cheuk-yan, whose platform headlined the minimum
wage/maximum work hour law. Lee was re-elected in a tight race of 14
lists competing for 8 seats that included three other labour leaders
who were all re-elected – fellow democrat Leung Yiu-chung of the
NWSC, and two pro-Beijing unionist, FTU vice-president Tam Yiu-
chung (running as DAB chair to win big enough for the re-election of
rural leader Chueng Hok-ming ranked second on his list), and FTU ve-
teran/DAB member Wong Kwong-hing who traded his labour-func-
tional seat for a direct poll seat on a FTU list that focused on labour is-
sues with the minimum wage/maximum hour law a priority. The Tam-
Cheung platform prioritised official minimum wage measures as a top
issue besides ‘anti-inflation’ and ‘economic growth’.
Democratic Legco veteran, LSD’s Albert Chan, who supported mini-
mum wage/maximum hour laws won in NT-West, in which LP vice-
chair and Exco councilor Selina Chow lost her re-election. Running
against an array of strongly pro-grassroots platforms, Chow’s pro-busi-
ness platform paled by comparison and got even fewer votes than Civic
Party loser Fernando Cheung, who switched from his social work func-
tional seat to contest a NT-West seat on a platform calling for a fairer
and more compassionate community without explicit reference to la-
bour issues. A defeated ADPL ticket ran on a platform that listed a
minimum wage/maximum hour law after anti-inflation. Three de-
feated independents in NT-West ran on platforms that did not mention
any labour issues.
As a whole, the minimum wage and maximum work hour issue was
featured in 8 slates (30 candidates) out of the 14 slates (42 candidates)
contesting in NT-West. Those with a labour issues plank collectively re-
ceived 307,630 votes/77.4 per cent of the constituency’s total of
398,292 votes cast. Among the 8 winners only Albert Ho on one of the
three DP slates did not explicitly refer to any labour issue on his plat-
form ‘for progress and justice’. This was in sharp contrast to the DP’s
two other NT-West slates headed, respectively, by winner Lee Wing-tat
and loser Cheung Yin-tung whose platforms supported the minimum
wage. Perhaps as DP chair, Ho was mindful of the 1999 minimum
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wage debate that split the DP ranks and hence chose to highlight com-
munity service and local issues for a combined middle-class and grass-
roots appeal. A survey of the platforms in the other four constituencies
reveals a similar pattern indicating the prevalence of livelihood issues
among voters in the absence of key political issues.
Labour in Post-election Legco Politics
Labour presence in the 2008-2012 Legco should include three white
collar and middle-class unionists in functional seats – education’s
Cheung Man-kwong, social welfare’s Cheung Chu-kwok and medici-
ne’s Leung Kia-lau, ex-head of a Hospital Authority physicians’ union
supporting a minimum wage and collective bargaining rights. With the
labour-functional seats’ three legislators (two FTU and one FLU) plus
the FTU’s two Mr. Wongs (Kwong-kin and Kwong-hing) in directly
elected seats, CTU’s Lee Cheuk-yan, NWSC’s Leung Yiu-chung, and
DAB chair Tam Yiu-chang (in his FTU hat), unionists now claim ten
Legco seats. Yet two veterans, ex-CTU chair Lau Chin-shek and FTU
vice president Chan Yuan-han, both failed to be re-elected, yet their exit
was not unexpected due to intra-camp politics. With the DP, DAB and
ADPL’s basically sympathetic stance, the new Legco now has a de facto
38-seat pro-grassroots socio-economic issues coalition with a centre-left
tilt on public policies.
Soon after the election, LSD chair Raymond Wong called for the for-
mation of a ‘Pan-Livelihood Alliance’ with three other democratic Legco
grassroots advocates (Lee Cheuk-yan, Leung Yiu-chung and Frederick
Fung) not affiliated to any major political parties (Ming Pao, 11 Septem-
ber 2008). As in the LP’s defeat and the dominance of rice bowl and
labour issues in most winning platforms, Donald Tsang’s 15 October
2008 Policy Speech has confirmed the new livelihood concerns (Ming
Pao, 16 September 2008).
Now unionists are pushing the minimum wage issue as a test case
to counter the HKSAR regime’s pro-business tilt. An earlier bill pro-
posed by Chan Yuan-han failed to pass in late 2004 due to the pro-
business and pro-middle-class legislators’ joint opposition. But the lack
of success of the Tsang regime’s voluntary ‘Wage Protection Movement’
(two years after its October 2006 debut, it was subscribed by only 1114
firms covering 30,000 cleaners and guards) led to Tsang’s October
2008 decision to legislate on a minimum wage (Ming Pao, 16 October
2008). The proposed minimum wage law will be universal in covering
all workers, and the question remains the appropriate minimum wage
standard. As a majority of legislators support this law, many in the
business circles are keen to keep the standard wage low (at HK$22 per
hour vs. the unionists’ HK$33). Tsang must balance the competing sec-
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toral claims, exchanging the law’s universal coverage (to satisfy orga-
nised labour) for a fairly low minimum wage (to appease business in-
terests). The enactment process might take more than a year into 2010
and in view of the global financial crisis’ impact, few can predict the
economic situation by then.12
HKSAR Labour Activism since 1997
The 1997-2008 record of strikes, labour disputes, mass protests and
electoral campaigns yields glimpses into the unfolding dynamics in
HKSAR labour activism.13 The great socio-economic urgency and over-
riding political concerns vis-a`-vis Beijing constituted the two major
forces reshaping Hong Kong labour politics in the early HKSAR years
(Ming Chan 2008). The once optimistic assumption of uninterrupted
growth was shattered soon after the 1997 handover as the HKSAR slid
into a prolonged recession with negative GDP growth, record unem-
ployment, and budget deficits that necessitated wage cuts. With a 60-
month deflation, business bankruptcies and negative equity for prop-
erty owners, economic recovery came painfully slow and late.14 Re-
bound began in 2004, and most economic indicators did not return to
the 1997 level until 2007.
This economic crisis deprived the local populace of their self-confi-
dence with any assurance of economic security, upward mobility and li-
velihood advancement. This new economic vulnerability was compli-
cated by the deepening economic dependency on mainland China. A
common fear among local workers is the rapid rise of other mainland
economic hubs that would marginalise Hong Kong’s functional super-
iority and its near-monopoly in China-global economic links. An eco-
nomically humbled HKSAR’s mainland dependency is clouded by
competition with other Chinese cities. Such darkened prospects were
also echoed by a widening wealth-poverty gap between the haves and
have-nots in Hong Kong society. As many middle-class elements were
reduced to negative-equity homeowners while the working class en-
dured wage cuts and unemployment, and the disadvantaged suffered
severe reductions in welfare benefits due to budget deficits. Yet, the top
economic echelon grew by leaps and bounds. This growing inequality
and the rapid debasement accelerated class tensions and social instabil-
ity.
The post-1997 workers’ marginalisation and middle-class proletarian-
isation were accelerated by large-scale deindustrialisation amid Hong
Kong’s economic restructuring that shifted the bulk of local productiv-
ity from labour-intensive manufacturing to higher-skill services. This
has created serious employment problems for the non-skilled la-
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bourers, many of them recent mainland immigrants, adding to an
alarming trend of an expanding aging population with an inadequately
skilled workforce. Many middle-aged, middle-class people face the pros-
pect of unemployment once they lose their jobs, and those who get
training do not get the proper positions due to job/retraining pro-
gramme mismatch. All these problems, when combined with the re-
gime’s ‘neo-liberalisation’ approach to privatise public facilities/com-
munity services, could mean limited regime capacity with less penetra-
tive governance. The myriad problems on the HKSAR social front due
to prolonged economic pains and regime incapacity yielded new space,
opportunity and need for expanded direct engagements by civil society
activists and other non-regime players in a rising tide of civic activism
through collective actions or political manoeuvres.
The rapid politicisation of the labour movement since the 1980s,
while lamented by scholars and unionists, has amplified the fragmen-
tation of Hong Kong’s labour scene along ideological divides in the
post-colonial era (Ng 1999; Ng & Ip 2000; FTU 1999: 36-39). Armed
with massive membership and buttressed by labour ‘stars’ electioneer-
ing appeal, the rival union networks have since the 1990s assumed the
political functions of the constituency organisation and electoral mobi-
lisation. The politicisation of organised labour and the intensification
of labour militancy over rice bowl issues have characterised the local la-
bour scene. While loyal to Beijing on political matters, leftist unionists
often return to their class line over socio-economic concerns. The
FTU’s promotion of labour welfare and its stance against tax hikes in
the 2004-2005 HKSAR deficit budgets reflected its awareness of the
grassroots’ concerns as a bona-fide local labour, instead of a Beijing-led
political organ. While the independent unions remain the democrats’
major grassroots electoral pillar, the TUC’s fadeout yields a more fluid
centre vs. left balance, as HKSAR politics evolve around new state-so-
ciety dynamics.
Amid the middle-class’s new political input, the local labour front is
still fragmented along a blue-grey vs. white collar divide and polarised
by the CTU vs. FTU demarcation, as each competes for support exter-
nally but also battles intra-camp allies over class identities and social
constituencies. The DAB-HKPA merger signalled a new middle-class
power organ at the expense of the DAB’s FTU grassroots links. The Ar-
ticle 45 Concern Group’s four Legco barristers became the Civic Party
in March 2006 with new recruits among academics and professionals.
This might signal a new middle-class power vs. grassroots concerns
within the democratic camp, but the 2008 Legco poll results refuted
such a simple dichotomy as the LSD’s gain confirmed livelihood con-
cerns tied to democracy and demands for regime accountability. The
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DP’s 2008 rebound validated its mixed middle/working-class appeals
with community service catering to voters’ needs.
The seemingly competing dynamics of political vs. socio-economic
unionism need to be rearticulated. In the post-2003 economy recovery,
HKSAR unionists have re-established socio-economic unionism as the
bedrock to advance workers’ interests through electoral/legislative man-
oeuvres, and the looming economic downturn by late 2008 (as October
unemployment rose to 3.5 per cent) could reinforce this trend. As such,
cross-party and inter-union collaboration on bread and butter issues
and social justice struggles is imperative for the entire labour front to
arrest grassroots marginalisation under the HKSAR plutocracy. Long-
term unemployment and dislocation stemming from economic restruc-
turing will ensure the emergence of emphasis on poverty and live-
lihood in policy debates, with an increasingly sharp class differential.
The revival of social unionism could pave the way for a democratic
camp and a pro-Beijing grassroots class coalition on livelihood con-
cerns transcending political divides. A stable democratic-patriotic camp
populist ‘rice bowl coalition’ would be of decisive significance as it
might command a Legco majority to reshape HKSAR legislative poli-
tics.
As the HKSAR polity evolves toward Beijing-promised universal
franchise by 2017-2020, labour input into party politics and election-
eering over labour issues will likely intensify. In a troubled economy
with a widening wealth-poverty gap, labour politics would reflect the
deepening of class cleavages in electoral politics. A fragmented labour
movement tied to a pluralistic political arena could be a natural out-
come for the ‘electoral politicisation of labour’ and ‘labourisation of leg-
islative politics’ twin processes in twenty-first century HKSAR. Local
politics might unfold along the twin axes of partisan divisions on politi-
cal matters and class interest coalition on socio-economic issues. The
troubled economic prospects ahead due to the US financial crisis and
global recession could re-ignite tensions and escalate conflicts on the
domestic front. These could yield space for a much needed strategic re-
positioning of the political parties in both camps to cast themselves as
effective advocates for middle-class and grassroots interests versus a
pro-business regime to gain momentum in future political maneuvers.
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10 Hong Kong’s Trade Unions as an Evolving
Social Organisation
and Their Prospects for the Future
Sek Hong Ng & Olivia Ip
Workers come together in trade unions largely for the purpose of act-
ing in concert to protect and advance their pay, job security and other
occupational interests in the workplace. Such an ‘industrial conscious-
ness’ about common job interests shared by the employees is hence of-
ten narrow in scope, being localised and economical and sectional in
nature. It is sustained by a shared perception of conflicting interests
vis-a`-vis the employer or management. However, trade unions often
also subscribe to a philosophy or spirit of association that is ideological
or quasi-ideological – betraying, characteristically, a vision of their so-
cial mission and yearning for the realisation of ‘working class’ solidar-
ity with other unions (Flanders 1969). As such, a labour movement
can be recognised, in addition to its industrial agenda of seeking better
payment and employment conditions directly from the employers, by
its political orientation and philosophy and, in turn, its participation in
political activities. In other words, it is not unusual for trade unions to
behave politically, in spite of their supposedly intrinsic character as the
employees’ representative organisations or agencies to defend and bet-
ter the latter’s occupational interests.
This chapter attempts to look at the changing posture of trade
unions in Hong Kong as this society went through a hectic pace of
transition during the last two and a half decades. During this period,
Hong Kong was ushered through a dualistic experience almost unique
and hardly paralleled by its counterparts in Eastern Asia. The first was
its ‘de-colonisation’ process, compressed within a horizon of a 13-year
span prescribed by the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1985, which
mandated the reversion of Hong Kong back to China in 1997. The sec-
ond were China’s landmark ‘post-socialist’ reforms to evolve into an
economy of ‘market socialism’, a process for which Hong Kong has
been both a conduit as well as a beneficiary.
As a sequel to the above experiences, there has been a considerable
amount of fluidity in Hong Kong’s society arising not only from the in-
creased mobility of labour and capital but also the creation of new in-
stitutions and re-structuring of existing ones. An example of these in-
stitutional changes is the trade union system. Organised labour had
been fading for almost three decades in post-war Hong Kong. How-
ever, the momentous impetus of the political transition before the
1997 ‘dateline’, plus the re-structuring of Hong Kong’s economy and
industry because of the new ‘paradigm’ created by China’s marketisa-
tion reforms have precipitated far-reaching changes in the structure,
power base, strategy and policies among Hong Kong’s labour unions
and their movement.
In this context, Hong Kong trade unions and labour organisations
are penetrating the neighbourhood community, outside the conven-
tional ‘industrial jurisdiction’ of these workers’ combinations. Such pro-
pensities are manifested in the electoral activities that are performed
with growing density by Hong Kong’s trade unions as de facto ‘labour
parties’ at the grassroots level in various districts and local commu-
nities.
Therefore, a thesis to canvass and explore here is the postulation that
Hong Kong’s organised labour is becoming a kind of ‘third sector orga-
nisation’. Such a notion has been adopted by writers like Giddens
(1998, 2000) to describe those emerging agencies and institutions, lo-
cated outside the public and private sectors, for social leverage against
deprivations of the under-privileged and excluded from the ‘main-
stream’ in modern societies.
The outline of the chapter is as follows: first, we will sketch the post-
war development of Hong Kong’s labour unions through the 1980s as
the background. Then we move on to a discussion of the developments
of the labour movement in the transition period towards the 1997 date-
line, highlighting the challenges and limitations faced. This is followed
by an exploration into the future prospects of Hong Kong’s trade un-
ions, drawing on the ‘Third Way’ theory put forward by Giddens
(1998, 2000).
Historical Background: A Longitudinal Profile of Post-War
Unionism in Hong Kong
In retrospect, it has been suggested that Hong Kong’s labour unions
have evolved largely from a background which fashioned their charac-
ter as, by and large, a pervasively ‘political’ movement of the working
class. Political and ideological aspirations of organised labour in Hong
Kong were essentially a ‘spill-over’ from the vanguard militancy of the
‘revolutionary’ worker-cum-student movement in pre-war China. La-
bour unions in Hong Kong owe to such a pre-war background their
historical image as collectivities enmeshed in Chinese politics. They
were concerned accordingly more with ideological rhetoric, fraternal
mutual benefits and acting as the quasi mass organs for the rival Na-
tionalist and Communist parties after their formal split as China’s gov-
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erning elite in 1926. The rupturing of the relationship between the left
and right wings of the Chinese labour movement followed, coinciding
with the collapse of the ‘landmark’ Hong Kong-Canton General Strike
and Boycott in the same year (Ng 1985: 419).
A Political Impasse of Ideological Split: 1950s to Mid-1970s
A pervasive theme of its ‘politicisation’ persisted within the Hong Kong
labour movement after the Second World War. In the wake of the re-
sumed civil war in mainland China and its liberation in 1949, the
Hong Kong union movement was politically divided into polarised
blocs between the pro-China and pro-Taiwan sectors. This dualism in
the labour movement consolidated when the two politically opposite
trade union centres, the left-wing Hong Kong Federation of Trade Un-
ions (FTU) – then known as the Hong Kong and Kowloon Federation
of Trade Unions – and the right-wing Hong Kong and Kowloon Trades
Union Council (TUC) were both created in the same ‘watershed’ year
of 1949. Ironically, both adversaries, the TUC and the FTU, all opted
to register as non-union ‘friendly societies’ under the Societies Ordi-
nance. They did not challenge the restrictive provision in the newly in-
troduced Trade Union Registration Ordinance of 1948 which, techni-
cally, prevented them from registration as official trade union centres.1
During the 1950s and 1960s, this vanguard labour movement re-
treated visibly to an industrially non-militant stance.2 Behaving more
as industrially based ‘friendly societies’ or craft-based fraternities, most
of these labour unions, as either FTU or TUC affiliates, ‘delivered the
much needed mutual aid benefits and other supplementary provisions
to their veteran members constantly threatened by the insecurities of
unemployment and low pay’ (Lethbridge & Ng 1995: 76).
Such a union strategy was probably rational during this period when
refugees flooded the Hong Kong labour market. Given the paucity of
social wages (like public housing, medical care, schooling and social se-
curity public assistance) available from a government of much less so-
phistication than today, many of the socially dislocated and margina-
lised refugee workers on causal hire in transient jobs had to look to pri-
vate associations, like the unions or clan associations and other
voluntary charity agencies, for income supplements, dormitories,
clinics, education classes and other welfare benefits.
Another feature of the labour movement in this period was the pro-
liferation of unions emerging along lines of politico-ideological clea-
vages. It was a commonplace picture of dualistic unionism, featuring
the FTU (and its affiliates) and its right-wing rival, the TUC (and its af-
filiates), in almost every one of the major industries, occupations and
trades which they organised. This polarisation occasionally extended to
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the workplace level as rival union branches in the large-scale enter-
prises like the transport, power and other public utility corporations.
Given such an impasse of inter-union contest for enlisting member-
ship and organisational influence along the ‘left-right’ political divide,
it was clear that the relative resourcefulness of these worker fraternities
became an integral aspect of their emulative and competitive strategy.
In this connection, the union’s mutual aid and benefit provisions were
instrumental in cementing the loyalty and ideological commitment of
the rank-and-file members. Hong Kong’s unions functioned, as consis-
tent with the model of socialist unionism which places priority upon
the party-labour movement link, like a transmission belt in fostering
the political organisation of the labouring mass (Lethbridge & Ng
1995: 76).
At the same time, Hong Kong as a labour-surplus economy was
striving to industrialise and restructure itself into a manufacturing
base from its pre-war entrepoˆt commercial background. Hong Kong
and its labour market were hardly conducive, at least in terms of a
working-class consciousness (a consciousness antagonistic to capital
and foreigners, as was conspicuous behind the militant waves of work-
ers’ solidarity of the 1920s), to the brewing of any recalcitrant labour
unrest and agitation. When the manual labour market was flooded
with refugees, these arrivals were understandably politically neurotic
and averted any overt expression of collective action against the author-
ity and employers.
When Hong Kong moved from the 1970s into the 1980s, the labour
movement was also purged of its initial ‘radical’ character inherited
from its pre-war activism in the 1920s. Politically obsessed with the left
wing-right wing rivalry, organised labour was emasculated as an indus-
trial combination and became an inarticulate veteran movement. Its
voice was hardly audible in public policy formulation, especially given
the FTU bloc’s boycott of participating in any officially appointed con-
sultative organs. The FTU’s policy of staying away from any member-
ship of government-sponsored boards and committees, touched off by
the 1967 civil upheavals, persisted doctrinally until the late 1970s. The
boycott was rescinded by the FTU following the ‘opening up’ of China
to the outside world. Symptomatic of an ageing and passivity syndrome
afflicting the labour movement, the level of unionisation subsided to a
historical ebb of less than 16 per cent of the salaried and waged labour
force in the territory in the mid-1980s (Lethbridge & Ng 1995: 78).
A ‘New Deal’ of De-politicisation: Mid-1970s to Mid-1980s
However, the politically dichotomised ‘mainstream’ labour movement
began to emerge from the doldrums of its industrial inactivity and fee-
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bleness of the 1970s by starting its creeping renewal process of re-
forms and modernisation. Reforms were ushered in when the move-
ment was afflicted increasingly by the unions’ internal problem of or-
ganisational stagnation (England & Rear 1975; Turner et al. 1981), as
well as the challenges stemming from a younger, more inquisitive and
better educated labour force – let alone the crystallisation of competi-
tion poised by an articulate fringe of non-union labour pressure groups
spearheaded by a Christian group, the Christian Industrial Committee.
Also compounding this arena of organised labour was the rise of an al-
ternative ‘white-collar’ union movement. The latter was based locally
upon the civil service and epitomised a non-political (or at least, politi-
cally neutral) image of concentrating its involvement in pay, pay differ-
entials, conditions of service and collective bargaining with the govern-
ment as a bureaucratic employer over sectional grade-specific interests.
At the same time, these labour unions were also eclipsed by the ‘usurp-
ing’ effects of a reformist programme of labour legislation pursued by
an increasingly technocratic civil administration which sought to de-
colonise its image and role, both local and externally. This coincided
with a period of enlightened governorship beginning with Sir Murray
Maclehose. He steered and ushered Hong Kong along the path of mod-
ernisation and industrial advancement into an affluent and civil society
which witnesses today, inter alia, the upgrading and safeguarding of
the working life standards of the labouring mass.
The modernisation of China since the early 1980s has also induced
and inspired these veteran unions to rescind gradually their former ob-
session with ideological rhetoric and embark, instead, upon a renewal
strategy to pragmatise and depoliticise their union programmes. These
union initiatives to innovate began to emerge around the mid-1970s
and to crystallise in the mid-1980s, and are documented briefly as fol-
lows.
As Service Organisations
Of benchmarking importance on the unions’ renewal agenda have
been their moves to modernise the provision of membership benefits,
recasting their nature from the supply of philanthropic wage supple-
ments to those which would appeal better to the average wage-earner
as both a privatised affluent consumer and a receptive young worker
yearning for after-work education and association activities. In this con-
nection, the FTU and its large affiliates, which were relatively resource-
ful in providing space within their premises, emerged as one of the
best known agencies organising the private equivalents to the univer-
sity fixtures of extra-mural educational activities. Concomitantly, many
of the bigger labour unions, whether affiliated to the FTU, TUC or ‘in-
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dependent’ bodies such as the civil service staff unions, have stepped
up their co-operative enterprises by providing their members with re-
tail outlets dealing in a variety of popular merchandise items at conces-
sionary prices, often extended to include catering and travel agency ser-
vices, and even credit card facilities. Other popular services/amenities
addressing membership’s leisure pastime activities covered, inter alia,
sponsoring recreational activities, sports and outings, as well as organ-
ising, as mentioned above, extra-mural programmes or a variety of
adult education and vocational skill training. In this connection, it has
been commonplace for the leading trade union centres to institute each
worker education centre as an annex to the union administrative
bureaucracy.
As Workers’ Representative Organ
The second measure widely adopted by the unions for attracting and
consolidating the membership has been their conspicuous assumption
of a more vocal spokesperson’s role in representing the occupational in-
terests of the workers whom they organise. At the micro level of the
enterprise or industry, there were a number of attempts by different
unions to regularise their dialogue with individual employers, corpo-
rate or otherwise, in establishing or re-establishing mutual links of
union recognition for collective bargaining (Turner, Fosh & Ng 1991:
82-84; Lethbridge & Ng 1995:86). This was paralleled by an ascending
propensity of the unions to intervene in employees’ trade disputes and
work stoppages – partly as a resource to support the workers in dispute
and partly in a conciliatory posture to reconcile their differences with
employers.
In addition, the labour unions have also become one of the most vo-
cal and audible pressure groups in society articulating the ‘grassroots’
interests of the labouring masses. Where pluralistic sectional interests
proliferate and prevail in Hong Kong, such a quasi ‘transmission-belt’
role would probably be strategic in a modern non-authoritarian society
in order to help a basically appointed colonial administration to keep
monitoring the pulse of the social beneficiaries’ (i.e. the grass-roots citi-
zens) expectations and needs in public policy formulation. Following
the uplift of its freeze on dialogue with the Hong Kong government in
the late 1970s, the FTU and its affiliates, as well as other unions out-
side the FTU ambit, became involved in an increasing number of gov-
ernment-appointed or officially sponsored consultative bodies – such as
the Labour Advisory Board, the Vocational Training Council, the Indus-
trial and Occupational Safety Council and, more recently, the Employee
Retraining Board. Besides acting in such a rudimentary ‘ministerial’
role, the modernised unions were less restrained in recourse to street-
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corner social actions in protest against alleged acts of social injustice.
Hence, by way of petitioning, public assembly, demonstration, or sta-
ging industrial actions, these unions have on various occasions pre-
sented a salient pressure on the government over controversial labour
policy decisions (such as on labour importation and other official ac-
tions of labour market intervention) and lobbied for favourable legisla-
tive motions in order to protect and advance the workers’ cause (Leth-
bridge & Ng 1995: 77).
Paradoxically, what has emerged from these unions’ policy readjust-
ments and organisational restructuring in the early and mid-1980s was
a syndrome of a dualistic process of ‘depoliticisation’ and ‘politicisation’
in the labour unions’ public posture and activities. Against the back-
ground shifts in the political economy of China, as well as the uncer-
tainties looming over Hong Kong’s future political status after 1997,
Hong Kong’s unions have visibly depoliticised since the mid-1980s by
engaging themselves less and less in ideological polemics over the
mainland-Taiwan tussle. However, they have in parallel become more
and more enmeshed in the internal public administration and domes-
tic politics of the territory. Compounding such a shifting terrain of
unions’ retreat-cum-advances in the political arena, a salient impetus
was given by the democratic reforms sponsored by the government
since the beginning of the 1980s – initiated partly to erect an institu-
tion of representative government and partly to position the territory
for its political transition towards 1997. ‘As a by-product of these elec-
toral reforms, trade unions were provided with an avenue and en-
hanced access to political power, being enshrined in the “estate of the
realm” when designated as members of one of the earliest functional
constituencies’ (Lethbridge & Ng 1995: 77). Unions in Hong Kong
were reshaped to assume a new mission which has persisted until to-
day.
Labour Unions as the Beneficiary of the Political Transition for
the 1997 Dateline
The electoral reforms sponsored by the government, while enhancing
the public image and political influence of organised labour, have un-
wittingly precipitated and provoked a second and renewed ‘wave’ of po-
litical contests and tussles, splitting again the labour movement and
emasculating its ‘solidarity’. This time, the movement drifted back to a
fragmented state of multi-unionism, now centred upon the polarised
stance between the veteran pro-China FTU, and the newly constituted,
yet popular, third trade union centre allied (yet void of a formal part-
nership) to the Democratic Party, the Hong Kong Confederation of
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Trade Unions (CTU). Conditioned by the political impasse in which
the territory was trapped before the handover and hastily encouraged
by the Hong Kong government in a ‘zealous’ endeavour to democratise
drastically the administrative and legislative institutions in Hong
Kong3, the local union movement seemed to have behaved in such a
staggering way as to waive increasingly its intrinsic ‘core’ character as
the representative body of organising and articulating workers’ indus-
trial interests. Instead, it now becomes trapped in the impasse of a
highly politicised tussle between the FTU and CTU, as these two union
centres, in this second ‘wave’ of politicisation, evolved into a pair of
embattled adversaries and contestants for i) political influence in the
legislature, and ii) leadership as the standard-bearer of the working-
class interests of the labouring masses.
Ironically, the contradiction arising from the escalation to a new ‘es-
tate of realm’ in the political domain of the labour unions, thanks to
their newly gained electoral-based popular power, has been the eclipse
of the labour movement as a bonafide industrial organisation represent-
ing the genuine occupational interests of the working class. ‘What
claims precedence on the union’s platform ceases to be the commit-
ment to “deliver the goods” wanted by their membership, but instead
becomes the question of how best to appeal to the votes…’ (Ng 1986:
284)
An analogy can be drawn, at least implicitly, between the British sit-
uation a century ago and the Hong Kong picture today. In the former
case, ‘an awareness of the incompatibility between industrial and politi-
cal goals helps to explain the decision of the British Trades Union Con-
gress to sponsor, around the turn of the century, the creation of a sepa-
rate Labour Party’ (Ng 1986: 285). Now in the Hong Kong context, it
has become apparent as well that many of these trade union politi-
cians, as novice members of the governing elite, are increasingly with-
drawn from the normal labour union affairs, which the thesis of ‘union
integration’ suggests, whether from the Marxist (Hyman 1971: 11-14) or
non-Marxist perspective (Galbraith 1972: Chapter 23 & 24).
The Tussle between Trade Union Centres: The Political Impasse of the 1950s
Re-created?
A corollary to the hastened elevation of these vanguard labour unions
and their leaders into the rank of Hong Kong’s new echelon of the gov-
erning ‘nouveau riche’ has been the stalemate sustained by the in-
creased hostilities between the FTU and its new adversary, the CTU.
The latter has been a purportedly ‘independent’ body yet appearing es-
sentially as a democratic, anti-China and, curiously, a quasi-socialist
(anti-capital) grassroots organisation of the labouring masses. On the
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periphery of these two contesting trade union centres in the labour
movement existed a pluralistic fringe of lesser union federal bodies like
i) the pro-Taiwan TUC, which has withdrawn from the political arena
largely because of its failure to find an effective role in the post-1997
environment, and ii) the (nominally) neutral union groupings such as
the Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions (FLU) and
the federal-like civil service general unions – the biggest of which is
the Chinese Civil Servants Association (the union with the largest
membership in Hong Kong). See Table 10.1. A number of key person-
alities in their leadership have successfully enshrined themselves as po-
litical activists, with a sizable cohort of them being co-opted into the es-
tablishment as elected members of the law-making Legislative Council.
On this contested terrain, both the FTU and the CTU have been evi-
dently, up to the present, the ‘core’ contenders for leadership and domi-
nation in the mainstream labour movement and the exercise of the
movement’s political influence on the governance of Hong Kong. The
CTU’s agenda is even more ambitious – not only to serve as the stan-
Table 10.1 Declared Membership of Major (Employee) Trade Union Centres in
Hong Kong, 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2006
Major trade
union centres
No. trade unions (%) Declared membership (%)
1997 2000 2003 2006 1997 2000 2003 2006
































































































Source: Annual Statistical Report, Registry of Trade Unions, Labour Department, Hong Kong
SAR Government, various issues.
Notes: (1) CTU, Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions; FLU, Federation of Hong Kong
and Kowloon Labour Unions; FTU, Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions; TUC, Hong
Kong and Kowloon Trades Union Council.
(2) According to the records of the Registry of Trade Unions, some employee unions were
affiliated to more than one trade union centre between the years of 1997-2006.
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dard bearer of the alternative movement to the FTU ‘orthodoxy’ but
also to usher upon the legislative infrastructure a number of hastily as-
sembled pro-labour legislative motions (like the 1997 law providing for
collective bargaining and consultation rights to trade unions at enter-
prises, which was later repealed by the newly incumbent SAR govern-
ment). These were parts of a professed endeavour by the CTU to erect
a ‘pro-active’ institutional system of ‘rule by law’ within Hong Kong.
Besides, the CTU has also been keen to nurture and consolidate a web
of international hedging with friendly overseas organisations in an at-
tempt apparently to pre-empt any possible threats of excessive interven-
tion and coercive control by the PRC on trade union freedom and
rights of association in Hong Kong after 1997.
Virtually, what has emerged from the CTU’s inflated political power
as a sequel to the heavy dosage of government-sponsored democratic
reforms before 1997 is a re-creation of the post-1949 syndrome of ideo-
logical confrontation and internal split within the Hong Kong labour
movement.4 This time it is the FTU and the CTU (in place of the
TUC) which have been openly and unyieldingly engaged in a mutually
emulative and ‘cut-throat’ campaign against each other in eliciting pop-
ular votes from the labouring grassroots in successive episodes of poli-
tical elections.
The implications are at least two-fold for the labour movement. First,
these two key union centres have never collaborated closely with each
other on any co-ordinated or harmonised programme of organised la-
bour’s activities but, instead, contested vigorously with each other on
parochial issues which would appear to appeal best to the voters’ nom-
inal industrial interests and preferences.5 A patent example has been
the controversy centred upon labour importation in the 1990s. Under-
standably, given its close association with the PRC, the FTU was locked
in an embarrassing situation over this issue during the early and mid-
1990s. It was confronted with the political imperative of having to
deny the admission of its mainland compatriots to work in Hong Kong
as migrant labour, due to the hostile local mood of the labouring
masses against the guest workers for depriving them of their job op-
portunities during a lean period of high unemployment. To censure la-
bour importation from the north was clearly a perturbing source of pol-
icy contradiction for the FTU. The dilemma helps explain the FTU’s
reluctant militancy and lukewarm opposition to such a measure of la-
bour market de-regulation at the beginning. Second, the two sides of
industry, the labour unions and the employers and their associations
have drifted into open hostilities on the debate of whether to continue
or limit and even halt the large-scale importation of guest workers
from the mainland and elsewhere. The rupturing of labour-manage-
ment dialogue in the mid-1990s at the central level of public policy
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consultation was apparently triggered off by this issue – trivial in nat-
ure given the relatively small size of the population of imported work-
ers involved (25,000 under the General Labour Importation Scheme).
The ‘divide’ between organised labour and management on this issue
became so wide on the eve of the 1997 handover that their mutual an-
tagonism seriously impeded the efficacy of the tripartite Labour Advi-
sory Board.
The emasculated Labour Advisory Board has been further weakened
by the usurping acts of a number of vanguard politicians elected to the
legislature under the trade unions’ sponsorship. Having now ascended
to the echelon of political representatives in the Legislative Council,
these trade union leaders-cum-Legislative Councillors zealously
guarded their newly acquired legislative prerogative against the low-key
yet workable mechanism of tripartite labour policy consultation and
formulation. Such tripartism has hitherto centred at the level of the La-
bour Advisory Board where compromise and consensus have been, as
a normative practice, jointly negotiated with prudence between repre-
sentatives of the two sides of industry. As a sequel, the tradition of a
steady labour legislation programme for bettering workers’ protection
and employment standards, established in the early 1970s under the
governorship of Maclehose, has been ruptured because of the aggran-
dising acts of the more ambitious, newly elected union representatives
in the Legislative Council. Anxious to push forward a well-intentional
yet ill-coordinated number of ‘progressive’ labour legislations, they
coerced a weak government to usher in, often in a premature and bi-
zarre fashion, a series of pro-labour private members’ bills to the Hong
Kong legislature in anticipation of the handover. And the Labour Advi-
sory Board was often by-passed for consultation. Such activism of these
‘democratic’ unions led to the glutting of the labour arena with a volu-
minous and fragmented mix of new and amended enactments and
alienated the bulk of the local small and medium-sized enterprises,
forcing them to canvass the option of cross-border relocation away
from Hong Kong. It appears that the proliferation of fragmented pieces
of new labour law has unwittingly added to the territory’s unemploy-
ment agony, by inflating production costs and inducing Hong Kong
factories to migrate to mainland China where costs were much lower.
Limitations of the Trade Unions as Industrial Organisations
In spite of their political ascendancy since the mid-1980s, there has
been lack of any noticeable advance of the unions in improving their
workplace status. Trade unions have remained feeble in penetrating
the workplace by any structured shop steward arrangements. And this
feebleness has been attested by the persisting failure of their workplace
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organisations to make any progress in negotiating for voluntary union
recognition for collective bargaining by the ‘lead’ private corporate em-
ployers (Turner, Fosh & Ng 1991:80-83, 100-102; Ng 1995: 214-215).
Concomitantly, sporadic incidents of union militancy have appeared
but invariably collapsed, as illustrated vividly by the ‘landmark’ indus-
trial episode which led to the disintegration of the famous air stewar-
dess strike waged against Cathay Pacific Airways in 1993. Union fee-
bleness to levy defensive industrial action was also echoed, about a
decade later, by other examples of organised labour’s collective acquies-
cence, as witnessed by the mass layoffs by Hong Kong Telecom (later
taken over by and re-titled as Pacific Century Cyberworks Ltd, PCCW)
and its subsequent ‘down-sizing’ exercises, later emulated in other
leading cases of corporate re-organisation in the public utility and
banking industries. These industrial crises notwithstanding, such
qualms about job security have not touched off any militant acts of
union protests and labour agitation.
De-industrialisation and Prospects for the Future
The industrial feebleness and docility of Hong Kong unions as docu-
mented earlier are explicable to a large extent by the de-industrialisa-
tion-cum-recommercialisation process which this society experienced
during the last two and half decades as it evolved as a post-industrial
economy.
De-industrialisation: this attrition process occurred due to the migra-
tion of factories away from Hong Kong in the 1990s. Paradoxically, this
took place because of mainland China’s industrial take-off. The PRC,
in its reform euphoria since the mid-1980s, has liberalised admission
of foreign and overseas investment, provided a lucrative outlet for
Hong Kong capital with an expanded market, a supply of capital, and
production goods. Hence it has afforded this city economy with a low-
cost ‘hinterland’ (of cheap land and labour) to which the latter’s manu-
facturing activities could be decanted and relocated. The migration en
masse of Hong Kong-based factories across the border, pushed away by
escalating production costs (of land and labour prices), led to a dra-
matic ‘withering away’ of Hong Kong’s manufacturing sector. De-
industrialisation has also drastically curtailed the size of Hong Kong’s
industrial employment, causing a sizable group of middle-aged and
redundant blue-collar workers to live away from their workplaces.
Concomitantly, Hong Kong has evolved to enshrine itself as a lead-
ing business and financial centre of East Asia. Vested with an efficient
infrastructural system of transportation, telecommunications, and
banking services, plus a stable government and convertible currency re-
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gime, Hong Kong has been recycled swiftly back to its commercial role
as an entrepoˆt, especially as the gateway to China. It used to serve for
China in this capacity before the Korean War embargo. Instead of con-
centrating on such traditional maritime industries as shipbuilding and
repairs, wharf and godown storage, and waterfront stevedoring as it did
before the war, Hong Kong has advanced and diversified its core ter-
tiary activities into new areas such as container port handling and
trucking, air cargo transport, banking and telecommunications.
The above economic processes have given rise to a two-fold implica-
tion which affected the development of trade unionism in Hong Kong.
First, there was a drain of the blue-collar veteran members from the
older and established trade unions as the size of the production work-
ers shrank rapidly because of de-industrialisation. Some unions, in par-
ticular those belonging to the FTU and CTU blocs, responded with an
enhanced endeavour to recruit white-collar union members from the
newer service occupations like those located within the finance and
banking sector. However, the industrial basis and the working class sol-
idarity of the entire labour movement were emasculated. Second, the
factories became less and less tenable as the workplace level for unions
to liaise with and organise their members, largely as a sequel to their
en masse migration northwards across the border to the mainland. In-
deed, the changing configuration of the labour market due to the
growth of atypical employment, flexi career, and foreign migrant labour
has made the workplace increasingly marginalised as the basis for the
trade unions to consolidate and cement their membership. In this con-
text, it appears that Hong Kong trade unions, in spite of their newly
discovered political status and influence in the domain of electoral poli-
tics, are exhausted increasingly in their industrial agendas as workers’
combinations are purged of an industrial basis because of the transient
nature of the workplace as a unit of work and employment for the la-
bouring mass.
The advents of the East Asian financial crisis and the recession after-
wards, ensued in 2003 by the epidemic and its depressant impact upon
the Hong Kong economy, have exposed the vulnerability of the labour-
ing mass and the incapacity of the trade unions. The latter were almost
helpless and resourceless as workers’ defensive organisations to shield
the Hong Kong employees at risk from the vicissitudes of capital and
predicaments of widespread job losses and dislocation, when a retreat-
ing economy became trapped in ‘doldrums’. Down-sizing, business clo-
sures, lay-offs and wage cuts, as well as the creeping growth of a re-
casualised labour market (largely due to part-time and short-term con-
tract hiring practised increasingly among employing organisations)
bred a new urban sub-class of the unemployed and low waged periph-
eral workers. However, lacking an infrastructure of collective bargain-
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ing deals with employers and their associations, Hong Kong trade
unions were overtly powerless and characteristically docile about these
‘offensives’ with the exception of sporadic industrial militancy in the re-
tail and aircraft engineering trades (Chan, Ng & Ho 2000: 88-91).
Ironically, such a union docility at workplace level organisation and
the relative absence of an entrenched collective bargaining tradition
among enterprises have bred an element of resilience actually enjoyed
by these Hong Kong labour unions. This is because of a strategic flex-
ibility they apparently possessed, inasmuch as they were able to avert
and by-pass the thorny task of having had to defend and amend the
legacy of what has always been viewed as the orthodox and sacrosanct
function of western-styled business unionism, which was a role as a
collective bargaining agent. Indeed, such a reformist agenda, as how to
rationalise and restructure activities of collective bargaining so as to re-
align these with the new ‘paradigm’ of a post-industrial economy and
its business, has beset incessantly the labour movements in the ‘First
World’ domain. And a focal point of this challenge has been the emas-
culation and decay of collective bargaining (partly due to its endemic ri-
gidities) and endeavours by organised labour to salvage and re-vitalise
such an eclipsed arrangement (Gindin 1998: 198-202). However, given
the global mood for ‘market fundamentalism’ and the state’s (and also
business’s) anxiety to de-regulate and rescind regulatory and restrictive
institutions like collective bargaining, the labour unions’ defence for
this type of industrial and workplace arrangement and practices has
proved to be cumbersome and costly (Wood 1998: 4-6, 11-15; Meiksins
1998: 32-38). Not only collective bargaining has been viewed as an ex-
pensive activity but also the free and new economy proponents articu-
late an entrenched suspicion against union bargaining as a totem of
workers’ power which negates the efficient operation of market forces
and resists the competent organisation and direction of the techno-
cratic managers (Sisson & Storey 2000: 12, 22-29; Moody 1998: 63-
64). The embattled and uncompromising contest between manage-
ment and labour (organised labour) is hence centred upon the adver-
sarial collective bargaining system, and by default, Hong Kong unions
may have, even unwittingly, enjoyed a strategic gain by not having
been caught in captivity for defending its continuance, because of its
relative absence.
Paradoxically, a feeble tradition of collective bargaining has made it
possible to advance a thesis that trade unions in Hong Kong have a
propensity to develop and evolve into ‘community unionism’ as a new
form of ‘third sector’ organisation. This is because of the pre-1997 poli-
tical reforms sponsored by the government which led to a process of
democratisation and growing mass participation in election activities.
The continuation of this process has been guaranteed by the Basic Law
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for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) after 1997
(Basic Law 1990; Ng 1998: 213-216). Trade unions in Hong Kong are
encouraged by the shifting political context of electoral advances to
evolve a strategic role of organising the grassroots neighbourhood com-
munity in support of and partnership with the formal political parties.
In addition, some trade unions in Hong Kong are equipped (as work-
ers’ self-organisations) to perform an ‘agency’ role of penetrating the
neighbourhood community for mutual assistance and insurance.
Besides, due to the changing labour market and the subsequent
growth of the self-employed, seasonal workers and part-time employees
and those employed in other forms of atypical employment arising
from the labour market flexibility ‘creed’ (i.e. a drift towards ‘re-casuali-
sation’), the workplace has retreated into an eclipsed position and be-
come less the ‘bastion’ for labour unions to enlist and organise their
membership. Instead, the unions are now paying equal attention to the
residential community for sustaining a dialogue and liaising with their
members. This ‘lay’ approach is also consistent with the legacy of
Hong Kong unions, which have never been strong at the workplace le-
vel. Also, given their feeble industrial strength, some ‘vanguard’ unions
and labour bodies now act as the spokesperson of workers across all
trades in the neighbourhood regarding employment, wages and labour
market issues. It appears that the labour grievances which some
unions articulate are even generic and not specific to employment af-
fairs, pertaining to housing, transport, general price level and cost of
living, pollution and the environment, as well as associated ecological
issues which can affect the wage-earners’ common well-being and posi-
tion either as employees or self-employed (Ng 1997b: 667-672). The
agenda for these unions is to cater to the ‘working life’ betterment of
the people, whether they are workplace or neighbourhood-based. They
also lobby extensively for official leverage against the industrial vicissi-
tudes of ‘post-modern urbanism’, in the capacity as labour’s pressure
groups belonging to the ‘third sector’ domain at a time when these
community service-providing agencies are expected to have a widened
scope in Hong Kong (Tung 2000: 33, 98). They campaign with vigour,
for instance, that the government should intervene, using appropriate
policy dosage like taxation reforms, improved social security and public
assistance provisions and minimum wage legislation to correct income
inequality and the increasingly sharp wealth differentials which polar-
ise the rich and poor, between those who ‘have and those who have
not’ in Hong Kong society.
Because of the above developments, a new type of unions’ activities
and of policy agenda for Hong Kong trade unions has emerged during
recent years. There exists a possibility for these Hong Kong labour un-
ions, or at least a number of them, to evolve a community-oriented role
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which suggests potentially a new mission for unions. Tentatively, the
following postulates are suggested that mirror these propensities as
Hong Kong’s unions are adapting their nature and functions to the im-
perative of ‘de-industrialisation’.
Postulate I
Trade unions in Hong Kong are relatively free from the constraint of
the collective bargaining institution and its bureaucratic implications.
This freedom enables them to explore a new role and function when
collective bargaining has become exhausted of its agenda and declined
globally in popularity. Ironically, such a flexibility is due to the relative
immaturity and under-development of collective bargaining activities in
Hong Kong.
Postulate II
Trade unions in Hong Kong are prompted and encouraged by the shift-
ing political context of electoral development and mass participation in
such processes to evolve a strategic role of organising the grassroots
neighbourhood community in support of and partnership with the po-
litical parties. This is reminiscent of the ‘transmission-belt’ function of
the socialist unions yet re-created in the milieu of an ecologically frag-
mented ‘post-industrial’ society.
Postulate III
Trade unions are equipped as the workers’ self organisation, to perform
an ‘agency’ role of penetrating the neighbouring community. Besides,
due to the growth of the self-employed, part-time employed and other
forms of atypical employment resulting from the labour market flex-
ibility ‘syndrome’, the workplace has retreated and become less the
‘nexus’ for labour unions to organise their membership (Ng & Poon
2004: 212). Instead, trade unions, as in the Hong Kong situation, are
paying equal attention, if not more, to the residential community for
sustaining a dialogue and liaising with their membership.
Postulate IV
There is a propensity for the trade unions facing the challenge of ‘de-
industrialisation’ to develop and evolve into ‘community’ unions as an
alternative form of unionisation. Instead of demarcating themselves
along industrial lines, the modern and post-modern unions can func-
tion as ‘local community’ unions by representing and acting as the
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spokesman of workers across all trades in the neighbourhood about
employment and wages and labour market conditions, alongside hous-
ing, transport, general price level and cost of living, pollution and
wage-earners’ common well-being and their stake as employees or the
self-employed. These occupational interests and expectations about
‘working life’ betterment can be oriented and directed both at employ-
ers as well as actors outside the workplace and employing organisa-
tions.
The above postulation about a potentiality of Hong Kong labour unions
to evolve a role in organising the neighbourhood community as a ‘third
sector’ organisation can probably be put in perspective against the
background of post-industrial urban development. Such a prospect
may suggest that the trade unions are becoming less workers’ combi-
nations and more a representative agency acting for and organising the
wage-earners and their associated interests.
We are suggesting in this chapter that some Hong Kong unions are
exploring an avenue of crystallising their membership base anchored
in the neighbourhood (and residential) community largely because of
growing difficulties these unions have experienced in organising the
workplace. It is hence essentially a response of organised labour to the
erosion and retreat of the employing and work unit as a fixed station
for unions’ recruitment and membership organisation.
The shop floor ‘nexus’, however, recedes as a result of the changing
character of work and employment, the most noticeable manifestation
of which is the rise of atypical employment in categories like those of
part-time and temporary hiring. These new forms of employment,
alongside the rise of self-employment in industries like transport, ste-
vedoring, hospitality and entertainment mean that the wage or fee
earner does not have an employer or lacks a fixed employer. In terms
of the conventional wisdom about the organisational strategy of labour
unions, these new employment groups are far less amenable to mem-
bership recruitment, an exercise which hence needs extending beyond
the ‘domain’ of the workplace. The latter retreats as an employing unit
for the individual and becomes less relevant than in the case of regular
employment for these casual atypical employees.
However, there are also endemic to the process of ‘post-modern’ ur-
banism a series of ‘dis-organisation’ and ‘fragmentation’ tendencies
which threaten to rupture a neighbourhood-based community. As ar-
gued by Giddens in his critique on the sociology of ‘post-industrial’
modernity, the urban and suburban people are periled increasingly by
the anomie and pathos of community disintegration and loss of iden-
tity and security. This is largely because the pattern of lifestyle in ‘late
modernity’ becomes heavily ‘commodified’ and ‘individualised’, betray-
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ing an element of ego anxiety about recognition as well as a creed for
privatisation and freedom of independent choices in the commercial-
ised marketplace. ‘Late urbanism’ hence cherished an ethos of ‘material
symbolism’ and ‘consumerism’ which could pervert more embedded
and intrinsic values of commitment and affiliation.
‘The consumption of ever-novel goods becomes in some part a
substitute of the genuine development of self … consumption
under the domination of mass markets is essentially a novel
phenomenon which participates directly in processes of the con-
tinuous reshaping of the conditions of day-to-day life.’ (Giddens
1991: 198-199)
The post-traditional and post-industrial neighbourhood communities
under the impact of ‘late modernity’ also lose their traditional, frater-
nity-based social equilibrium as they become ‘risk societies’ (Giddens
1991: 28). They are, first, beset by new risks as the basic dimension of
‘space’ (social and material distance) is compressed heavily by science
and technology. Second, the residential community becomes far less
competent, both ecologically and technically, to accommodate and
hedge against risks for its members because of institutions’ decay (spe-
cifically, a ‘de-institutionalisation’ process as a result of the decline of
the church, mutual aid fraternities, clan groupings and community
charity associations, etc.). Precisely because of these accentuated risk
propensities, while the urbanised individuals are more or less con-
stantly alert to ‘signals that relate here-and-now activities to spatially
distant persons or events of concern to them, and to projects of life-
planning’ (Giddens 1991: 128), the ‘post-modern’ neighbourhood com-
munity has evolved to attach a high and strategic premium on insur-
ance against collectivised risks which cannot be handled adequately by
the individual via the marketised agencies and devices alone.
As a new ‘risk society’, the post-industrial neighbourhood hence
poses an equally strong, if not more pervasive, demand for collective
agencies of community hedging and support than its traditional pre-in-
dustrial counterpart. These are hence the ‘providential reasons’ as pi-
voted around the assumption that ‘increased secular understanding of
the nature of things leads to a safer and more rewarding existence for
human beings’ (Giddens 1991: 28). A role for such a nature was per-
formed by the occupational fraternity as a nexus of a community dur-
ing the period of basic craft production. Later, in the heydays of the fac-
tory system, the social work voluntary organisations also excelled as
key agencies of community integration and stabilisation. However, as
the domain of work and the institution of the workplace change in
their nature and decline in relevance to the working (and labouring) in-
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dividuals in an era of ‘late modernity’, which fragmentises waged em-
ployment and blurs the traditional divide between the work and non-
work existence of the individual, these conventional agencies of com-
munity integration are emasculated and no longer adequate socially.
And in this post-modern context new agencies are required. An exam-
ple prospective is hence a community-oriented labour body which can
act as a ‘third sector’ socio-industrial agency to cater to those having
entered or about to enter the waged labour market and even retired
persons.
Giddens in his ‘Third Way’ thesis makes an explicit claim on ‘third
way’ politics to address a new paradigm of these ‘post-modern’ risks
(Giddens 1998, Chapter 2; Giddens 2000: 2), for which the ‘third sec-
tor’ organisations are to perform a key role of community leverage and
standardisation.6 These activities therefore occur outside the domains
of the government sector and private businesses, and distinguish these
para-institutional agencies as the ‘third sector’ organisations. In the
context of ‘late urbanism’ (post-modernity), the imperatives of provid-
ing for opportunity, stimulus of innovations and hedges of security are
paralleled by the challenges of the new risks, shifting ecology and en-
vironment, and the quest for individual autonomy.
These risks are also ascertainable in the instance of Hong Kong as a
post-industrial urban society. In particular, the political transition of
Hong Kong, the industrial drama of China’s modernisation reforms,
and the East Asian financial crisis and post-crisis recession, combined
together to precipitate a series of social and industrial issues which its
government and people have to face in the new decade. Many of these
problems are associated with the labour market interests, work and
employment of the urban population, especially among those at the
periphery of the labour economy. Examples of these current industrial
issues are the insecurity of part-time and flexi employment, staggering
unemployment levels, low wages and long hours, business consolida-
tion and personnel down-sizing, involuntary self-employment and re-
tirement, and perils of foreign workers importation, de-skilling and
problematic retraining, and a stampede for expensive adult education
in search for competency enhancement and credential layering. These
issues of the post-industrial labouring people are probably a global syn-
drome and not specific to Hong Kong. There has been an embryonic
awareness among the refractory mass of the working class around the
world about protecting their interests at the grassroots level and regu-
lating the ‘world labour market’ as a mission of the trade unions or
other social agencies purporting to represent the workers and their in-
terests (Moody 1997: 282-292). However, these challenges apparently
constitute a new risk syndrome also for Hong Kong as a post-industrial
society, which will pose a pressing case for an agenda of effective action
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to the government and organised labour. To perform such a role, la-
bour unions can be destined to act as a potentially ‘third sector’ agency.
Conclusion
We are postulating that the post-industrial society of late urbanism is
confronted with a new constellation of industrial and labour market
risks, which are pervasive for the individuals and the community to
which they belong. However, these problems can no longer be compe-
tently handled by the state, the welfare agencies and private businesses.
Neither are they crystallised entirely at the workplace level, largely be-
cause of the transient nature of the workplace as a unit of work and
employment. We suggest a potential propensity for Hong Kong trade
unions to restructure themselves as community unions in response to
these industrial challenges. As an echo to Giddens’ ‘Third Way’ thesis,
we also postulate that the future unions exploring and assuming such
a community role can be resourceful as a revitalised industrial agency
located within the ‘third sector’, outside the state and private business
sectors, as well as outside the conventional ambit and territory of any
specific trades, industries or occupations.
There were, of course, problems arising from these attempts to cre-
ate (and re-create) a union-focused community outside the occupation.
An occupation-based worker community has been popularised in the
western literature (on industrial sociology and industrial relations) dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s as a bastion of worker solidarity, especially
among the craft trades. However, this type of craft community is indus-
try or trade specific and is solidaristic largely because of its parochial
narrowness and boundary distinction vis-a`-vis other occupations. But if
unionisation were to be based upon the organisation of the neighbour-
hood community as envisaged under the present ‘new unionism’ mod-
el, the analogy could be at best partial. This is because the union base
actually becomes fragmented into ‘enclaves’ and local pockets of em-
ployee associations whose membership could belong to a diversity of
industries. A common occupational interest would hence be less ten-
able as the denominator to sustain a solidaristic identity for mutual as-
sociation among members due to i) the drift of a new regionalism
which could overshadow the workplace; and ii) industrial diversity of
those making up the ‘constituency’. For this reason, what can be envi-
saged at present are probably the ‘seed’ potentials of a fraction of the
labour movement in Hong Kong evolving a role and activities which
suggest the thesis of a community union as a third sector agency. How-
ever, it is still premature to postulate in any deterministic manner the
relative pervasiveness of this form of new community unionism. As it
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appears, it is still embryonic and visible in a teething stage. It may take
more years for it to crystallise into a shape which may eclipse the
‘mainstream’ union tradition as an alternative in the ‘post-industrial’
age.
For this reason, it may be hazardous to suggest that the Hong Kong
experiences with community unionism would pose a model which can
be emulated elsewhere in other post-industrial economies facing simi-
lar economic re-structuring dramas of ‘de-industrialisation’. However,
the Hong Kong case does point to the imperative of late urban indus-
trialism as a potent force inducing trade unions to change and re-posi-
tion themselves as the social agency organising the labouring mass. A
possible route of re-configuring the trade union and (re)writing its mis-
sion and agenda is, as canvassed in this chapter, for it to evolve into a
‘third sector’ organisation. Such a ‘third sector’ trade union will be
more effective in penetrating and organising the new hybrid ‘working
class’ today which are either wage-earners in employment or self-em-
ployed recipients taking a fee from their ‘principals’. They are located
in the neighbourhood community and are diversified in terms of their
work life interests, occupations and industries, as the workplace is gra-
dually retreating as the ‘nexus’ of labour market participation. They
tend to harbour a plurality of industrial as well as non-industrial expec-
tations in search for a better quality of urban life. And a ‘third sector’
community union may need to learn to equip itself with the appropri-
ate competencies in order to cater to these grassroots needs and expec-
tations in an effective way – perhaps by evolving or allying itself with a
‘new’ labouring party in a post-industrial society.
Notes
1 Such an anachronistic clause, inherited from the pre-war legislative regime to contain
local unions’ excessive political activism and only rescinded recently by the post-1997
SAR government, has been prohibiting labour unions from combining into union
federations, save where these federal mergers were limited within a single industry,
occupation or trade. However, this limitation was liberalised and rescinded by the
SAR government a year after it came to power.
2 This was in sharp departure from the earlier and widespread militancy betrayed in
organised labour’s agitation directed against the post-war British administration and
its private capital allies in the public utilities and commercial sectors controlled by
the British hongs, i.e. ‘trading houses’, during the rehabilitation years after the Sec-
ond World War. See Ng 1997a: 54-55.
3 This zeal has been widely interpreted as a pre-emptive strategy by the pre-1997 gov-
ernment to conserve Hong Kong’s status quo in preparation for the political change-
over of sovereignty.
4 These reforms have nurtured and extended, in the 1995 election, the system of politi-
cal balloting by direct electoral voting to such an extent that it antagonised China
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which, in turn, castigated these ‘premature’ electoral advances as a devious ploy by
the British administration to attempt perpetuating its post-1997 influence in Hong
Kong.
5 The most patent illustration of such a polarity was probably the separate and compe-
titive adoption of an almost identical yet overtly protectionist stance against the main-
land guest workers by both the CTU and FTU.
6 The ‘third sector’ organisations are those non-governmental agencies (NGO) and sec-
ondary associations outside the public and private business domains which perform
a role of service providers within the post-industrial societies. They are especially
viewed as the key institution for social leverage against deprivations and crisis for the
underprivileged in modern and post-modern societies. See, for example, Giddens
1998.
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11 Non-governmental Feminist Activism in
The People’s Republic of China:
Communicating Oppositional Gender
Equality Knowledge1
Cecilia Milwertz & Wei Bu
Can a new wave of the women’s movement be identified among the
emerging social movements in contemporary China? According to the
historian Wang Zheng (1998) not only does a new women’s movement
indeed exist in reform period China, but this movement is also nation-
wide in scope, is launched by women themselves, and is ‘one of the
most significant things happening in contemporary China’. A women’s
movement constitutes ‘the conscious collective activities of women
[and men] fighting for feminist goals’ (Dahlerup 1986), while femin-
ism can be defined as ‘... the critical examination of gender relations
from the position of protest against women’s unequal status’ (di Leo-
nardo & Lancaster 1997). The current wave of the women’s movement
in the PRC began in the 1980s. It was then greatly nourished by the
United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women being held in
Beijing in 1995. Major actors in the movement include the All China
Women’s Federation system, academic women’s and gender studies
scholars, professional women’s organisations, various forms of non-
governmental organising and religious organising (Jaschok, Milwertz
& Hsiung 2001). Each of these groups is engaged in promoting gender
justice and challenging the dominant, unequal gender order by advanc-
ing changes in knowledge, attitudes, practices, policies and legislation
concerning gender equality issues. In this chapter we are concerned
with one of these groups within the women’s movement: non-govern-
mental or popular (minjian) feminist organisations. These are organisa-
tions that have been set up since the late 1980s by activists at their
own initiative and whose activities are determined largely by activists,
regardless of any formal affiliation/registration they may have with
party-state institutions (Milwertz 2002).
Popular organising started out in Beijing, as well as elsewhere in
China, as a reaction to the increasing discrimination against women
that was resulting from economic reforms. It then evolved to provide a
variety of interpretations of and activism against an increasingly broad
range of gender inequalities. Activists began to organise spontaneously
to support vulnerable social groups, to create social change and to chal-
lenge gender-based inequalities in society (Du 2004; Howell 2004; Liu
2004; Milwertz 2002; Wesoky 2002). Such organisations do not have
political change as their motive, and they do not contest for state
power. They are, however, as Howell (2003) has argued, important oc-
cupiers of non-governmental space and components of a public sphere
within which they create critical reflection around gender issues.
One of the defining features of the current wave of organising is the
reinterpretation of taken-for-granted cultural assumptions about the
dominant gender order through the ‘cognitive praxis’ (Eyerman & Jami-
son 1991, 1998) of social movement organising. The creation, and also
the dissemination, of new knowledge about gender equality issues take
place at several interconnected sites of interaction and communication.
These include: 1) communication within the movement, 2) interfaces
between the movement and the global women’s movement, 3) interac-
tion between the movement and society - the general public and autho-
rities. Elsewhere we have built upon the work of Lave (1993), Lave &
Wenger (1991) and Lather (1991) to show how new knowledge about
gender relations (specifically related to the issue of domestic violence)
has been generated by activists in a situated learning process and with-
in a community of practice (Milwertz & Bu 2007). Following Assiter
(1996), we have argued that activists in popular organising have joined
a global emancipatory epistemic community that considers women’s
rights to be human rights. Our focus in this chapter is on the third
point of communication mentioned above. We are concerned with the
ways in which popular feminist organisations in Beijing extend the
emancipatory epistemic community they have joined by communicat-
ing alternative gender equality agendas to policymakers, authorities
and the Chinese population in general. The question we address is:
How is oppositional gender knowledge disseminated in a context in
which the media are tightly controlled by the party-state.2 With the
term oppositional we refer to knowledge (and practices) that seek to
challenge the legitimacy of the dominant gender order and break its
hold over social life. In other words, we are concerned with how acti-
vists bring about meaningful social change. Our focus is on two exam-
ples of the various modes of communication by which activists dissem-
inate gender equality knowledge about violence towards women, parti-
cularly domestic violence.3 The two examples are of two forms of
drama – the first is an instance of political theatre in which activists
aim to influence policymakers, while the second concerns the use of
documentary drama to reach out to and include the population in gen-
eral in the movement.
The promotion of gender equality is one of the Communist Party
and People’s Republic of China state’s central policies. A large number
of studies have analysed cultural and socio-political aspects of gender
issues in China, as well as the advances that have been made in elimi-
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nating discriminatory practices and securing women’s rights but also
the vast inequalities that persist.4 The issue of men’s rape of women is
one example of the ongoing struggle for women’s rights and the elimi-
nation of violence against women.5 As we will shortly be moving on to
the use of various forms of drama, performance and education as
modes of communication, we illustrate the long-term struggle for
change concerning this particular issue by juxtaposing an old song
‘The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention’
(translated in Perris 1983) to a recent regulation passed by the Ministry
of Education. The song has been sung since the 1930s by soldiers in
China, and it is familiar to anyone who experienced the Cultural Revo-
lution. The seventh point in the song, which provides guidelines for
proper behaviour, prohibits rape. Statistics on rape are far from accu-
rate in China. Rape is considered extremely shameful and is stigmatis-
ing for the victim and the victim’s family as reflected in the recent case
of Huang Jing, in which the women’s movement was intensely in-
volved (Ai & Hu 2005). Despite the lack of precise numbers, in 2003
the reporting of numerous incidents of rape of girl students by male
teachers led the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Security
and Administration of Justice to recognise this as a serious problem
that should be addressed by legal means (Jiaoyubu, Gonganbu & Sifa-
bu 2003). Thus, as in the case of many other gender-related matters,
an issue that has been addressed for many years is as yet unresolved.
However, as this example illustrates in the new context of the reform
period, the problem is being addressed in new ways by both the wo-
men’s movement and the state.
This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part we de-
scribe the emergence and development of popular feminist organising
in Beijing since the mid-1980s as one element of a new reform period
wave of the Chinese women’s movement, and we discuss the relation-
ship between such organising and the state. In the second part we dis-
cuss the use of mainstream and alternative media in a politically re-
strictive context, focusing on two aspects of communication processes.
First, we examine how the communication of oppositional gender
equality knowledge is legitimised and how activists experiment within
the bounds of acceptable modes of communication that are also effec-
tive in reaching their goals. Second, we look at how the use of alterna-
tive media enables the democratisation of the social movement knowl-
edge creation process. Popular organising in many ways imitates party-
state modes of communication that use the mass media, street coun-
selling, political theatre and documentary drama. We argue that when
activists use radical and alternative media for public consciousness-rais-
ing, this may democratise the communication process. Activists use
this realm to communicate their ideas to a targeted audience and ulti-
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mately engage that audience in the knowledge production processes
that lie at the core of the movement. We argue that the success of acti-
vists’ endeavour to transform society may lie in these kinds of partici-
patory processes, which may then lead to the widespread generation of
emancipatory knowledge that challenges the dominant, inequitable
gender order.
Popular Feminist Organising in Beijing: One Element of a New
Wave of the Chinese Women’s Movement6
This chapter is based on a study conducted from 2000 to 2002 of pop-
ular feminist organising in Beijing in the 1990s and early 2000s. We
identified 27 popular feminist organisations, groups, networks and wo-
men’s studies centres established in Beijing between the late 1980s
and the late 1990s. Our data are from several sources. First, we con-
ducted interviews with the founders/directors of 22 Beijing organisa-
tions, groups, networks and women’s studies centres. Second, we car-
ried out questionnaire interviews with 180 activists about their activism
within these organisations, and, third, we made use of case studies of
six organisations engaged in addressing domestic violence. Five of
these organisations were addressing domestic violence in the 1990s,
these were the Women’s Research Institute/Maple Women’s Psycholo-
gical Counselling Centre, The Women’s Media Watch Network, The Le-
gal Advice Service Centre, The Centre for Women’s Law Studies and
Legal Services, and Rural Women magazine. One organisation, the Do-
mestic Violence Network, was established in 2000 and was based upon
experiences gathered through activism carried out during the 1990s.
We interviewed core activists in each of these six organisations. Our
study of the Domestic Violence Network is ongoing. Data on the invol-
vement of the organisation in the staging of the play The Vagina Mono-
logues has been collected by Bu Wei, who is also involved in these activ-
ities as an activist responsible for the network website.7
It is difficult to say exactly how many people are involved in popular
organising. Based on the numbers provided by each of the 22 organisa-
tions in our study a total of 717 activists had been active in these orga-
nisations up to the year 2000. Of the 717, 482 were reported as cur-
rently active in 2000. This is a very approximate number as the organi-
sations were not able to provide exact numbers. The 180 activists we
interviewed were active in an average of three organisations. If we as-
sume that the 482 activists reported as currently active were also active
in an average of three organisations, then the total number of activists
would be 160 – a number very close to the number of activists we were
able to include in our study. However, since we are aware that we were
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unable to include all activists, it is likely that the numbers are under-re-
ported. It seems that there were in fact approximately 500 active acti-
vists in 2000, as reported by the organisations. This number must
then be broken down into those activists working at the core of orga-
nising and others who have looser links. The Domestic Violence Net-
work, for example, reported 200 activists, of which the majority were
employees of the Women’s Federation, a hospital and local community
administrators engaged in Network projects. The 180 activists included
in our survey are mainly female (93 percent), middle-aged (average age
41 years) and well-educated (98 percent have studied up to or beyond
college level). Half of these people are members of the Communist
Party, and about one-fifth consists of members of the Youth League or
the Democratic Parties. In terms of their jobs, the majority (72 percent)
are employed as university teachers or journalists, or else they are uni-
versity students. Some 9.2 percent hold jobs as cadres in the govern-
ment administration or at government institutions (Bu & Mi 2005).
How do these activists and their organisations relate to the state? On
account of the complexity of the state, which is not uniform in its prac-
tices, projects or effects (Yuval-Davis 1997), most women’s movements
in the world apply a dual strategy of working both with and against the
state (Basu 1995, cited in Desai 2002). In the controlled political con-
text of China, working directly against the state would be equal to elim-
inating possibilities for future activities. On the one hand, the patriar-
chal state endorses and maintains unequal gender relations through its
economic policies and overall strategic planning. As Desai (2002, refer-
ring to Borchorst 1999 on feminist theory of the state) has shown in
the case of India, women’s movement activists contest the way the state
perpetuates women’s subordination by defining them primarily as
wives and mothers, even when they participate in the paid workforce,
and despite legislation that defines women as equal citizens. A recent
obvious example in China concerned the Women’s Federation slogan
‘Today’s girls – tomorrow’s mothers’, used to promote education for
girls by emphasising the benefit to society in terms of their later contri-
bution as mothers. The slogan was changed to ‘Today’s girls – tomor-
row’s women’, following contestation by activists from popular organis-
ing. On the other hand, activists recognise the necessity to work with
the Women’s Federation and the party-state in general to effectuate
changes in policies and legislation.
In the early years of popular feminist organising, various forms of
interaction with party-state institutions were employed as strategies for
survival and legitimisation and to gain recognition by the state. The
story of the Women’s Research Institute/Maple Women’s Psychological
Counselling Centre, related by its founder Wang Xingjuan (2000),
gives a good impression of the difficulties encountered. Since then, the
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interaction between popular organisations and party-state institutions,
including the Women’s Federation system, has been developed into
more genuine forms of collaboration. Popular feminist organisations
do not possess institutionalised power in the sense that there are no es-
tablished formal political channels through which they can work. In
this situation collaboration with party-state institutions is of the utmost
importance for their policy-focused activities to have an effect. In order
to submit reports and law proposals to authorities, popular feminist or-
ganisations work through formal political channels via their contacts
with individuals within party-state institutions. Moreover, they reach
out to the population in general via the administrative structures of
party-state institutions and the Women’s Federation system. The fact
that the Women’s Federation is undergoing major changes is also em-
phasised by activists as being a significant reason that collaboration is
becoming increasingly possible. Such is the pragmatic side of organis-
ing. Importantly, collaboration between activists and the state is also
based on the activists’ ideological sense of sharing with the party-state
a responsibility for the well-being of their society.
Dahlerup’s (1986) definition of women’s movements (mentioned at
the beginning of this chapter) provides a useful framework for under-
standing the contemporary Chinese women’s movement and its fluid
links between activists, activities and organisations situated within and
outside the formal structures of the All China Women’s Federation sys-
tem and other party-state institutions. Popular organisations are part of
a movement that is driven by many different types of organisations,
groups and followers – by what Suzanne Staggenborg (1995) has de-
fined as ‘a social movement community’. Moreover, Dahlerup (1986)
stresses the importance of movement activities rather than structures
of organisations. In the Chinese case this implies shifting the focus
away from the issue of state control. Almost all popular organisations
are in some way affiliated and registered with party-state institutions,
but focusing on this may complicate rather than promote understand-
ing of the role of these organisations in effectuating changes in gender
relations.8 Additionally, activists share their commitment to a common
cause. What binds the activists, their organisations and their activities
together to constitute the current wave of the Chinese women’s move-
ment is the combination of presenting a collective challenge to existing
practices and of sharing a collective commitment to emancipatory
change. If we focus upon the shared ideology and goals of the women’s
organisations rather than on their various structures, or on the opposi-
tion between new forms of organising and the party-state, the women’s
movement may be seen to both protest against the party/state and its
policies and also cooperation with it in addressing practices such as do-
mestic violence. There has been a shift in China from a single, party-
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state initiated women’s organisation to the growth of many women’s or-
ganisations. The way in which these new organisations are dependent
upon, co-opted by or resist the state needs to be considered. However,
new forms of organising, elements of the All China Women’s Federa-
tion and other party-state institutions are also joined together in a new
wave of the women’s movement. The activists’ attitude towards colla-
boration with party-state institutions is a combination of strategic prag-
matism on their part, and the fact that party-state representatives and
activists share many social movement objectives. The founder and core
activist of one popular organisation described the collaboration of her
organisation with the government as follows:
We have the same goals as the government. However, identical
goals do not mean that we have identical analyses, methods and
perspectives related to the issue of domestic violence. These dif-
ferences do not mean that the government is our enemy. They
are our comrades in arms. We and the government are together
in one trench. This means that we have a united front. The CCP
emphasises a united front. In our (…) work we should also apply
the united front strategy. (Interview September 2002)
The waves of women’s movements, again following Dahlerup (2000),
consist first of the establishment of many new feminist organisations
and groups, second, of extensive debate within and outside of the
movement, and, third, of the movement making an impact upon legis-
lation and the discourse on women and gender. A new wave is emerg-
ing within a movement that oscillates between periods of greater and
lesser intensity of mobilisation. If it is successful, the movement will
contribute to changing the norms and values in society, and this may
be taking place as activists succeed in enhancing public awareness.
The new wave has been formed by co-organising across institutions,
and includes active participants and supporters from within party-state
institutions. Thus, the rise of popular feminist organising in Beijing is
one aspect of the development of a new phase of the Chinese women’s
movement. This phase is neither limited to the activities of non-gov-
ernmental feminist organising, nor is it confined to the capital.
Legitimising and Democratising Communication of Oppositional
Gender Knowledge
As in other parts of the world, activists are dependent on the media to
transmit their messages to the general public and authorities. Most
Beijing organisations have cooperated with the ACWF newspaper Chi-
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na Women’s News, and all the organisations that aim to influence both
the public and the policymakers collaborate in various ways with the
mainstream mass media. Since the late 1990s, additional modes of
communicating information on gender justice have been adopted. In
terms of communication technology these range from the extremes of
internet websites to traditional drama performances written and staged
locally by rural citizens. In the following we describe and discuss two
examples of such modes of communication. The first, a planned street
demonstration that turned into a public meeting, tested the limits of
acceptable action. The other, based on the staging of a play, has devel-
oped into democratised communication processes that seem to be
spreading.
Political Theatre: A Demonstration That Became a Public Meeting
Social movements in many other parts of the world generally use var-
ious forms of protest – demonstrations, strikes, marches, boycotts and
occupations – to focus attention on their issues. In China, however,
even though the authorities are no longer unaccustomed to organising
from below, outright protest actions in the name of registered organisa-
tions are more or less impossible. A different style of action has there-
fore been adopted by popular feminist organisations to manoeuvre
within this political climate. In contrast to the many street demonstra-
tions staged by as diverse interest groups as peasants, workers and new
urban homeowners, we know of only one attempt by popular feminist
organisations in Beijing to stage a street demonstration.9 In 1998
members of the Media Watch Network became aware of the atrocities
taking place against ethnic Chinese women in Indonesia through infor-
mation provided to them by a member who was abroad and also
through the Internet.10 In contrast to the attention being given to the
matter in other places, the Chinese government and media were silent
on the issue. The fact that nobody in China seemed concerned about
what was happening made a great impression on the activists. In order
to protest against the events, activists from the Media Watch Network
decided to stage a demonstration outside the Indonesian embassy in
Beijing, and a request for permission to hold a demonstration was sub-
mitted to the relevant authorities. Activists were well aware of the con-
troversial nature of their request. One of the main organisers of the de-
monstration was a Party member, so in order to avoid repercussions
against her, it was decided that only the non-Party members should
sign the application. Unsurprisingly, permission to hold the demon-
stration was not granted. This, however, did not discourage activists
from their determination to demonstrate both their solidarity with eth-
nic Chinese women in Indonesia and their opposition to violence to-
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wards women in general. An explicit aim in pushing the case was to
shift the boundaries for acceptable non-governmental political action
and enlarge the space available for the expression of alternative dis-
courses. This is an objective that is rarely voiced by activists. One of
the organisers explained:
I realised that there was no hope. But I thought that that atti-
tude – even if this is Chinese society – believing that we cannot
do things and then not trying, means we will never be able to
do things. For example, when we wanted to establish the Media
Watch Network we had to put in a lot of effort. We did a tremen-
dous amount of work before it became possible – including con-
vincing our leaders. Otherwise, we would never have been able
to set up the network. So I thought, OK, they don’t accept that
we hold this [demonstration], but perhaps there will come a
time when everyone will be doing this sort of thing. Slowly, this
kind of citizen human rights mentality will evolve (…). Slowly a
momentum will build up. (Interview Media Watch 2000, tran-
script 43.3)
Holding onto their ambition to expand the space available for expres-
sions of protest, activists proceeded with alternative plans to hold a
public meeting at the China Women’s News offices where the Media
Watch Network held its monthly meetings. The day before the meeting
the chief editor of the newspaper was called upon by the All China Wo-
men’s Federation. The Federation had been informed that the newspa-
per had applied to hold a demonstration and that a meeting was to be
held, and the chief editor was requested to call off the meeting. Media
Watch activists reacted by explaining that the meeting was not a news-
paper activity. On the contrary, it was a ‘popular (minjian) NGO activ-
ity’. Moreover, Media Watch activists emphasised that they had no in-
tention whatsoever of making trouble for the newspaper, and they sug-
gested moving the meeting to the more neutral grounds of a hotel.
The Federation responded that if the newspaper was not involved then
there were no grounds for intervention on their part.
Information about the meeting was spread via women’s movement
organisations and gender studies centres, where students were asked
to further spread the message. About seventy people, including women
and gender studies scholars, women’s movement activists and also stu-
dents, who were not necessarily active movement participants, joined
the meeting. Everyone was given a yellow ribbon to wear because the
organisers had read on the internet about a yellow ribbon campaign or-
ganised by overseas Chinese to support ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.
The speakers included Professor Wu Qing, a women’s movement acti-
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vist, who was then an elected member of both the Haidian District Peo-
ple’s Congress in Bejing Municipality and the Beijing Municipality
People’s Congress; Chen Mingxia, Professor of Law at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences who is involved in drafting laws related to
gender equality and the first coordinator of the Domestic Violence Net-
work; the well-known author Zhang Kangkang; Liao Xiaoyi, the initia-
tor of Global Village, an environmental NGO; women’s movement acti-
vist Ge Youli and the Head of the China Central Television programme
Half the Sky, Zhao Shujing. In her speech Zhao Shujing emphasised
that the television programme had been established as a result of the
1995 Women’s Conference being held in Beijing, and that this meant
the programme was duty bound to relate to the Indonesia events in so-
lidarity with women in other parts of the world. A similar argument,
legitimising the meeting by placing it within the context of China’s
commitment to international agreements, was used in the opening
speech of the meeting. Two years after the meeting the speaker ex-
plained how she had focused her speech upon the international ratio-
nale for convening the meeting:
The most important thing is that we ourselves [the Media Watch
Network] are an outcome of the 1995 Women’s Conference. The
aims of this organisation are precisely to implement the Plat-
form for Action and to supervise the Chinese government and
society’s implementation of the Platform because implementa-
tion is the responsibility of the whole country. We must under
no circumstances forget that the 1995 Women’s Conference was
convened in Beijing and that thousands and thousands of peace
doves were released over the skies of Beijing (…). I also said that
a nation, a people and an individual can do without a lot of
things, but we can never do without people’s conscience in the
face of this violation of women’s human rights. If we are silent
it would be equivalent to losing one of humanity’s most basic in-
tuitions (…). The first aim was to let the world know that women
in China had not forgotten the 1995 Women’s Conference, that
we were continuously monitoring the Chinese government. The
government was silent; we could not be silent. We were monitor-
ing the government and society and letting them know that im-
plementation of the Platform for Action includes action against
violence towards women – this is a very important part of the
Platform. This was our aim. Our aim was also to let the world
know that women in China are not silent and that we wanted to
safeguard peace in the world, that we must do something
against violence towards women. These were the two most im-
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portant aims.11 (Interview Media Watch 2000, transcript 45.1,
45.2, 46)
In likeness to Esherick & Wasserstrom’s (1990) analysis of the spring
1989 events, the public meeting may also be viewed as an exercise in
political theatre, although evidently on a much smaller scale. The meet-
ing was political theatre in the sense that it followed an historically es-
tablished repertoire of collective action, meaning that ‘even when im-
provising, protesters worked from familiar “scripts” which gave com-
mon sense to how to behave during a given action …’ (Esherick &
Wasserstrom 1990:839, based on Tilly 1978). Thus, the meeting fol-
lowed the format of a standard political meeting, starting with an open-
ing speech and followed by speeches by various prominent ‘leaders’ – a
well-known procedure thus being used for communicating alternative
messages. While the meeting followed a standard format, it also pro-
vided space for creative improvisation by organisers and speakers. Pro-
fessor Wu Qing, who is an eminent speaker, provided one of the most
moving performances. She was dressed completely in black – an in-
spiration from the global Women in Black Movement – and carried a
candle:
When she went to the podium she lit the candle. She cried.
Many people in the audience cried. She said that she was not
only speaking for women violated in Indonesia. She was also
speaking for women in Rwanda and for women all over the
world. (Interview Media Watch 2000, transcript 45.4)
Wu Qing definitely succeeded in moving the audience. However, as
Esherick & Wasserstrom argue, building on Tilly (1986), it is the
authorities that are the main target of political theatre, although the
general public is also addressed. This is emphasised by the use of the
petition format, which acknowledges the fundamental legitimacy of the
government to which the appeal is being addressed. Two petitions had
been prepared for submission by the meeting – one addressed to Uni-
ted Nations secretary general Kofi Annan and the other to the Indone-
sian government. Moreover, the media had been invited to ensure
media coverage of the petitions and the meeting. Although many jour-
nalists attended the meeting, in this instance Media Watch Network ac-
tivists were unable to secure coverage of the event in the Chinese med-
ia. Only China Women’s News printed a short piece on the meeting.
Drawing on their professional contacts, the organisers managed to en-
sure coverage in non-Chinese media, including The Voice of America,
The New York Times, The Washington Post and The South China Morning
Post. Recognition that they were testing the limits of acceptable action
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is expressed by the activist who, although she stressed that popular or-
ganising supports the state, also noted:
We support the nation in implementing the Platform for Action.
In the Platform there is a paragraph about violence towards wo-
men. This is what we said. Nobody could accuse us of anything.
(Interview Media Watch 2000, transcript 42.4)
The political sensitivity of the event was also reflected in activists’ re-
sponse to a Voice of America broadcast on the meeting, which implied
that activists were criticising the Chinese government. Activists again
emphasised that their meeting was a protest against the Indonesian
government and not against the Chinese government. Nonetheless, the
meeting was controversial insofar as activists were attempting to use
the arena of the street to voice the agenda of the women’s movement,
but also because they were indirectly criticising the government for its
failure to react to events in Indonesia. While this meeting was excep-
tional in so directly addressing the government’s failure to act, the pub-
lic meeting format is often used by popular organisations, and such
meetings are also usually covered by the media. This coverage by the
state-controlled media is understood by activists as an expression of
state recognition of popular organising.
Documentary Theatre: A Play That Democratised the Communication
Process
Another form of communication used by popular feminist organisa-
tions for challenging existing gender inequity and opposing violence
towards women is, as has been analysed by Louise Edwards (2008),
the play The Vagina Monologues, which was written by US actor and
playwright Eve Ensler (1998).12 The author interviewed about two hun-
dred women whose real-life experiences were transformed and con-
densed into a sequence of stories that form the play. The play builds
on the second wave women’s movement practice of consciousness rais-
ing, which again is inspired by the Chinese practice of ‘speaking bitter-
ness’ (Milwertz & Bu forthcoming). It aims to break the silence on se-
cret, private, and shameful sexual violence, to shift the issue into the
public domain and facilitate discussions of sexual oppression. In
March 2002 the play was staged in Shanghai in an English-language
performance for a predominantly expatriate audience. Subsequently, at
the initiative of the Domestic Violence Network, a Chinese version was
staged by students from Zhongshan University in Guangzhou in De-
cember 2003. The Guangzhou performance, as well as later activities
that evolved out of that particular performance, is our focus below.
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The play was first translated into Chinese because activists viewed it
as a useful medium for communicating oppositional knowledge about
violence towards women. They felt it would help them particularly to
reach a young target group that was not attracted to activities like the
more conventionally used street counselling. The Chinese version of
the play was developed in collaboration with Professor Ai Xiaoming
(then known from her involvement with the Sun Zhigang case13), who
was using the play in her gender studies class. The young students
who performed the play became involved in a consciousness raising
process in which their own taken-for-granted assumptions of gender
relations, sexuality and violence towards women were questioned and
challenged. The students also actively participated in the design of the
Chinese performance. This was demonstrated most clearly by their ad-
dition of a dance sequence depicting the abandonment of infant
daughters in China. This meant that what was originally intended to
convey a message to a young target group, perchance involved the ac-
tors themselves in both communicating and generating knowledge
about gender relations. The creation of the Chinese performance was
thus transformed into an alternative media communication process,
‘offering the means of democratic communication to people who are
normally excluded from media production’ (Atton 2002: 4). Alternative
media has been defined not only by its content, but also by its capacity
to generate non-standard methods of creation, production and distribu-
tion (Atton 2002). The use of this play provides an example of such
media, one that has enabled democratisation not only of the dissemina-
tion process, but also of the knowledge creation process.
After the play had been performed in Guangzhou, Professor Ai
Xiaoming and the Gender Studies Forum at Zhongshan University,
supported by the Domestic Violence Network, began working with doc-
umentary filmmaker Hu Jie on two documentary films – one of the
performance of the play itself (Hu 2005a) and one of the process of
using the play to communicate oppositional knowledge about violence
towards women (Hu 2005b). The idea was to distribute the films so as
to inspire further use of the play across China. One of the places where
this was successful was in Guangxi at the Huaguang Women’s College,
where a group of young, rural female students performed parts of the
play in March 2005, adding text based on their own experiences. Fol-
lowing these experiences, the Domestic Violence Network began plan-
ning to further develop this way of promoting participatory communi-
cation by collaborating with the Hebei Women’s Federation to write
and perform a play. Inspired by The Vagina Monologues, the idea was
that the play would be based on the stories of rural women who would
collect the stories and then write and act the play. Generally, definitions
of alternative media stress the fact that their content is radical and is
NON-GOVERNMENTAL FEMINIST ACTIVISM IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 239
aimed at the promotion of social change (Atton 2002). In his defini-
tion of alternative media, Atton (2002: 18) emphasises that alternative
media should privilege ‘the processes by which people are empowered
through their direct involvement in alternative media production’. This
has happened with activists’ use of the play. Plans to include the rural
population in participatory communication via alternative media are
particularly significant given that the mainstream mass media is
largely oriented to the urban elite. There are few publications for disen-
franchised social groups, and those that do exist, including China Wo-
men’s News, have limited editorial independence and their circulation
and institutional power dwindled in the 1990s (Zhao 2005).
There is obvious continuity between the use of drama for conscious-
ness raising and the educative function that characterises the new art
and literature produced by the Communist Party (Holm 1984). As
early as 1929 a sophisticated set of ideas for implementing propaganda
was developed at the Gutian conference. The importance of basing dra-
ma on local quality (difangxing) was stressed as a prerequisite for mak-
ing propaganda effective (Holm 1984). The creation of plays by local
amateurs, and the focus on ‘real people and real events’, were seen as
ways to increase the educational impact on the targeted audience
(Holm 1984). This was further developed in the yangge movement,
launched in 1943, the first of a series of Communist Party mass move-
ments based on literary-artistic genres.14 The use of ‘real people and
real events’ in the adaptation of The Vagina Monologues for China did
not follow any overall plan for communication strategies formulated by
activists. On the contrary, when Guangzhou students included a piece
on abandoned girl babies, this was in response to a suggestion by Pro-
fessor Ai Xiaoming and the Domestic Violence Network that they
should include a topic specifically related to China. And at the Guangxi
performance the students themselves decided to include pieces based
on their own lives.
Given the similarities between activists’ modes of consciousness rais-
ing and CCP propaganda methods, are women’s movement activists
then simply implementing yet another CCP style movement? The an-
swer will require broader and more in-depth studies than ours. Our
tentative analysis focuses on the voluntarily participation of the tar-
geted audiences. In the course of writing and performing dramatic pro-
ductions based on their own experiences, these people generate new
knowledge about and raise awareness of gender relations. This takes
place at the interface between three agencies: activists, ‘recipients’ (who
are themselves engaged in creating new knowledge) and the knowledge
they produce together. This recalls Lusted’s definition of pedagogy as
involving the role of teacher, learner and the knowledge they produce
together. The success of the further development of the use of docu-
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mentary drama will depend on the degree to which activists are able to
discard perceptions of the role of the ‘teacher’ as a neutral transmitter,
the student as passive and knowledge as immutable material to be im-
parted (Lusted 1986, cited in Lather 1991: 15).
Conclusion
In this chapter we have been concerned with ways in which non-gov-
ernmental feminist women’s movement organisations in Beijing com-
municate alternative gender equality understandings to authorities and
the Chinese population in general. We have looked at two cases of
communication. First, a public meeting that used political theatre to
address the party-state system, and, second, how the use of documen-
tary drama has enabled the active engagement of a small segment of
the general population. A significant strength of the urban, intellectual,
elite activists who have established non-governmental feminist organi-
sations is that they are well-connected transnationally. International in-
teraction has been important in inspiring and influencing the creation
of new knowledge. Activists also legitimise their activities by linking
up to international UN events and global events, such as the V-Day
Movement, the 16 Days of Activism Against Violence Against Women,
and the Canadian-initiated White Ribbon Campaign, in which men
also engage in opposing violence towards women.15 Moreover, activists
make good use of the formal communication channels established by
the party-state, both by submitting proposals to authorities and by
reaching out to the general population via party-state institutions. The
example of the planned demonstration is, as noted, exceptional. Gener-
ally, in order to safeguard the long-term interests of organising from
below, activists will impose restraints upon their actions to ensure that
they are not too provocative. As we have shown in the case of the pub-
lic meeting held in support of ethnic Chinese women in Indonesia, the
format followed a well-known and uncontroversial political theatre
standard.
In regard to the use of documentary drama, we found that quite an
innovative process of engaging the target group and drawing them into
active participation in the movement was taking place. Although our
material on the use of documentary drama is limited, we contend that
one may discern highly significant communication processes used by
popular feminist organisations that are of importance to an under-
standing of the potential impact of the women’s movement. We main-
tain that these alternative media approaches testify to the fact noted at
the beginning of this chapter – that the current women’s movement is,
at least potentially, one of the most significant things happening in
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contemporary China. It is indeed altering deeply entrenched cultural
views that see the unequal gender relations of the dominant gender or-
der as ‘normal’ and ‘natural’. A strategic approach is needed to end vio-
lence towards women and to challenge the socio-economic and political
context of power relations in hierarchical societies based on exploitative
gender relations. One element of such an approach is the participation
of the whole community (Cheung et. al. 1999). By using mainstream
media, and also alternative media (in Atton’s sense of alternative in
content and form), urban, well-educated, elite activists in popular orga-
nising are both targeting and involving other groups in public con-
sciousness-raising activities. The audiences targeted by the activities
following on from The Vagina Monologues have become actively in-
volved in generating knowledge in ways similar to those employed by
activists themselves – activities that led them to come to view violence
towards women as a question of gendered power relations and, for
some, also as a human rights issue (Milwertz & Bu 2007). By facilitat-
ing this participation, activists are achieving the movement’s transfor-
mative goals through a ‘knock-on’ effect. Those who were previously
‘recipients of communication’ become actors within the core of the
movement’s activities and to various degrees also come to challenge
the dominant gender order.
This process is not spectacular, and it is unlikely to be noticed by the
internationally marketed English language mass media. Public con-
sciousness-raising in which poor girls at a school in Guangxi or rural
women in Hebei create documentary drama based on their own lives
are generally not viewed as sensational events. They are not covered by
the Western media as was the 2004 banning of the staging of The Va-
gina Monologues in Shanghai and Beijing. However, in the long run the
involvement of people in the documentary drama activities may turn
out to have far-reaching implications for the development of the wo-
men’s movement in China based on the establishment of a cross-class
coalition that could result from activists finding solidarity through
shared gender identity. Urban, middle-aged, intellectual activists are
reaching out not only to young students, but also to peasant women to
build strategic alliances based on common gender interests. These alli-
ances acknowledge but also strategically transcend differences such as
class, education, and rural-urban location. Like women in other parts
of Asia (Stivens 2000), Chinese activists too are making claims in
terms of a strategic universalism based on a shared humanity.
Increasingly, studies of popular organising and social movement ac-
tivities in the People’s Republic of China are recognising the impor-
tance of alliances and interaction between activists and the party-state.
Rather than viewing the state-society relationship as dichotomous, it is
being argued that the heterogeneous nature of both state and society
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and their multifarious interactions must be acknowledged (Edwards
2008; Ho 2007; Lu 2007). Gilboy and Read (2008) argue that political
and social reforms are thoroughly alive in China, and that they are
based on the two elements of, on the one hand, an increasing number
of active citizens who are voicing interests and demands and, on the
other hand, a party-state that is open to change. If we accept the impor-
tance of an increasing number of active citizens in moving forward this
trend, then it is time to focus more on how the intellectual core of the
women’s movement, as well as that of other social movements, inter-
acts not only with the state, but also with the general public.
Notes
1 We thank Inga-Lill Blomqvist and Anja Møller Rasmussen at the Nordic Institute of
Asian Studies Library and Information Centre for invaluable assistance in identifying
and making available materials for this paper.
2 See Zhao 2005 on the current status of the mass media in China. In a study of envir-
onmental NGO activism, Yang and Calhoun (2008) argue that the development of a
green public sphere involves both constraining and enabling aspects of interaction
with the mass media, alternative media and the Internet.
3 Although violence was not initially addressed in popular organising, it has gradually
become one of the focal points of activism (Milwertz 2003).
4 The Almanac of Chinese Women’s Studies 2001-2005 (Quanguo fulian funu¨ yanjiusuo
2007) provides an overview of recent studies in Chinese, while Hershatter 2004 pro-
vides a relatively recent review of English language studies.
5 We do, of course, recognise that men are also victims of rape.
6 This section of the paper is based on and further develops our joint research, includ-
ing Milwertz and Bu 2003, as well as drawing on earlier work by Milwertz (2002).
7 Bu Wei has been involved as an activist in popular feminist organising since 1995,
and has studied these organisations since 2000. Cecilia Milwertz conducted her first
interviews with activists in 1994, and has since then been engaged in studying
organising around gender issues.
8 See Milwertz 2002 on registration and affiliation of popular feminist organisations.
Contrary to the practice in other parts of China, none of the popular women’s organi-
sations in Beijing are affiliated or registered with the Beijing Women’s Federation,
though one organisation has been a group member of the All China Women’s Fed-
eration.
9 According to Hu & Wang 2006 quoted in Gilboy & Read (2008), mass protests in
China have risen from 10,000 incidents involving 730,000 people in 1993 to 74,000
incidents involving 3.7 million people in 2004.
10 Cai, Feng & Guo 2001 provide an introduction to the setting up of the Media Watch
Network and the early years of activities.
11 The Platform for Action is an international document resulting from the Fourth UN
Women’s Conference committing governments to work for gender equality – see
United Nations 1996.
12 In Milwertz & Bu 2008 we discuss the use of the play by the Domestic Violence Net-
work website to influence the mainstream mass media. Milwertz and Bu (forthcom-
ing) is an interview with Bu Wei who is one of the main initiators and facilitators of
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the use of the play by the Domestic Violence Network, about the role of the Network
in introducing the play to China. This section draws on these publications.
13 For a vivid description of the dramatic Sun Zhigang case, see Pan 2008.
14 Yangge is the name of a form of North Chinese dances, songs and variety acts per-
formed by amateur peasants during the New Year, see Holm 1984.
15 The V-Day Movement, started in 1998, administers the play The Vagina Monologues
and distributes funds in support for activities to stop violence towards women and
girls. The 16 Days of Activism against Gender Violence is an annual global campaign
started in 1991 by the Centre for Women’s Global Leadership at Rutgers University
in the United States. The campaign begins on 25 November, the UN International
Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, and lasts until 10 December,
the UN Human Rights Day.
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12 The Hong Kong Catholic Church:
A Framing Role in Social Movement
Beatrice Leung
Introduction
Relations between church and state have historically ranged from the
relatively mild tensions in Western democracies (Dillon 1999; Robins
& Robertson 1987; Moyer 1990; Hanson 1987) to the fundamental
conflicts over authority found in authoritarian, especially communist
states (Hanson 1980; Stehle 1987; Leung 1992; Weigel 1992; Good-
stadt 1996). Ideological incompatibilities and cultural differences led to
repeated clashes of authority in communist China between those who
sought atheist communism and those who held religious beliefs (Ra-
met & Ramet 1993; Treadgold 1973). Problems involving the Catholic
Church are more complex because its hierarchical structure posed extra
challenges to the omniscience of the ruling Communist Party (Ramet
& Ramet 1990; Michnik 1993; Szajkowski 1983).
In the whole period of British rule in Hong Kong (1841-1997), no re-
ligious group, including the Catholics, had ever offered a social frame
to the mass to engage in a social movement to challenge the colonial
rule. However, since the post-colonial period, within a few years of the
Chinese rule in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR), the Catholic leader Bishop Joseph Zen Ze-Kiun started. La-
ter in 2006, Zen was elevated to Cardinal offering a frame for social
movement on a couple of social issues challenging the HKSAR govern-
ment as well as Beijing in the name of defending some basic Christian
values such as religious freedom and human rights.
Social scientists argued that religious organisations, like any social
organisation, could offer a frame either to stabilise the society by ren-
dering social, medical and educational services to the needy and the
poor or by collecting dissents to agitate social change (Snow, David &
Benford 1992: 137). This chapter aims to discuss how the Catholic
Church went from playing a role of the contractor to the Hong Kong
British government to stabilise the society to becoming a frame for so-
cial movement to ‘rock the boat’ in the HKSAR. One of the key figures
in promoting social movement in the Catholic Church is Cardinal Zen,
whose politically active actions and influence were frowned upon by
the Tung administration of HKSAR as well as Beijing leaders who also
wanted him to be removed for their own benefit. In participating in ac-
tive social movements, the Catholic Church has become part of the
emerging civil society in Hong Kong that championed the preservation
of the fundamental and universal values of freedom and human rights.
Early Roles of the Hong Kong Catholic Church
Catholic missionaries were invited by the British to take care of the
spiritual needs of the Irish soldiers in the Hong Kong barrack soon
after the arrival of the first group of British in 1841. Since then, the
Catholic missionaries have provided Catholic-based education in the
colony for the past 150 years and established a large network of Catho-
lic schools in Hong Kong, giving the impression that the Catholic
Church had a very warm relationship with the British (Leung & Chan
2003: 23-46). At the same time, the Catholic Church also provided a
large array of social services to the community at large. However,
Christian churches were regarded as ‘contractors’ instead of ‘partners’
to British Hong Kong’s education and social services, because the
church only ran the schools and social services according to the govern-
ment’s education and social policy as well as received a government
subvention of 80% of the running expenses (Leung & Chan 2003: 23-
46).
In the late 1960s, under the leadership of Bishop Francis Hsu
(1969-73), social issues and Christian teachings were integrated into
daily life as suggested by the Second Vatican Council (1963-65) (Good-
stadt 2003: xi-xvi). Bishop Hsu then responded to the widespread an-
ger about social abuse, government corruption and official compla-
cency (Goodstadt 2003: xi-xvi). Such actions angered the British colo-
nial administration. As such, it is possible to argue as suggested by E.
Goffman that cultures generate a ‘primary framework’ that renders
particular social acts meaningful. Religion has been effectively and effi-
ciently mobilised as a frame for a social movement as in Poland (Osa
1997: 339-366). Tarrow also noticed how the frame works in an author-
itarian state and remarked that where power is centralised and condi-
tions are homogenised, once opportunities are opened, framing and or-
ganising a social movement are facilitated (Tarrrow 1994: 93).
Prior to the handover of Hong Kong to China on 1 July 1997, the
Christian churches, including Catholic Christians, became increasingly
involved in politics and social actions to fight for religious freedom and
lifestyle under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’. The Catholic Church
became involved in the fight for democracy and religious freedom be-
cause many of its members were Hong Kong‘s new middle and profes-
sional class who had become politically proactive as a result of fear of
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the incoming authoritarian Communist rule and demanded that the
Church support their cause (So & Ludmilla 1996: 364-398). Thus, in
the 1991 and 1995 Hong Kong Legco elections, the Catholic actively
supported the election campaign, so much so that the turnout rate of
Catholic voters was much higher than that of the general public (86.6
per cent vs. 39.1 per cent in 1991; 81.5 per cent vs. 35.8 per cent in
1995). The majority of Catholic voters were pro-democracy (Leung
1992a: 151-186; Chan & Leung 1995: 275-314). As such, the Catholic
Church adopted a political frame to champion the needs of their reli-
gious community.
The Catholic Church after the Handover
Since 1997, after the return of sovereignty to China, Hong Kong has
become the first ‘Special Administrative Region’ (SAR) of PRC. This
political change also affects the status and functioning of the Catholic
Church. In reality, the Catholic Church has become even more vocal.
One of the first social issues taken up by the Catholic Church after
1997 was the right of abode issue for mainland wives and children
who were born of mainland women and Hong Kong men. Many of
these wives and children came to live in Hong Kong under a two-way
permit. As such, they were overstayers, and once they exceeded the
legal duration of stay in Hong Kong, they became illegal immigrants.
These children together with the mother applied for right of abode
after the handover with the view that they would be granted permanent
abode by the new SAR government.
The right of abode appeal was upheld by the Court of Final Appeal
that under the Basic Law, all mainland children born of Hong Kong
permanent residents are entitled to live in the HKSAR, but the Hong
Kong government rejected the decision. The Government’s rejection
was based on the argument that these children and wives would put
enormous pressure on housing, employment and public health.1 Some
scholars and human rights groups accused the Government of produc-
ing dubious statistics to instill fear in the public and give the impres-
sion that the only possible solution would be to have the judgment ef-
fectively overturned.2 Cardinal Wu and Zen of the Catholic Church also
criticized the Government’s stance on the Right of Abode which gained
the support of the public. Cardinal Wu stated:
A large number of adult Hong Kong residents came from the
Mainland to settle here in the 1950s and 1960s. Hong Kong at
that time was not blessed with a strong economy or firm social
structure. Nevertheless, when faced with a continuous flood of
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refugees, there was no hesitation, and doors were opened to wel-
come them … Based on the belief that ‘blood is thicker than
water’ and that ‘all within the four seas are one family’ … how
can we harden our hearts, look on with indifference and a lack
of humanity, and use ‘interpretation’ to deny them hope …?3
Here the Catholic leaders, in particular Cardinal Wu and Zen in their
pastoral letter, offered a successfully framing which enables the social
movement to ‘mobilize potential adherents and constituents to garner
bystander supporters and to demobilize antagonists as suggested by
scholars like Snow et al. (Snow, Benford, Rochford, Jr., & Worden
1986: 465-66; Snow & Benford 1988).
The second issue that the Catholic Church engaged in was educa-
tional reform. Here the key issue was the implementation of the so-
called ‘mother-tongue’ as the medium of instruction for schools. Under
the Hong Kong educational system, all schools adopted a bilingual pol-
icy where students are taught in Cantonese and English, with some
also offering Mandarin as a third language. Among the academically
good schools (a large number of them are Catholic schools) the com-
mon language medium is English. These schools produced students
who excelled not only in academic subjects but were also excellent Eng-
lish language speakers. Out of 512 secondary schools, there are 250
Protestant and Catholic run schools, forming 49 per cent of the total
number of secondary schools. Among Christians, Catholics run the lar-
gest number of schools in Hong Kong, followed by Anglicans, then by
the Church of Christ in China (Brown 2001: 19-61). Including kinder-
gartens, primary, secondary, and other schools, the Catholic Church
sponsored 297 schools which served 219,615 students (Hong Kong
Catholic Directory 2008: 624-625). In a survey conducted in 1999, it
was revealed that 76 per cent of high-ranking officials in the Hong
Kong government had graduated from Christian (Protestant and Catho-
lic) schools.4
The shift of language policy was criticised by some Catholic priests
amidst the outcry by many parents who continued to see English as a
key to a successful career for their children. The key arguments against
the change of language policy was that it would affect Hong Kong‘s
status as a metropolitan city and that it would not address the declin-
ing language standard among students. However, research showed that
this policy would deprive Hong Kong students of an opportunity to
learn English as compared to students of Taiwan and the mainland
which have stepped up English learning in their educational policy
(Leung 2000: 125-152). However, within the Church, there were diverg-
ing views.5 In addition, the Church also disagreed with the Govern-
ment’s educational objective which aimed at enriching the moral, emo-
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tional, spiritual and cultural life of their students to improve the mate-
rialist world and lead a healthy life (Brown 2004: 263-274) while the
objective of the Catholic education was on the transcendental value of
life and taking morality and spirituality as the key priority, and arguing
that the materialist world and healthy life should be pursued to support
the moral and spiritual endeavour, which are essential to leading a life
of truth, goodness, and beauty in this world and the eternal life (Flan-
nery 1975: 725-37).
Another area of contention between the Catholic Church and the
HKSAR was the management of schools. The Government introduced
the school-based management (SBM) system to advance openness, ac-
countability and democracy in all of the schools. Catholic and Christian
educators view the SBM system as a direct challenge from the Govern-
ment and argued that this policy infringed their religious freedom. The
composition of the new school-based management system comprised
60 per cent school administrators as well as 40 per cent representa-
tives from teachers, parents, alumni and community leaders who
might or might not be Christians or Catholics. Among the teachers,
the majority were lay members, and around 73 per cent were non-
Catholics. The Church viewed this change as a challenge and a dilution
of the power of the Church that would impede their policies on Catho-
lic education.
In addition, Bishop Zen, representing the Catholic Church, also ex-
pressed apprehension over the Government’s policy to introduce com-
pulsory teaching requirements and texts on issues such as the support
of abortion that might contradict the Catholic teachings. Such policies
forced the Catholic Church to distance itself from HKSAR’s education
(Brown 2004: 263-274). Bishop Zen’s anxiety was not groundless, and
it was confirmed by the former director of the Central Policy Unit, the
pre-1997 Hong Kong Government’s think tank, which perceived that
there was a desire within the SAR Government to lessen the depen-
dence on religious organisations for the provision of education (Good-
stadt 2003: xi-xvi).
Bishop Joseph Zen thus publicly expressed his own concern to the
Catholic educationalists that the Catholic educational vision and mis-
sion would suffer immensely if the Education (Amendment) Bill 2002
were passed (Zen 2004). Although the Bill was passed in 2004,
Bishop Zen had asked the Catholic schools to reject the order of the
Government and maintained the status quo of the school curriculum
for a period of 4 years. When Zen filed a court case against the Gov-
ernment, political analysts realised that the educational conflict had
not ended yet and that it would carry on. Zen lost the court case; but
the framing role of the Catholic Church began to bear fruit when the
other Christian churches followed in Zen’s footsteps, and other educa-
THE HONG KONG CATHOLIC CHURCH 249
tional sponsoring bodies asked the same question vis-a`-vis the govern-
ment. In this clash in educational reform, Zen offered a frame in inter-
preting that simplifies and condenses the complicated issue by selec-
tively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events and se-
quences of actions within his present environment (Snow, Rochford,
Jr., Worden & Benford 1986: 465-66).
A third issue the Catholic Church became actively involved in was
the issue pertaining to Article 23 of the Basic Law that requires the
Hong Kong government to legislate the prohibition of acts of seces-
sion, subversion, treason, theft of state secrets, sedition, as well as for-
eign political organisations conducting political activities in Hong
Kong, and local political organisations establishing ties with foreign po-
litical bodies. Bishop Zen led the Church and joined the legal profes-
sionals and the pro-democratic groups in voicing his objection to the
proposed new laws that threatened the freedom that Hong Kong peo-
ple used to enjoy. The opening part of his speech in a seminar on the
legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law fully revealed his attitude to-
wards this issue:
I am worried about the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law
because the contents of the consultation document and the
aggressive style of the document constitute a serious threat to
the ‘One Country, Two Systems’. Under the principle of the
‘One Country, Two Systems’, the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese
operates smoothly like many other Catholic dioceses in the
world. According to the guiding principles of the consultation
document, if the Catholic Church in China in future were to be
condemned as an organisation endangering the national safety,
the Catholic Church in Hong Kong would follow the same fate
(…). If we legislate Article 23 of the Basic Law according to the
consultation document, the religious policy of the mainland can
be easily transmitted to us. What is the religious policy of the
mainland? It alludes to an ‘absolute control’ on religious mat-
ters. It levies a heavy punishment on those who refuse to render
absolute obedience by arbitrary persecution6.
His opposition to the legislation was clearly built on the fear that the
repressive Chinese religious policy would be introduced into Hong
Kong if the fire screen of the ‘One country, Two Systems’ were to be re-
moved after legislation of the Article 23 of the Basic Law. As a result of
his vocal actions, he was defined by the press as the most strident and
high-profile supporter of the proposed new laws and became a focal
point of political opposition to the unpopular, Beijing-backed govern-
ment (Lague & Murphy 2003: 24-27). On 23 November 2002, 60,000
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to 70,000 citizens rallied against the legislation of Article 23, and the
anti-government rally on 1 July 2003 was the largest rally with half a
million people participating since the turnout during the June 4th Inci-
dent of Tiananmen 1989. Catholics joined the rally after a prayer meet-
ing led by Bishop Zen at the rally’s starting point. Zen himself did not
join these rallies but was engaged in private prayers of long hours in a
chapel during the whole event.
Bishop Zen became the only outspoken dissenting voice at the time
when local pro-democratic groups which were traditionally the strong-
est voices of protest had been marginalised. Zen became the new con-
science of Hong Kong after the retirement of Anson Chan, the former
Chief Secretary, and Martin Lee, the Democratic Party leader. The
frame offered by Zen on this issue set up a social consensus when it
‘resonates’ with a population not only by mirroring the existing value
(religious freedom) but also by clearing defining and assigning the
blame for the particular problem (legislating Article 23 of the Basic
Law) to the Government and offering the solution by suggesting the
dropping of the legislature all together as suggested by theorist Gam-
son (Gamson 1992: 7).
Bishop Zen was elected as the most Outstanding Personality of
2002 by the mass media organised by the prestigious South China
Morning Post, Radio Hong Kong Channel 3, and the popular newspaper
The Apple Daily. From the 2558 votes, Zen won 50 per cent and so
came first. Readers who chose Zen mentioned that he embodies the
values of hope, justice, charity, love and wisdom and fights with out-
spokenness and bravery. He is also regarded as an inspiration to all
(The Apple Daily 1 Jan. 2003; Kung Kao Po 12 Jan 2003). He was also
chosen as one of the ten most influential public figures when Radio
Hong Kong celebrated the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to
China in 2007. The Wall Street Journal echoed the local opinion to the
international community that Bishop Zen was leading the Hong Kong
Catholic opposition as democracy parties became marginal and that
Bishop Joseph Zen was moving to fill a political void by playing the
role of a ‘frame’ by collecting pro-democratic activists in the name of
freedom and human rights (Lague 2003: 14). In addition, his action
was also supported by Vatican. When he made his ad limnia visit to the
Vatican in September 2004, he was received warmly by Cardinal Sor-
dano, Secretary of State of the Vatican, and Sordano verbally supported
Zen’s endeavour of defending freedom (South China Morning Post 1 De-
cember 2004). The elevation of Bishop Joseph Zen to the cardinalate
in April 2006 reflected the Vatican’s high opinion of Zen, as it en-
trusted him with the duty of adviser and assistant to the Pope on China
Affairs in addition to his duty as the prelate of the Hong Kong Diocese.
From such recognition, it is not difficult to imagine his popularity and
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public support of his fight against the government on the above issues.
As such, Zen can be seen as providing an effective frame to pursue hu-
man rights, democracy and religious freedom and to mobilize the
Hong Kong middle class and professionals to launch their demands.
The fourth issue concerns the role of the Hong Kong Catholic
Church in the relationship between the Vatican and the mainland Chi-
nese government. Sino-Vatican diplomatic relations were established in
1942 but were formally cut in 1951 with the expulsion of the papal
nuncio Archbishop Riberi (Chen & Jiang 2003: 162-276). Under com-
munism and Mao Zedong’s emphasis on class struggle, religion be-
came part of the bourgeoise and thus was not tolerated. It was only
after the Reform Policy of 1978 that religion began to reappear in Chi-
na. However, the Sino-Vatican relationship went on a roller-coaster
ride.
In 1981, Cardinal Casaroli, then Secretary of State of the Vatican,
made the first overture to China, aiming at normalising Sino-Vatican
relations. However, the Vatican’s unilateral appointment of Bishop Do-
minic Deng Yiming in 1982 led to a temporary suspension of the
Sino-Vatican relationship (Leung 1992: 189-256; Tang 1991: 126-130).7
However, informal contact between the Vatican and China was re-
sumed shortly thereafter, and some progress was made. In November
1987, Zhao Ziyang, then Secretary General of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), met Cardinal Sin of Manila in Beijing, and they agreed to
hold talks to initiate a formal Sino-Vatican negotiation.8 The meeting
gave hope for heralding a new dawn in the Sino-Vatican rapproche-
ment. However, there remain major differences such as the appoint-
ments of bishops and the relations between the official and under-
ground Chinese Catholics. Added to these two existing issues are Beij-
ing’s demand for the transference of the ecclesiastical administration
to the civil authority and the demand that the Vatican refrain from in-
terfering with China’s internal politics. Above all, the Catholic-HKSAR
government relationship has brought international attention and im-
pacted on the Sino-Vatican relationship.9
Throughout the years, Hong Kong has played a crucial role in the
development of the Catholic faith and Catholic churches on the main-
land. Hong Kong’s efficient and effective communication attracted
overseas bridge-builders for meetings on coordination and the ex-
change of views. The diocesan-sponsored Holy Spirit Study Centre pro-
vided excellent services to overseas bridge-builders as its research sec-
tion had a good collection of data on religions in China for consulta-
tion. Its staff helped initial programmes in various ways, including
accompanying new workers for an initial trip to China and providing
up-to-date information through its quarterly publication Tripod. The
Hong Kong dioceses’ traditional role of a ‘bridge-building Church’ for
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the revival of the Chinese church won the approval and appreciation of
the Vatican.10
The bridging missions were aimed at the revival of the Chinese
church and coincided with the beginning of ‘openness’ in socio-eco-
nomic policies in the modernisation programme of Deng Xiaoping
since 1979. The bridge-building mission mainly focused on supporting
churches, the training of priests, sisters and Catholic laity, sending reli-
gious literature and teachers, and giving financial aids for church op-
eration and church-related social service projects. This assistance,
which was extended both to the official and unofficial sectors of the
Church, has played a crucial role in the past two decades in the revival
of Catholicism in China.
The actual extent of the revival and development of the Chinese
Church is reflected in some basic statistics. Religious activities propa-
gated very rapidly. In 1983 there were 300 Catholic churches in China,
by 1987 the number had increased to 2,100; by 1992 to 3,900; by
1997, 5000; and 5,400 churches in 2004. The number of Catholic ad-
herents was estimated to have risen from 3.3 million in 1986 to over
10 million in 1992, and 12 million in 2004 (including both the official
and underground churches). In 1997 there were 1,500 Catholic priests.
In 2004 there were 2,200 priests, three-quarters of whom were or-
dained in the past 12 years (‘A Chronology of Catholic China’ 1993: 19;
China Catholic Communication 1993: 10-18; 1997: 10-18; 2000: 8-14,
18-20; 2004: 18-20).
In the same year of 2004, it was recorded that in the official sector
there were one national seminary, 6 regional seminaries and 7 provin-
cial seminaries and 10 diocesan seminaries with 1,000 major seminar-
ians and 600 minor seminarians in training. There were 10 training
centres for the underground sector with 800 seminarians (major and
minor) in training. There were 40 novitiates for religious sisters, with
1,500 sisters in training in the official sector and 20 in the under-
ground sector for the training of 1,000 sisters (‘A Chronology of Catho-
lic China’ 1993: 19; China Catholic Communication 1993: 10-18; 1997:
10-18; 2000: 8-14, 18-20; 2004: 18-20). In 2004, there were 1,000 can-
didates in 19 seminaries and 5 pre-seminaries while there were 800 in
the 10 underground seminaries (China Catholic Communication
2004: 18-20). In 2004, there were 3,300 sisters with 40 convents in
the open sector and 1,600 in 20 convents in the underground sector of
the Chinese church (most of them under the age of 35) (China Catholic
Communication 2004: 18-20).
The great expansion of churches and chapels as well as the increase
of priests and sisters reflect that this rapid expansion was the result of
the bridge-builders who donated huge amounts of money to build and
restore churches nationwide, both in rural and urban settings, respond-
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ing to the needs of local Catholics who desperately needed pastoral
care.
However, the revival of Catholic life did not go along with the state-
Party’s policy, which aimed at eliminating the religious influence in
the socialist state (Ye 1996). One year before Hong Kong‘s handover to
China, Ye Xiaowen, head of the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State
Council of China, visited Hong Kong and indirectly warned Hong
Kong Catholics that the bridge-building should come to a halt after
1997. He argued that since the mainland did devise the idea that Hong
Kong should conform to the mainland’s religious policy, the Hong
Kong Catholics should not attempt to transplant its religious practice
to the mainland. He frankly reminded the Hong Kong Catholics that
after the transfer to Chinese rule in 1997, they should observe the prin-
ciples of ‘mutual non-subordination, mutual non-interference and mu-
tual respect’ as stipulated in Article 148 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of PRC (Sunday Examiner 5 July 1996;
China Message August 1996: 12-13). This was the first official indication
from the PRC to the HKSAR to refrain from their bridge-building en-
deavour. Prior to that, many religious visitors to China informally got
the same message that requested Hong Kong Catholics to refrain from
engaging in the bridge-building mission.11
After Hong Kong’s transfer to Chinese rule, Bishop Joseph Zen, the
coadjutor Bishop of Hong Kong who had taught in mainland semin-
aries for the last ten years, was politely but firmly refused to visit Chi-
nese seminaries in February 199812. The clerics and laity leaders of the
Hong Kong Catholic Church under Zen’s leadership were not willing
to yield to the demands of the Chinese officials who indicated that
Hong Kong should stop building bridges with China after the hand-
over on 1 July 1997.13 In other words, the Hong Kong Catholic Church
had a dual role to play: the bridge-building church for the revival of the
Chinese Church, a mission given to them by the Vatican, and the role
of a local church to deal with the HKSAR government. Hong Kong
with its international vision tried to embrace the dual missions simul-
taneously under the leadership of Zen.
In the dispute between the Vatican and China on the canonisation of
120 saints in China (October 2000), Zen not only openly criticised Chi-
na’s grip on its Chinese bishops by forcing them to follow the Party on
this religious issue, but also revealed that he was asked by an official
from the Liaison Office in HKSAR to celebrate the canonisation mod-
estly. Zen’s message caused great alarm in Hong Kong society as the
message from the Liaison Office was, ipso facto, an interference with
religious freedom in Hong Kong.14 Beijing’s continuous attack on the
Vatican during the whole week of celebrations for Canonisation Day
through its propaganda mechanism that condemned several saints as
254 BEATRICE LEUNG
rapists and criminals was curtailed by Zen’s open retort. With Zen’s
message, public attention was diverted from the controversy of canoni-
sation to the infringement of religious freedom in Hong Kong.
The Vatican had one more reason for favouring Bishop Zen, and as
a matter of fact, many Catholic experts who know China and its church
affairs do as well. In February 2002, there were 51 experts of different
nationalities invited by the Propaganda Department of the Vatican to
brief its new leaders on China affairs.
Among these 51 experts none stood up at the critical moment to
speak for the Vatican on the controversial canonisation of 120 saints in
China, except Zen who was brave enough to defend the Vatican’s posi-
tion at his own expense. Above all, his defence was so successful that it
put a halt to Beijing’s continuous attack on the Vatican.
For the Vatican, the value of Bishop Zen of Hong Kong can be seen
in Beijing’s suggestion to remove him from Hong Kong in exchange
for restarting the suspended Sino-Vatican negotiation of 2001. The sug-
gestion was made in 2002, when the campaign of anti-legislation of
Article 23 of the Basic Law was in full swing while Catholic opposition
on education reform had not yet been resolved. Although the Vatican
had been anxious to normalise the Sino-Vatican relations, it had to
evaluate Beijing’s offer in the political context of the triangular rela-
tions between Beijing, Hong Kong and the Vatican. Not only did
Bishop Zen continue to head the Catholic community in Hong Kong
to fight for religious freedom and human rights, but on 24 March
2006 he was also elevated to Cardinal of the Hong Kong Catholic
Church and became a close adviser of the Pope. The Vatican also did
not entertain Zen’s removal from Hong Kong as requested by the Chi-
nese government.15
The current head of the State of Council of the Vatican Cardinal Sor-
dano’s encouragement by asking him to continue his endeavour to
fight for freedom signified that he was needed by the Vatican in Hong
Kong and on mainland China. With Zen’s elevation to Cardinal, he be-
came one of the few Chinese advisers who really knew about China
and who could influence the Vatican on its Chinese policy with his ex-
pertise in China affairs. On 22 September 2006, Zen met the Pope
and suggested retiring from being the prelate of Hong Kong to concen-
trate on Chinese affairs (South China Morning Post 22 September
2006). The Vatican appointed Bishop John Tong to be his coadjutor to
share his responsibility of the Hong Kong diocese, while Zen contin-
ued to take care of the Chinese Catholic Church. However, the contri-
butions of Zen in defending the fundamental values of the Catholic
Church gave the Vatican reason to entrust him with the duty to look
after China affairs. The additional responsibility of being the chief advi-
ser on the Vatican’s Chinese Affairs allows Zen to fly between Hong
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Kong and Rome more frequently than before. On Christmas Day
2008, Zen announced that he will be succeeded by Bishop John Tong,
who propagates a milder approach.16 Hong Kong’s church-state rela-
tionship will turn a new page in the post-Zen era.
Discussion and Analysis
Having discussed the roles of the Catholic Church and to understand
more fully the actions taken by the Church and Cardinal Zen, it is im-
perative that we explore how the Catholic Church framed its role.
The Catholic Church has its own teachings based on theology on the
church and state relationship to guide the church in its relation with
the government and politics. Although the church teachings do not di-
rectly refer to the ‘framing’ roles which is a technical term in social
sciences, they explain why the church engages in this role to stabilise
or unstabilise the society. These teachings are documented in the Pas-
toral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World of the Second Vati-
can Council (1963-65):
The role and competence of the Church being what it is, she
must in no way be confused with the political community, nor
bound to any political system, for she is at once a sign and a
safeguard of the transcendence of the human person.
In their proper spheres, the political community and the Church
are mutually independent and self-governing. Yet by different
title, each serves the personal and social vocation of the same
human beings.
The church, founded on the Redeemer’s love, contributes to the
wider application of justice and charity within and between na-
tions. By preaching the truth of the gospel and (…)she shows re-
spect for political freedom and responsibility of citizens and fos-
ters these values. (Abbott 1966: 287-288)
A Catholic scholar argued that under the principle of separation of the
church and state, cooperation between the church and state is expected
to serve the needs of the same people who live under the reign of a po-
litical system and belong to the Church. In real life, the Catholic
Church should help human beings to live a life filled with morality
and spirituality and prepare them for the eternal life, while the govern-
ment is expected to help people live a decent life and to satisfy their ba-
sic needs to enable them to pursue a moral and spiritual life (Li 1992:
85-86). It explains why the Catholic Church was prepared to play a
‘framing’ role to work for social stability by cooperating with the Hong
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Kong government by providing educational, social and medical services
and responding to the people’s needs before Hong Kong reverted to
Chinese rule again. The Catholic role of framing for social stability be-
came possible when a mutual interest was found between the British
government and the Catholic Church.
Such a role continued as Hong Kong returned to the mainland and
became a special administrative region. The HKSAR Catholic Church
continued its role as a bridge to stimulate the revival and growth of the
Chinese Catholic Church although its role was met with much obstruc-
tion by the Chinese government. However, despite this, churches have
proliferated on the mainland. As a result of this increase in church
membership, the Chinese government may have felt ill at ease. This
explains why the Chinese government wanted to eliminate the bridg-
ing efforts of the Catholic Church in HKSAR as it could nourish a pos-
sible frame to challenge the Chinese rule as witnessed in the Falun
Gong case.
Another framing role was created by Cardinal Zen when he appealed
for support from his members and the public at the time of the discus-
sion of Article 23 of the Basic Law. He framed the movement in the
name of justice, charity, religious freedom and human rights. With this
as a guiding frame, his message appeals to all sectors of the Hong
Kong population. The Church, by giving the guiding principle as a
moral leader, played a ‘framing’ role in the social movement to annul
the legislation. Most of the commentators stated that without Zen’s
support, the legal professionals would not have persisted in the strug-
gle.17 A related issue is education reform where again Bishop Zen de-
fended the interest of the Church, and religious freedom in education.
In actively establishing a frame for social action and social movement,
Cardinal Zen was careful not to become politically involved. Hence, he
refused to become involved in political activities or join political parties.
He argued that his framing role was not for political reasons but for re-
ligious reasons and thus for the protection of basic Christian values of
human rights.
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13 Religiosity and Social Movements in China:
Divisions and Multiplications1
David A. Palmer
To include religion in a discussion of emerging social movements in
China would seem to be a natural thing to do: after all, one could ar-
gue that in China, the social movements with the greatest numbers of
followers, the most efficient mobilising ability, and the greatest capacity
for resistance to government repression are religious ones. From the
underground churches to Tibetan and Muslim movements to Falun
Gong, organised popular resistance in China has frequently taken reli-
gious form since the late twentieth century.
And yet, an uncritical application of the sociological concept of the
‘social movement’, with its emphasis on conflict and a state-society di-
chotomy, to China’s religious sphere – and perhaps, by extension, to
Chinese society in general – risks blinding us to the true location and
dynamics of social agency in China. While it is not difficult to identify
religious movements of resistance in China, such phenomena merely
represent a small but attention-grabbing portion of a broader process
of the redeployment of religious networks and communities in their re-
lation to society and the state.
When we look closely at the theoretical literature on social move-
ments, however, we come to the quick conclusion that, following the
definitions given, strictly speaking, religion cannot constitute a social
movement, even less so in China; in fact, it would appear that under
China’s traditional and contemporary social and political structure,
there can simply be little social movement of any sort. Considering this
question, we risk repeating the debate of the early 1990s about civil so-
ciety in China, which did not reach a meaningful consensus (Modern
China 1993, 19: 2; Vandermeersch 1994; Chevrier 1995; Brook & Frolic
1997; Weller 1999). If, as argued by Alain Touraine, civil society is the
arena within which social movements occur and which social move-
ments seek to expand (Cohen 1996: 185-186), the results of that debate
are highly relevant to the present discussion of social movements.
One of the contributions concerning Chinese religion to that discus-
sion, made by Kenneth Dean, underlined the growing social role of re-
ligion in rural Fujian, but critiqued the applicability of the concept of
civil society to describe the public spaces opened up by the popular reli-
gious revival (Dean 1997). In another vein, Richard Madsen, in his
sympathetic study of China’s Catholics as an incipient civil society,
came to the sobering conclusion that although Chinese Catholic com-
munities, particularly in the underground Church, engage in organised
activity that is effectively outside of government control: ‘this indepen-
dently organised social activity does not necessarily lead toward social
self-governance in a pluralistic society. It sometimes leads to fragmen-
tation and, potentially, anarchy’ (Madsen 1998: 127). Robert Weller, on
the other hand, stressed both the resilience of informal social resources
which could be mobilised by traditional religious communities, while
stressing the split between amoral cults that accommodate themselves
to the instrumental individualism of the market economy, and the vol-
untarist moralism of Taiwanese sectarian societies and new religious
movements, which come closest to approximating civil society associa-
tions (Weller 1999: 83-84).
In this chapter, I will therefore begin with a critical discussion of the
concept of ‘social movements’ as understood in the sociological litera-
ture, with an eye to its relevance to the Chinese case, and argue that
any fruitful consideration of social agency in China will have to ques-
tion some of the assumptions underlying Western paradigms of reli-
gion, resistance, and historicity. I will then examine the social dy-
namics of the resurgence of Chinese popular religiosity in two distinct
forms in post-Mao China: the revival of temple cults in the rural areas
and the qigong movement in the cities. Data for the former are derived
from a review of ethnographic case studies and, for the latter, from par-
ticipant observation and an analysis of documentary materials pro-
duced within the qigong milieu (Palmer 2007). I will then conclude by
arguing that social agency in these movements has expressed two types
of social logic: lines of division between distinct social actors in confron-
tation, approaching the classical social movement paradigm, and zones
of multiplication of complex relationships between social actors, under-
mining the boundaries between them.
Questioning ‘Social Movements’
A quick perusal of the sociological literature on social movements re-
veals a widespread amalgam between notions of ‘movement’ and ‘pro-
test’, ‘resistance’, ‘challenge’ or ‘conflict’ with the state. Alain Touraine
defines social movements ‘as organised conflicts or as conflicts be-
tween organised actors over the social use of common cultural values’
(Touraine 2002: 90). For Sidney Tarrow, a movement is defined as ‘col-
lective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in
sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities’ (Tarrow
1994: 4).
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Common to all these definitions is the focus on conflict as a defin-
ing characteristic of a social movement. Another underlying assump-
tion is that social movements are expressions of agency, of the ‘autono-
my of social actors’ (Touraine 2002: 92): they are the result of groups
of people acting freely and collectively to achieve a common goal of so-
cial change or resistance to change. And yet, one wonders: is there no
agency when there is no conflict? Is there no possibility of movement
outside of protest? For Touraine, it would appear not. Looking at Latin
America, he concludes that ‘there are no social actors in this part of
the world’. Turning his gaze to Eastern Europe, he finds, as well, ‘no
new actors’ and that ‘the capacity for social agency in the present situa-
tion is much lower than we expected’ (Touraine 2002: 94). He would,
no doubt, be even more disappointed if he considered China: classical
social movements, in the sense of the labour movement, women’s
movement, environmental movement, and so on, are indeed very re-
stricted in their capacity for ‘challenging’ action in China.
Should we then conclude that there is little or no space for social
agency in China? I would like to argue that on the contrary, in a con-
text of tight state control, religious groups and networks have demon-
strated a high degree of resourcefulness in opening and creating a
space for the attainment of their objectives. Elizabeth Perry, in her
study of rural violence in socialist China, has stressed that the organi-
sational base of popular rural protest has not followed the same evolu-
tionary trajectory as in Europe, where reactive violence (food riots, tax
revolts) of communal groups aiming to defend traditional prerogatives
against an expanding state gradually gives way, when the state and
market gain the upper hand, to ‘associational’ organisations such as
trade unions which engage in ‘proactive’ collective action such as
strikes (Perry 2002: 276, quoting Tilly 1975) – sectoral mobilisation
that could be considered ‘social movements’ in the classical sense.
Rather, she notes, rural China in the reform era has witnessed the re-
constitution of traditional social units with a religious component. But
her presentation of religious movements in terms of popular revolts
against the state and inter-communal violence may obscure the com-
plexities and ambiguities of popular religious groups in their relations
with the people and the state. To adequately perceive their agency, it
will be necessary to abandon two preconceptions commonly found in
the literature on social movements: first, the assumption of a radical
discontinuity between state and society; second, the assumption that
conflict is essential to social agency. We will then be able to see reli-
gious groups deploying a wide range of creative strategies to protect
their interests, expand, and effect or resist change, in rare cases exhibit-
ing some characteristics of fully fledged social movements, but in most
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cases consciously avoiding conflict with the state, rather sharing zones
of multiplication with the local state and other social actors.
Beyond issues of conflict and resistance, it will be fruitful to consider
the underlying utopianism and historicity of social movements. Be they
class-based labour movements or culturally based environmental or
feminist movements, the actors in social movements share a common
explicit or implicit utopian horizon indissociable from the unfolding of
Western modernity, a progressive evolution towards greater social pro-
gress through a historical dialectic in which societal change is triggered
by underclass or subaltern groups challenging the centre or privileged
classes, thereby forcing a re-ordering of social relations which moves
society closer to the utopian ideal. It is through such a dialectic that a
common social field comes into being, within which opposing protago-
nists interact and ‘battle for the control of historicity’ (Cohen 1996:
182; Touraine 1981: 31-32, quoted in Oommen 1996). In other words,
the protagonists situate themselves on the same historical trajectory
and clash over the control of its unfolding. Such historicity, however, is
entirely foreign to Chinese religion. What happens, then, when Chi-
nese religious sacralities and cycles intersect with the linear unfolding
of rationalised ‘society’? To what extent can the mutual interferences
thus produced be compared to social movements?
Temple Revivals in the Chinese Countryside
Let us begin with the traditional Chinese religion, often called ‘folk’ or
‘popular’ religion, which, over the twentieth century, has largely disap-
peared from most mainland Chinese cities but has undergone a signifi-
cant resurgence in several rural parts of the country. The focal point of
Chinese religion is the temple, which is simultaneously a sacred spot,
a public space, and a social organisation (Goossaert 2000). Two types
of temple concern us here: temples for the cult of local gods and
saints, which typically bring together all residents of a particular village
or district; and temples for ancestors, called lineage halls, which are re-
served for members of the same patrilineage. Communal worship at
deity temples is held on regular festivals such as the god’s birthday or
cyclical rites of cosmic renewal (jiao). Temples and festivals – which re-
quire a complex logistical organisation – are managed by lay commit-
tees whose members and officers can be chosen through a variety of
procedures including selection by consensus, drawing lots, divination,
or rotation among households. Troupes of local priests, who typically
claim a Taoist and/or Buddhist affiliation, are often hired to perform
the required rituals. All village residents or lineage members are ex-
pected to contribute financially to the construction, restoration, or ex-
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pansion of a temple, as well as to the organisation of ritual events and
festivals. Temple and festival committees collect and manage these
funds, as well as the funds collected in donation boxes and through the
sale of incense for daily worship. As we will see, these funds may be
spent for public or social services in addition to ritual activities.
It is important to bear in mind that in the Chinese religion, each
temple represents an independent cult which has no institutionalised
relationship with other temples or, for that matter, any other social or-
ganisation. Temples do, often in a most dynamic fashion, cultivate rela-
tionships and maintain ritual alliances with other temples and social
organisations, but never as part of a nested, institutionalised hierarchy.
Furthermore, belonging to none of China’s five officially recognised re-
ligions2, most popular temples have no natural link with the state reli-
gious affairs bureaucracy and are technically illegal. In some areas,
there has been a trend to register such temples as Taoist or Buddhist,
thereby integrating them in the state’s system of religious manage-
ment, through giving them membership in local state-sponsored reli-
gious associations. But, as I will discuss further below, the implications
of such membership are far from representing simple subordination.
With Chinese temples, then, we are faced with a phenomenon of
hundreds of thousands of associations, largely independent of the state
and of each other, which, in many villages, have become one of the
main forms of local social organisation. The extent of the phenomenon
is hard to measure. Since it is not a unified, self-conscious, national, re-
ligious community – this type of religiosity does not have a self-recog-
nised collective name and does not even traditionally refer to itself as
‘religion’, nor does it have any criterion for membership based on be-
lief, it is impossible to compile statistics of ‘numbers of believers’
which could be compared to those of, say, Catholics, Muslims, or Com-
munist Party members. It is possible, however, to quantify, at least in
some better documented locales, numbers of temples and the fre-
quency of their ritual activities, which are the main occasions on which
temples play a significant role in social organisation, community gath-
ering, cultural production, and circulation of resources. One quantita-
tive indicator of popular participation in temple life is the percentage
of households in a given village who have contributed money, labour
or materials to temple reconstruction projects.
No national statistics are available, but one prefecture government
report counted over 10,000 temples in Yulin district, Northern Shaanxi
province, for a population of 3.1 million in the mid-1990s – an average
of one temple per 315 persons (Chau 2005b: 21). In Southeast China,
through a painstaking field survey of the Putian region of Fujian pro-
vince, Ken Dean and Zheng Zhenman identified some 1,639 temples
in the 600 villages of the region: 2.7 temples per village of 1,200 inha-
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bitants on average – which amounts to one temple per 444 inhabitants.
Furthermore, temple reconstruction ushered a renewal of community
celebrations: in the area studied by Ken Dean, ritual events and festi-
vals occurred within walking distance of the average village over 250
days per year (Dean & Lamarre 2003).
These figures are significant because they can be compared to a
China-wide estimation of one temple per 400 inhabitants in 1900
(Goossaert 2000). To be sure, Fujian arguably had a higher than aver-
age temple density, while the number of temples was very low in other
regions, where local state agents were much less amenable to temple
reconstruction and a renewal of ritual activities. But the high number
of temples in the impoverished, landlocked North Shaanxi belies the
assumption that popular religion flourished only in the more prosper-
ous and liberal coastal areas (Weller 1999: 85-86). Such figures can
only give us a limited idea of the extent of temple religion, since they
make no distinction between large monasteries and small shrines, nor
do they give an indication of temple activity: some may be dormant
and others flourishing. In other parts of China, superficial observation
indicated a much lower incidence of temple life: there were significant
variations, not only between regions, but even from one village to an-
other. The overall data, however, point to the exceptional resilience and
dynamism of temple religion in some parts of mainland China, where
it would seem to have reached levels of activity comparable to those
prior to the early twentieth-century anti-superstition campaigns.
This is all the more remarkable given that temple religion has been
the object of repeated campaigns to destroy popular religion since the
late nineteenth century, for both ideological reasons – the struggle
against superstition – and practical ones – the expropriation and con-
version of temples, which were usually the largest buildings in a town
or village, into the infrastructure of an expanding modern state:
schools, tax collection departments, police stations, army barracks, or
government offices. The political significance of converting temples, as
self-organising nodes of local society, into the specialised branches of a
centralised bureaucracy was not lost on local residents and modernis-
ing activists alike who, throughout the first decades of the twentieth
century, often clashed over the uses and appropriations of temples
(Prazniak 1999; Duara 1991; Goossaert 2006).
After 1949, the new socialist regime, which was able to penetrate
deep into every village, had the means to effectively carry out, for the
same ideological and practical reasons, what had been the longstanding
Guomindang policy of eradicating superstition, to which was now
added the additional stigmatising label of ‘feudal’. And yet, while the
general trend and political atmosphere of the first decade of the Peo-
ples’ Republic made it increasingly difficult for temples to operate, and
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encouraged their confiscation or destruction by local activists and
authorities, CCP policy was to focus on struggles against ‘landlords’,
‘class enemies’, and ‘counterrevolutionary elements’ – who were often
active in temple management – rather than on attacking the temples
themselves (Gong 2003; Feuchtwang & Wang 2001: 36-37). The press
on occasion criticised fanatical activists who desecrated temples and an-
cestral halls, upsetting the people and thus causing them to support
the landlords (Aijmer & Ho 2000: 147). In parts of North China stu-
died by Adam Chau, the social stability and economic recovery brought
about by the new regime actually stimulated a new flourishing of pop-
ular religion and the reconstruction of temples destroyed by the Japa-
nese or during the civil war, with the impetus now coming more from
the peasants than from the overthrown landlords and rich merchants,
who had been the traditional sponsors of temples (Chau 2003: 41-42;
Perry 2002: 289). It was only in the mid-1960s, with the Socialist Edu-
cation Campaign of 1964 and the 1966 ‘Smash the Four Olds’ cam-
paign of the Cultural Revolution, that rural popular religion and its
temples were almost completely eradicated for more than a decade –
although deity statues and sacred objects were often buried or hidden
by temple activists, and low-key, secret ritual activity continued.
With the more open climate at the end of the 1970s, temples began
to resurface. While the process involved the rebuilding and reopening
of temples that had previously existed, the social context in which tem-
ple religion was reviving was completely different from that in which
its traditional organisational forms had developed. The land endow-
ments which had previously sustained temple operations had been ap-
propriated by the state and redistributed to the farmers, and the gentry
society and traditional political economy through which temples had
played their social role at the centre of what Duara has called the ‘cul-
tural nexus of power’ (Duara 1988) no longer existed. If, in the first
half of the twentieth century, temples could be seen as organic emana-
tions of the old, ‘feudal’ order against which social movements mobi-
lised peasants, workers, and women, the tables were reversed in the
post-Mao era: while the socialist order retreated from its revolutionary
voluntarism, it was temple construction which mobilised people
around new projects, often virtually from scratch and in an agonistic
relationship with the state. It is in this limited sense that we can com-
pare temples in the reform-era PRC with social movements.
Typically, the first sign of temple revival was the increase in the
numbers of worshippers who, sensing the more open political atmo-
sphere, came to burn incense at the spot where the temple had pre-
viously stood – whether the original buildings were completely de-
stroyed, dilapidated, or taken over for other purposes. Gradually, people
would, in an unorganised fashion, clear the premises, install deity sta-
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tues, and do makeshift repairs. The turning point occurred, however,
when one person took the initiative to launch a fully fledged rebuilding
project – an undertaking requiring significant organisational capacity
as well as the ability to mobilise networks of support among villagers,
donors, and officials. Each situation is unique, and these individuals
had a range of backgrounds and motivations. Specific examples men-
tioned in the literature range from a devout farmer and old soldier
(DuBois 2005: 56) to an unpopular local Party secretary seeking to re-
gain his lost legitimacy (Jing 1996: 89). A common case involved
individuals who had been stigmatised with a bad class background dur-
ing the Mao years, and for whom temple building represented a way of
reclaiming and reasserting their identity and dignity, and regaining so-
cial status (Aijmer & Ho 2000: 207-209; Eng & Lin 2002: 1272). For
example, a temple manager I interviewed in Lianshan, Northern
Guangdong, was a retired primary school teacher whose landlord class
background had caused him to be persecuted as a ‘Rightist’; with no
place to stay in the village, he had taken up residence in the ruins of
the local temple. Feeling that the god had protected him during those
terrible years, he had arisen to rebuild the temple in the 1990s. An-
other typical case of temple reconstruction occurred after cadres who
had desecrated a temple or divinity statue were struck by sudden death
or strange illnesses, prompting villagers to speculate that the god was
exacting revenge, or when someone had a dream of the village god ex-
pressing resentment at not having a proper home (Feuchtwang &
Wang 2001: 63). The group of people who helped the initiator of the
temple project would evolve into the temple management board, in
which the initiator may or may not have continued to play the domi-
nant role. The people most commonly active on temple boards are typi-
cally senior villagers interested in local customs and history, retired lo-
cal government leaders and Party members with good connections and
organisational experience, and younger entrepreneurs who treat temple
activity as spiritual, symbolic and social capital.
The most visible sign of a temple’s activity and influence is its festi-
vals. The size, length, and occasion of temple festivals vary greatly, al-
ways following local custom. Occasions include traditional yearly festi-
vals such as the Lantern Festival (yuanxiaojie), the birthday of a major
temple god, or cyclical rituals of cosmic renewal (jiao) which occur
every one, three, ten, or sixty years. A festival may last between one
and ten days, and includes continuous rituals conducted by troupes of
religious specialists, traditional opera performances (sometimes re-
placed by action film screenings) (Aijmer & Ho 2000: 214 n.7), a deity
procession around the territory of the temple’s ‘jurisdiction’, competi-
tive rites such as lion dances, dragon boat races, or rocket firing (siu-
pao), and plenty of economic activity on the side. People participate in
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festivals both as individuals – worshipping the gods and enjoying the
festive atmosphere – and as representatives of sub-segments of the
community such as lineages, villages, local businesses, or government
departments. The atmosphere is one of ‘hot and noisy’ (renao) sensory
overload, with total attendance, in some cases, reaching the hundreds
of thousands over several days (Chau 2005a: 262). During and after
the festival, gossip among villagers will evaluate the success in drawing
and entertaining large crowds, and compare the festival with previous
ones or those organised by neighbouring temples, putting the face and
prestige of the organisers, and by extension of the whole village, at
stake (Eng & Lin 2002: 1274). A temple festival is often the most sig-
nificant and memorable event in the life of a rural community, becom-
ing an important moment in the creation and enactment of local iden-
tities, and often the subject of intense rivalries between communities
vying with each other to build the most resplendent temple and hold
the most spectacular festivals. Indeed, the revival of a temple and its
festivals often stimulates neighbouring villages to do the same, both to
enhance their status and to build ties between villages through partici-
pation in each others’ rituals and festivals (Dean 1993: 9).
All of this occurs in a political context in which most temples are
technically illegal, and their customs and festivals stigmatised as ‘feu-
dal superstitions’. Negotiation and tension with agents of the state are
thus an inescapable feature of temple life and have been described in
detail by several scholars. A recurring picture emerges in several of
these studies, of a constant ‘tug-of-war’ (Yang 2004b) over the uses and
appropriations of public spaces. Ann Anagnost thus cites the example
of hundreds of rebuilt temples which were expropriated in Fujian in
the 1980s and converted into school dormitories, childcare centres, rec-
reation centres, television-viewing centres, youth clubs, rest stops, and
rain shelters (Anagnost 1994: 221), and the confiscation of festival
funds to build a reservoir. At the same time, the Fujian Daily de-
nounced the conversion into temples of a noodle factory, primary
schools, food-processing plants, and cattle pens, showing that the dy-
namic of temple revival and that of temple conversion occur in parallel,
with buildings and spaces becoming the sites of an ongoing struggle
between the state and local populations – in some cases expressed
through demonstrations and riots led by spirit mediums and festival
organisers against local Party offices, and in other cases expressed as a
more subtle popular reappropriation, such as when old ladies disrupt
school discipline by burning incense and worshipping in the midst of
classroom activities (Anagnost 1994: 241-245). Ken Dean has described
police interference in the 1986 and 1987 procession of the Patriarch of
the Clear Stream in Penglai township, Fujian, during which some Tao-
ist priests were arrested and the procession disrupted. The authorities
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were unable to bring the festivities to a halt, however, and triggered
such strong popular resentment that they were hesitant to interfere
again (Dean 1993: 104-117; Dean 1998: 269). One line of analysis has
been to see this tension as an expression of popular resistance to state
power. Anagnost thus states that labelling popular religion as ‘feudal
superstition’ has invested it with a ‘potent means of expressing counter
hegemony, a subaltern conception of the world, or system of value
(…)’. ‘Ritual clearly becomes oppositional in that it reasserts local
meanings and local identity against the more universal claims of the
state’ (Anagnost 1994: 42, 245).
Other studies, however, present a more nuanced analysis of the
forces at play.3 The theme of ‘microstruggles over space’ is further de-
veloped by Mayfair Yang, in her studies of popular religion in Zhejiang
province. Yang stresses the overlapping uses of the same spaces by the
state and religious cults, citing, for example, the case of a Wang lineage
hall in rural Yongchang Township, which had been turned into an ele-
mentary school in the Republican era. In the early 1980s, faced with
the imminent demolition of the building, still occupied by a school, to
make way for road construction, lineage members organised them-
selves as an archaeological relic preservation team, and successfully pe-
titioned higher levels of government to have the site protected as a Cul-
tural Relic. Both the state and the lineage then simultaneously invested
the buildings with competing significations which coexisted side by
side: at one time, ancestral portraits vied with political banners for the
attention of the schoolchildren still studying in the building. Later, the
school moved out when the local government turned the structure into
a museum, dedicated to the building as an example of ancient architec-
ture, but not as a hall for ancestor worship – in which, nonetheless,
lineage members continued to hold their annual sacrificial rites. In
1998, the museum’s theme was extended to become a ‘Base Area for
National Defence Education’, charging entrance fees for exhibits on
military history and displays of tanks, fighter planes, and warships
placed on either side of the main altar for the ancestor tablets. A giant
white statue was erected in the hall’s courtyard, depicting two Wang
brothers who led the anti-Japanese defence in the Ming dynasty. Thus,
while at one level, the building appears as the site of a ‘tug-of-war’, ‘a
place for the competitive display of national sacrifice versus adherence
to local kin and community’, at another level, the competing uses ‘per-
fectly encapsulate the convenient conflation of honouring lineage an-
cestors with paying homage to patriotic heroes who resisted foreign in-
vasions of national space’: the state-employed managing committee of
the museum is dominated by members of the Wang lineage, who are
proud to have so much official recognition for their lineage hall, which
is even designated as a provincial-level tourist attraction, with govern-
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ment funding to build an amusement centre for playing billiards and
video games (Yang 2004b: 720, 734-738). Transforming temples into
museums becomes a way for the state to appropriate local culture
while freezing it (Dean 1998: 270). The state appropriates the space
for its ideological uses, while the lineage hall obtains state legitimisa-
tion and protection: these will ‘coexist in an uneasy state of coopera-
tion, tension, and interpenetration’ (Yang 2004b: 738).
In their study of a stretch of road in Sichuan along the route towards
Tibet, anthropologists John Flowers and Pamela Leonard explore the
place of temples in the negotiation of local peoples’ memories and
moral worlds in the face of successive civilising projects (Flower & Leo-
nard 1998; Flower 2004). Rejecting the discourse on ‘everyday forms
of resistance’, they see a relationship of ‘mutual cooptation’ which they
contrast to cases of peasant riots and angry confrontations which were
recurrent in the same region in the 1990s (Flower & Leonard 1998:
274-277, 280-287). They describe the reopening in 1992 of a temple to
Chuanzhu – the Lord of Rivers, who protects the community from
flooding – whose statue was destroyed by township government offi-
cials a few days before the god’s annual festival was to be celebrated.
Just afterwards, a flood swept through the area, destroying many
houses, the main road, and the township high school, a disaster which
was interpreted by the people as divine retribution for the desecration,
proving the efficacy of the god, increasing popular support for rebuild-
ing the temple, and undermining the legitimacy of the local govern-
ment. The anger of the god, a divinised figure of the ‘upright official’
Er Lang of the early Han dynasty, focalised popular resentment against
the corruption of the current local officials. Later, when the local leader-
ship team was changed, new Party Secretary Gao supported the temple
in order to restore the government’s legitimacy, and had the govern-
ment finance the renovation of the temple, on the condition that it be
promoted as a tourist attraction and be integrated into state bureau-
cratic structures by being designated as Buddhist, with nuns from the
state-sponsored Buddhist Association appointed to manage the temple.
The temple enthusiasts were happy to participate in this cooptation, to
a point: they accepted the categorisation of the temple as a resource for
economic development, while simultaneously holding to the legend of
Er Lang as a moral criticism of the commercialisation and commodifi-
cation of society; and they accepted the Buddhist nuns, but had them
accommodated in a new hall dedicated to the Buddhist Goddess of
Mercy (Guanyin), preserving the original cult to Chuanzhu. A few
years later, Party Secretary Gao was recalled, and the local government
once again attempted to restrict the temple; Gao’s name, however, was
inscribed on a new stone tablet in front of the temple, from then on to
be forever associated with the upright virtues of the god Chuanzhu.
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From this account, the temple appears as a site where real conflicts be-
tween the state and local society are enacted and negotiated, and where
universal civilising discourses are intertwined with local memories and
appropriated by the residents: ‘The temple gave [the farmer] hope not
because it was “traditional”, but precisely because it was a place where
the subject of civilising discourse could be engaged, instead of written
out of the narrative’ (Flower 2004: 681). Feuchtwang and Wang have
likewise noted how the image of temple gods and managers as right-
eous servants of the people has come to combine village history and
tradition with the collective values of public duty previously inculcated
by the CCP (Feuchtwang & Wang 2001: 77).
Turning to northwest China, we can consider the case of the Kong
lineage of Dachuan village, Gansu, studied in detail by Jing Jun
(1996). This village had doubly suffered during the Mao years, first on
account of the ‘feudal’ and ‘reactionary’ background of its dominant
lineage, descendant of Confucius, and second since much of the vil-
lage, as well as most of its graves, had been permanently flooded and
forcibly resettled for the building of a reservoir. For the members of
the Kong lineage, rebuilding their lineage hall and reviving its ances-
tral cult was a way of reclaiming their memory and rebuilding their
shattered identity. While the temple rebuilding project was initiated in
the 1980s by an unpopular Party secretary hoping to regain legitimacy,
he was driven out of office by younger Party members who were active
in an (unsuccessful) campaign for compensation for the land lost to
the reservoir, and who became, together with some old men who had
received classical Confucian training in their youth, the core of the
group of temple activists. In order to ensure legitimacy for the temple,
its original purpose as an ancestral temple restricted to Kong lineage
members was doubled with one as a hall to commemorate Confucius
as a sage of the Chinese people, and therefore a public site for the pro-
motion of Chinese culture and national pride. However, the installation
of a statue of Confucius, crafted in the manner customary of popular
divinity statues, caused the temple to be viewed by most villagers as a
popular god, able to answer prayers and cure illnesses, making the
Confucius temple one of the major centres of folk religion in the area.
Here, the temple was clearly a site for the expression of local tensions
and political conflicts, but these were diffused by juxtaposing Kong
clan identity, the state’s civilising project, and popular religious culture.
In his study of the Black Dragon King temple in Yulin district,
Northern Shaanxi, Adam Chau paints a picture of the emergence of a
new type of local elite which draws its power from moral authority and
access to tradition, in constant negotiation with two other types of local
elite: business entrepreneurs and agents of the local state. His study fo-
cuses primarily on the latter, showing how temple boss Wang success-
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fully ensured the legitimisation and protection of the temple by having
its old stone gate designated a cultural relic, by providing cash pay-
ments to police patrolling the huge annual temple festivals, as well as
tax and income streams for the local commercial and electricity bu-
reaus, and spending temple revenues on environmental and educa-
tional projects recognised and praised by the forestry and education bu-
reaus. He finally succeeded in having the temple officially registered as
a Taoist place of worship, at a ceremony scheduled to coincide with the
high point of the Dragon King’s birthday festival, with the best opera
performances in all of Northern Shaanxi and thousands of local festi-
val-goers present. The ceremony brought into each others’ presence,
mutually recognising and acknowledging each other, the personal char-
isma of the temple boss, the divine power of the god, the political
authority of the state representatives, and the communal energy of the
crowds (Chau 2005a: 269).4 An illegal temple and an unpopular local
state leadership thus used each other in order to obtain the legitimacy
they respectively lacked: legal and political for the temple, popular and
divine for the local state agents.
Using the surplus funds raised through incense donation boxes, the
Dragon King temple launched a reforestation project which won inter-
national acclaim as the only non-governmental arboretum in China,
and built a primary school which, with generous funding from the
temple and excellent facilities, quickly became the best primary school
in the entire district (Chau 2005a: 258-259). Indeed, in a context in
which, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the state increasingly disen-
gaged itself from the village level, providing few resources to cash-
strapped village governments and Party branches whose main function
often came to be limited to the unpopular activities of tax collection
and enforcing birth control policies, temples have frequently emerged
as alternative centres of resource collection and allocation, to which vil-
lagers willingly contribute funds, which in many cases are spent by the
temple board on local infrastructure such as the construction and re-
pair of roads, bridges, schools, and even basketball courts (Yang 2000:
486-489). In her comparative study of four villages in Jiangxi and Fu-
jian, Lily Lee Tsai concludes that single-lineage villages which practise
village-wide rituals or with an active temple association ‘provide broad
community networks that village officials can draw on for public ser-
vices’ (Tsai 2002: 9). She notes that the committees formed to rebuild
temples and lineage halls often evolved into ‘community councils’ that
organised religious, social, and philanthropic activities. While villagers
would not contribute to appeals for funds by village cadres, they ‘will-
ingly and universally’ contributed to public projects when solicited by
temple boards. In one village, the temple committee’s revenue was four
times higher than that of the village government and had taken over
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all of the road building in the community (Tsai 2002: 10, 11). Local
cadres often sought the support of temple boards for their projects,
and downloaded responsibility for social services to them, although
they continued to take credit for their achievements when reporting to
higher levels of the administration (Tsai 2002: 21-23). Thus, Ken Dean
claimed that popular religion has become a ‘second tier of local govern-
ment’ in many parts of rural China (Dean 2001; 2003). In a township
I visited in Northern Guangdong, temple board members were said to
be ‘more powerful than the Party’ and, by circulating a petition signed
by over 20,000 residents, had successfully campaigned against the lo-
cal government’s plan to change the name of the township. And yet,
relations between the temple board and the local state were cordial and
cooperative, cemented by a father-son relationship: the son was the Of-
fice Director in charge of the day-to-day management of the township
government, while his father, a retired primary school teacher, was the
leading member of the temple board. In a case described by Feucht-
wang and Wang, a lineage hall committee, which had been provided
with an office in the village government building, ended up occupying
its entire ground floor (Feuchtwang & Wang 2001: 64).
Many studies have stressed the support given to temples and lineage
halls by local and regional governments eager to promote tourism and
to attract investment by overseas Chinese. In her research on the role
of Singaporeans in the revival of religious activities in their ancestral
villages in southeast China, K.E. Kuah-Pearce has noted that while vil-
lage cadres tended to support the revival of ancestor worship for senti-
mental reasons, officials at the county level also encouraged such activ-
ities for instrumental reasons, hoping that the ties thus created with
Singaporeans would lead them to contribute funds to schools and hos-
pitals and invest in infrastructures benefiting the entire county. Large-
scale religious festivals for the Patriarch of the Clear Stream, who was
worshipped by most Singaporeans on trips to their hometowns, and
whose temple was renovated with local government support as a desig-
nated tourist attraction, were staged with the active cooperation of the
local authorities, which declared the festival a public holiday and had
the schools closed, while pupils performed dances and musicals and
were provided with dress, drinks, and pocket money by the festival or-
ganisers (Kuah-Pearce 2000: 167, 185, 190).5 In other cases described
by Go¨ran Aijmer and Virgil C.Y. Ho, temple activists and enthusiastic
local cadres successfully ‘used’ Hong Kong connections to press for re-
cognition by higher levels of government, asking their Hong Kong kin
to intervene with the authorities and even to threaten – successfully –
that they would destroy the roads they had funded if a Provincial Work
Team, sent down to supervise an anti-superstition campaign in 1993,
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insisted on confiscating two modest village temples (Aijmer & Ho
2000: 224).
Some local cults have also been used by state agents to promote Chi-
na’s political reunification: most notable has been the use of the cult of
Mazu, billed in the Chinese press as the ‘Sea Goddess of Peace in the
Taiwan Strait’ (Peoples’ Daily Overseas Edition 22 April 1987, quoted in
Liu 2005: 3). Taiwanese temples contributed financially and organised
large-scale pilgrimages to the ancestral temple in Meizhou, Fujian.
State agencies legitimised these activities and encouraged the organisa-
tion of academic conferences on local gods to which local scholars,
temple activists, and overseas donors were invited (Dean 1993: 92) –
although, as noted by Yang, rather than leading to political unification,
‘cross-strait Mazu pilgrimages are creating a regional ritual space and
religious community of Chinese coastal peoples that do not conform to
existing political borders’ (Yang 2004a: 216). Attempting to replicate
the Mazu model and hoping to build ties with Hong Kong and Macau
residents, the Shenzhen Cultural Bureau rebuilt the Chiwan Tianhou
temple in 1992 as an uneasy hybrid of secular museum and place of
worship (Liu 2005). This case of a temple built by the government
itself is also increasingly common, as local authorities attempt to ap-
propriate the popularity of religious activity and profit from its revenue
streams, either by building new temples or taking over existing ones.6
The temple of the Patriarch of the Clear Stream, mentioned above, was
even the object of a struggle for control between local and provincial le-
vels of government (Dean 1993: 126).
From the cases studied above, it is obvious that rural temple revivals
do express conflicts over what Touraine calls the ‘appropriation of his-
toricity’ (Touraine 1988: 68) or the respective roles and powers of social
groups in the collective development of society. While social move-
ments are struggles over conflicting interpretations of shared universal
norms and utopian values and are thus contests taking place between
actors within the same linearity of history, temple revivals disrupt the
centralised, developmental historicity of the nation-state, rewinding
local communities into overlapping cyclical time-frames of festivals
and ritual events. And yet, in their relations with the nation-state and
its civilising projects, by participating in the local elaboration and ap-
propriation of developmental discourses and practices on patriotism,
the economy, tourism, cultural preservation, and education, they do
open up a peculiar type of ‘public sphere’ which is highly charged by
the tension between incommensurable spatialities and temporalities.
Thus, while they clearly express the assertion of local identities, they fit
into neither of the extreme models of identity identified by Touraine as
disqualifying a group as a social movement: their behaviour is not one
of seeking ‘pure identity’ through withdrawing from active engagement
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with social change; nor do they display the ‘purely strategic’ model of
groups competing for power and privilege within a social structure
which is not contested (Cohen 1996: 183). A temple is not an interest
group but a type of social, spatial, and temporal organisation which
can be invested by different groups, networks, and even the state itself
in the pursuit of their respective interests. While temples do not expli-
citly challenge the political order, rather, when necessary, try to inscribe
themselves into it through the legitimacy provided by the labels of ‘cul-
tural relic’, ‘tourist site’, ‘designated site for religious activities’, ‘patrio-
tic education’, or ‘economic development’, the interpenetration of the
temple and the modern state as mutually alien forms of social organi-
sation can only lead to changes in the local political order.
It is an interaction in which several logics may operate at the same
time. From the perspective of the totalistic ideological discourse of the
state, which operates on binary dichotomies between the developed
and the backward, the modern and the superstitious – what I term lines
of division – the reality in the field can only appear incongruous, and
only three options are conceivable: to rename the phenomenon, as
mentioned above, by inscribing it into legitimate categories; to ignore
it; or to eliminate it. It cannot be surprising, then, that whenever popu-
lar religion is not ignored or renamed by the official media or policy, it
is always denigrated and attacked with anti-superstition discourses and
campaigns – and that the earlier studies which have relied primarily
on Chinese official newspaper reports (notably Perry’s and Anagnost’s)
have thus focused on dimensions of repression, conflict, and resis-
tance.
But later research in the field has uncovered a more subtle dynamic7,
which could be termed as one of the zones of multiplication. Multiplica-
tion can be understood in terms of increasing numbers of new autono-
mous units often connecting with each other in ‘rhizomatic networks’
(Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 20, 31), which is how the spread of temple
religion can be described, as opposed to the growth of a single social
body. It can also be understood as the multiplication of relationships
between beings of a different nature: gods, humans, state agencies,
producing an entirely new reality each time a term of the equation is
modified. As shown by Adam Chau, the temple blasts open the state’s
monolithic discourse about itself, revealing a profusion of ‘linking and
articulating channels’ between the temple and different local state
agencies, while the latter likewise establish channels with multiple in-
dividuals and popular organisations, through which circulate healings,
money, gifts, status, protection, tributes, deference, and legitimacy
(Chau 2005a: 268-69). Ken Dean has suggested thinking of a ‘floating
signifier’ released into the socio-political system by Taoist ritual, which
provides ‘lines of flight’ from the ‘despotic signifier’ of imperial power
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(Dean 1993: 184, 185). The multiplying logic of the temple also oper-
ates in the relationships between divinity statues, temple managers, lo-
cal worshippers, state officials, overseas pilgrims, geomancers, busi-
ness entrepreneurs, and priests – each of which enters the sacred space
with differing sets of motivations, cosmologies, and pantheons, produ-
cing an infinite range of intersecting connections and dissolving all at-
tempts to impose fixed lines of division.
The Qigong Movement8
Turning to qigong, we can see a similar interplay between lines of divi-
sion and zones of multiplication, but in which there was a conscious
attempt to invest the unfolding historicity of modernity, producing a
phenomenon which came much closer to resembling a social move-
ment. The modern category of qigong was devised at the end of the
1940s in the nascent health bureaucracy of the ‘Liberated Zone’ of
South Hebei, and established as a sub-discipline of Chinese medicine
within the medical institutions of the new Peoples’ Republic during
the 1950s. Defined as ‘breath training’ and including body, breathing,
and mental exercise regimens, the category aimed to integrate, standar-
dise, and secularise the vast array of traditional body cultivation and
meditation techniques, which had typically been practised in religious
settings and transmitted through ‘feudal’ master-disciple relationships,
but which were seen as having positive benefits for health. Following
the logic of lines of division, the project of qigong was to separate the
physical body techniques from the dross of feudal and superstitious
symbols, customs, and social relations, turning them into a scientific
clinical practice that could be harnessed at low cost to train the healthy
bodies of New China’s people. In practice, during the 1950s and early
1960s, qigong clinics provided relief for the mentally stressed Party elite
at hospitals and sanatoria such as the Beidaihe beach resort (Palmer
2007: 29-45).
During its first phase, qigong was entirely instrumentalised by the
state and could hardly be considered a movement. But, after more than
a decade during which the qigong institutions had been closed due to
the Cultural Revolution, qigong reappeared in the late 1970s and in-
creasingly took the form of a popular movement. Operating outside of
the medical institutions, some qigong activists created their own stan-
dardised sets of exercises, which were practised by groups of people in
parks. Thousands of charismatic ‘qigong masters’ emerged from obscur-
ity, claiming to have secretly nurtured their powers during the Cultural
Revolution, and now ‘came out of the mountains’ to heal the sick and
save humanity from suffering. Laboratory experiments, which appeared
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to prove the material existence of the vital force or ‘external qi’ emitted
by masters towards patients from a distance, gave a scientific basis to
the mysterious powers of the masters, and pointed to qigong exercises
as the key to unlocking the paranormal abilities which lay latent in
every human being. This tantalising possibility was enthusiastically
taken up by key members of China’s scientific elite, especially within
the military and nuclear technology establishments, who enlisted lead-
ing figures in the CCP to support the dream of a new ‘somatic science’
which would trigger a new worldwide scientific revolution under Chi-
nese leadership (Palmer 2007: 46-85).
The standardised sets of qigong exercises, called gongfa in Chinese,
each had a name, such as ‘Xianggong’ (‘aromatic qigong’) or ‘Zhineng-
gong’ (‘intelligent qigong’) and were associated with a qigong master,
who was the author or inheritor of the method. Although a gongfa tech-
nically referred to a set of exercises, in practice each gongfa was the
basis of a training network linking the master to hundreds, thousands,
or even millions of practitioners. Each gongfa was transmitted to the
mass of practitioners by networks of trainers in local practice points
throughout a region, the country, and often even abroad. As networks,
they involved both vertical communication between the master, his dis-
ciples and trainers, and the practitioners, as well as horizontal commu-
nications between network members. Most gongfa networks registered
as ‘research societies’ under the umbrella of state-sponsored national,
provincial, and municipal federations which were typically led by well-
connected, retired government and party leaders who practised qigong
themselves, and which operated under the patronage of government
ministries (health and sports) and official Science and Technology asso-
ciations (Palmer 2007: 183-218). Newspapers reported the healing
miracles of the masters as phenomena at the frontiers of cutting-edge
science, while best-selling books on the ‘grandmasters’ such as Yan Xin
and Zhang Hongbao spawned a publishing industry.
By the second half of the 1980s, qigong had become a mass phenom-
enon, promoted and carried forward by several distinct groups of peo-
ple: the qigong masters, the paranormal scientists, the retired Party
leaders, the health and sports officials, and the multitudes of ordinary
practitioners. It is hard to estimate the number of persons who prac-
tised qigong. While the figure of over 100 million is often mentioned, it
would be more realistic to consider that regular practitioners at the
peak of the qigong craze numbered around 10 million, while several
times as many people practised occasionally, attended healing sessions,
or had other direct experiences of qigong. Given that qigong was largely
an urban phenomenon, and that the majority of practitioners were wo-
men and seniors, this figure still represents a significant proportion of
those categories of the population.9
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The leading figures among those who practised, studied, and pro-
moted traditional Chinese body technologies under the name qigong
described themselves as the ‘qigong sector’ (qigong jie). They were active
in a social space I call the ‘qigong milieu’: a nebula of networks and as-
sociations which expanded massively in the 1980s. The qigong milieu
was a space of relative freedom in which, between 1979 and 1999,
many types of popular activities and networks flourished: the group
practice sessions in public parks, the therapeutic encounters and heal-
ing sessions, the training workshops, the academic conferences, and
the ritualised meetings of state-supervised associations; the intercon-
nected networks of qigong associations, organisations, and institutions;
and the popular qigong magazines and books through which qigong dis-
course was elaborated, debated, and diffused. Within the qigong milieu,
people exercised their bodies and minds, practised divination and lab-
oratory experiments, and discussed subjects as varied as Buddhism,
Daoism, the scientific method, health maintenance, and the progress
of Chinese culture. Thousands of masters competed in an emerging
market for qigong health, healing, and spiritual arts, each proposing his
own package of exercises and theories. Debates raged on the effects
and powers attributed to qigong. The training and practice networks
founded by hundreds of masters may well have formed China’s great-
est collection of popular associations during the period and, in the
words of Zhu and Penny, ‘probably the greatest mass movement in
modern China that was not under direct government control’ (1994:3).
The groups within the qigong milieu were characterised by extreme di-
versity and fragmentation, but this centrifugal tendency was countered
by, first, a mystical and syncretistic outlook that encouraged tolerance
and mutual receptivity, and second, a sense of cultural marginality bor-
dering on the heterodox, leading to a common consciousness of the
need to justify themselves in relation to the ridicule that could be direc-
ted at them from the perspective of conventional Western scientism
and orthodox Marxism.10 These counter-centrifugal tendencies facili-
tated the circulation of people and ideas between diverse groups.
When we look at the relationship of the qigong milieu with the larger
society, qigong can in some ways be seen as a social movement. Qigong
was characterised by social mobilisation, in which there was increased
communication and common action between people from different
backgrounds, social spheres, and regions, on a national and even global
scale, as they promoted their common goals. What started with decen-
tralised, non-coordinated initiatives in the mid- to late 1970s quickly
took a life of its own and acquired organisational capacity within a few
years, with a core network of influential political leaders, scientists,
and masters who were able to assume leading roles within the move-
ment and to articulate and promote a common vision and discourse.
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The social goals upheld by the movement included improving the
health of the masses, bringing about a renaissance of traditional Chi-
nese culture, and triggering a Chinese-led scientific revolution which
would lead to a paranormal utopia. These goals were formulated as fit-
ting within, and even as potentially spearheading, the unfolding of the
Marxist teleology of national progress: qigong, which had been the
source of Chinese civilisation in its Golden Age, had been restricted,
exploited, and driven underground by feudal powers and religious dog-
mas for over 2000 years, but it was now reviving, flourishing, and trig-
gering scientific breakthroughs and a cultural renaissance in the new
era opened by the Chinese Communist Party (Palmer 2007: 86-101).
From the beginning of the movement in 1979, this utopian vision of
qigong and its scientific premises was attacked by a number of scien-
tists and ideologues, and polemics on both sides of the issue were of-
ten aired in the press (Palmer 2007: 158-182), producing what we
might call a conflict over the interpretation and control of historicity;
and yet, until the second half of the 1990s, this conflict was largely re-
stricted to the press and was hardly expressed as a struggle between op-
posing social groups. On the contrary, certain state agencies and politi-
cal networks were actively supporting the movement, making it as
much a top-down as a bottom-up phenomenon. The qigong movement
was termed by commentators as a re, a ‘fever’ – one of the countless
cultural crazes which swept post-Mao China in the 1980s and 1990s,
ranging from ‘culture fever’ to ‘Mao fever’ to ‘stock market fever’. The
‘fever’ can be situated somewhere between the political campaigns or
‘movements’ (yundong) of the Mao era and the fully commoditised con-
sumer fads of capitalist societies: a ‘fever’ is a form of collective effer-
vescence which occurs when official policies and informal signals sent
from above correspond with, open the space for, and amplify popular
desire, which appropriates these spaces in unexpected ways, simulta-
neously complying with, appropriating, disrupting, and mirroring the
projects of state hegemony. Thus, in qigong, the official campaign to
promote science and technology as the foundation of Deng’s Four
Modernisations was enthusiastically taken up by the qigong milieu and
recast as a call to encourage the mass propagation of breathing exer-
cises as a stage in China’s cultural and scientific renaissance. As ‘mo-
ments when an entire cultural area (often all of urban China, some-
times the nation as a whole) is unified by a common activity’, as de-
scribed by Ellen Hertz (1998: 82)11, fevers create a social sphere in
which, unlike temple revivals, all the actors operate within the roughly
corresponding spatial and temporal frames of the nation and its
historicity.
The qigong episode thus forces us to abandon a conflictual model
that places state authority in opposition to the autonomy of individuals
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and popular groups. It shows a movement that developed through the
interpenetration of networks, groups, institutions, practices and con-
ceptual systems, in which it is impossible to fully separate the state
and popular groups as distinct entities. An image of the state as a
monolithic entity makes way for a landscape of interconnected persons,
networks and institutions that advance, retreat, cross each other and
turn around, link up, pass each other, collide, expand and influence
each other, reaching to the edges of society, without ever completely
covering it. It is difficult to draw a clear line between what is within
the state and outside of it. ‘The extra-institutional is co-extensive with
the state, (…) it is structuring, not only deforming’ (Chevrier 1995: 171).
It is within such a system, and not outside of it, that qigong groups
were formed and expanded.
The case of qigong thus reveals a dynamic that is often contrary to
the processes of individualisation and institutional differentiation char-
acteristic of Western paradigms of modernity. This begins with the dis-
positions and orientations nurtured by the body practices themselves.
Western sports and physical training produce power at the point of fric-
tion between discrete material bodies. Muscles are trained against the
resistance of external objects. The body’s power is measured against
disembodied targets. Physical, mental, emotional, and moral abilities
are the subject of separate training regimens. Chinese body technolo-
gies, on the other hand, reveal an opposite tendency: the concentration
of all forms of power into the cosmic centre of the body, usually named
dantian, the elixir field beneath the navel, evoking metaphors of the al-
chemical furnace in which heterogeneous elements are forged into a
single elixir, itself a sign of the primal unity of the Dao. Collecting, cul-
tivating, and concentrating energies leads to an inner connection with
the ultimate cosmic Power. The energies to be collected are not only in-
side the body but outside as well, including the powers of the sun, of
the moon, of trees, of animals, of other people, and of symbols: hence
the attempts to draw on and fuse the different traditions of Daoism,
Buddhism, Confucianism, martial arts, medicine, and science. Power
is generated, not through friction, but through fusion, through enter-
ing into a mutually transforming resonance with the object: absorbing
the energy of a tree, for instance, does not involve pushing against it:
rather, relating to the tree in such a manner that the flow of energies
within it passes to the body of the practitioner. In qigong, the body be-
comes the ultimate multiplicator, enabling the practitioner to combine,
through direct practice and visceral experience, domains as varied as
physics, physical exercise, mysticism, calligraphy, illness narratives,
science fiction, the refinement of saliva, martial arts heroism, medi-
cine, archaeology, the comparative study of civilisations, enhancing
and/or controlling sexual potency, biology, physiognomy, workplace
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stress management, scientific methodology, national essence, and regu-
lation of the digestive system, among other things. Each line of divi-
sion applied to qigong by modern discourses, each of which had its cor-
responding institutions, such as those which separate the categories of
science, tradition, religion, sports, medicine, and national defence, only
served to open new zones of multiplication between them, producing
dense networks, not only of signification, but also of social relation-
ships between people from different social spheres.
The intermediate space of qigong was not autonomous. It was simul-
taneously co-opted by the state and popular groups: each tried to use qi-
gong for its own ends. If the state encouraged the development of qi-
gong circles and gave them institutional support, it was as an instru-
ment of its objectives in health, science, and national identity. Its
support for the construction of a unified national qigong community
aimed to co-opt and control it. In exchange, popular qigong groups ob-
tained an institutional legality and legitimacy that permitted their mas-
sive expansion. Qigong could thus prosper by combining the institu-
tional support of the state and the dynamism of popular groups.
But the multiplying logic of the qigong movement is perhaps what
led to its own dissolution and to its polarisation through the Falun
Gong episode. By the mid-1990s, the trend towards wholesale
Westernisation and capitalism had become so overwhelming in China
that qigong dreams of reconciling science, tradition, and utopian ideals
fell by the wayside. Interest in creating a distinctive Chinese science
faded, as power in the Chinese scientific community shifted from the
more nationalist military establishment to civilian institutions increas-
ingly engaged in international exchanges and interested in applying
universally recognised standards and methods (Wang 1993: 115-141).
The idealised body was now that of the hedonistic consumer of fash-
ion, beauty products, plastic surgery, and sexual pleasure (Brownell
1998; Johansson 1998). Traditional culture became a commodity, a re-
source to extract and package for the booming markets of tourism, lei-
sure, and health (Cingcade 1998).
In the new context, the qigong movement was led to a point of bifur-
cation, reflecting what Weller has called a ‘split-market culture’ in
which religious groups, in the transition to a capitalist market econo-
my, either accept or reject its amoral individualism (Weller 1999: 83-
105). Much of the movement followed the trend of the times, towards
increased commodification and commercialisation within a framework
of bureaucratic regulation. The market for qigong was considerable, but
the entrepreneurial business practices of many qigong masters trig-
gered controversies over ‘fakes’, ‘forgeries’, and ‘swindling’. Such issues
were concerns of public discourse about most types of market com-
modities in China, at a time when consumer rights and principles of
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business accountability and integrity were still new to the emerging
Chinese economic culture. Such practices dissolved the utopian e´lan of
the qigong movement, making qigong masters appear no different from
other profit-hungry businessmen. Tainted by controversy and under re-
newed attack by the scientific community, political backing for com-
mercialised qigong dwindled.
In this context, Li Hongzhi, who had founded Falun Gong as a qi-
gong method in 1992, attacked the overall direction of the qigong move-
ment, calling instead for a rejection of hedonism and for a morality
that invoked both the asceticism of ancient spiritual masters and the al-
truism of the Maoist era. The primary goal of practice became spiritual
accomplishment and entering the ‘Falun world’, while this world be-
came the stage of an apocalyptic moral battle between demonic forces
and the Great Fa. Where qigong allowed the multiplication of practices
and fantasies of health, prosperity, and spirituality, and involved open-
ing the body to the diffused energies of the cosmos – ‘collecting qi’
from nature, sending and receiving qi between practitioners, dabbling
in all types of techniques, symbols, and concepts – Falun Gong drew
lines of division between sensual pleasures and the spiritual rewards,
through suffering, of exclusive cultivation. Falun Gong appealed to
widespread concerns about morality and corruption and proposed a ra-
dical alternative to mainstream hedonism and materialism.
In Falun Gong practice, the moral line of division became the domi-
nant theme, structuring the body discipline itself and tying it to an
apocalyptic eschatology which resonates with medieval texts describing
the imminent destruction of the world before the appearance of the
True Lord Li Hong, who will inaugurate a new era of joy and longev-
ity.12 To the body exercises and spiritual concepts of qigong, Li Hongzhi
added a social critique based on moral fundamentalism. Where the
simple, honest and virtuous person was often ridiculed and abused by
his co-workers, Falun Gong raised his suffering to the level of a heroic
spiritual struggle in which he was to resign himself and bear the
blows, each insult and each wound being a gift of ‘white matter’ which
would help him to move a step higher toward celestial perfection. All
the more so if a Falun Gong practitioner was verbally or physically
abused while defending the Fa. Morality was now the central issue, dis-
placing the typical qigong concerns with science, paranormal abilities,
and tradition. The evolution toward moral predication reinforced the
tendency to politicisation. Falun Gong discourses of morality extended
beyond body discipline to social criticism, social problems being per-
ceived in China as the result of a decline in the morality of the people
in general and of government leaders in particular.
While the qigong movement promoted ideas that were deviant or
even heterodox by the standards of Marxist orthodoxy, the public beha-
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viour of most qigong advocates, masters, and practitioners had followed
the norms of orthopraxy13, multiplying webs of reciprocal relations
with officials, and publicly displaying deference to the social and politi-
cal order. Falun Gong, on the other hand, broke this logic of interpene-
tration. By the mid-1990s Falun Gong began to cease participating in
the ritual organisation of the post-Mao state system. After coasting on
the qigong boom and benefiting from the political legitimacy and net-
works of the state-sponsored China Qigong Research Society, which
had played an instrumental role in launching him as a national celeb-
rity in qigong circles, Li Hongzhi, having attained a sufficiently large
following and reputation, withdrew from the association in 1996. By
putting an end to his collaboration with state-sponsored qigong associa-
tions, he placed himself outside the circuit of personal relations and fi-
nancial exchanges through which masters and their organisations
could find a place within the state system. Instead, he sought to estab-
lish an autonomous social body, the great body of the Dharma or Fa, in
which each disciple becomes a Fa-particle; in which the practitioners’
bodies were the theatres of both personal spiritual struggle and of the
apocalyptic battle between the demonic old world and the righteous Fa.
While refusing to engage with the state according to its rules, Falun
Gong endeavoured to remain at centre stage, offering the power of its
Fa to society and even to the state, organising spectacular public ‘ex-
perience-sharing’ gatherings and, through its protests against critical
media, opposing any attempt to diminish its social influence. Falun
Gong sought to replace the interpenetrating flows of power of the mul-
tiplication paradigm with a unidirectional flow, from the cosmic power
of the Fa, through Li Hongzhi and outward to society.
Where the multiplying logic of qigong scrambled the lines of division
within the state, revealing and reinforcing its own multiplying tenden-
cies, the state’s response to Falun Gong mirrored the latter’s logic of di-
vision, the one reinforcing the other. This polarising dynamic con-
firmed the vision of a world divided between the ‘saved’ disciples of Li
Hongzhi and the world possessed by demons. And the repeated pro-
tests by followers, both before and after the official crackdown begin-
ning in July 1999, at newspaper offices, around Zhongnanhai, on Tia-
nanmen Square – which led to a hardening of the CCP’s lines of divi-
sion – drew official power into a moral battle pitting the demonic
oppressor against suffering martyrs. And in return, in the years follow-
ing the repression, Falun Gong became further radicalised, launching
a movement to haemorrhage the CCP to death by encouraging mass
defections of its members. This campaign was spearheaded by the
media outlets managed and staffed by Falun Gong activists, notably
the overseas Chinese newspaper Epoch Times, which widely distributed
a series of anti-CCP tracts (Epoch Group 2005).
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Although one emerged from the other, qigong and Falun Gong are
thus two distinct movements with their own logic within distinct sets
of historical and political circumstances. While qigong and Falun Gong
are clearly both social movements, they offer fascinating cases for ques-
tioning assumptions about dichotomies between ‘state’ and ‘society’, il-
lustrating the dynamic interplay between zones of multiplication and
lines of division.
Conclusion
This chapter was written with the hope that applying the concept of so-
cial movements might help us to better understand the relationship be-
tween religiosity and society in contemporary China. The two cases I
have examined, of temple revivals and the qigong movement, though
very different from each other, represent two ends of the wide spec-
trum of Chinese popular religiosity. Neither clearly fits conventional
definitions of ‘religion’, and both have, more often than not, found
their continued existence and legitimacy by adopting the labels of cul-
tural heritage, tourism, economic development, medicine, sports, or
science. Nor do they fit conventional definitions of social movements.
But applying the concept of social movements has been useful, not
merely to conclude, as is inevitable when categories derived from Wes-
tern history are applied to other parts of the world, that the category it-
self should be questioned, but to help us to derive models of social
agency that would better describe the dynamics at play when Chinese
religious groups find themselves in agonistic relationships with the
state. This chapter has suggested that two types of dynamics can be ob-
served around Chinese religious practices of the body and the temple:
‘division’ and ‘multiplication’, showing that the two often coexist asym-
metrically, with ever-extending arborescent lines of division ironically
opening ever more zones of multiplication. On the other hand, the
symmetrical mirroring of lines of division by the Chinese state and
popular movements collapses the possibility of a social resolution and
polarises into an apocalyptic struggle in which each side tries to exter-
minate the other.
Notes
1 I am grateful to Gilles Guiheux and K.E. Kuah-Pearce, and the participants at the
conference on emerging social movements in China, for encouraging me to look
more deeply into the relations between Chinese religion and social movement theory.
I am also indebted to Kristofer Schipper, Ken Dean, Vincent Goossaert, Mayfair Yang,
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and Adam Chau for many insights and stimulating discussions which have helped to
shape the ideas discussed in this paper.
2 Buddhism, Taoism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam.
3 For a critique of the notion of peasant resistance as applied to China, see Weller
1994.
4 A similar encounter is described in Dean 1998: 266. See Feuchtwang & Wang 2001
for an in-depth study of the charisma of temple managers.
5 On government sponsorship of festivals, see also Siu 1990a, 1990b.
6 See Lang, Chan & Lagvald 2005 for several examples of state-sponsored construction
of Wong Tai Sin temples in mainland China.
7 Constraints on field research in China may be a factor accounting for the fact that
most field studies have focused on relatively successful cases of temple-state rela-
tions, rather than on cases of overt conflict.
8 Parts of this section are reproduced from portions of Palmer 2007: 13-22, 291-295,
301-305.
9 For a detailed discussion on the difficulties in estimating numbers of practitioners,
see Palmer 2007: 258-261.
10 This understanding of the qigong milieu is taken in analogy to the Western ‘cultic
milieu’ categorised in Campbell 1972: 122.
11 See Hertz 1998: 71-93 for a discussion of the notion of ‘fever’ in relation to the stock
trading craze of the early 1990s.
12 Falun Gong’s apocalyptic doctrine can be traced back to the Buddhist eschatology of
the kalpas or universal cycles, which, in Chinese heterodox sects, have pointed to so-
cial chaos and corruption as foreboding the end of the present kalpa inaugurated by
the Sakyamuni Buddha, and have preached paths to salvation and preparation for
ushering in the new kalpa. On the Li Hong prophecies, see Seiwert 2003: 82-84, 86-
89; Seidel 1969-70; and Zu¨rcher 1983: 3.
13 Anthropologist Erika Evasdottir, in her study of Chinese intellectuals (Evasdottir
2004), defines orthopraxy as ‘the express formulation of action to conform to com-
monly held standards’. Based on Evasdottir’s conceptualisation, I take orthopraxy to
mean the collective performance of political order – an order which is not the pro-
duct of an outside or transcendent law, but the fruit of the harmonised performance
of the actors themselves, including both the rulers and the ruled. In orthopraxy, order
ceases to exist when the actors themselves cease to perform it.
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